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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned witli a discussion and comparative analysis of how the law 
allocates propert)'^ rights in respect of ‘luigratoiy tilings’ - objects that appear naturally 
upon or beneath the ground, but which, by virtue of tlieir own inherent characteristics, 
move to and fro across different tracts of land. In this sense, the work is concerned witli 
running and percolating water, wüd animals, fugacious minerals such as hydrocarbons 
and other ambient, sub-soil substances. The work’s opening chapters (Part I) analyse the 
development of the common law relative to different migratory thmgs witli regard to 
botli Scots and EngHsh law. The analysis therehi reveals a diverse range of approaches 
taken to the issue of ownership includhig that migratory things may be subject to full 
ownersliip in situ, characterised by quahfied proprietary rights to reduce into possession, 
or deemed ownerless undl reduced into possession. The study reveals, however, that in 
general, the right to exploit the resource is of more hnport practically than ownersliip as 
such. In this sense, altliough in some cases limitations have been placed upon the abdit r^ 
of landowners to exploit migratory things, the dominant approach revealed is one of 
absolute dominium (an absolute right to exploit). One repercussion of this approach — 
and m fact other allocation rules - is tliat a legitimate exploitation, which has the effect of 
taldng the resource from the land of another, will generally bestow upon the taker 
ownership and defeat any rights of ownership that the otlier previously held therein. 
This is facihtated by a doctrine termed 'the law of capture’. Tliis judge-made rule 
provides a real challenge to recognised tenets of ownership, particularly tlie idea tliat an 
owner is protected against appropriation of liis things by another witliout his consent.
In Part II, the role of pohcy inherent hi the development of die law relative to niigratory 
tilings is discussed. Inefficiencies and mequit}^ associated with die absolute dorniniuiii 
approach are dien examined and alternative approaches to resource allocation — 
including correlative rights, prior-appropriadon and reasonable use rules - are analysed 
(primarily by reference to different US reghiies for water allocation). The study uncovers 
a spate of different pohcy markers that underpin diese disparate legal approaches 
hicluding; encouraghig economic investment and industrial development; providhig low 
transactional costs; providing for certahit)? of rights to exploit; recognishig the correlative 
rights of others; conservmg die resource; hiiiiung environmental damage; and adherhig 
to existing precedent and constitutional obhgations. The work reveals diat how a reghne 
determines appropriate pohcy choices may be grounded upon a number of factors.
including: die value of die thing (eidier in a private, monetary sense or wider social utility 
fashion); die physical abihty to exert control over die substance until reduced into 
possession; the extent diat its presence (and extent of its presence) is loiowable in sitir, the 
degree to wliich Imowledge exists as to die hnpact — either in terms of efficiency or some 
odier social utihty repercussion — that any particular exploitation might hold; and how 
abundant or scarce die resource, in its natural state, is.
Part III of die thesis focuses upon die example of water law reform in Scodand in die 
aftermath of die Water Services and Water Environment (Scodand) Act 2003 ('WEWS’), 
which will, inter alia, radically shake-up existing approaches to rights of users to exploit 
water resources. This issue merits attention as water law is clearly the key hve’ issue in 
the field. By drawing on the pohcy rationale discussed in relation to different migratory 
things in previous chapters, the study analyses the extent that the post-WEWS regime is 
an appropriate one for water governance in Scodand. The regime is judged against a set 
of criteria which is distUled from various pohcy markers identified earher in die work, 
namely: efficiency; ensuring beneficial uses; and legahty. These aims are not compatible 
in dieir enthety and how die balance is struck by a reghne widi regard to competing 
pohcy goals is a key issue. In general, the thesis supports the shift from a general laisses^  
faire approach to water abstraction and impoundments to a state-controhed regulatory 
regime in Scodand. In so doing, however, die work queries whedier the pohcy balance 
has been struck in the most appropriate way and also identifies a number of pitfalls in the 
abiht)^ of the reghne to meet its ahns in practice. Conclusions are drawn in Part IV. The 
analysis presented in tiiis thesis is hnportant in respect of hiforming discussions regarding 
water governance in Scodand but it may also contribute to debates over allocation of 
rights to migratory things generaUy.
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PART 1: CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
This study is concerned with a discussion and comparative analysis of how the law 
allocates property rights’ in respect of objects that appear naturally upon or beneath the 
ground but which, by virtue of their own inherent characteristics, move to and fro across 
different tracts of land. This definition encompasses such disparate, ambient resources 
as wild animals, running and percolating water, hydrocarbons and similar sub-sod 
substances such as sdt and brine. In short, unhke objects which are either fixed upon or 
beneath land, such things are no respecters of artificial, man-made boundaries" and from 
time to time may move across borders either by natural causes or as a (direct or indirect) 
result of human intervention. For want of a more eloquent means of expression, in this 
work these objects have been termed ‘migratory things’.
Wilde the nature and characteristics of different migratory things vary considerably -  
from sentient, roaming wdd animals to relatively stable hydrocarbon resources -  tiiese 
objects normally share such characteristics as an economic value to those upon whose 
land tliey are found and the relative inability^ of proprietors to physicaUy exert control 
over the same untd ‘captured’ or reduced into possession di some way. In a sdnilar vein, 
migratory things are in general subject to the physical abdity of adjacent proprietors (and 
at times otliers) to ‘attract’ them — either purposely or incidentady - by die carrying out of 
legitimate works, or other forms of activitjg upon their own land without any unlawful or 
dlegitimate invasion of the other’s land in the normal sense (such as trespass). These 
features raise somewhat unique questions about how traditionaUy held notions of
’ Including bo th  ownersliip and rights o f  use.
“ In  tliis sense reference is made to legal boundaries rather than physical barriers. 
 ^T o  van in g  degrees.
property rights (eg the right of protection against tlie appropriation o f tilings by others 
without an owner’s consent) might be apphed to migratory tlihigs.
The work is comparative in nature and seeks to compare and contrast the relative 
positions of Scots and English law with regard to propertj^ rights in migratory tilings. 
From a purely academic perspective, tliese questions bear analysis not least for die reason 
that the law appears to be somewhat unclear, misunderstood and at times contradictory 
bodi within and across the two jurisdictions. Many of the principles which govern diis 
area stem from old precedents and hence are drawn from case reports diat are not always 
entirely clear or consistent even widiin themselves. There is comparatively Htde writing 
on such topics and no-where is the law relating to property rights in migratory diings 
brought together in one place wldi any attempt to tease out general, underlying 
approaches and principles.'’ Furdiermore, given the surprising lack of comparative works 
between Enghsh and Scots approaches to propert}^ and land law, this work represents a 
valuable contribution to this general debate.^
Aside from tliis academic interest, die questions diat diis diesis seeks to unravel are 
important from a pracdcal perspective. It should be recognised diat (particularly in 
respect of water) migratory things may be hnportant commodities in both an economic 
and pubhc utiht); sense and hence propertj^ and allocation rights therehi are crucial 
societal issues. It is a central plank of diis thesis, that in respect of some migratory
■' A lthough the autlior has now  published a substantial academic article relating to tliis aspect o f  die study - 
see B. Clark, ‘Migratory T hings on Land : Propert}'^ Rights and a Law o f  Capture’ (2002) AMI 6.3 EJCL.
 ^ A lthough som e o f  the underlying principles o f propert}? law across both sides o f  die border are similar, 
their origins and terminology^ often diverge. As Reid notes "[a] lawyer trained in Scotland can w ithout 
difficulty^ (odier than linguistic difficulty^ read and understand a book about property^ in Germany, or 
indeed, in Japan (where the law is based on G erm an law). But he is Ukely to be perplexed and bewildered 
by a book on the law o f  property^ in England." - Iv. Reid, The Lmw oJTroperty in Scotland (1996) at para 2. 
F o r rare examples o f such comparative works, see C. D ‘0  Farran, Pnndpks of Scots and English Land Lan' 
(1958); D . Large, The Land Law o f  Scotland : A Comparison w ith American and English C oncepts’ (1986) 
17 Eiwtl, L. 1; E. Galbraith, ‘Putting a Itilt on it: key differences between Scots and English law’ (1998) 10 
Coiporaie Counsel 51.
tilings, for too long appropriate questions regarding issues of property and rights of use 
and the pohcy ramifications wliich underpin current approaches in these senses have 
been ignored. As tlie foUowhig chapters will ülustrate, judicial decisions regarding 
migratory thhigs have often either been determined in somewhat of a pohcy vacuum or 
in accordance widi out-dated pohcy choices.
This thesis, which seeks both to paint a picture of the current legal landscape in respect 
of property rights hi migratory things and also analyse a range of pohcy options for 
change, develops tlirough several stages. The first task of the work is to tease out the 
fundamental underlying principles of tlie law relative to various different migratory 
thmgs across botli Scotland and England. This part of the work, wliich is prhnarhy 
narrative in nature, involves a detailed examination of relevant authorities and m general 
seeks to estabhsh the rights private landowners hold in such things, prhnarily from a 
property perspective. So, for example, given the ambient nature of objects like water and 
hydrocarbons, tlie tliesis ponders the question as to whether either or both reghnes 
recognise a fuh right of private ownersliip hi migratory dungs in situ, whether tliey merely 
recognise some sort of quahfied proprietary right to ‘capture’ die thing concerned, or 
whedier no private ownership rights are given recognition until the thing is reduced hi to 
possession. An interesting issue here is the interplay diat subsists between die limitations 
to propert}^ rights that might be recognised hi migratory diings in situ and assertion of 
general principles of Ian downer ship such as die weh-worn maxim, a coelo ad centrum — 
which holds that landowners own, in a vertical stratum, ah from the centre of the earth 
up to the ‘heavens’.
A subsidiary question diat can be posed here relates to the issue of what protection from 
the acts of odiers a proprietor might hold over migratoiT things upon or beneadi liis land
— in particular, where there is no other invasion of his property rights in the traditional 
sense (eg through trespass or removal of support). In this sense, a question tliat is 
discussed at tliis stage is whether such protection, if it mdeed exists, might stem from 
ownership rights or rather from some other ground of action. Much of the debate here 
centres on a judge-made doctrine Imown as the law (or rule) of capture’. This rule, 
wliich became infamous around the time of the oil boom and bust in the USA in the late 
19*’’ century/early 20*'’ century, sanctions the appropriation of a migratory thing from the 
land of another (without his consent) by the carrying out of legitimate activities upon 
one’s own land.^’ In short, under the law of capture, the law leaves tlie allocation of 
defensible property rights until after the thing has been reduced hito possession.
The above issues are a reflection of the difficult choices that ought to be taken by a legal 
regime over the extent that private property rights are ascribed to migratory thhigs and 
how such rights are to be balanced in respect of tlie needs of competing users. Given 
the ambient nature of migratory tilings, they may not easily be subject to ownersliip 
rights in the traditional sense. In this regard, the tliesis discusses the interaction and 
balance that might be struck between competing correlative rights of property^ and also 
the scliism between property rights and other available grounds of action, such as those 
that might be sought under rights of support, or on nuisance and neghgence grounds. 
As whl be noted later m this thesis, tlie issue of ownership of migratory things may be 
redundant in many respects. By contrast, the more important issue may in practice be 
the right to exploit a migratory resource. Such a right may be seen as a sub-right or 
consequence of ownership but the right may exist where ownersliip itself is absent. 
Moreover, as shall be noted later hi this work, one party’s right of ownership in many 
cases may shnply flounder in the wake of another part)^’s right of use.
See eg K.W. Blinn ei af Internationa! Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation Agreements : Eegal Economic and 
Policy Aspects (1986).
In terms of how the material is structured, the thesis is spht into three composite parts. 
Part I, encompasses chapters 2, 3, and 4 and deals with rights of property and use under 
both Scots and Enghsh common law in respect of three broad categories of migratoiy 
things, namely: chapter 2, wild animals; chapter 3, water running in defined channels and 
percolating groundwater; and chapter 4, fugacious minerals and other shndlar sub-soü 
substances hicluding hydrocarbons, asphalt, sht and brine. Given a lack of domestic 
autliority regardhig this final category, attention is paid to relevant principles found in 
Commonwealth and US authority (much of wliich is steeped in Enghsh common law 
principles). Additionahy, in respect of hydrocarbons, some discussion is devoted to tlie 
apphcable law in the specific context of the UK offshore hcensing reghne. Tliis is 
hnportant as, given tliat on-shore hydrocarbon development is so Ihnited as to be ahnost 
neghgible in practical terms, off-shore exploitation represents the main practical issue in 
respect of hydrocarbons hi the UK. This section seeks to provide an ihuminathig 
discussion of the practical ramifications of traditional approaches to the law relative to 
the ahocation of rights hi migratory tlihigs. One or two current lacunae in tlie law are 
identified and problems arising from these loopholes and theh hiteraction with the law of 
capture are discussed.
As weh as estabhshing a clear picture of tlie principles of law as regards rights of property 
in different migratory things, chapters 2,3 and 4 attempt to draw out underlyhig pohcy 
themes which have supported legal determinations made from time to time in different 
contexts (without necessary taking a critical approach to the pohcy rationale at this 
juncture). Many different pohcy rationales are thrown up wliich are furtlier discussed in 
this tliesis, including, but not hmited to: recognising absolutist notions of ownership; 
providing low transactional costs; ensuring certaint}^ in the law: protecting and
encouraging economic investment; recognising tlie correlative rights of others; and 
adhering in a formalist sense, to previous precedent. In respect of the latter, early 
judicial determinations in relation to one sort o f migratoiy thing (eg wild animals) have 
gone on, perhaps not always justifiably, to inform tlie law relating to another (eg 
hydrocarbons). In some cases (eg water) the pubhc and hfe-sustaining characteristic of 
the resource is an additional factor to be weighed in any judicial determhiation which 
may tend to support doctrines favouring pubhc utihty over private exploitation. Havhig 
said this, the dorninant, although by no means only, model that has developed historically 
from the autliorities in respect of migratory tilings in both Scotland and England & 
Wales is tliat of absolute dominium.^
Part II of the thesis is set out hi chapter 5. Building on the preceding sections of the 
diesis, chapter 5 begins with a discussion of die role that pohcy has played in the 
development of the law relative to ownership and rights of use in respect of different 
migratoiy thhigs. The chapter then focuses on die dominant, absolute domhiium 
approach and discusses some of die negative repercussions that might be manifest by 
such a doctrine from economic, environmental and pubhc utihty viewpoints. In tiiis 
regard a range of identified, negative manifestations of pohcy are discussed, such as ‘the 
tragedy of the commons’ and associated inefficiency repercussions, and the inherent 
inequit)r resulting from unfettered, absolutist rights in migratoiy things.
Tliis ill practice m ore often refers to an absolute right to use o r exploit a tiling rather than absolute 
ow nership in situ as such. As is noted  hi the foUowhig analysis, however, som e o f  the autliorities are 
confused about tliis issue.
Using the law relating to percolating, underground water’’ as a relevant example, tlie 
chapter then discusses some of tlie alternative regimes dealing with the allocation of 
rights in migratory things wliich are manifest in US states and the pohcy choices that 
inform them. Such doctrines include a number of disparate approaches (some o f which 
have m fact been manifest hi the UK in certahi contexts from time to time) and hiclude: 
correlative/riparian rights approaches, wherein due regard must be paid to the rights of 
otlier landowners; reasonable use doctrhies which limit tlie sorts of water uses diat can 
be undertaken; and prior appropriation regimes, wherein if a beneficial use can be 
estabhshed, it may be protected against die subsequent actions of otiier users. By 
reviewing relevant hterature, die work discusses from a critical pohcy stance some of die 
benefits and draw-backs which have resulted from these different approaches.
Part III of die diesis encompasses chapters 6 and 7, which togedier comprise a case 
study which focuses on current reforms on-going in relation to Scottish water law, Tliis 
case-study bears analysis hi order to ülustrate a ‘hve’ example of how a legal reghne might 
attempt to balance relevant pohcy choices in respect of the ahocation of rights to 
migratory thhigs. Drawing on the general law expounded in chapter 3, chapter 6 begins 
by discussing the current, largely laisseq f^aire position as regards water law in Scodand and 
points to current problems widi waste, hiefficieiicy, water shortages and sustahiabhity 
concerns. The chapter then analyses die ‘nuts and bolts’ of the proposed reforms 
brought in by the Water Environment and Water Services (Scodand) Act 2003 in the 
aftermadi of requirements of the European Water Framework Directive.'^ In short, the
 ^Percolating underground water (ie n o t flowing in a defined stream) is often simply term ed ‘groundw ater’. 
The issue o f  groundw ater was chosen because o f  die comparatively Itigh num ber o f  alternative legal 
doctrhies that have arisen in respect o f  allocating rights therein. I t also feeds usefully hito die discussion 
on Scottish water reform  hi chapter 6 and 7.
20 0 0 /6 0 /E C . A t present there is little writing on diese reform s in Scodand. To facihtate the analysis, 
com parisons are also drawn with the English w ater governance system where hcensed-based approaches to 
water have been m anifest for some thiie and m ore literature abounds.
reforms (in so far as they are relevant to the nature of this thesis) will over-lay the 
current, largely common law position relative to water witli a licensed-based'^' system 
governing abstractions and impoundments of water in Scotland.
Chapter 7 then draws upon some of the policy arguments discussed in earlier chapters, as 
well as international law and practice relative to water governance and otlier relevant 
academic literature, and analyses the proposed regime for Scotland from a critical policy 
perspective. Here it is analysed whether the emerging system for water governance is an 
appropriate one for Scodand. In so doing, die new water scheme in Scodand is gauged 
primarily from diree identified," underlying policy objectives, namely: legality (in 
particular, involving an extensive discussion of potential problems of compatibilité^ widi 
the relevant provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights); promoting 
efficiency (both hi respect of providing low transactional costs and promoting the most 
economically efficient uses of water);'" and ensuring reasonable/beneficial uses, 
includhig die need to recognise envhonmental and other wider, societal concerns. Much 
of die debate here centres on the extent that an allocation regime can be left to die 
vagaries of the market or conversely requires to be tighdy controlled by the state in terms 
of regulatory provision. Chapter 7 also considers the question as to where the particular 
balance needs to be struck between diese (at times) competing aims of a water 
governance regime and discusses die role diat chmatic and scarcit)^ issues relative to 
water might play in diis determhiation. Tliis discussion raises questions regardhig the 
efficacy of standard approaches to nhgratoiy tilings on a national, or for that matter, 
hiternational scale as opposed to different, distinct, regionahsed approaches.
A nd o ther regulatory fora.
These policy factors are, in part, distilled from the policy rationale identified in the US w ater governance 
structures discussed in chapter 5 as well as policy rationale discussed in respect o f case-law pertahung to 
nhgratoiy tlhngs in earlier chapters.
Tlhs term  may hold different meaiungs w lhch are explored in chapter 7.
i
Part IV encompasses Chapter 8 of tire thesis. This chapter draws together the strands of 
discussion from the preceding chapters. Tliis involves commenting on the interplay 
between ownership issues and the availability of remedies which may or may not be 
based on property rights under botli Scots and English law. The chapter summaries and 
further discusses role that pohcy themes have played hi the development of the law 
relating to the ownership of, and allocation of usage rights hi migratory things. In 
particular, the conclusion discusses what general propositions about aUocathig rights in 
respect of migratory tilings can be developed from the Scottish water case-study. In tliis 
sense, although some of the issues discussed in chapters 6 and 7 may appear to be of 
‘micro’ level in that they are germane to the particular issue of water governance in 
Scotland, they nonetheless may be extrapolated to inform the wider debate about malting 
choices in respect of allocation reghnes for migratoiy things. Notwithstanding this, given 
current global concerns over water shortages, the question of efficient and equitable 
water allocation is perhaps the key issue in the field and for this reason is an hnportant 
issue wortli addressing in its own right.
FhiaUy, at this juncture it can be noted that migratoiy tilings do pose difficult questions 
about theories of property. In particular the issue of how a propert}^ right can be 
transferred to anotlier party without tlie owner’s consent (under a law of capture) fits 
into theories of propert}^ is a vexed one. Altliough tliis issue is touched upon from time 
to thne in this thesis, this work is not fundamentally concerned with theoretical aspects 
of propert}^ law and hi particular how migratory things fit withhi different properp" 
theories. The analysis presented hi this thesis may nonetheless represent a useful 
sprhigboard in respect of such a theoretical work.
CHAPTER 2
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN  WILD ANIMALS.
Overview
The law relating to the ownersliip in, and rights to exploit wild animals present upon 
land is important in itself as providing an early example as to how the law was articulated 
by jurists and apphed and developed by courts in respect of a migratory thing of 
economic value to landowners. Moreover, the development of the law relating to wild 
animals can in anotlier sense be seen as a fore-runner in the field of migratory tilings. As 
part of a formahstic approach by the courts (for example in tlie USA) the law relating to 
wüd animals was used (perhaps somewhat erroneously) as an analogy to found the basis 
of properp^ rules to be apphed to other forms of ambient resources such as 
hydrocarbons. To set tlie scene for this chapter, the next section discusses some basic 
property rights in wüd animals under both Scots and Enghsh law.
General points regarding Animals ferae naturae
Aihmals ferae nature are, as the hteral translation would suggest, wüd by nature. In their 
natural state they may be present on land, but their presence is often no more tlian 
temporary as they move to and for across tracts of land by theh own vohtion. Given 
theh transitory nature, law (and tlie ahocation of property rights) differentiates between 
such anhnals which are wüd and those that are by contrast, tame or domesticated 
(animals mansuetae naturae) and thus at least hi theory under the physical control of 
landowners at ah thiies. Both Enghsh and Scots law broadly fohow Roman law hi tlhs 
regard. The traditional viewpoint hi Roman law as regards tlhs demarcation between 
tlie two different classifications of animals has been expressed by Thomas : “anhnals 
were classified as ferae naturae or mansuetae naturae, wüd or domestic by nature, the
0
distinction being dependent upon the species not tlie particular individual animal : a pet 
lion would stül be ferae naturae ; the most savage of dogs mansuetae naturaif
It is worth noting that certain categories of wüd animals (such as hares, rabbits or deer) 
may be classified as ‘game’ in the sense that they are hunted for economic benefit. In 
terms of ownership rights that parties may hold in wüd annuals, the law does not ni 
general differentiate between that accorded to game and that accorded to other wüd 
animals. O f course, particular legislation may be aimed controlling access to, and rights
■ J.A.C. Thom as, Textbook on Konian Ixtw  (1976) at p 167. There has been som e debate about the Roman 
classifications and indeed it may no t be so clear cut as Thom as asserts. Tliis is no t an issue that merits 
m uch discussion for the purpose o f this thesis, bu t for a luminous examination o f  tliis m atter see G. 
M acLeod, ‘W ild and Tam e Animals and Birds in Rom an Law’ in P. Birks (ed) New Perspectives in the Toman 
Law ofPropeiiy (1989) at pp 170-184.
“ The Case of Swans (1592) 7 Co.Rep. 15b at 17b.
11
specifically in, game, but this does not in itself detract from the general common law I
relating to animals ferae naturae.
Property rights under English law
Sentient wüd animals drat freely roam on lands in dreir natural state are not stricdy 
spealdng die subject of ownership.^ It is certainly clear drat no absolute properp^ vests in 
a landowner in the wüd animals that roam his lands whüe ahve. The landowner may, p
however, hold what might be termed a ‘qualified properpri in such animals. This term is 
not in itself particularly useful, however, and may in fact denote quite different rights.
The notion of ‘qualified properpP may relate to either a mere right to reduce the animals 
mto possession or a right of ownership that is subject to die proviso that it may be lost 
as outlined below. Such qualified property rights can arise in a number of different ways 
— either per industriam, ratione impotentiae et loci, or ratione soli.
Qualified property in living animals naturae obtained per imdustnam arises by lawfully, 
taldng, taming or reclaiming diem / Animals ferae naturae become die property of any 
person who lawfully takes, tames or reclaims diem, although property in die animals is 
defeasible in the sense diat it is lost when the animals regain dieit natural liberty. 
Recognising such property rights in captive wild animals, it therefore follows diat 
trespassoiy remedies wiU he for the taking of captive wild animals.'* The example of deer 
has been determined by the Enghsh courts and although stricdy spealdng naturae, if 
deer are reclaimed and kept in enclosed ground they are the subject of such a property 
right. ^
In as similar fashion, the owner of land has a quahfied property ratione impotentiae et loci in 
the young of wüd animals born on the land untü diey fly or run away.*' Such ^^oung 
beasts, at an early stage in then development, are unable to leave the boundaries of die 
landowner’s property so are regarded as part of the land on which they are found. 
Accordingly a trespassoiy action wül he for taldng young anhnals so born.^ Such a 
properp?^ right is stül quahfied, however, by the caveat that it is lost when the young gain 
the abüip: to flee from the land — whether, of course, in practice they do so or not.
The other reflection of tliis ‘quahfied property’ is diat the landowner also has the 
exclusive right to hunt, take and IdU wüd animals on Ids land which arises ratione soli as an 
hicident of land ownersldp.” Such a right can furdier be granted to others, r'atione
 ^ Bbde V Higgs (1865) 11 H L  Case 621 at 631 per L ord W estbuiy at 638 per L ord Chelmsford; Keehle v 
Hickeringdl (1706), as reported in 11 M od Rep 74 at 7 5 , Powel l  J.
*' Gtymes v Shack (1610), Cro. Jac. 262.
5 So they were capable o f  passing to the executors and are liable to be taken in cUstress for rent - Morgan v 
Abergavenny (Earl) (1849), C B 768; Also see Ford v Tjnte (1861), 2 John  & H 150.
The Case of Swans supra n 2.
Blade v Higgs supra n  3;. Fitfim'beti N a t Brev 207, 213. 
ibid.
privikffi? This type of grant is in fact in itself an incorporeal hereditament and amounts 
to an endowment of a profit a prendre. The proprietary nature of this right is important 
and is discussed further below.
There is by contrast, however, absolute property*'” to be had in dead wild animals — diis 
vests, as shall be noted, in the occupier or owner of die land (or the grantee of die 
sporting rights if the right has arisen ratione prwiligd)f Such rights to dead animals may 
be protected against the actions of poachers who lull wild animals on die land of anodier 
— so for example, such a poacher wül have no property in wüd animals Idlled and 
property in die same is acquired by die landowner." This point is picked up in more 
detaü below.
Rationale
The rationale behind die legal vesting of such quahfied property rights in wüd animals on 
landowners is fatdy clear. On the one hand given die sentient and roaming nature of 
wüd animals, it may in practice be difficult to bestow fuh rights of ownersliip in  them, 
but nonedieless die law recognises diat there is an economic benefit to be gleaned from 
their exploitation by diose across whose lands the animals roam. Thus some measure of 
legal protection of such rights should exist. Cook has noted that,
[t]he statement in die Commentaries [regarding the concept of quahfied propert)' - Co 
Litt 145b] points towards the presence of a form of property of quahfied-ownership in 
wild animals. Nevertheless, such beasts or birds have an economic or social value. They 
may be a source of food, clothing or fuel; they may constitute a social adornment or
ibid; Keebk v I-iickeringill supra n. 3 at 75 per Powell J — cf. Gott v Measures [19481 i  KB 234 where it  was said 
that sporting rights confer no propertjj- in wild game — it m ust be taken, however, tlrat tlie use o f term 
'p ro p e iy ' here denotes absolute property! Tliis case is discussed in m ore detail below, 
ownersliip
Fit^erald vFirhank [1897] 2 Ch 96, CA. Tliis case refers to fisliing rights; cf. Fowe v Adams, [1901] 2 Ch 
598
Sutton V Moody (1697) 1 Ld Raym 250; Blade v Fliggs supra n  3.
status symbol, such as deer in a park; or they may be a suitable subject matter for 
sporting rights. Property law has therefore arrived at a compromise situation between 
the inapplicability of an absolute property on die one hand, and an economic or social 
value on the other. This concession takes the form of a special property, otherwise 
loiown as a 'qualified property’. At its simplest, this notion can be demonstrated by the 
property of a person in deer in a park, hares or rabbits in a warren or even fish in a 
pond, subject to the qualification that the propert]^ will cease if at any time the animals 
gain their 'natural liberty’ and cannot be said to possess an animus reverendi.^^
The extent tiiat such qualified property rights in fact display typical attributes of propert}^ 
rights (in particular, legal protection against the actions of others) is examined further 
below.
Reflecting the economic value of such wild animals, for some time certain species of 
wild animal have been claimed by the Crown as part of the Royal Prerogative. Indeed it ®
has been argued that property rights in aU animals ferae nature originally vested in the f
C row n,although the better view seems to be that the extent of tire Monarch’s power in 
this regard has always been limited to such animals as swans and Royal Fish and that in 
relation to other wild animals, qualified property rights arise ex lege as an incident of 
landownership.^'^ The lack of clarity regarding this point is one which goes back to the 
time of the early jurists. Blackstone, for example, postulated the rule that aU apparently 
ownerless property such as animals ferae naturae belonged to the fitst occupier - by victue 
of the feudal system being the Crown. This view is contrary to a previously stated 
opinion by tlie same jurist that such property will belong to the first finder.^^ It will be 
shown, however, that discounting those particular classes of animals which vest in tire 
Crown as part of the royal prerogative, neither view can be said to represent current
P. Cook, ‘The Prerogative Proper!)" : Basis o f  tire English G am e Law System’ in Meister & Cook (eds) 
Property and Protection : Essc^s in Honour of Bnan Harvey (2000) at p 119.
A t least those that could be considered ‘gam e’ and hence o f  econom ic value — although see B/ade v H i^ s  
supra n. 3 where the court rejected an^r separate rules apphcable to the branch o f  animals naturae that 
could be considered game and those that would not.
'•* F or an excellent analysis o f  the so called prerogative origins o f  proper!)' rights in wild animals see P. 
Cook s^^pra n. 12 at pp 108 — 133.
■5 Bl. Com. i-295-296 (12“' ed).
English common law in this regard. Tiiis is one key area where English law departs from 
its Scottish counterpart. Property in animals ferae naturae may not, in fact, vest in tire first 
finder. As noted below, unlike Scots law, English law does not follow the Roman 
approach and application of the doctrine of occupatio in respect of wild animals.
Property rights in Scotland
The situation as regards wüd animals in Scots law differs in some key respects from tliat 
in England. Although it had once been thought (in common with English law) tliat at 
least those animals that could be considered as 'game’ were inter regalia as part of tlie 
Royal prerogative, tliis is no longer the case and such an approach was expressly rejected 
in Duke of A.tbol v M adnroyf Altliough the right to take wild animals upon land can be 
considered an incident of landownership,’’ Scots law treats such things as mere res nullius 
in the sense that they are deemed ownerless while in their natural state. Under Scots 
Law, stricdy spealdng therefore, aldiough a landowner has a right to reduce wild animals 
on liis land into possession, he has no greater right to the wild animals tlian anyone else 
who may take them. So for example, the Scottish courts have held that there are no 
rights of propert}^ in pheasants;^or in deer, even if in a park, unless they are tame.^^ The 
temporary presence of game on land, is only really relevant therefore from tire point of 
view of control of access to the land.^ '^ This is tire crux of the issue and in this regard, as 
Gordon suggests, “ [tire landowner] may exercise his power of coirtrol in such a way as to 
create a valuable right”.
(1862) 24 D . 6 7 3 , Lord Justice Clerk Ingks at pp 682 et seq. A notable exception is ‘Royal Fish’ wliich 
is tlie sole propert); o f  the Crown, Bell Brin., s 1288.
D.L. Carey Miller, CoiporealMovables in Scots Law  (1991) at p 22.
Malloch vEasfJej 1685 3 Slak. 291.
Wilson V Dykes 1872, 10 M 444.
See Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia Vol II  paras 540-546.
W. G ordon , Scottish Land Law  (2™' ed : 1999) at para 9-04.
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Once the wild animal is reduced into possession or lolled by a party, property in that 
thing win vest in him. The idea of taking possession of, and dins gaining legal title to 
corporeal moveable propert}^ which is open to acquisition is of course not a new one and 
Scots law broadly follows Roman law in this regard. The Roman doctrine of occupatio 
stipulates that anything capable of private ownership and not already owned can be 
acquired by taking possession of it.^  ^ Therefore, it follows that property, for example, m 
underground water or wild animals will vest in the first person to capture or contain such 
things. Under the classic Roman formulation, the doctrine of occupatio applied both to 
things wliich had never been owned and also those which had ceased to be owned. 
Aldiough the doctrine of occupatio has been adopted by Scots law, die general rule is diat 
occupatio only sanctions the appropriation of tilings that have never had an owner.^^ 
Reflecting the feudal origin of land law in Scotiand, tilings which had been once owned 
but have since been lost or given up generally belong to the Crown. '^^ It is important to 
note that an exception to this rule on practical grounds would appear to operate in 
respect of wüd animals, where if they escape from the control of one party then they 
may be acquired by another. It would be clearly difficult to differentiate in practice 
between animals which had never been owned and those that had been once owned and 
had regained their natural Hberty.^^
Where a part\^ is in 'hot pursuit’ under Scots and EngUsh law
Scots law goes further, however, than giving title to tiiose that capture or Itiü wüd 
animals. Bell opined tiiat niortaUy woundnig an animal so tiiat it cannot escape would be
-2Justiiiiîin, JnstitutesH, I, 12; Justmian, Di^estAl, I, I, 3 and 5.
2^  Stair, Institules I, 7, 3; II, I 5 and 33; Ersldne Institute II, I, 10; BeU Prindples ss 1287-1288.
2-f Stair II, I, 5; III 3,2,7; Ersldne II, I, 12; Bell s 1291.
Valentine v Kennedy 1985 SCCE. 89; D.L. Carey IVliUer, CoiporealMovoahks in Scots JLaw (1991) at p 25.
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sufficient to give ownership to the person pursuing i t f  Stair in fact had previously set 
out a slightly different rule when he suggested that if one partj^ is pursuing an animal and 
has a reasonable prospect of catching it then if it is subsequently caught by another, 
property will be acquired by the initial pursuer/^ Similar, long-standing rules apply in 
relation to tlie 'fast and loose’ conventional rules of whale fisliing.^® Gordon has noted 
that "[ajccording to tliese customs a whale harpooned, or one once harpooned and still 
caught in harpoon line was a 'fast fish’ and belonged to the strdcer even if others helped 
to catch it with further harpoons; if it broke free from tlie harpoon it was a 'loose’ fish 
and could be caught by anyone” Taking tiiis notion a step further, it has been held 
under Scots law that one in pursuit of game may enter tlie land of another if a mortally 
wounded animal has been driven there, wltliout committing any trespass. In NicoH v 
Strachari’^  it was held that where the animal was either dead, apparently dead or wounded 
to the extent that it could no longer make its escape then it would not be trespass to 
enter into tlie land of another to claim it.
Such rules, as set out above, have a clear poHcy aim. They reflect the fact that a certain 
amount of effort and perhaps economic investment may have been applied in respect of 
the pursuit and it would perhaps be inequitable to allow another party to intervene at tliis 
stage and take the animal for himself. This rule, however, does of course leave open the 
potentially difficult issue of when exactly a person has a reasonable prospect of capmring 
an animal and/or whether or not an animal has been mortally wounded prior to capture 
by anotlier partqc Thus die law in this regard does not lend itself to clarity. In practice
B ells 1290.
Stair las ts  vol II, I, 33.
Mddison Sons v Row 1794, 3 Pat. App. 334; The A.berdeen A.tiic Co v S u t t e r 4 Macq. 355.
W. G ordon , 'C orporeal Propert}? Law’ in K. Reid (ed), The Law of Property Law in Scotland (1996) at para 
541, footnote 5.
(1912) 7 A dam  31, 34-36.
such a deteiinination might inevitably involve some difficult evidential questions and 
thus give rise to higher transactional costs.
Concerns such as these came to die fore in the New York Supreme Court case o f Pierson 
V Postf In this case, Post (with a pack of hounds) was in 'hot pursuit’ of a fox on public 
land. Pierson (radier amusingly termed by die court 'a saucy intruder’), well aware of tiiis 
fact, subsequendy lulled die fox and took it for himself. Post sued for damages in 
respect of the value of the fox but lost on die basis that one who hunts an animal ferae 
naturae establishes no rights of property in it until it is either captured, killed or mortally 
wounded and not prior to this. Despite die dissenting opinion of Justice Livingstone 
who felt that such a decision might prove a disincentive to the socially worthwliile 
pursuit of fox hunting, die court’s ruling was founded primarily on the practical basis 
discussed above that it would be difficult to determine when capture was inrmiiient, so 
that a right to the thing pursued should only pass when capture occurred.^"
Trespassers and property in game
Another issue where Scots and English approaches to property/ rights in animals ferae 
naturae differ is in relation to property rights which are vested in trespassers who take 
game on the land of another. Under English law, if a trespasser were to wild kill animals 
on die land of another , no propert)^ would pass to that person — it would vest in the 
landowner.^'' UnHlce die Roman position (and Scottish position that follows the Roman 
rule) in tliis regard, which stipulates that properlqr in animals ferae nature will, in general, 
always vest m the first part}" to reduce diem into possession, '^* under the landmark
■’> 3 Cai. R  175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1805). 
)UWat l79 .
Blade v H/ggx supra n. 3.
Justinian. Institute (Bk 2. tit. 1, s 12).
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decision in Plade v the fact that the taldng by a trespasser is illegitimate means tliat
the animals so taken will not be the property of the trespasser but that title wÜl revert to 
the landowner on whose land the game is found. This rule was promulgated even 
though at the time of that decision it had not been held that a poacher who takes game 
on the land of another committed larceny^^ and also that the Game Act of that time, 
which provided for tlie stopping and taking away of game from a poacher, by 
implication arguably did not recognise that the general common law gave ownersliip in 
poached game to the landowner upon whose land the game is captured.
For Scotland, however, the Institutional writers are unequivocal that property in game 
will vest in a poacher who takes them, although he would hable in trespass to the 
landowner.'^” Tliis point was clearly affirmed by the court in the case of Scott v JSveritP in 
which a poacher brought a civü action against the prosecuting authorities to reclaim 
game which had been confiscated from him after it was found in his possession. The 
Court was quick to affirm the right of the poacher to have the game restored to him on 
the basis that as the game was ns nullius it would became die property of the first person 
to occupy it: “unless the statutes dealing witli poaching expressly provide for the 
forfeiture of the animals captured, the general law of occupancy is apphcable and tliey 
remain the property of the taker.”.'**’ This principle can be traced back to Roman law 
when Justinian stated “ [so] far as tlie occupant’s title is concerned, it is immaterial 
whetlier it is on his own land or on that of anodier that he catches the wüd animals or
supra n. 3.
H aleP .C . 511.
See tlie argum ents o f counsel for tlie appellants in Black v Hiyps supra n. 3 at 1475-1477.
Stair II, I, 33; Erslune Institute 11, 110; Bell s 1286. Game legislation ma)', how ever, expressly provide 
that game poached should be forfeited but liis does no t negate the general rule o f  occupancy in tins regard. 
3'.’ 1853 15 D  288. 
ibid.
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birds, though it is clear that if he goes on another man’s land for die sake of hunting or 
fowling, the latter may forbid him entry if he is aware of his purpose.”'**
The differential in the two approaches of die Scottish and English courts in tiiis matter 
may to some extent be rooted in die fact that under English law there is a recognised 
property right (albeit a ‘qualified’ one) vested in the landowner in relation to wild 
animals present upon his land. For Scots law, as noted above, although a person has the 
right to reduce wild animals into possession as an incident of landownership, his right is 
seen as no greater than anyone else’s.
The rule regarding trespassers has been developed furtlier in England, however, and 
perhaps in an illogical fashion. It has been held somewhat surprisingly, that if a 
trespasser starts to hunt an animal in the land of one (whose right to the game arises 
ratione soli and not rationeprivilege), and kills it in die grounds of another, property vests in 
the IdUer who is merely in turn liable to the landowners in trespass,'*  ^ The fact diat the 
game is not IdUed on the first party’s land (whose right has arisen ratione soli) would seem 
to be the reason why in contrast to the general Blade v H i^ s  rule outlined above, propert}^ 
would not vest in him. Where the right arises ratione privilege tiien diat right to the game 
would continue despite the fact that die animals are captured or killed somewhere else — 
and hence the spoils would belong to the owner of die right.'*^  Aside from this 
exception, why title to the animals would not vest in die second landowner upon whose 
land the poacher has taken them is unclear. The animals are clearly reduced into 
possession on that proprietor’s land and die poacher’s act is an illegitimate one which 
should not vest title to the game with him any more than if the miscreant had taken the
Jusdfiia/i’s List Bk II, 1,12.
■*“ Sutton V Moody supra n. 11; Churchward v Studdy (1811), 14 E ast 249.
Blade v H i^ s  supra n. 3 at 633. This is because tlie privilege to hunt has been granted and does no t arise 
from  ownersliip o f  the land itself.
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animals on the land in which the chase begun . In Blade v H l^s, the Lord Chancellor 
attempted to justify this vexed position by the fact that “the game was not originally 
found in [the second landowner’s] possession but was only driven upon his ground by 
the chase and pursuit of the hunter”/'* Such a view, however, was in the same case 
criticised by Lord Chelmsford:
I have some difficulty in understanding why the wrong doer is to acquire a property in 
the game under die circumstances here supposed. If the animal had left die land of B. 
and passed into the land of C of its own will, and had been, immediately it crossed the 
boundary, killed by C., it would unquestionably have been liis property. Why dien 
should not the act of a trespasser to which C. was no party, have the same right to the 
animal as if it had involuntarily quitted the neighbouring land? And why, not only 
should B. lose his right to the game and C. acquired none, but the property, by this 
accident of place where it happened to be killed, be transferred to die trespasser? It 
would appear to me to be more in accordance with principle, to hold that if the 
trespasser deprived the owner of the land where die game was started, of his right to 
claim the property" by unlawfully IdUing on the land of another to which he had driven it, 
he converted it into a subject of property for that other owner and not for liimself.'*^
Despite such judicial criticism, it has been suggested that given tiiat the rule has stood 
for so long and not been expressly overruled, it would remain as it is."*^  The existence of 
gaming statutes which might require tlie forfeiture of any game poached may render any 
practical revival of this debate unlilcely.
Baiting of wild animals
The example of baiting is one that may be of use later in this thesis as an analogy when 
examining the efficacy of a law of capture in relation to hydrocarbons. As shah be noted 
in chapter 4, in early US jurisprudence relating to hy-drocarbons, given a lack of any 
established rules in this area, decisions were made by drawing analogies witii recognised 
common law principles relating to wild annuals. A baiting scenario is one where a party" 
sets bait on liis own land that has the effect that game is attracted to tlie bait from the
A t p 633. E ven though game is never in possession o f a landow ner as such until captured. 
Blade V Bligos supra n. 3 p erL o id  Chelm sford at 639-641.
Halsbmy’s Laws o f England ed 3^ol 2 para 210.
land of anotlier towards the baiter’s land and tlien is captured by him. This is arguably 
analogous with a situation where one party drilling oil from beneath liis own land draws 
forth oil underlying the land of another. In such a case there is no trespass or other 
invasion of property rights as there would be with poaching in general.
The key question in tliis sense is whether, by setting a bait, and thus perhaps purposely 
drawing animals from tlie land of another, any ground of action will be available to the 
aggrieved landowner. In relation to English law it submitted that as there is no element 
of trespass on to another’s land and the propertj" has not been taken on the land of the 
otlier (for example, as would be the case with a poacher), and the act of baiting is a 
legitimate way to exploit resources upon one’s own land, the game would vest in the 
baiter. This is so even though the baiter’s actions have caused the game to leave the land 
of another perhaps to a greater extent tlian would normally occur by the course o f nature 
and hence the baiting can be considered to have in some way diminished the qualified 
proprietary right of the other landowner to take game on his land. In Scotland, as each 
landowner has as much right to hunt for wild animals as any other, it is submitted tliat 
there would similarly be no infringement of any proprietary right in tliis situation, hence 
no ground of action and, of course, properly" in the animals taken would pass to the 
baiter (wliich in any case, as noted above, passes in Scotland irrespective of whether or 
not the taldng can be considered legitimate). /
This may aU seem straightforward enough but some telling observations can be made 
about the qualified property right to take possession of wild animals tliat exists in 
England & Wales when this hypothetical baiting scenario is compared witli tlie facts of
1 1
the old EngHsh case of Keeble v Hickeringi/lS^ In this case Keeble owned some land on 
which he had constructed a pond to attract ducks that he would then catch with nets. 
HickeringiU, a neighbour who was unhappy about Keeble’s activities, fired a gun to scare 
the ducks away and Keeble sued for damages. The court ruled in Keebles’ favour and 
Chief Justice Holt in the (somewhat sparse) court judgement remarked, “to learn the 
trade of seducing ... ducks to come... in order to be taken is not prohibited by either 
the law of the land or the moral law; but it is useful to use art to seduce them, to catch 
them, and destroy them for the use of manldnd, as to kill and destroy wildfowl or tame 
cattle. Then when a man useth liis art or his sltiU to take them,... this is his trade; and he 
that hinders another in his trade or livelihood is liable to an action for so hindering 
h im ...”' '
On this rationale, although there is nothing to stop one from baiting wild animals from 
another’s land (for example, if HickeringÜl had constructed his own pond to attract the 
ducks) a party cannot seek to frustrate the attempts of another to capture a thing by 
spoiling tactics carried out with a wilful intent to injure the otlier party’s rights. This 
qualified property right in wild animals is therefore somewhat unusual m that it is strong 
enough to prevent others from interfering with it, except in circumstances where tlie 
otlier party takes possession of the tiling itself (where there is no other ground of action 
such as trespass) which is arguably the most extensive invasion of property" rights 
possible.'** On policy grounds, such an approach is justifiable in that from an economic
11 E ast 574, 103 Eng. Rep. 112 (KB 1707).
Similarly in Eiteygcrald v Eirbantz [1897] 2 Ch. 96 a party who had been granted fisliing rights (wliich the 
court held am ounted to a profit a prendre) was entitled to claim damages where the actions o f  the defendants 
flooded the river with dirt}" w ater and scared tlie fish away.
Tliis in fact is an idea that encountered is in respect o f  otlier migrator}" things. In  tlie English case of 
Baltard v Totnlinson ((1885) L.R. 29 Cli D . 115), despite the fact tliat it was viewed tliat a landow ner had no 
propert}" in underground w ater in situ as it was an incident o f  landownersliip that the landow ner had the 
right to exploit this water, the adjacent landow ner had no rights to pollute the water -  even though he 
would be free to take the w ater for liimself). So in tliis circumstance, again it is interesting the existence of
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rationale, property law should facilitate the legitimate exploitation of natural resources (in 
the case of such things as game by whichever party is first able to do so) but equally the 
law should prohibit action that otherwise seeks to thwart a party’s attempts to do so, as 
given the investment of would-be exploiters of natural resources such as game, any 
interference may cause waste and inefficiency. By contrast, in a baiting scenario botli 
competing activities are seeldng to legitimately exploit the resource — and both may 
require investment -  and hence, in such scenarios the law should remain neutral.'''*'' It 
would be interested to note how a Scottish court would view such a scenario. Lücely an 
action could be sought on the grounds of nuisance.'*”’
An interesting English judgement wliich perhaps bucks this general trend is Gott v 
Measures^ In this case, a party to whom sporting rights had been granted, shot a dog 
which had come onto, and was attacldng game on the land over which the rights 
pertained. The case in fact was concerned with statutory interpretation in that s 41 of 
tlie Malicious Damage Act 1861 prescribed criminal penalties for parties who did 
“unlawfully and maliciously IdU, maim or wound any dog, bitd, beast or other animal...” 
It was a valid defence, however, to lull such an animal in defence of one’s property (as 
this would render tlie killing neither unlawful nor malicious). Wliile at first instance, die 
justices held that given that the respondent had shot the dog on lands over which he had 
fuU sporting rights, he did so in defence of his property" and witliout malice, this view 
was rejected by the Divisional Court.
property rights p rotect n o t against tlie seizing o f  tlie water by anotlier party, bu t do safeguard against 
destruction or damage to the thing by that party.
Such a principle is apparent in respect o f  judicial approaches to water exploitation — see further 
discussion in chapter 3.
I'Jb N uisance has been described as an infringem ent o f natural rights o f  ownersliip (Ranldne, Law of 
Landownership 4“' ed (1906) pp 339 el seq) or use o f  property tliat occasions serious disturbance or 
substantial inconvenience to a neighbour — see for example, Wall v Jamieson 1965 SC 56, per Lord President 
C ooper at 57-58.
5" [1948] 1 KB 234.
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The teasoning of the court was delivered by Lord Goddard CJ.
[i]t seems to me that tlie law really is not in any doubt here, and that is that a person may 
be justified in shooting a dog if he lionesdy believes that it is necessary as being tlie only 
way in which he can protect his property. Therefore, if a farmer finds a dog in his ewe 
flock, as sometimes happens, chasing sheep, and so fortli, which may cause incalculable 
damage to a farmer, it may be that the only way he can protect his flock is by shooting 
the dog, and he can do it. Tins case [by contrast] is one in which it seems to me the 
respondent has no property in anything. He had the sporting rights. H e... was entitled 
to go on the land for the purpose of hunting the game, but he had no property in the 
game... until he had reduced die game into possession. Neither a person owning the 
sporting rights nor the landowner has any property in wild game... Therefore... when 
this occurred it cannot be said that the respondent could have reasonably believed that 
he was entitied to shoot die dog as being done in the protection of his property", because 
that would be a reasonable belief in something which die law does not recognize... so it 
seems to me that you cannot honesdy believe that it is necessary to shoot a dog to 
protect your property when you have no property" to protection
This case then seems to deny any sort of property right in game when a party" is granted 
the right to take the same from another’s land. As we saw from Keeble’s case the right 
to take game (upon one’s own land in that case) luas a property right sufficient to be 
safeguarded against the actions of odiers who disturbed that right (in that case the 
scaring of ducks by the adjacent landowner).^***’ It is questionable how tiiis should be any 
different from tlie right to be safeguarded by law (and hence granted a defence under the 
Malicious Damage Act) against the actions of a rampaging dog that at least threatens to 
infringe the right to exploit of the game on land. As noted above, the right to exploit 
game is of an economic value to the grantee (who has no doubt paid for the privilege) in 
the same way that an owner benefits in an economic sense from items he owns. Lienee, 
in the same way the law at least arguably ought to safeguard against infrmgements of 
such rights and allow parties where necessary" (and witiiin reasonable limits) to take 
actions themselves to safeguard those rights. Furdiermore, in terms of consistency witii 
other recognised principles of land law, as Counsel for the respondents in Gott
at 239-240.
50b A lthough it is possible to view Keehle’s case as being one wliich sets out the general rule that an action 
will he w here one part}" mahciously acts in such a way as to cause detrim ent to another’s occupation or 
hvehliood.
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suggested, although game as such remains res nullius, a right to reduce the same into 
possession on another’s land has been recognised as a profit a prenàf^“ and contraiy to 
the court’s bare assertion that there is no property in tlie game, is hence clearly a 
property right of a kind in tlie game/* It is well established that unlike the case witii 
mere Hcences, profits a prendre are sufficiently proprietary in nature to be safeguarded 
against the actions of others who interfere witli tliat rlglit/^ It is unclear in the 
chcumstances tiierefore why such a property right should not afford the grantee any 
right to shoot the dog which was invading this right.
Summary
From tlie foregoing, some general principles and policy rationale pertaining to wild 
animals can be established. Fitst, given a lack of physical control over such ambient 
resources as wild annuals, a legal system will tend not to allocate full ownership rights 
therein until reduced into possession. Recognising the economic value of wild animals 
to landowners, however, what might be termed ‘quaUfied’ propert}" rights (under English 
law) may be protected in some ways — eg in particular, through tlie law of trespass or by 
unlawful disturbance of a right to exploit. The right is not always protected, however. In 
general terms, in circumstances where a party acts in an unlawful or illegitimate way then 
the property right is capable of sustaining an action against the wrongdoer. Where 
another part}" acts in a legitimate fashion on his land wliich negates the quahfied property" 
right of an adjacent proprietor, the law tends to remains neutral and would not intervene 
to provide a remedy to the aggrieved party.
5U'' wliich can be transferred to another, 
m / a t  238.
See for example, Bolton v Forest Pest Management Institute (1986) 21 D.L.R. (4“*) 242 at 249.
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It has also been shown that allocation of ownership may in some cases occur before the 
object concerned has been fuUy reduced into possession, eg where the animal has been 
mortally wounded under 'fast and loose’ type rules. Such a rule rewards the effort and 
perhaps the economic investment of tlie pursuer and hence encourages exploitation, but 
pinning down exactly when and in what chcumstances ownership wül arise may perhaps 
not always be an easy task. This ambiguity in itself may result in disputes and hence 
inefficiencies. These arising issues will be returned to later and may inform a discussion 
of the law relative to other migratory tilings.
CHAPTER 3 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN  WATER 
Introduction
As shall be noted below, the law relating to property rights in water upon or below land 
in the UK is vague, uncertain and Mice tlie substance itself, shifting and inconstant. Tliis 
notion was recognised by Ranldne as follows:
[n]o part of the law of neighbourhood has given rise to so many difficult and dehcater 
questions as the law which relates to right[s] in water. The shifting and inconstant 
nature of the element itself, while doubdess the chief cause of the difficulties wliich 
pervade this department of jurisprudence in all systems of law, is a fair symbol of the 
vagueness which has all too often characterised the body of legal doctrine that forms 
[this subject]... In this more than any other portion of the law of ownership is to be 
observed the modifying influence of climate, of the configuration of land, and of human 
industry. The leading principles of the law were laid down centuries ago in the Roman 
jurisprudence. These have been recognised as a safe guide during the whole history of 
Scots law, have been appealed to in the Courts of England and America, and have been 
taken over as authoritative in France and Germany. But many of the most interesting 
and important developments of the institution have been reserved for the determination 
of the lawyers of die present [19“'] century.^
This chapter steers a pathway through the maze of property" rights in running and
percolating water upon land and attempts to establish what rights of ownersliip a
landowner has in such waters and tlie extent tliat such proprietary rights are protected
against the actions of others who infringe those activities in certain ways. The chapter
begins by malting some basic propositions about water rights and English common law.
English Law
General Points
Notwithstanding that there are certain rights in water which arise by virtue of ownership 
of riparian properly", the traditional viewpoint holds tliat flowing water, whether running 
in a known and defined channel or percolating tlirough the soil in a random fasiiion is
' J. Raiildue, Law of Landownership 4“' ed (1906) at p. 511.
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not the subject of ownership at common law/ The rationale underlying tliis is tliat 
water, in common with the air tliat we breathe, is a natural life-sustaining element 
common to aU manldnd. Despite dicta to contraiy, in certain early cases such as Williams v 
Morlatut and Uggins v Ingef it seems to be recognised that flowing water is only puhlici 
juris (owned by the pubhc) in the sense that all may drink and utüise this natural resource 
for tlie necessary requirements of supporting life.  ^ The water is not owned as such but 
rather tlie pubhc have a general right to use the water.
O f course that is not to say that, in a similar manner to capturing a wild animal, water 
which has been appropriated or taken into possession either from a defined channel or 
from that percolating beneath the land is not the subject of property. Property wiU vest 
in the taker, albeit only throughout tlie time of possession.** Similarly, as one would 
expect, water which is held in some sort o f receptacle wih be the property of the part)" 
who has possession of water, in so far as that possession endures.^
Riparian Rights
Rights, which although falhng short of fuU ownership are proprietary in nature, may vest 
in flowing water, however. In relation to streams wliich flow in a Imown and defined 
patliway certain riparian rights exist. Such rights are best viewed as limitations on the 
general absolute right to draw water that applies to underground percolating water, 
wliich shall be alluded to later. In relation to water flowing in defined channels, at 
common law, a riparian owner is unable to take all the water, but nonetheless certain
 ^1-iaisbuy’s Laws of England, 3"“ ed Vol 39, p  506 (1962).
3 (1824) 2 B & C 9 1 0 .
(1831) 7 Bing 68.
3 See Embety v Owen (1851), 6 Exch. 353; Mason v H ill (1833), 5 B & as. 1; Chasemore v Richards (1859), 7 HL 
Gas. 349.
2 Bl Comm. 14, 18.; Mason v H ilt (1833) 5 B & Ad 1, at p 29; Hocker v PorriU (1875) LR E xch 59; Ballard r 
Tomlinson (1885) 28 Ch D 115, CA (pum ping o f percolating water).
 ^ 2 Bl Comm. 14; Ferens v O ’Brien (1883) 11 Q BD  21.
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lights alise: he has the sole right to fish in tlie water/ he has a right to the continual flow 
of water through the land, subject to the ordinary and reasonable use of the water by tlie 
upper riparian owners/ he has the right to take and use water for ah reasonable domestic 
purposes*** or perhaps in some cases manufacturing purposes even where this may result 
in the stream being exhausted;** and he has the right to draw water for extraordinaiy 
purposes provided that such use is reasonable*^ and the water is not substantially altered 
in volume or characterE
Known and defined channels may also exist underground and the same rules apply to
those channels above ground as to tliose below. The onus of proving that the channel is
known and defined, however, will fall upon the person claiming the riparian rights. In
the Irish case of v Ballymena Township Coînmissionerj"  ^Chatterton, VC remarked that
[t]he onus of proof is on die person claiming riparian rights and it lies on him to show 
that without opening the ground by excavation or having recourse to abstruse 
speculations of scientific persons, men of ordinary powers and attainments would laiow, 
or could with reasonable diligence ascertain, that the stream when it emerges into light 
comes from and has flowed through a defined subterranean channel.
While tire forgoing issue is discussed in detail below, the Vice Chancellor’s comment 
provides an insight into one of the justifications for the absolute dominium rule tliat 
appHes in relation to percolating groundwater, namely: tlie lack of physical Imowledge 
concerning the extent of such water resources in situ and therefore the inapplicability of 
defined rights in such resources until reduced into possession.
" Eckrojd V Coulthard [1898] 2 Ch 358 at 366. E xcept iu tidal waters, the public have no right to fish even if 
they have a right o f navigation -  Pearce v Scotcher (1882) 9 Q B D  162; Blount v Lajard  [1891] 2 Ch 681 at 689 
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John Young <& Co v The Bankier Distillety Co [1893] AC 691 at 698.
See McCartney v Londondery and Lough Swilly RY [1904] AC 301; Kensit v Great Eastern K  (1883) Ch D  566 
at 574.
” Ormerod v Todmorton Joint Stock M ill Co L td  (1883) 11 Q BD  155 at 168; McCartney i> Londonderry and Lough 
Swilly By supra n. 10 at 307.
Rugfy Joint Water Board v Walters [1916] Ch 397.
’ 3 McCartney v Londondeny and Lough Swilly Ry supra n. 10 at 307.
(1886) 17 LR Ir  459 at 474,475.
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The limitations placed upon the right of riparians to abstract water clearly recognise the 
competing needs of adjacent landowners and the law seeks to strilce a balance between 
allowing private water exploitation and ensuring tliat downstream users are not overly 
prejudiced. The rationale underlying riparian regimes is furtlier discussed in chapter 5. 
It should also be noted that these riparian rights have since been amended significantly 
by statute and in general a riparian owner cannot take water except when in possession 
of a relevant licence.*^
Underground water not in a known and defined channel
Such riparian rights have no role to play in the case of underground water wliich 
percolates in an unloiown, undefined way. UiiHke the case with water in defined 
channels, landowners have no right to replenishment of this source. Thus, an adjacent 
landowner can extract such water as he pleases with no need to pay regard to the rights 
of others who may be prejudiced by the fact diat, as a result of tlie abstraction, the water 
fails to arrive beneath their land.*** Tliis unfettered right of exploitation has been termed 
one of 'absolute dominium’ and a number of cases bear out this point.***
The tale behind tlie adoption of this approach is an interesting one. As the examination 
of the law relative to ownersliip of hydrocarbons in situ in chapter 4 will illustrate, judges 
who asserted an absolute dominium approach in respect of oil rendered by drilling 
activities did so by following a largely formalist judicial approach in that they simply 
applied recognised, comparative precedent (largely relative to water and wild-animals) to
’3 F or England and Wales, see W ater A ct 1962, s 23; 1991, s27(l).
Chasemore v Richards supra n. 5.
"  Including Chasemore v Richards ibid; Acton v Blundet (1843) 12 f i  & W  324 and Bradford v Rickies [1895] AC 
587 HL. W liether tliis also means that water already below another’s land can be ‘captured’ by an adjacent 
landow ner carrying out works on  his own land shall be discussed below.
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the sphere of oil and gas. It seems that jurisprudence for tirese judges was somewhat 
mechanical and their rules self-defining. It is therefore somewhat ironic that some of the 
very precedents (relating to ground water rules) that these later judges leaned on were 
themselves not rooted in a formalist theory. Murphy has contended that
in the operative case of the rules for groundwater law, however, die truth hes in the 
opposite direction [from formaUst theory]. The nineteenth century jurists in deciding 
the content of groundwater law were active, creative, and non-mechanical. They truly 
acted as decision-makers in a legal system that did not act autonomously of science, the 
market, or technology, at least in the instance of groundwater and acquifers.^ ®
At the time of the early decision makers, the Enghsh courts would have been cognisant
witli tlie correlative (riparian) rights doctrine that aheady existed in relation to water in
A
defined streams.*** The fact tliat there were well-defined rules which predated any legal
determination relating to groundwater suggests that historically spealdng, defined streams 
and waterways were of far more importance in practical terms than underground water.^*' 
Murphy explains that :
If a formalist judicial approach had been taken tiien English courts would probably have 
plumped for a riparian rights doctrine in respect of groundwater. However, after a brief
E.F. M urphy, ‘T he Recurring State Judicial Task o f Choosing Rules for G roundw ater : H ow  O ccult 
Still?’ 1987 N L R  120 at p 121,
This view prevailed after a battle w ith a ‘p rior appropriation rule’ tliat pre-dated it. Tliis issue is 
discussed in chapter 5. Scotland never embraced the prior appropriation approach as it was influenced 
directly from  the ju s  communes -  see generally N. Wliitly, ‘W ater Law Regimes’ in Reid & Z im m erm an (eds) 
A  H isioy o f Private Law in Scotland Y  o\ 1 (2000).
2“ L. G oodeve, The Modern Law of Real Property 5 (T ‘ ed. 1883); J. Gould, The Law of Water, s 46 at 105-03, s 
265-267 at pp 465-468 (1" ed 1883).
“* M urphy supra n. 18 at p 121.
■i'J
[n]ot until entrepreneurs wanted to dewater the ground for mines and quarries, or 
mechanically pump previously unlmown draft volumes for steam conversion, or cooling, 
or sale, or other consumptive uses, did a natural phenomenon become the human 
resource of groundwater. At diat moment, and no sooner, did the legal system have 
basic decisions to make among claimants whose conflicts ranged from dumping 
extracted water as a nuisance to using or preserving groundwater as a thing of actual (or 
potential) cash value.
flirtation witli an approach that protected prior uses/^ the courts made a clear decision to 
embrace what is commonly termed the 'absolute dominium’ doctrine/** The decision not 
to expand the riparian regime to the sphere of underground percolating water can be 
seen as largely a pragmatic one. From a practical point of view, the refusal to allocate 
recognised riparian rights to underground percolating water stemmed primarily from tlie 
lack of scientific and technical Imowledge of underground water. As noted in the 
landmark case of Chasemore v Richards, any determination that there had been interference 
with underground water was impractical and inefficient as it “would require the evidence 
of scientific men”. '^ Tliis fact does not in itself justif)" an absolute rule. It might of 
course have been possible to limit uses to those that could be deemed reasonable or 
beneficial without necessarily needing to enquire into whether or not it interfered witli 
the water of others. Such matters are explored in chapter 5.
In any case the rejection of the correlative rights doctrine that existed in respect of water 
in defined channels was not taken as part of a formalist approach on the basis of some 
established doctrine but ratlier tliat there “was a keen awareness that no tradition existed, 
that no precedent bound, and tliat what could be found in the law books was persuasive 
only, rather tlian any part of an established common law rule”. '^ These judges simply 
thought it ‘impracticable’ to adopt a rule for groundwater similar to tlie one for riparians 
owning land along the banks of surface streams. Groundwater to them was too 
unlmowable in its hydrological aspects.^ ** Clearly determining the directional flow and
22 See Balston p  Bensted 1 Camp 463(1808). Such a p rior appropriation approach is discussed in detail in die 
com paradve section in chapter 5.
23 In  Acton v Blundell supra n. 17. As noted, die term, however, is misleading and given tha t underground 
percolating water is probably best considered res nullius a m ore accurate albeit less eloquent term  may be an 
‘absolute right to use’.
23 Chasemore v Richards supra n. 5 at 147.
23 E. M urphy supra n. 18 at p 128. A lthough it shoidd be recalled that the court in Acton p Blundell did note 
that under Rom an formulations, the law did n o t im pose habihty where a landow ner intercepted 
groundw ater diat flowed below liis neighbour’ land.
2'’ E. M urphy, supra n, 18 at p 128.
volumes of groundwater was at Üiat time impossible to ascertain — rather, such treasures 
of water were deemed so secret, uncontrollable and ever-changing that they could not be 
subject to the regulation of law or specific rules as was the case with surface streams/^
In addition to the lack of technical Imowledge concerning underground percolating 
water, the absolute use rule was preferred in tliat it was most consistent with the needs 
of an emerging industrial society to exploit natural resources. As the court in a seminal 
early US decision suggested, to hold otherwise would result in “material detriment to tlie 
common wealth, with drainage and agriculture, niining, the construction o f highways and 
radroads, with sanitary regulations, budding and the general progress of improvement in 
works of embellishment and utility” .^ ' According to this view, given that underground 
water was so secret in its nature, parties could not be held responsible if tlieir actions, for 
example, drew water away from the land of anotlier. To render parties hable in such 
circumstances might severely curtad their industrial activities.
In its classic Enghsh formulation, the motives behind one landowner’s abstraction of the 
percolating water is not germane to the founding of any case for a remedy. In Bradford v 
Pickles where there was evidence of unscrupulous motives on the part of tlie party 
dradiing the water prior to it reaclung an adjacent landowner’s wed - it was aUeged tliis 
was done to force the sale of the land - the court viewed this fact as irrelevant and found 
no grounds of action for the defendant.^® Lord Macnaghten stated that Picldes was
22 Chatfield v Wilson 28 Vt. 49 at 54 (1856).
2^  Frafier V Bmtvn 12 Oliio St. 294 (1861) at 311.
2^"" It should be noted tliough that tlie absolute dom inium  approach may n o t always be seen as one 
supporting industrial uses. In  Chasemore supra n. 5, for example, the case involved tlie determ ination o f 
w ater rights betw een two com peting industrial users. Wliile tlie court’s determ ination o f  an absolute 
dom inium  rule benefited the abstractor it was, o f course, not o f benefit to the industrial user whose 
legitimate comm ercial activities v"ere ham pered when the w ater was drawn away from  liim.
Bradford p Pickles supra n. 17.
entitled "to force tlie [appellant] to buy him out at a price satisfactorily to liimself’ and 
that even tliough Pickles’ motives might seem “churksh, selfish and gasping” and 
“shocldng to a moral philosopher”/* the House of Lords refused to curtail die right of a 
landowner to exploit his property in any way consistent with his absolute power of 
exploitation in the land. Such a viewpoint is based on a traditional notion of propert}" 
absolutism espoused by judges in the Victorian era under which landowners were under 
no general obligation to use theic land in such a way as being consistent with wider 
community interests.
Comment
This extreme Blackstonian view of propert}" is one which denies operation of any 
doctrine of abuse of rights. The civil law concept of abuse of rights is one which holds 
that no right can be exercised for the sole purpose of damaging someone else’s rights. 
As Mattel explains, however, some civü law systems reject this notion on the intellectual 
basis that it is somewhat contradictory for die law to grant a right but dictate diat 
exploitation of the right amounts to an abuse in certain circumstances. Other civü law 
systems, (including for that matter, Scotiand) have, by contrast, adopted specific land law 
limitations - such as the notion of aemulatio - to achieve the same result. Common law 
systems such as England do not recognise the abuse of right doctrine.^' It has been 
asserted that this should not be seen as particularly troublesome. Mattel, for example, 
has noted tiiat “ [the abuse of rights doctrine] is perfectly substituted by the
3“ ibid at 600.
3' ibid at 601.
32 Such a general viewpoint is no  longer prevalent in English law; witness tlie stream o f  positive law that 
has been enacted in the last century which has restricted land-use in relation to such m atters as planning 
and the environment. For a review o f  the sliift away from  traditional absolutism to the imposition o f  
propert}" obligationalism see K. G ray & S.F. Gray, Elements of Land Law  3rd ed (2001), chapter 10.
33 See for example the French case of Clemcnt-Bayard, Cass. Civ Aug. 3, 1915, D. 19171705 wlhch involved 
the spiteful placement o f  fences wliich endangered the taking o ff  and landing o f h o t air balloons; see also 
A. G am baro, ‘Abuse o f  Right in Civil Law’ in Aequitas and Equity A.M. Rabello (ed) (1994) at p 375.
3-' U. M attel, Basic Principles of Property Law : A  Comparative and Economic Introduction (2000) at p 149.
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reasonableness It is interesting to note, however, that there is an inherent
inconsistency between the idea of reasonableness and the extreme property absolutism 
evident under Enghsh common law in respect of exploitation of underground water 
which clearly cannot be viewed in any sense as ‘reasonable’. The brake of reasonableness 
under the tort of nuisance or neghgence is not in fact always the “perfect substitute” 
Mattei contends it is. As Pickles starldy illustrates, the tort of nuisance cannot be 
invoked when that involves the proper exploitation of resources upon one’s own land 
Nuisance is more concerned with circumstances in wliich tliere has been an unlawful 
invasion of another’s property rights in some way. However one looks at this issue, 
clearly tlie extreme apphcation of the unfettered right to abstract rule manifest in Pickles 
may lead to unfairness, exploitation and waste. This issue is further discussed in chapter 
5.
Ownership, property rights and subterranean water
The Enghsh cases discussed above are commonly cited in support of the general 
proposition tliat no property hes in underground water. There is confusion, however, m 
the mterpretation of some of tlie cases cited as autliority for this proposition. This 
confusion may be of httle surprise, however, given tliat the facts o f these cases are often 
obscure and on a close analysis, the judgements not particularly sound.
In fact in A.cton v Blundell, which concerned the right of a landowner to divert 
underground water away from the land of another,^** the Lord Cliief Justice expressed a 
contraiy viewpomt when he stated that “the owner of tlie soil [has] ah tliat hes beneath 
the surface; tliat the land below is liis propert}", whether it be sohd rock, or porous
33 ibid.
3^ ' A nd n o t as the headnote would suggest a tight to pum p w ater away from  ano ther’s land. This issue is 
discussed later under law  o f capture’.
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ground, or venous eartli, or part soil, part waterP^ ~‘ (emphasis added). Tiiis obiter comment 
of the Lord Chief Justice in fact suggests that the landowner does have propert}" in water 
percolating below liis land as tlie water is treated as pars soli
Campbell has cast doubt on this viewpoint, however, remarking that, “the context in 
which the dictum was expressed however was ... whether the right to the enjoyment of 
an underground spring... was governed by the same rules of law as those wliich apply to 
and regulate a water course flowing on tlie surface. [The Lord Chief Justice] was 
tiierefore addressing primarily the issue of tlie right to use the underground water and 
not tlie question of its ownership” .^ ® It is submitted that such a view stretches what the 
Lord Chief Justice stated - his words : “tlie owner of the soil has aU that Hes below tlie 
surface; the land [including the water] below is liis property” seem fairly unequivocal to 
tills writer. Nonetiieless, Campbell’s view is lent support by views set out elsewhere in 
the case law. In Ballard v Tomlinsonlfi for example, in holding that there was no property 
in underground water, the court took the view that this did not mean that an action 
could not be brought on the basis of the conduct of an adjacent landowner who had 
polluted the water supply.
Moreover, the argument that underground percolating water is res millius until reduced 
into possession is supported by other Enghsh decisions. In the case of Rg Simeon v Isle of 
Weight Rural District Councif^ land was sold subject to reservation of the surface or 
underground water and aU necessary easements, rights, privileges, advantages, powers 
and liberties necessary for tlie enjoyment of tiiat reservation. A covenant was entered 
into by tlie purchaser not to cause water supply from tlie land sold to be diminished.
32 Acton V Blundet supra ii. 17 at 353.
33 C. Campbell, ‘The Ownersliip o f  Corporeal Propert," as a Separate T enem en t (2000) 1 /R  39 at p  52. 
3'3 (1855) 29 Ch D  11.
[1937] Ch. 525.
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The original seller claimed compensation when the local council sought to compulsorily 
purchase the land under statutory powers with a view to conducting works which would 
result in S’s rights to the water being injuriously affected/*
The court held that the attempt to reseiwe the percolating water failed on the basis that it
could not be the subject of property/^ Luxmoore J, pointed to the earlier case of Race v
Ward where the court viewed that water is
no part of the soil, lilce sand, or clay, or stones, nor the produce of the soil, hke grass, or 
turves, or trees.. and, when it issues from tlie ground, till appropriated for use, it flows 
onward by the law of gravitation. Wliile it remains in the field where it issues fortli, in 
the absence of any servitude or custom giving a right to others, the owner of the field, 
and he only has a right to appropriate it; for no one else can do so without committing a 
trespass upon the field; but when it has left his field, he has no more power over it, or 
interest in it, than any other stranger.'*^
Such a viewpoint, therefore, seems to hold tliat underground water is incapable of 
ownership until reduced into possession on die practical grounds tliat it “flows onward 
by the law of gravitation” and tliat any rights to appropriate tlie water are lost when it 
migrates to anotlier land.
It has been argued that the case of Acton, wliich some commentators (particularly those 
in the USA") have viewed as authority for tlie principle that a landowner has absolute 
ownership in underground percolating water, in fact establishes no such property right. 
Rather on tlie facts of the case, what is really determined is no more than the issue tliat 
there could be no right under tort to claim damages for harm caused by diversion of
"  s. 2 o f  the Public W orks Facilities Act, 1930.
■*2 T he court was willing to hold, however, tliat the reservation although misconceived, should be construed 
as a reservation o f  all necessary rights to enable the original ow ner to obtain water from  tlie land conveyed; 
and that the covenant imposed a contractual obligation on the original buyer and those deriving title from 
him (such as the local council) no t to interfere vtith existing and future water supply. Damages were 
therefore awarded on that basis- see Luxm oore ] at 537, 538.
•'3 4 E. & B. 702 at 709.
■’3 See for example, R. Kaiser & Frank F, Skillern, ‘D eep Trouble : A discussion o f  the Edwards Acquifer 
water crisis’ 6 S C E n v f iL J .  213 (1997) at p 263.
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underground water on the basis that such harm would not be foreseeable/^ On a true 
reading of the case, this viewpoint seems a sound one and as noted above, judicial 
assertions as to the fact that underground water is owed in situ were made obiter dicta.
Notwithstanding such a position, it is worth noting that support for the proposition that 
there is a right of property in underground percolating water can be found elsewhere. 
In Bradford v Pickles, A.L. Smith J.A, set forth the proposition that: "... an adjacent 
landowner has no property in or right to subterranean percolating water until it arrives 
underneath his soil... therefore no property or right of his is injured by the abstraction of 
tire percolating water before it arrives under liis land.”''*^ Again this at least seems to 
imply drat such underground water is the property; of die landowner when it arrives 
beneadi his land.
Water Law in Scotland
General points
Whitty has noted drat "[t]he development of the Scots law of water rights broadly 
follows the familiar three-stage pattern found iir areas throughout Scots law: a first 
medieval reception of English (Glanvdlian) law, followed by a reception of Roman law as 
developed in the European ///r commune, followed by a second reception of EngHslr law 
beginning in tire late eighteendr century.”''^  It is of litde surprise drerefore that there are 
a number of marked similarities between Scottish and English law relating to property 
rights in water, although at times variances in approaches can be seen.
■'5 E. Opiela, ‘The rule o f  capture in texas : an outdated principle beyond its tim e’ (2002) 6 U D EN U 'T.R  87 
at pp 90-92. 
supra n. 17 at 163.
N. X^diitt)', ‘W ater Law Regimes’ in K. Reid and R. Zm im erm an (eds), A  Hisioty o f Private Law in Scotland 
\ h l  1 (2000) p 420.
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Ownership
In relation to ownership of water, Scots law adopts the Roman law distinction between 
running water and standing water. According to Stair “running waters are common to aU 
men, because they have no bounds; but water standing, and capable of bounds, is 
appropriated”/*^
Reid suggests that “running water, at least when left to run in its natural state, is treated 
as ownerless”/''* There appear to be two main reasons for this viewpoint — first from a 
philosophical standpoint, that in common with air and light, water is an essential life- 
affirming natural resource and hence should not be the property of any one person and 
secondly from a practical perspective, “because of the evident impracticalit}^ of 
attributing ownership of individual molecules in a fast-running stream” Despite such 
notions, as noted below, water in its natural state is subject to certain private property 
rights.
Moreover, to what extent Reid’s blanket statement regarding the fact tliat running waters 
are not capable of ownership is true is, it is submitted, somewhat debatable. 
Institutional works such as those by Ersldne and Bankton, both take a similar view to 
Reid in this regard.^' Tltis general viewpoint has been followed in tlie case-law also and 
was affirmed by the court in Morris v Bickets’^
Stair Insts I I I  5. See also Erskine In s t II, I, 5; B ankton Inst I, 3,2.
K. Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland (1996) at para 274.
ibid.
Erslune, 11 i, 5; B ankton, 1, iii, 2.
52 (1864) 2 U  1082 (affd (1866) 4 M  (HL) 44).
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Tliis view is by no means unanimous however. For example, although Raiildne supports 
tlie traditional viewpoint that water ia a defined channel is owned by no one,” he states 
that in certain cases running water not in a defined and Imown channel may be held to 
be the property of the landowner -  the reasoning being that such water is merely part of 
tlie soil and hence in accordance with the doctrine o i a coelo usque ad centrum is part of tlie 
landowner’s estate. '^* The issue is further confused by the fact that a times writers use 
the terminology in different ways. For example, what amounts to ‘running’ is open to 
question. Does ‘running’ necessarily entail water flowing in a Imown, defined way or 
would water percolating underground in a random or unknown fashion also be included 
within such a definition? The Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland, for example, 
appears to agree with the traditional Reid/Bankton/Ersldne viewpoint, when it states 
tliat “running water is a res comttzunis... the property of no-one.”^^ A little later it 
continues, however,”  “water not in any defined channel, but distributed over tlie surface 
or through the strata of soil is regarded as pars soli; like minerals and eiœrything else a coelo 
tisque ad centrum, it is the property of the proprietor upon whose land it fahs’’.”
Ranldne’s view in respect of tlie proposition tliat percolating water is pars soli was 
followed by the court in Crichton v Turnbull!''^ This case concerned a disposition wliich 
attempted to convey tlie “windmill, pump, well and water supply and piping” as separate 
tenements in a field which was to be retained by the landowner. In holding tliat a 
conveyance of a separate tenement of the water was not competent. Lord Moncrief took 
the view that percolating water was pars soli (in view of tlie fact tliat it was heritable by
55 Ranldne, supra n 1 at pp 523-526.
ibid at p 513 
55 Encyclopaedia of Scots Law  (1926) at p 549.
5'» Acton v Blundell supra n. 17.
'^’Encyclopaedia of the Laws o f Scotland, supra n 55. T he same view is expressed in the Stair Memorial 
Encyclopaedia vol 25, para 342.
5*^ 1946 SC 52; A view supported by W. G ordon, Scottish Land Lair at para 7-61.
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accession”^  and could not tiietefore be conveyed separately from the land itself/*'^ ’ Such 
viewpoints relating to percolating underground water are influenced by Enghsh law in 
this regard and based upon the dictum of the Lord Chief Justice in Mcton v Blundell 
(explained above).
Riparian Rights
Again in similarit)^ to English common law, certain riparian rights in water in a defined 
channel which fall short of full ownership vest in riparian proprietors.^^ Such riparian 
rights are proprietar)^ in nature. In this sense Whitty has noted that “wlhle the doctrine of 
common interest developed originally, and is usually presented, as if it merely regulated 
the relations of riparian owners between themselves, rights are also enforceable against 
the general pubhc. In terms of the fundamental principles of Scottish property law, 
riparian rights are real rights”.
A riparian proprietor is “entitled to die water of liis stream in its natural flow witiiout 
sensible diminution or increase, and without sensible alteration in its character or 
quality”,”  A riparian proprietor also has a general right to make use of water which 
passes over his land and he may consume it in an unfettered fasliion for domestic
which seems contraiy to the traditional viewpoint that w ater on land (unless it is standing) is moveable -  
see K. Reid, supra n  49 at para 273.
Ibid at p 63.
As Wliitty has acknowledged, “ [i]n term s o f  comparative law, tire Scottish doctrine is very similar if  no t 
identical to the English doctrine o f riparian rights... T he history o f  tire Scottish doctrine o f  com m on 
irrterest how ever is very different from  the Iristory o f  the English doctrine o f  riparian rights. The latter 
emerged orrly irr the second qirarter o f  tire nineteenth century when it replaced the previous orthodoxy, 
ofteir called tire doctrine o f prior appropiiatiorr. By contrast the Scots law developed directly from tire jus 
commune beginning in tire early seventeenth century at latest and at no time received tire English doctrine o f 
p rior appropriation” , stipi'a n. 47 at p 451. T he term  ‘riparian’ was first used in Scotland in 1864 in the case 
o f  Morris v Bicket (1864) 2 M 1082, (1866) 4 M (HL) 44 — it has been argued that tire term was horrowed 
from  English law which in turn had been influenced by French sources tirrough the m edium  o f American 
sources — see Wliitt)^, supra n. 47 at p 457.
Û2 Wlritt}% supra n. 47 at p 451.
«  Young Co V BankierDistilhy Co (1893) 20 R (HL) 76 at 78.
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(primary), altliough not industrial (secondary) purposes.’ In respect of non-domestic 
(or secondary uses), it appears diat a reasonable quantity may be abstracted without 
objection, altliough there must be enough left for the uses of inferior proprietors.^^ A 
further prescriptive right to abstract for secondary purposes may be acquired, however. 
Gordon has suggested that “although the position is not entirely clear, it would appear 
that the prescription in question is the long negative prescription, cutting off the right of 
other riparian proprietors to object to the abstraction.”  The period of prescription 
would then be 20 years in terms of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, 
s 8.””  Again in similarity with English riparian rights, the law seeks to str&e a balance 
between the encouragement of exploitation of resources and the protection of the 
correlative rights of downstream proprietors to receive a flow of the water.^ *^
'Non-application of riparian rights to water outside a defined channel
In relation to surface and underground water outside of a definite channel, aldn to tlie 
position under English common law, the resource may be used freely by the proprietor 
of the land in which it is found and the limitations on such use in respect of water in a 
defined channel (to take account of tlie rights of otlier users) have no role to play here.”
The one exception to this rule is that, unlilœ die position of English law in this respect, a 
proprietor cannot intercept percolating water and hence cut off supply to the inferior
K. Reid supra n. 49 at paras 287-288. The rights may be limited under the com m on law — eg by com m on 
interest, servitudes, nuisance or public rights o f  navigation and additionally in various ways by statute -  eg 
the F lood Prevention (Scotland) A ct 1961; W ater (Scotland) A ct 1980 and the Civic G overnm ent 
(Scotland) A ct 1982. The abstraction regime is set to be radically shaken up by the W ater Services and 
W ater Rights (Scotland) A ct 2003. Tltis issue is discussed in detail in chapter 6.
Marquess of Breadalbane v W  Highland Ry (1885) 22 R 307, per Lord Ordinary (Welwood) at 310/ M /A/; v 
Glen-Moraj Glenlimt Distillery Co L td  (1898) 1 F 135.
E arl o f Kintore v Pine <& Sons L td  (1903) 5 F 818; see also Rigby and Beardmore v Doinnie (1872) 10 M568.
2^ W. G ordon , supra n. 58 at para 7-32. O nce tlie prescriptive right has been established, downstream 
riparians w ould no t be able to object to the abstraction on tlie grounds o f  exhaustion o f  the source.
T he riparian doctrine is further discussed in chapter 5.
'’'*2 Milton V Glen-Moray Glenlivet D istilhy Co L td  (1898) 1 F 135, 6 SLT 5, 206.
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heritor for purely spiteful reasons.™ This is because iti Scotland the right to drain away 
tlie water is subject to the doctrine of aemulatio vtcini under the law of n u i s a n c e . T h u s ,  
where a landowner conducts an otherwise lawful exercise of property rights for purely 
spiteful motives that may give the party adversely affected by the act grounds to bring a 
legal claim.^  ^ The rule may in practice be of little significance, however. As Ranldne 
explains “it must seldom happen that an act of enjoyment of property should be actuated 
solely by malice, by a desire to injure a neighbour. For that is what the rule requires. 
Mere caprice is not enough; and the slightest patrimonial interests, present or anticipated, 
win suffice to overcome the plea”.™
Capture and underground water
The following section examines the extent that what can be termed a ‘rule of capture’ 
applies in respect of underground percolating water. In short, a rule of capture sanctions 
the appropriation of a migratory thing from the land of another by the carrying out of 
activities upon one’s own land. Thus, the physical act of capture is sanctioned by die 
law. Aside from physical capture, some instances also involve die notion of legal capture 
in the sense that die physical act of capture also entaÜs die transfer of ownership from 
one part)^ to another.™" Clearly a mere physical capture brings with it rather less 
conceptual difficulties dian one involving die involuntary transfer o f ownersliip and 
diese issues will be picked up below in both this chapter and die next. Whether capture
2” K. Reid, supra n. 49 at p 339; com pare with Bradford v Pickles supra n. 17. It may further be the case that 
water cannot be drawn away where tltis causes a collapse o f  support to adjacent land.. T hese issues are 
discussed below.
2’ See Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia vol 14 paras 2034-2035; Karnes, Principles o f Equity (4^ '^ ed, 1800) p 42; J 
Rankine supra n. 1 p 381.
22 See for example BeU. Principles 964, 965.
25 Glassford vAstley 1808 M. Appx; J. Ranldne supra n. 1 at p 383.
25^  It is perhaps conceptually difficult to tltink o f  the physical act of capture o f  a substance leading to a 
capture o f  ow nership from  one party by another. As Penner has noted “ [n]o one can do anything to 
interfere w ith a person’s ownersliip o f an item  o f property^, since that is a norm ative reladonsliip. A person 
can only do things wliich interfere with a person’s possession. Interference is factual, and alters a person’s 
factual reladonsldp to an item o f  property^. T he only tiling that can alter a person’s ownersliip o f  Ids 
property are rules o f law or the exercise o f  legal pow ers” (J.E. Penner, The Idea of Property in Law  (1997) at p 
144).
is merely physical or both physical and legal, the key point is that it involves human 
intervention and this should be contrasted with property passing by natural causes - for 
example, when a wild animal strays across a boundary or escapes and is caught by 
another, or when water runs freely from one tract of land to another.
In this sense, water deposits underlying anotlier’s land may be intentionally extracted by 
an adjacent landowner, or more commonly, abstraction may be simply a bi-product of 
legitimate work (such as inining) carried out upon a neighbouring land. The existence or 
otherwise of a remedy for a disaffected party here may yield interesting ideas about tlie 
applicabilitj'- of property rights in a migratory substance lilte water. The law relating to 
underground water in tliis regard is also important in that it has commonly been used as 
an analogy to justify the existence of a law of capture in relation to hydrocarbons.™
England & Wales
It has been argued by some commentators that as a landowner has tlie right to make use 
of water percolating under liis land he may do so even if this serves to capture water 
from beneath the lands of others which would not otherwise have been drawn away and 
that in this his motives in so doing are irrelevant.™ Wliile this may be so, tlie rationale 
behind this viewpoint is based upon a clutch of early cases and it is in tlie view of tliis 
writer that many of these early decisions have in fact been misunderstood. The earliest 
decision in this respect is tlie aforementioned case of Acton v Bhmdellf The headnote to 
this decision would appear to be unequivocal as it reads that “tlie owner of land through 
which water flows in a subterranean course, has no right or interest in it, wliich will 
enable liim to maintain an action against a landowner, who, in carrying on mining
2-' D iscussed in chapter 4.
2^  See eg K. Gray and S.L Gray, Elements o f Land Law  4 '^' ed. (2003) at p 64. 
2'* supra n. 17.
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operations in his own land in the usual manner, drains away tlie water from tlie first 
mentioned owner, and lays his well dry.”™
It is important to note, however, that this headnote does not in fact accurately describe 
the legal principle set out in this case. In Acton, the plaintiff supplied his cotton miU with 
water from an underground web. The defendant, on rniniiig coal on liis land, pumped 
water which had begun to build up in his mine in order to keep this structure dry. This 
action, however, also caused the plaintiffs well to dry up. The Lord Cliief Justice stated 
that
the person who owns the surface may dig therein and apply all tliat is there found to his 
own purposes at his free wül and pleasure, and that if, in die exercise of such a right, he 
intercepts or drains off the water collected from underground springs in his neighbour’s 
well, this inconvenience to his neighbour falls within the description of damnum absque 
injuria, which cannot become the ground of an actioG*^
Although tliis seems unequivocal it should be noted that the pleadings in the case were 
somewhat vague and tlie judgement shghtly confused. On a true interpretation of the 
facts, as MacIntyre has suggested, “ [tjhe vital point to note is that no water was ever 
abstracted Jro?n the plaintiffs land. It was just prevented from getting there wliich is an 
entirely different tiling.”™ (emphasis added). Notwithstanding that the Lord Justice 
took the view that the water lying underneath the proprietor’s land (wliich tlie Lord 
Justice had in fact viewed as pars soli) could be appropriated by tlie lawful works of 
anotlier, given diat tliis comment is not directly relevant to the facts of this case, these 
remarks should be taken as merely obiter.
22 ibid.
2*^ ibid. at 353.
2'2 J. M aclntjve, 'The D evelopm ent o f  Oil and Gas O wnersltip Theoiy in Canada' in Oil and Gas Law: Cases 
andMatmats, R.J. H arrison (ed) (1975) at p 43. As M acIntyre notes at p, 43 (£n. 27), “ [a] close examination 
o f  the facts will bear out tltis conclusion, although the pleadings are obscure and the headnote is hopeless” .
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Subsequent cases that have been referred to in support of the notion drat a law of 
capture applies to subterranean water include Chasemore v Pdchardi'^ and Bradford v Pick/es.^  ^
In Chasemore, a House of Lords decision which has been said to form die leading 
authority in die area/^ the Board of Healdi for Croydon dug a large web wliich reduced 
die flow of the local river. A mib-owner who had hitherto utibsed the water of the river 
to drive his mbl claimed for damages when he now found his operations thwarted by a 
water shortage. The court dismissed die claim again on the basis that die respondents 
had an absolute right to extract water from beneath their lands.
Again jurists have latched on to this case as supporting the notion that water may 
legitimately be extracted from beneadi anodier’s land. Ferguson, for example, asserted 
that ^ \^Chasemore\ has definitely established that a proprietor can exhaust the percolating 
underground water on his own land, and diat he can do so irrespective of the extent to 
which it percolates from his neighbour’s land, or liis operations affect liis neighbours 
web.””  It is submitted diat this viewpoint is in fact flawed. In Chasezziore, a study of die 
facts reveals that die water had been intercepted prior to its reacliing the plaintiffs land. 
Therefore, extraction of die water from beneath that land did not occur. Sbubaiiy, in 
Bradford, the plaintiff was held entitied to sink webs into high ground which intercepted 
water on its journey to die plaintiffs reservoir. Again, however, it is important to note 
that interception occurred prior to the water reacliing die plaintiffs land. Whbe it may 
seem a fairly irrelevant distinction whedier or not in exercising rights to an underground 
resource, the water is drawn from beneadi a neighbouring land or merely stopped from 
arriving there, die distinction it important in diat as we shab be noted, many of die early
supra 11. 5. 
supra, n. 17.
82 Ferguson, The Law of Water and VLater Rights in Scotland, (1907) at p 327. 
53 at 329.
u s  decisions relating to capture and hydrocarbons are founded upon judicial 
misinterpretations of these early cases.
Despite the misconceptions concerning these early cases, nonetheless, there now seems 
ample authority wliich suggests that underground water can be appropriated from 
beneath an adjacent land without committing any actionable wrong. The earliest case in 
tills regard seems to be Popplewell v Hodkinsoff^ Importantly tlie basis of tliis case was 
not whether or not ownership is possible in underground water but whether a right of 
support from underground water exists at common law. Indeed it was conceded by 
counsel for the pursuers that “according to Chasemore v PJchards, and other cases, a man 
cannot claim a right to subterranean water as such.” As has been noted it is at least 
arguable that tliis may not be the case and indeed this submission is contrary to the Lord 
Chief Justice’s opinion in Acton v Blundell that underground water is pars soli.
Nonetheless, Counsel contended, that the lack of ownership in such waters did not mean 
tliat there was no right to support from tlie water and averred that the maxim sic utere ut 
alienum non laedas applied. He pointed to dicta to this effect in North Eastern Raihmy 
Company v ElliotE  This argument was rejected by the court, however. Cockburn CJ 
opined tliat “ [ajlthough there is no doubt that a man has no right to withdraw from his 
neighbour the support of adjacent sob, there is nothing at common law to prevent his 
drammg the sob, if, for any reason it becomes necessary or convenient for Ibm to do 
so” .”  This remark suggests tliat the law here is prbnarby concerned with the balancing 
of competing rights and biiplies tliat the absolute right to dram water takes precedence 
over the right of support of the water. In its judgement, tlie court made reference to a
5' (1869) E xch  LR 248. A lthough see also Elliot p North Eastern R/)> Co 1863 10 HLC. 333 at 359 & 365. 
55 (Ij. & H. 145; 29 Lj (Ch.)
5'> supra n. 84 at 251/252.
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number of possible industrial applications tliat might result in the withdrawal o f  support 
of underground water from adjacent land. The inference that can be drawn from the 
language used by the court is tliat a pro-development rationale was central to the 
decision. In the court’s view the law should not place hurdles in the way o f bona fide 
industrial activities.®*’"
PoppleweU has been followed in a clutch of more recent judgements including Eangbrook 
Properties E td  v Surrey County CouncilThomas v Gulf Oil Refining T t f f  and Stephens v Anglian 
Water Authority^ It was held in Tangbrook that the plaintiffs had no cause o f  action 
either in nuisance or in negligence when the defendants, in draining water from their 
own land, as an incident to this, also drained away percolating water from the plaintiffs 
land and caused subsidence. Altliough the defendant’s actions caused the plaintiff injury, 
this was a case of damnum sine injuria. Again the case turned on the fact tliat there was no 
natural right of support o f underground water. We shall return to tliis point below when 
comparing English and Scottish approaches to support.
Despite this right to drain water away from beneath an adjacent proprietor’s land, tliere 
is some authority to suggest that if a landowner drains water percolating from beneath 
his land and this has the effect of confhcting with the rights of otliers in a flowing stream 
(eg to drain water away from that stream) then such an action may be prevented by tlie 
parties so affected. In the case of Grand Junction Canal v Shugarf Hatherley LC overruling 
the judgement of Jessel MR, held tliat where a landowner’s operations had die effect of
5*'=“ A lthough it is n o t a pro-developm ent decision in the sense that industrial activities o f  ofliers m ay suffer 
w hen support o f  underground w ater is rem oved by another.
«2 [1970] 1 W L R 161.
»» (1979) 123 SJ.
s‘2 [1987] 3 A llE .R . 379.
90 1871 LR Ch D  483.
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draining off water which was flowing in a natural stream then he may be prohibited in so 
doing. He stated
if you cannot get at underground water without toucliing the water in a defined surface 
channel, you cannot get it at all. You are not by your operations, or by any act of yours, 
to diminish the water which runs in the defined channel, because that is not only for 
yourself, but for your neighbours also, who have a clear right to use it, and have it come 
to them unimpaired and undiminished in quantity.
There are obvious practical difficulties with this approach, which shall be discussed 
below. In any case the judgement has since been interpreted in a somewhat narrow 
sense. In what may be seen to be a somewhat creative decision, Lord Alverston in tlie 
case of English v Metropolitan Water BoarW suggested that in Grand Junction Canal Lord 
Hatherley’s comments were confined to a situation where a party had directly tapped the 
stream by bringing his drain into immediate connection with it. Lord Alverston’s view in 
this respect was influenced by the opinion of Vaughan WiUiams LJ in Jordeson v Sutton Gas 
CJ^ where he said :
[w]ith regard to Grand Junction Canal Co p Shugar it seems tolerably clear from the longer 
report of this in the Law Times that Lord Hatherley treated the case as one in which there 
was a direct tapping of an overground stream flowing in a defined channel, and not merely 
a withdrawal of percolating underground water affecting the underground stream.
Whether tiiis was in fact what Lord Hatherley intended -  and it is doubtful from the 
facts of the case whedier such a viewpoint is really sustainable -  Scotiand has firmly shut 
the door on liis general approach on practical grounds as outlhied below.”
Capture in Scotland
ibid at 488.
•2’ 1907 Jan  28, 29, 30 KBD
'^ - Jordeson v Sutton Gas Co (1899) 2 Ch 217 at 251-252.
'23 Tills vie\v|ioint has been upheld by courts in otlier jurisdictions also -  see for example the view o f the 
Oliio Suprem e C ourt in tliis respect in Fraper v Brown 12 Oliio St. 294, 310 (1861).
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In relation to whether or not underground water can be ‘captured’ from beneath 
another’s land in Scotland, it appears tliat Scots law has been influenced by case law 
south of the border in this regard. Ferguson, for example, points to tlie House of Lords 
decision in Chasemore v Richards inter alia as authority for the notion that water may be 
extracted from beneath another’s land without any action lying.™ As this thesis has 
already pointed out, Chasemore should not be read as providing authority for this 
proposition. Albeit tliat there is now ample other authority to suggest that this principle 
has been accepted into English law.”
There appears to be a paucity of Scottish authority in this area. As Lyall merely notes, 
“the position may be the same in Scotland”.™ Some cases relative to naming activities 
which may give guidance are discussed below.^®" One important case in this area though 
is Milton V Glen-Moray Glenhvet OistilkiyP In Milton tlie court held that in relation to 
subterranean water, any water which percolates onto that land by natural causes may be 
intercepted and extracted by the owner of die land -  it being no objection that die water 
has percolated from or en route to a stream or piece of land belonging to someone else.98
In Milton a lower heritor of a stream brought an action against a liigher heritor who sank 
a well 12 feet from the stream to supply water to his distillery. While recognising that 
under Chasezzzore a landowner is entided to freely appropriate subterranean water which 
would odierwise feed a stream, counsel for die pursuer suggested that “if it is proved 
that die well is fed in whole or in part by water wliich has once flowed in die stream die 
wididrawal of that water (even by percolation dirough the bed o f die stream and thence
‘2** Ferguson, ^upra n, 82 at p 327,
'25 See the discussion in tlie preceding section.
‘22’ Stair MetzzoridEncyclopaedia Vol 25 at para 346. 
‘22”' U nder ‘natural and non-natural uses o f  land’. 
22 (1898) 1 F 135, 6 SLT 5, 206.
‘25 See also K. Reid supra n. 49 at para 343.
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through the intervening strata) is outside the principle in the case of Chasemore, and falls 
under the general rules wliich regulate the rights of riparian owners in rivers and 
streams”.™ In tliis regard, counsel relied upon the English decision of Grand Junction 
Canal Co v ShugarW
Lord Hatherley’s view in Grand Junction Canal, however, was given short shrift by Lord 
KyUachy (whose judgement was later affirmed by the Inner House) who pointing to the 
impracticality of Lord Hatlierley’s view, stated that :
it does... appear to me that ... his Lordship’s decision... is extremely difficult to 
support... or reconcile... with the principles laid down so autlioritatively in the case of 
Chasemore p Richards. In the first place, the doctrine is not, in my judgement, a workable 
doctrine. Not to mention extreme cases... there is hardly, I should think, a coal or iron 
pit in this country which does not to some extent drain from the neighbouring strata and 
pump to the surface water that has at some time flowed in a neighbouring stream. 
Indeed I should think that the instances must be innumerable in which mining 
operations quite sensibly affect the level of neighbouring watercourses. Similarly, there 
are, I should think, few systems of agricultural drainage ... which do not, more or less, have a Hire r e s u l t .
This view points to a ‘floodgates’ argument whereunder tlie court is not keen to 
promulgate an inefficient rule which could lead to a glut of claims brought by disaffected 
claimants in response to legitimate commercial activities. Additionally, determiriing the 
existence of such potential liability may be difficult™™ and cosfiy for industrial 
abstractors to predict prior to carrying out tlieir activities. Moreover, die technical 
difficulty associated with determining exacdy how die abstraction had diminished the 
stream was alluded to when Lord KyUachy expressed the view that “I am not myself able 
to accept as substantial the distinction suggested between the interception of
22 Milton supra n. 97 at 40.
supra 11. 90 at 483. T he facts o f  this case are discussed above. 
Milton V GlenMoray Glenlivet Disiilleiy, supra n 97 at 140-141. 
A t that time perhaps impossible,
underground water percolating tlirough a stream, and tlie abstraction from the strata of 
similar water which has passed through the stream”.™^
It should also be noted that in this particular case, the abstraction from the stream was 
niinimal and had no real practical effect on water levels. In the view of tlie court, such 
abstraction from a defined stream would need to be at least material before an action 
might he.*”  Tliis leaves open the question as to whether habihty might follow from the 
significant tapping of a defined stream, although given strong opinion voiced by Lord 
KyUachy above, tliis would seem doubtful.
Would the case be different, if tlie abstraction served to take water away from beneatli, 
and hence dry up, neighbouring land? It has aheady been seen tliat according to the 
general principle set out in the Enghsh case of PoppleweU v Plodkinsonff' no action would 
he on the basis that there is no right of support from underground water. It may appear 
that the position is different in tltis respect in Scotland. In Bald v Alloa C Æ ÿ ” a 
proprietor granted a feu of a piece of land but reserved the minerals. On the land 
buUdhigs had been erected and they stood above coal wastes fiUed with water wliich 
supported tlie surface of the land. He subsequently granted tlie minerals to a third part)  ^
who on pumptiig out tlie subterranean water, caused subsidence resulting in damage to 
the surface and buildings wliich had existed at the time of the grant. In an action taken 
by the feuar of tlie land both the gran ter and the mineral tenants were found hable for 
tlie damage caused on the basis that tlie party who withdraws support does so at his 
peril.
ibid. at 141.
"'3 ibid. per LJC M acdonald at 143, and Lord M oncrief at 144. 
supra n. 84.
1854 16 D  870.
53
While this case at first blush may appear to be inconsistent with the Enghsh case of 
PoppleweU, it has been argued that this is not tlie case and that Bald and PoppleweU are in 
fact reconcilable, by imphcation Scotland should follow the Enghsh rule and that Bald 
can be distinguished on the basis that it involves adherence to die principal diat ‘one 
cannot derogate from his own grant’. In The Encyclopaedia of the Eaws of Scotland it is 
stated
[i]n PopplewelUs case CJ Cockburn said ‘[a]ltiiougli there is no doubt that a man has no 
right to withdraw from his neighbour die support of the adjacent soil, there is nothing at 
common law to prevent him draining that soil, if for any reason it becomes necessary or 
convenient for liim to do so. It may be, indeed, that where one grants land to another 
for some special purpose — for building purposes, for example — then since according to 
the old maxim ‘a man cannot derogate from his own grant’, the grantor could not do 
anything whatever widi his own land which might have die effect of rendering the land 
granted less fit for the special purpose in question tiian it otherwise might have been’ 
The exception here pointed at seems precisely to cover and explain the principle set outin Bald’s c a s e .  ^ *2)
While tliis argument is attractive, it is not entirely persuasive. Clearly the fact diat the
granter had feued the land to the pursuer and then leased die minerals to the mineral
tenant in the Imowledge that worldng the same would cause subsidence and damage to
the land and buildings diereon influenced the court in finding the granter liable. The
decision that the pumping away of the water was unlawful, however, appears grounded 
.on the general principle diat “ [t]he party who withdraws die natural support, or die
artificial support [such as percolating water] wliich conies in place of die natural support, 
does so at liis peril”.*”  By implication of the facts of the case, such an obligation not to , :y
remove support clearly, on audiority of Bald, extends to support of underground water -
which is contrary to the Enghsh position. It might also be noted that the arguments 
presented in the case make no reference to rights of property in underground water. If 
the court had been willing to hold tiiat such water is pars soli and the pursuer’s property’ in
' ”2' Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland supra n 55 at p 308. 
"’2 Bald supra n. 105 at 875, Lord Mar.
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situ, then arguably a case could have proceeded on the basis of misappropriation by the 
defenders of the pursuer’s property. Tins idea is returned to later below.
The right of support of underground water
The possible discrepancy between Scots and English law widi regard to rights o f support 
of underground water bears further examination.*®® The first key point to note is that die 
Enghsh position that there is no right of support of underground water has been 
criticised on die basis that it is ihogical and not consistent with recognised principles of 
land law. Tliis point shall be picked up shordy. It may be useful to begin, however, by 
noting that it has been argued that cases such as PoppleweU and Eanghrook Properties have in 
fact stretched what the courts determined m early decisions such as Bradford v Pickles. As 
Harwood has remarked, “[i]n \Bradford\ die wrong aUeged was shnply deprivation of the 
plaintiffs supply of water, not physical damage to his property. In effect the plaintiffs 
were complahiing about nodiing more than economic competition”,*™ which is to be 
contrasted with a situation where die drainage of water causes damage to the property of 
another. Tliis is certainly true -  the issue of subsidence was not present in Bradford As 
noted above in this thesis, that case was merely concerned witii allocating rights in the 
natural resource to competing users and deliberating whedier an abstracting party’s 
intention might be germane to the basis of any claim.
'"5 Tliis is n o t the only difference between tlie two systems o f  support. For Scots law, a natural right o f 
support arguably extends to land no t only in its natural state bu t also to land wliich has been  built upon. 
In Scodand, it seems also to be accepted that support is no t a right as such but ratlier that the otlier party is 
merely under an obligation no t to undertake works wliich result in the rem oval o f  support. For a 
discussion o f  these issues see R. Rennie, Minerais and ttze Law of Scotland (2001) d ip t  4; K. Reid, supra n. 49 at 
paras 252-262; W. G ordon supra n. 58 .at paras 6-80 - 6-130. This would appear not to be d ie case in 
England w here it seems that a natural right o f  support exists only in respect o f land in its ‘natural’ state and 
in respect o f  land which has been built upon  a right o f support will only exist where die right has been 
acquired, eg through an easem ent {Halsbuty’s Laws of England (4'“' ed) paras 172, 176). M oreover case law 
south o f the border has affirm ed the fact that a partj^ may be under an obligation to ensure that support is 
maintained against potential hazards n o t brought about by that part)?’s actions (although such habilit]' is 
based upon neghgence or nuisance and is no t strict) -  see for example, Leakey v National Trust [1980] Q.B. 
458 (C.A).
"^2 M. H aiw ood, ‘Water, water, eveiirwhere’ (1987) The Conveyancer 175 at p 176.
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Moi-eovei-, as tlie next chapter will elaborate upon, under Enghsh common law there is a 
right of support in respect of migratory subsoil substances such as sût and (arguably) 
rock salt (and of course there is a general right of support of the soil itsel:Q, Why tltis 
right of support should not extend to water is unclear. Although property rights barely 
feature in support cases, it might be contended that a right of support could be said to 
subsist in such things as sût and rock salt because these substances are part of tire soû 
and hence owned in situ, whereas underground water is generally perceived to be ns 
nulliits until reduced into possession. Furthermore, it seems from the reasoning 
employed in PoppleweU noted above, that on pohcy grounds the unlimited right to extract 
underground water is stinply taken to outweigh any correlative right of support for pro­
development reasons. Whüe such viewpoints wÛl be chaüenged in later chapters in tltis 
diesis, for the present time it can be stated that from a factual standpoint, such a 
distinction drawn between underground water and odier subsoû substances, is, of 
course, whoûy artificial. Land is rarely supported by water or minerals alone, but radier 
by a mixture of the two, and substances such as sût are themselves suspended in water.
The Enghsh position may be attacked furdier in die hght of later court decisions that 
have strived to draw artificial distinctions to circumvent the water exception and produce 
a desired result. In Brace v S.E. Regional Blousing AssociatioiW the plaintiff s house enjoyed 
an easement of support from the defendanf s house. When die defendant’s house was 
demohshed, it did not in itself interfere widi the support, but the resultant exposure of 
the earth to the elements caused dehydration of the eardi and consequent damage to the 
plaintiffs property. The court held til favour of die plaintiff even though it recognised 
diat there could be no prescriptive right of support from underground water. The
(1984) 270 E .G . 1286 (C.A.).
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distinction that the court drew was tliat this was not a case of draining away water which 
removed support (which by implication would not have been actionable) but rather tlie 
present case involved “altering the conditions which operated to afford support”.*** 
Eveleigh LJ. continued “I ... cannot equate... tlie drying out of clay, through 
atmospheric conditions, in particular by heat, as bearing any resemblance to then Idnd of 
activity tliat is granted immunity in tlie cases to which we have been referred.,. If I dry 
out a twig I cannot regard myself as talcing water from it in any ordinary sense of tliat 
term ...”**^ This view is illogical and as Harwood has suggested "Apparently the less 
water abstracted, the greater the potential liability!”.**^
The water exception in Scotland
It is worth noting that Rankine in fact criticised the decision in Bald on the dubious 
premise that it was contrary to the English position and it is by no means certain that tlie 
subterranean water exception would not also apply hi Scotland.**'* If one examines the 
Scots law of support, however, it can be argued that there are furtiier reasons for holding 
that the water exception is not a logical one in Scots law either.
Under Scots law, the issue of support is one wliich is particularly uncertain and vague 
and indeed some confusion exists as to both the legal basis for support and the extent of 
its application. After many centuries of legal indifference, in practical terms, tlie issue of 
support came to tlie fore in the mid-19®' century when tlie industrial revolution 
prompted tlie mass excavation of coal by mining in Scotiand. Aggressive excavation
ibid at 1288, per Eveleigh L.J. 
"UW.
'^3 M. H arw ood siipi'a n, 109 at p 179. 
Ranldne supra n. 1.
techniques led not infrequently to subsidence and hence a raft of claims from adjacent 
landowners that support to their land had been eroded.’*'*"
Many of today’s textbooks refer to the notion of ‘rights of support’.**® Despite this, it 
has been argued by Reid tliat this terminology is perhaps not appropriate.**® This is 
because there is no positive obligation on an adjacent or sub-adjacent proprietor to 
provide support and he need not do anything to preserve existing levels of support — tlie 
other proprietor therefore has no ‘right’ to support as such. The adjacent or sub- 
adjacent proprietor is under an obligation, however, not to undertake any positive act 
which serves to endanger existing levels of support.**^ Following Reid’s viewpoint it is 
probably better therefore to think of support less in terms of rights and more in terms of 
an obligation imposed on the adjacent proprietor not to carry out any act which removes 
support.**®
The Legal Basis of Support in Scotland
Tliis approach to support is relevant in terms of the legal basis of this obligation. The 
common viewpoint is tliat support arises ex lege as an incident of ownership.**® Thus 
Ranldne describes support as a natural right.*^ ** Such a term is perhaps somewhat 
Ülusoiy, however, and given tlie preferred viewpoint that support is best described in 
terms of being an obligation, it follows therefore that it may be more prudent to view
” “2'' See Reid, supra n. 49 at para 252.
’‘5 W. G ordon, supra n. 78 at para 6-80; R. Rennie supra n. 108; P. Robson and A. McGowan, Property Law  
2"'' ed (1998) at p 60; McAllister and Gutlirie, Scottish Property Law : A n  Introduction 1992 at p 43 -  see also 
the Coal Industry N ationalisation A ct 1946 (c59), s 48(1) (a), where die term appears.
Reid, supra n 49 at para 253.
” 5 Such a view pohit is recognised by odier key authors in the field including W. G ordon  supra n. 78 at para 
6-83; J. HaUiday, ‘Conveyancmg’ (1997) at para 34-05.
"2 R obson and McGowan, supra n. 115; McAlhster and G udirie, supra n. 115.
*2" Ranldne, supra n. 1 pp 384, 385.
Capture of water and proprietary remedies
*25 Andrew v Henderson and Dmmack (1871) 9 M 554.
*22 Caledoman RJy Co v Sproi (1856) 16 D  559, revsd 2 Macq 449, HL. 
*23 Buchanan v Andrew (1873) 11 M (HL) 13.
*2-5 See HaUiday, supra n. 124; Ranldne, supra n. 1 
‘25 W. G ordon, supra n. 78 at para 6-89.
*2‘'> R. Rennie, supra n, 108 at p 79.
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support as a restriction, on die use of land under the general notion of nuisance or 
neghgence.
The case-law, admittedly, does not bear out a common approach to the legal origin of 
support and three possible solutions are revealed. Reid suggests that despite the 
existence of case-law wliich points to support arising by common interest*^* and otlier 
authority that support be classified as an hiiphed servitude,*^^ tlie most sustainable view is 
that support arises under the general law of dehct or nuisance.*”  Under such a 
viewpoint, tlie obhgation not to remove support is merely one aspect of tlie general rule 
that a landowner use his propert)'' in such a way as to injure the propert}^ of his 
neighbour — sic utere tuo ut alienim non laedas. This viewpoint appears to be accepted by 
other key writers such as HaUiday and, by imphcation, Ranldne.*™ Under this view it 
would seem ihogical to differentiate in any way between the actions of parties wliich 
removes soü and that wliich draws away subterranean water. The support is either 
removed or it is not. Admittedly support provided by the hydrostatic pressure of 
underground water is often (as was die case in Bald) not natural support but rather 
artificial support. Tlds however should not alter die general situation. As Rennie has 
stated (affirming the view of Gordon in diis regard)*^ ® “ .. .it does not matter how or why 
the artificial support is provided; if it is there at the time of severance of minerals from 
the surface then it is the de facto support and cannot be removed. This seems... to be an 
accurate statement of the law”.*™
:;7
.
Aside from actions based upon support, it may be wortli considering the possibility^ of 
bringing an action simply based upon the fact that something tliat one once owned has 
been misappropriated (without consent) by another. Such an argument o f course 
depends on acceptance of the idea that underground water is pars soli and hence owned 
in situ (in accordance witli the doctrine a coelo usque ad centruni). As has been noted from 
Acton V Blundell and Scottish case-law that has followed this rule, such a view is at least 
plausible. If this is the case then it certainly seems difficult to countenance a rule that 
allows a thing owned by one party to be appropriated by anotlier party  ^without the first 
party’s consent. This, however, is exactly what court decisions in die USA affirmed in 
relation to hydrocarbon exploration and this general issue is examined in tlie next 
chapter.
For Scots law, however, it is hard to see how such a viewpoint could be followed. Not 
even by pointing to adherence to the doctrine of occupatio can it be said that such a rule 
should be justified. As noted in chapter two, the key point about occupatio is that even 
under its Roman formulation it has never sanctioned die appropriation of things that are 
currendy the property of another party.*”  Hence, in relation to migratory tilings (such as 
water), where the tiling is owned in situ, it follows that anodier party cannot draw diat 
thing away and claim rights of ownership in it on the grounds of occupatio. Once 
ownership of the migratory tiling has been lost by the original owner, tiien (aldn to the 
practical rule relating to wild animals*” ) it may be appropriated by another under Scots 
law. It is hard to see, however, tiiat Scots law would allow occupatio to occur when 
ownership is lost because of the act of die capturing party^ It is one tiling for the water to 
migrate by natural causes to beneath the land of anotiier; it is quite another for die water 
to migrate because of the activities of the other party;.
™ Justinian, Institutes II, I, 12; Digest 4 1 ,1,1, 3 and 5.
*25 D iscussed in chapter 2.
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The situation is, of course, different in respect of things which are res nullius. Since tirese 
things have never been owned, the party who appropriates the same should be able to 
claim ownership on the grounds of occupatio even if they have been appropriated from 
beneath the land of another.
These arguments are picked up again in die next chapter relating to hydrocarbons where 
the value of die substance itself may be of more consequence than is often the case widi 
underground water and hence proprietary actions may be more relevant. Suffice to say 
at this juncture, that it wiU be illustrated diat it is more credible to argue that under 
English law even where a migratory substance is owned in situ dien it is likely that 
property would pass to the taker, where that is a consequence of legitimate activities 
upon his own land, leaving no remedy for misappropriation to die aggrieved party;. Such 
a position may at least in part be due to the general lack of any notion of property; in 
moveables and remedies arising from such ownersliip in English law. This issue is 
explored more fully in the next chapter.
Natural and non-natural uses of land
By contrast to die general position espoused hi relation to die capture o f underground 
water, Reid posits the general proposition that for Scots law a proprietor may not 
undertake works designed to capture water from another’s land against die course of 
nature, although he cites no audiority for this.*™ If this proposition were to hold true 
then it would seem diat a landowner who conducts mhiing operations that seiwe to alter 
the dow of underground water which takes water away from a neighbouring land may be 
subject to legal action from the aggrieved party. As Reid continues, however, “this
i2'j Reid, supra n, 49 at para 343.
t).
difficulty is avoided by treating riiining as a ‘naturaf use of land, and tlie consequences of 
mining conducted in the normal way as ‘natural’ consequences. The rules therefore 
remain unbreached, while at the same time permitting mining by normal methods”.*®®
Reid here cites a number of cases including Durham v Hoodff Blair v Hunter Vinlayf^ 
Harvey v Wardrofi^^ and Wilsons v Waddelff The majority of the cases in fact relate to 
situations in which neighbouring land is flooded by die rnining operations of an adjacent 
proprietor. In Durham v H oodff for example, Lord President Inglis stated
[tjhere can be no doubt... tiiat the owner of a mine is entitied to work out his minerals 
without regard to the interests of his neighbour, so long as he confines his operations to 
his own grounds, and resorts to no extraordinary means of worldng; and if the effect of 
working out these minerals be to throw water down upon his neighbour who lies upon a 
lower level than himself, that is just the natural servitude which the lower heritor must 
submit to.., *36
In this case as the respondent had sunk a pit and exploded large charges of gunpowder 
widi a view to getting rid of water wliich flooded neighbouring land, diis fell outwith 
natural worldng of die land and an interdict was granted by the court.
Blair v Hunter Finlay <& Co*”  is a water abstraction case, however. In this case die court 
held inter alia diat an interdict would not be granted to proliibit mining operations which 
diverted water away from springs on die surface formerly used by neighbouring tenants. 
The Lord Justice-Clerk was unequivocal : “ [t]he law on the case is plain. The audiorities 
go to this, that a lessee of minerals is entided to work then in a way he pleases widiout
'3" Ibid.
*31 (1871) 9 M 474 at 479.
*32 (1870) 9 M 204.
*33 1824) 3 S 322 (N E 229).
*3-* (1876) 3 R  288, affd (1876) 4 R (HL) 29. 
*33 supra n 131.
*36 at 479.
*32 supra n 132.
62
reference to the injury he may inflict on a neighbouring proprietor, so long as he works 
them in a fair and ordinary way. He is not responsible for pumping dry springs wliich 
had formally been advantageous to a neighboming tenant... .”*®® Tliis view was echoed 
by Lord Cowan, where he stated that “the owner of minerals may work his mines in the 
ordinary manner, and will not be liable in damages, though mischief have resulted from 
his act, whether to neighbouring mine workings or to the adjoining heritors, provided 
always he has not acted wrongously or in aemulationem vidniff^'^ Importantly, Lord Cowan 
appears to regard underground percolating water as res millins until reduced into 
possession when he states that : “[t]he suspenders had no right to the water before it was 
brought to tlie surface, and as httle as when it was pumped up [by the respondents]” .*'*® 
Hence, in this sense no conceptual problem arising regarding the sanctioning of some 
sort of legal capture’ as outlined above.
Despite such viewpoints holding that where water is diverted away from a neighbouring 
land or passed onto neighbouring land by ordinary iiiining works, no action wiU he in 
damages or m interdict, as we have previously noted, tlie case of Bald would suggest tliat 
even in respect of a natural use of land such as mining, where that results in tlie removal 
of support from underground water to neighbouring land then an action would proceed 
on that basis and it must be assumed that habihty would be strict.
Summary of water rights
At tliis juncture it is appropriate to draw togetlier some of die common themes from the 
general analysis set out in tliis chapter. The above discussion has revealed a lack of 
consistency and at times clarity; of legal reasoning hi respect of water exploitation rights
*35 ibid at p 207.
*3'3 /W  at p 208. Contrast this with the English position set out above in Bradford v Pickles, supra n. 17.
6?
both under English and Scots common law. As noted above, tlie shifting physical 
characteristics of water makes it difficult to apply general ideas of property tliereto. 
Moreover the pubhc nature of water, in the sense that it is a life-sustaining resource vital 
for manldnd, has rendered it subject to limitations on private ownership. In this sense, it 
is important to differentiate between ownership and rights to exploit. For groundwater, 
in terms of ownership, it is arguably best seen as ?'es millms until reduced into possession 
but it is subject to a largely, unlimited right to exploit under both Scots and English 
common law. Under common law there are few (if any in England) limitations on this 
private right to exploit. Water in defined channels is again not tire subject o f  private 
ownership, but riparians enjoy certain, Hmited usfructuiy rights to abstract. While such 
riparian rights can be viewed as limitations on absolute rights to abstract to take into 
account the correlative rights of other landowners, they do not countenance wider- 
societal c o n ce rn s .A ltlio u g h  from an ownership perspective therefore, running water 
is generally deemed res conmtunes in the sense that it too important a public good to  be the 
subject of private ownership, this is somewhat irrelevant in the face of widely crafted 
private rights to exploit tire resource.
The issue of a law of capture is generally fairly straightforward in relation to water 
resources. Drawing water away from the land of another by virtue of works upon one’s 
own land, normally involves mere physical capmre. Despite some dicta to the contrary, 
as noted such water resources are generally deemed ownerless until reduced into 
possession. Title tiierefore merely passes to die first party to reduce tiie resource into 
possession -  even where tlie water has been physically taken from beneath an adjacent 
piece of land. In relation to percolating groundwater, the combination of a lack of 
technological Imowledge regarding water levels m dtu and the deleterious consequences
M oreover, tlie prescriptive right that may be constim ted may hi fact act to defeat the correlative rights 
o f  others.
of placing liability upon bona fide abstractors who had perhaps drawn water away from 
the land of otliers simply as a consequence of theit legitimate uses, weighed heavily in 
judicial determinations supporting this rule. In general, the law in this area has therefore 
been more concerned widi sanctioning legitimate industrial uses o f water and in die 
absence of any otiier ground of action (for example, in Scodand withdrawals motivated 
by spite and perhaps removal of support of underground water) aggrieved landowners 
wiU have no remedy at law. The above issues wdl be revisited ia die later analysis of 
reform of Scottish water law in chapters 6 and 7.
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CHAPTER 4 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN  FUGACIOUS MINERALS AND OTHER SUB-SOIL 
MATERIALS 
Introduction
This chapter concentrates on determining rights of ownership and use in relation to 
hydrocarbons and other fugacious and semi-fugacious substances iti tlie UK (including 
rights under the UK offshore hydrocarbons licensing regime). To this end, given a 
paucity of domestic sources, extensive reference is made to relevant US and 
Commonwealth authority. The chapter also analyses legal approaches to such migratory 
things manifest from time to time in relation to other related, principles of land-law and 
in accordance witli general notions of ownership. Some of the policy aims underlying 
tlie position of the law witli regard to these questions are also teased out and will bear 
further examination in die following chapters.
Hydrocarbons and UK Law
Under bodi Scots and Enghsli common law, the general proposition holds that all mines 
and minerals that lie beneath the sod belong absolutely to the holder of the dominium utile 
or tenant in fee simple as part of the land, a coelo ad centrum (unless reseiwed to the 
superior).' For England, this premise was first enunciated by Coke as follows:
L an d , in th e  legal s ign ifica tion  c o m p re h e n d e tli any  g ro u n d , sok o r  e a rth  w h atso ev er, as 
m ead o w s, p a s tu re s , w o o d s , m o o re s , w aters , m arsh es, m rfs  an d  h ea th ... I t  legally 
in c iu d e th  all castles, h o u se s  an d  o ti ie r  bu ild ings ... [and] besides th e  ea rth  d o th  fu rn ish  
m a n  w ith  m a n y  o th e r  necessaries fo r  his Hfe, as it  is rep len ish e d  w ith  liid d en  treasures, 
nam ely  w ith  go ld , stiver, b rasse , iro n , tynne, leade a n d  o th e r  m e tte ls  an d  a lso  w ith  g rea t 
v arie tie  o f  p rec io u s  s to n es  an d  m an y  o th e r  th ings fo r p ro f it, o rn a m e n t an d  pleasure. 
A n d  lastly th e  earth  h a th  in law  a g re a t ex ten t u p w ard s, n o t  only  o f  w ate r, as h a th  been
' A ltliough by statute all interests in coal are vested in the British Coal C orporation, presently by the Coal 
Industry A ct 1994 and petroleum  is now  vested m the Crown iiy virtue o f  tlie Petroleum  A ct 1998.
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said, but of ayre and all otiier tilings up to heaven, for cujus est solum ejus est usque ad 
coelum..7
The basic situation in Scotland in this regard can be summed up in the following 
statement: “a conveyance of land in unqualified terms [dominium utile] ghms a right to 
property in the substance or soHd contents^"' of the land without any assignable limit. 
This is what is meant by a conveyance being a coelo ad centrum. There are no limits in the 
vertical direction except such as physical conditions impose”.'^  As Reid has remarked 
“[s]o in a downward direction landownership encompasses the ground itself and all that 
is part of the ground {pars soli). This includes tlie constituent materials of the ground — 
soil, stones, minerals and tlie Hlce — and also trees, plants, buildings and other objects 
above the ground which have acceded to it” .'' This viewpoint is well established in both 
Institutional writings and subsequent case law.^
The common law position as regards hydrocarbons has never been clear cut, however. 
Prior to the statutory intervention of the Petroleum (Production) Act in 1934 that vested 
all petroleum on-shore in the Crown, the extent and nature of property rights that 
landowners held in petroleum reserves was unclear. Indeed the government of the day 
argued that given the uncertainties which shrouded common law rights to petroleum in
2 Coke U pon Littleton, 4.a. It is fair to say, however, that under English com m on law in practical term s 
tlie doctrine o f  a coelo ad centmm has been watered down somewhat. This can particularly be evidenced in 
relation to cases relating to trespass into airspace w here it seems tliat the right to airspace is limited to w hat 
a landow ner would reasonably require -  see for example, G riffiths J in Bernstein v Skjviews and General L td  
[1978] QB 479 at 487 -  and com peting rights o f  others may prevail. The doctrine is liltely to adhered to  in 
a stricter fasliion in Scotland -  see K. Reid, The Law o f Property in Scotland (1996) at para 163 and authorities 
below  in foo tno te  3.
T he reference to ‘solid contents’ rather than m ere ‘contents’ is interesting and may have been an im plicit 
reference to non-ow nersliip o f  water in situ. In  the case at hand, nodiing turns on tliis distinction, 
however, so perhaps notliing should be read into this.
Glasgow City and District Railway Co v Macbrajne (1883) 10 R 894 at 899, per L ord  M cLaren (affd (1883) 10 
R  894 IH). T he principle o f a coelo usque ad centrum is a proposition frequently asserted in Scots Law -  see 
Stair lusts II, 3, 59; II, 7, 7; Erskine Institute II, 6, I; ii, 9,9; Bell Principles ss 737, 940. For a Iristory and 
discussion o f  the maxim see F Lyall, The maxim cujus est solum in Scots Law  1978 JR  147.
’ K. Reid, supra n. 2 at para 198. Accession occurs where two pieces o f  property becom e co-joined in such 
a way as one becomes part o f the other.
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situ the drastic step of vesting such rights in the Crown was necessary to facilitate 
exploration/’ Much debate centred at this time as to whether it was possible to own such 
a fugacious mineral, in situ, or given its Vagrant’ characteristics, petroleum was (aldn to 
perceptions relating to subterranean water^) merely res nullius until reduced into 
possession.
Given the fact that petroleum reserves (which hiclude oil and natural gas) have been 
vested in the Crown for so long there has been httie judicial authority in the UK 
concerning what property rights lie with landowners in respect of oil and gas present 
below their land. In the light of a spate of US cases regarding rights of ownership in 
petroleum reserves, it seems prudent, however, to examine some of the theories of 
ownership that have developed in the USA. Additionally a clutch o f UK and 
Commonwealtli cases deahng with natural gas and shitilar fugacious and semi-fugacious 
minerals and other sub-soil migratory things may also provide some guidance.
US Theories of Ownership of Hydrocarbons
Given the multi-jurisdictional character of the legal landscape m the US, it wtil hold few 
surprises tliat a number of different tlreories of ownerslhp of hydrocarbons have been 
advocated and lent judicial support in the USA.
Hydrocarbons as Res Nullius
At tire time of the first cases relating to properpr rights in oil and gas, tire US courts 
found it difficult to reconcile traditional notions of ownership with a substance that
 ^ Craig II, vii, 17 & 18; Stair II, iii, 60 and 74; Ersldne. II, vi, 1; Bell, Piin., ss, 737-740, 940; Robertson v 
Rutherford (1840) 2 D. 1494, (1841) 4 D. 121; Harvie v Stewart (1870) 9 M. 129; Boyd v Bruce (1872) 11 M. 243; 
WDyte vLee (1879) 6 R, 699.
P. Cameron, Property Rights and Sovereign BJghts : The Case of the North Sea [1983] at p 53.
 ^D iscussed in the previous chapter.
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F or an extensive list o f  cases refer to Hemingway, The Law o f Oil- and Gas, 3rd ed, (1991) at p 25.
See Townsend v State, 147 Ind. 624, 47 N .E . 19; Hammonds v Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 255 Kv. 685, 
75 S.W. 2d 2 0 4 ;/(jwc'j- rForest O il Co., 194 Pa. 379, 44 A. 1074.
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moved by its own inherent characteristics to and fro beneath tlie soil. Given the fact 
that it was perceived that only animals ferae naturae and subterranean water shared these 
vagrant characteristics, tlie courts were quick to draw analogies with such things and 
apply tlieir interpretations of the common law relating to such issues to hydrocarbons/ 
Such analogies generally led to tlie result that a landowner would have no property in 
underground hydrocarbon deposits until they were extracted and reduced into 
possession.''
It can be observed that these early court decisions were therefore very much rooted in a 
formalist legal theory. Such a formalist approach considers legal reasoning to be a 
deduction tiiat proceeds from general rules established in previous cases. When faced 
with a new set of circumstances, under formahst approaches, courts wiU attempt to draw 
relevant analogies to till in tlie gaps and find relevant rules that can be applied.'" It is 
therefore perhaps of little surprise tliat in the wake of httie other guidance, courts strove 
to draw analogies with such other migratory things as running water or wild animals 
where the law at least appeared to be relatively well estabhshed.
It should be noted, however, that the analogy drawn between hydrocarbons and 
underground percolating water or animals ferae naturae is somewhat misleading and was 
fueUed by a misconception and lack of judicial Imowledge concerning tlie namre of oil 
and gas lying in strata that prevailed at the time of these decisions. As is now widely 
recognised, neither the migratory and fugacious nature of water nor the vagrant 
characteristics of wild animals can readhy be attributed to hydrocarbons given that “oü 
and gas occur in essentially closed systems with possible ownersliip restricted to the
owners overlying the reservoir” (and not as would be in the case witii running waters or 
wild animals, a whole range of landowners)," A further important point is that until 
tapped it is now well recognised that these minerals do tend to remain relatively stable 
widiin a given reservoir.'^
Today theories of ownership of oü and gas in US States have recognised these facts and 
the relative stability of hydrocarbon deposits beneatli certain tracts of land has resulted 
in two different approaches that recognise landowners’ proprietary rights; first, some 
States countenance ownership of oil and gas ‘in place’ beneath the surface of the ground 
as a separate estate; and secondly, some States recognise no ownership in oil and gas in 
situ as such, but rather what can be termed a ‘qualified’ proprietary right to search for 
and reduce the same into possession."*
‘Texas Theory’
The tlieory of absolute ownersliip, often referred to as ‘Texas theory’ on account of its 
origins, prescribes that the estate in petroleum reserves is a ‘defeasible’ or ‘determinable’ 
fee.''' In what can seen as strict adlierence to the maxim cujus est solum ejus est usque ad 
coelum et ad inferos, the fee holder owns oü and gas to the same extent that he owns other 
non-fugacious, minerals such as coal. It should furtlier be noted tliat aldn to tlie case 
with hard minerals, the estate in oü and gas can be severed from the remainder of the
See S.B. Presser and J .S. Zanaidl, Law and American History: Cases and Materials (1980).
Hemingway, supra n. 8 at p 25.
'2 J. M acIntyre, T h e  D evelopm ent o f Oil and Gas Ownersliip Theory in Canada, in O il and Gas Law ; 
Cases and Materials’ in R.J H arrison (ed.), Oil and Gas Law [1975] at p 43.
Strictly speaking, where there is merely a qualified right o f  some kind to reduce hydrocarbons into 
possession, the hydrocarbons w hen in place rem ain res nullius -  so at least in terms o f  ownersliip tliere is 
little difference between such an approach and a doctrme merely stipulating drat hydrocarbons are 7vs 
nullius. M oreover it shall be noted below that the issue o f ownersliip is itself largely a red herring and in the 
final analysis, at least in determ ining abstraction disputes, courts tend to always arrive at the  same place, 
albeit by a different legal journey.
See Anshut:^ Land Livestock Co. vs Union Pac R R  Co., 820 F, 2d (19th Cir. 1987); E llif us Lexon Drilling 
Co., 210 SW 2d 558 (Tex. 1948).
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land and hence transferïcd distinct from the land itself.'^ As the Texan Supreme Court 
held in the case of Texas Company
in place [tlie oil and gas] lie within the strata of the earth and are a part of the realtor. 
Being a part of the realty wliile in place, it would seem to logically follow that, whenever 
they are conveyed wliile in diat condition ... a conveyance of an interest in realty exists. 
It is generally conceded that, for the purpose of ownership and conveyance of solid 
minerals the earth may be divided horizontally as welt as vertically, and that title to the 
surface may rest in one person and title to the strata beneath the surface containing such 
minerals in another. Because of the fugitive nature of oil and gas, some courts, 
emphasizing the doctrine that they are incapable of absolute ownership until captured 
and reduced into possession... have made a distinction between their conveyance while 
in place and that of other minerals, holding tliat it created no interest in the realty. But it 
is difficult to perceive a substantial ground for the distinction. A purchaser of them 
within the ground assumes the hazard of their absence tlirough the possibiHty^  of escape 
from beneath the particular tract of land, and, of course, if they are not discovered, the 
conveyance is of no effect, just as the purchaser of solid minerals within the ground 
incurs the risk of its absence, and therefore a futile venture. But let it be supposed that 
they have not escaped, and are in repose within the strata beneatli the particular tract 
and capable of possession by appropriation from it. There they are clearly part of tlie 
realty.' ’^
The fact that such mineral rights are severable from the estate reflect the potential 
economic value of the resource and tlius efficiency rules would dictate that the such 
rights ought to be capable of being transferred in the same fasliion as other minerals. 
Oil and gas differs from solid minerals, however, in that ownership in place is defeasible 
or determinable in the sense that such ownership rights are lost when the oil migrates to 
beneath the land of another. As noted above -  and unlilce tlie case witli running water 
and wild animals - tliis is not something likely to be caused by natural causes. The key 
question from a practical perspective therefore, is whether title is lost when the oü 
migrates because of tlie drilling activities of an adjacent landowner. This important issue 
is returned to below.
Heniming\vay, supra n. 8 at p 27. 
176 S.W. 717 at 719-720.
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Qualified Ownership
The other popular American theory does not accept that full ownership can be vested in 
oil and gas in situ. Under the tlieory of ‘qualified ownership’, tlie landowner or lessee, 
whilst not having full property rights in situ to the resource, does have a recognised 
proprietary right to acquire such absolute title by reducing the hydrocarbons into 
possession."' It has been asserted that this proprietary right is analogous with a profit a 
prendrd^ under English common law or a servitude right to minerals under Scots law.'"' 
In fact the US courts have alluded to botli tlie concepts of profits and servitudes to 
classify tliis qualified proprietary right to reduce hydrocarbons into possession, although 
the majority of States that reject an ownership in place doctrine have alternatively held 
that a landowner holds a profit a prendre in the oil and gas in the ground. Importantly, it 
has been recognised that such a right is an estate in land in itself and hence severable 
from the land and transferable to otliers. In tlie case of Dabney-fohnston Oil Corporation v 
Walden the Californian Supreme Court held that
[t]he owner of land has the exclusive right on his land to drill for and produce oü. This 
right [arising] in tlie owner by virtue of his title to the land is a valuable right which he 
may transfer. The right when granted is a profit a prendre... an interest in real propert)»^  in 
the nature of an incorporeal hereditament. Under the usual oü and gas lease the owner 
confers on the lessee for the term of tlie lease an exclusive right to driU for and produce 
OÜ and other hydrocarbon substances. The profit a prendre... is an estate in real propert}^ 
If it for a term of years, it is a chattel real, which is nevertheless an estate in real 
property.2ü Where it is unlimited in duration, it is a freehold interest, an estate in fee, 
and real property or real estate. Thus... interests in oÜ rights wliich are estates in real 
property may be granted separate and apart from a grant of surface title.^ ^
It has been pointed out that the approach outlined by the court where the estate is held
for an unlimited time is somewhat contradictory. Bennet has suggested that
States that espouse such a theory include, N ew  York, Cahfornia, Alabama, Indiana, Ilhnois and 
Louisiana. F o r a fuller discussion o f  US ownership tlreories see Hemmiiigway supra, n. 8 at pp 23-30 and 
PlriUip et a l 'M odern Law o f Conseiwation : A nd You T hought the Law o f Capture was D ead’ 41 Kocky Mi. 
Min. Inst. 17. Rights, a prendre are discussed below, infra.
A profit a prendi'e is type o f interest wliich confers a right to take part o f  the soil, minerals o r natural
produce. Tliis does no t confer a right o f  ownersliip in sim (Bolton v Forest Pest Management Institute (1986) 21
D LR  (4 '^‘) 242, at 249), although it is sufficient to sustain an action o f  tort against diird parties.
T.C  D aintith  and A .D .G  Hill, Daintith and Wdlongbby’s United Kingdom Oil and Gas Law  2'“’ ed (1996).
In  similarity to a lease.
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the [Dabny] court seemed to adopt the ownership in place concept that a separate 
mineral estate owner can be created from an oil and gas lease of unlimited duration. 
The court noted that ‘altliough the oil and gas place doctrine is rejected, interests in oil 
rights which are estates in real property may be granted separate and apart from a grant 
of surface tide’ if the lease is for unlimited duration. In otiier words, the court 
recognized that such a lease creates a mineral estate and a mineral estate owner who 
owns the mineral estate in fee simple absolute — not just a mere profit a prendre or chattel
real 22
Tliis skewed reasoning is perhaps symptomatic of tlie problems which arise from 
attempting to deal logically with a substance tliat does not fit easily into existing 
categories of property rights. It should be pointed out, however, that the potential 
confhct between an unlimited grant of a right to reduce a thing into possession not 
owned in situ and determination that such a grant represents an estate in fee has not 
unduly concerned the judiciary in allowing die transference of such qualified propert)^ 
rights in other contexts. As discussed in chapter two, under the EngHsh common law 
relating to wild animals, although it is recognised that there is no right of ownersliip in 
wild animals present on land as such, the right of a landowner to IdU or reduce into 
possession the same -  which must be classified as aldn to a profit a prendre -  may be 
transferred to others for an unlimited period as an estate in land.
It is wortii noting that these sorts of definitional difficulties are manifest in other ways. 
For example, in respect of percolating groundwater, landowners receive proprietary 
protection afforded by the law in some ways but not in others. As noted in chapter 
three, under English common law it would appear that landowners are protected against
2' 52 P .2d at 243 (internal citations omitted),
22 J. Bennet, ‘O w nerslup o f Transm igratoiy Rlinerals, U tah and Zebras ; P ro o f that O il and Gas Ownership 
Law N eeds R eform ’ J L R E L  2001.
i :
loss caused by pollution of tlie resource by another whose land overlies tlie water but 
not against appropriation of all the water by tlie same individual/^
Other States that have rejected ownership in place have instead held that landowners or 
leasees hold a servitude right to oü and gas. For example, as the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana (with a civü law origin) held in Shaw v Watson “ [i]t is settled ... that a sale of a 
landowner’s right to oÜ and gas beneath his land is an alienation of a real right, which 
with regard to the prescription by wliich such rights are released is classed as a servitude 
upon tlie land”.^ *' Again the key point about a servitude right is that it is a real right and 
one which can be transferred to others.
Comment
Such a right to reduce the oü and gas into possession are very simüar to the qualified 
right to reduce wüd animals into possession in tliat it countenances the practical 
difficulties of vesting full ownersliip in a substance tliat exliibits Vagrant’ characteristics 
(albeit not, it is submitted, as vagrant as wüd animals) and hence is not under the control 
of landowners until reduced into possession whüe recognising the economic value of 
such substances to landowners wliich hence requites some form of legal protection. 
Moreover, tlie right is capable of being transferred to others separate from the land in 
order to facilitate its most efficient use.
Privy Council Authority
As has been noted, UK authorit)^ in this area is sparse. Furthermore it is difficult to 
draw any concrete conclusions from the case-law. A brace of Prhq^ Councü decisions
22 The relevant case is Ballard v Tomlinson (1855) 29 Ch D  11 -  the same rule also applies to wild animals 
see chapter 2.
2' Shaw, 92 S at 377-78.
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dealing with Commonwealth appeals^^ on the extent to which property rights may be 
said to exist in natural gas sets out contradictory views.
In U Po Naing v Burma Oil Company the defendants held a lease to a number of oil well 
‘sites’ and the right to take oil from tliem. In attempting to extract die oil the defendants 
were largely unsuccessful in this respect but did manage to draw out large quantities of 
gas. The plaintiff proceeded to raise an action against the defendants on the ground that 
the gas was his property. The Privy Council opined, however, that the plaintiff did not 
own die natural gas obtained from wehs sunk for the purposes of extracting petroleum 
for the simple reason tiiat natural gas, in situ, aldn to underground percolating water, is res 
nullius, and not tiierefore a subject of ownership until reduced into possession.
The Privy Councü, however, performed a notable volte face in the ensuing case of Boyrs v 
Canadian Pacific Paiilwayfi In this case, CPR sold land to Boyrs, subject to the reservation 
of petroleum. The petroleum was then leased separately to an oü company which 
proceeded to commence drilling activities. Boyrs subsequently sought an injunction on 
the grounds that the ‘cap of gas’ wliich he owned on top of die oü would be lost on 
extraction. In denying the injunction, the court was nonetheless “prepared to assume 
tliat the gas whüst in situ is the property of the [landowner] even though it has not been 
reduced into possession.”’® This is in direct contrast to the opinion of the court in U Po 
Naing that gas, in situ is res nullius. Why the court took a different opinion in respect of 
ownership of the gas is not clear from tlie judgment in tlie case. As shaU be discussed 
below, however, whether or not the hydrocarbons were owned in situ had no bearing on
25 Based upon  English com m on law. 
2<-> (1929) 56 L.R (IND. APP.) 140.
22 [1953] A.C. 217 
2R ibid. at 230.
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the decision in either case which followed US approaches in this regard and affirmed the 
efficacy of a rule of capture.
Fugacious minerals in Scots Law
Given the paucity of case-law it remains unclear what the position regarding propert}^ 
rights in fugacious minerals and other such sub-soü substances would be under Scots 
common law. '^' Speculation as to what the position in this regard would be can be 
gleaned by deduction from general principles. As has been noted above, that the maxim 
cujus est sohmi is a principle of Scots law is not debatable and while this brocard may have 
been watered down in practice in England this is arguably not the case in Scotland where 
as Reid suggests “the authorities are unanimous in asserting that doininium Hes with the 
landowner and in him alone”. I t  is it well established that, in general, minerals are 
therefore pars soli and owned in situ. Whilst the position regarding underground 
percolating water is unclear, on the balance of the authorities analysed in chapter 3 it is 
plausibly best viewed as incapable of private ownersliip until reduced into possession. 
Nonetheless, it would appear that given the relatively stable nature of oil and gas there is 
no reason to suggest that such hydrocarbons should not, aldn to hard minerals, be 
viewed as pars soli and owned in s itu f Moreover, as noted in the previous chapter, 
underground water is arguably treated as being incapable of private ownership in situ not 
merely because of its migratory nature but also because it is a life-sustaining resource 
essential to manldnd.^" The same cannot readily be said of oil and gas deposits,
This analysis is theoretical in some senses given that petroleum  resources have been vested in tlie Crown 
by statute.
2" Reid, supi'a n. 2 at para 198.
2’ O f  course the Petroleum  A ct 1998 expressly p ro tides that hydrocarbons in situ belong to the Crow n and 
the question here is tliat if  there were no nationalisation o f  resources w hat would the legal position  be?
22 G iven tlie im portance o f  w ater to societtr in general, this raises questions as to why the curren t com m on 
law in Scotland treats percolating groundwater and water in defined channels differently. Tliis issue is 
discussed further in chapters 5 and 6.
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22 T he law or rule o f capture is outlined in chapter 1 and discussed furtlier in relation to water in chapter 3. 
2-' Taverene, Co-opei'ativc Agremients in the Extractive Petrokuni Industiy, (1996) at p 1.
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patticuki'iy when other minerals of potential financial value to tlie landowner are (aside 
from exceptions provided by positive law) part of the estate in which they are found.
A law of capture and hydrocarbons
Nature of petroleum reserves
Recognition of the nature of petroleum reserves in their natural state is central to an 
understanding of the operation of a law of capture^^ in relation to hydrocarbons. 
According to Taverene :
[p]etroleum consists of naturally occurring and naturally generated hydrocarbons and 
associated non-hydrocarbon substances. Natural hydrocarbons are generated in tlie 
subsoil, in rocks referred to as source rocks, through deep burial characterised by high 
temperatures and pressures. After generation, the natural hydrocarbons migrate through 
the rock formations or rock layers and become entrapped in tlie pores or fissures of a 
suitable rock such as limestone and clean sandstone, Itnown as reservoir rock... Wlien 
brought to, appearing, or present at the surface... under atmospheric conditions, 
petroleum may be eidier solid (tar, asphalt) or a mixture of hquid and gaseous natural 
hydrocarbons... After being brought up through tlie borehole and passing the 
wellhead... petroleum is spht into crude oil, condensate and natural gas.24
It is obvious, therefore, that despite the fact that land is owned in precisely defined areas. 
Vagrant’ petroleum resources, being no respecter of artificial boundaries, may not fit 
neatly below any single defined piece of land. Indeed, a reservoir o f hydrocarbons may 
commonly extend beneath a surface area which has been divided into two or more tracts 
of land. In such instances, one of tlie major questions to be addressed relates to whether 
one landowner can legitimately develop the whole field by carrying out legitimate drilling 
activities upon his own land. WMe UK and Commonwealth guidance is sparse and 
contradictory, the overwhelniing consensus of the US case-law is that at common law 
such a landowner is permitted to develop an entire field leaving the aggrieved proprietor
witli a depleted tesource and no legal remedy. Such activities are sanctioned by the law 
(or rule) of capture.
Origins of the law of capture
The term ‘law of capture’ has its origins in tlie oü boom of the late 19"’ century in the 
USA. The seminal decision in this respect is die 1889 Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
case of Westmorland atîd Cambria Natural Gas Co v De. Witt.^^ In this case, in affirming the 
existence of a law of capture in respect of hydrocarbons, the court ruled that:
Hydrocarbons, like wüd animals but unhke other minerals, have the tendency and the 
power to escape, even against the wiU of its owner and to continue to be his propertj? only 
whüe within the area subject to his control, but when they migrate to other areas or fall 
under die control of other persons, that tide of the previous owner disappears. Therefore 
possession of the land does not necessarüy involve possession of the hydrocarbons. If 
someone driUing on his own land reaches the common deposit and obtains through those 
weUs the hydrocarbons of neighbouring areas, the ownership of that oÜ and gas passes to 
whoever produced it.. .2 '^
It is mteresting to note that the term ‘possession’ is used here in tlie fiftli line of the 
above quote mstead of ‘property’ and the two concepts do not seem to be properly 
distinguished here. This notion that remedies stem primarily from possession and not 
property (or ownersliip) is an Enghsh common law trait that wül be returned to later.
FoUowmg on from this decision, the subsequent case of Barnard v Monongahela Natural 
Gas Co^ '^  in a sünüar fashion afforded httie protection for those whose oü was extracted 
from beneath their feet. In the opinion of the court, tlie only option was for concerned 
oü-men to ‘use it or lose it’ and make haste drüling their own wehs. It is important to 
place these court judgements witliin the context of the industry at the time. From a 
poHcy perspective it is clear that the decisions of these courts set out a rule of 
convenience to meet the energy needs of a growing nation. Without such a rule, or any
25 18 A 724 (1889).
7F
'9: ri "A;
2*> ibid.
22 216 Pa 362, 65 A, 901 (1906).
2* B. Clark, ‘T he Law o f  Capture ; A Brick D ropped  in the P ond  o f Ownersliip T heory?’ (1999) 7 O G L T R  
178.
2'2 Barnard, supra n, 37.
4" J. Bennet, .ntprasx. 22.
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agreements between adjacent landowners, the oÜ simply could not have been extracted 
without incurring legal sanction.^® As McHvaine PJ. noted in Barnard “ [the law of -i
capture] may not be tlie best rule, but neither tlie legislature nor the highest court has 
given us any better” .^ "
A
■■SArguably the most interesting aspect of die law of capture is that it would appear that 
whether or not hydrocarbons are viewed as being owned in situ, subject to a qualified 
proprietary right to reduce them into possession, or are merely res nullius is not a relevant A
"I
factor in a capture situation and in every case the legitifnate drilling activities of one party A
may lawfully appropriate hydrocarbons which have been drawn from beneath another’s 
land. At least in respect of the issue of capture, the issue of ownership of hydrocarbons i|
in the ground is to a great extent superfluous. Bennet has gone so far to remark
one must ask whether these theories [of ownership] really assist legal practitioners and A
pubhc administrators in the twenty-first century in predicting how a confhct in the arena ty
of oil and gas wih be decided or whether these theories are merely Socratic method r'
fodder that law professors love to throw at s t u d e n t s . ^ o  7
i1
This may be true to some extent but nonetheless the issue of ownership throws up some - S
interesting conceptual questions. Where ownership of the hydrocarbons in place is A
recognised it seems, at first blush, a somewhat odd notion that this right of ownersliip 
does not hi practice prohibit the taldiig of property from party A by party B without 
party A’s consent. As has been noted previously, in relation to oil owned in sdtu, the US 
courts have held that given the fugacious nature of oh and gas, ownership is simply taken
to cease if the oil and gas migrates/' This does not merely apply where the oü migrates 
by natural causes (somediing which in practice is unHkely to occur); the exception goes 
so far as to sanction the ‘capture’ of hydrocarbons from beneath one tract of land caused 
by the legitimate drilling operations of an adjacent landowner. The Supreme Court of 
Texas opined that
[t]he rule is shuply that the owner of a tract of land acquires title to the oü and gas which 
he produces from weUs to his land, though part of the oü and gas may have migrated 
from adjoining lands. He may thus appropriate tlie oü and gas that have flowed from 
adjacent lands without the consent of the owner of those lands and without incurring 
habüity to him for drainage. The non-habüity is based upon the tlieory that after 
drainage the title or interest of the former owner is gone.4^
Many US states (i.e. those that have adopted quaHfied proprietary rights reghiies), 
however, have found the absolute ownership theory untenable not only in relation to tlie 
question of how full ownership can vest in substances over which a landowner has 
neither possession nor control but also because the rule of capture is viewed as being 
anathema to this doctrine’s central tlieme, along the lines of ‘if someone has full 
ownersliip in property how can it be appropriated by anotlier in tlie absence of the 
owner’s consent without any resulting ground of action?’ It has been argued that ;
this result was contrary to die essential characteristic of ownership, viz., the right of an 
owner to foUow and to re-acquire his property from one who has removed it without 
permission, and concluded that oü and gas are incapable of being owned apart from the 
rest of the land until actuaUy reduced to possession, the right of the landowner being one 
to search for and produce such products.42
4’ Hemnüiigway, supra, n. 8 at p 25.
42 E llif V Texon Dnlling Co.210 SW 2d 558 (Tex. 1948). Tliis theon^ is recognised in a num ber o f states 
including Texas, hlicliigan, W est Virginia, O luo, Pennsylvania, N ew  Mexico and Tennessee.
42 Hemmingway, supra n. 8 at p 28.
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Capture of hydiocarbons/other fugacious substances under UK/Commonwealth case- 
law
Does the law of capture operate in respect of hydrocarbons and other sub sod migratory 
substances in the UK? The short answer to this question is that the position is unclear 
and what httie case-law exists in this area is somewhat contradictory.
Natural gas
In the aforementioned Priv}  ^ Council appeal of U Po Naing v Burma Oil Company the 
analysis is straight-forward and the court simply took the view that the gas, aldn to 
running waters was res nullius and hence it belonged to no one unth reduced into 
possession with die first party acquiring the gas thus taking tide to it. This case then 
merely involves what can be termed ‘physical capture’ rather than ‘legal capture’ — tide to 
die gas does not pass from one party to another as the gas is simply taken by the first 
party who acquires it from an ownerless state. Capture is ‘physical’ in the sense that it is 
physically taken from beneadi an adjacent land and the law leaves deterrninations of 
ownership rights until after when possession by one party has taken place.
The subsequent Privy Council appeal of Boyrs v Canadian Pacific Purilwafi  ^ is far more 
enhglitening on die issue of interaction between ownership and the law of capture. In 
brief, even though the court took die view that the gas could be owned in strata, their 
Lordships were not prepared to hold “that the [oü company] is under an obligation to 
conserve the appeUant’s gas widi the consequent denial of the right to recover the 
petroleum in die usual way.”''" The most salient issue in Boyrs therefore is cleady not
44 supra n, 26,
45 supra 11. 27. Facts discussed above.
4C W a/228 .
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one of ownership but rather a balancing of correlative rights. As their Lordships noted,
“the question [and hence the more important issue] is not whose property the gas is, but 
what means the respondents may use to recover their petroleum”. From the judgement, 
the most important aspect of the case in terms of balancing the opposing rights of the 
applicants seems to lie in the fact that tlie respondents had an express grant to the
petroleum (albeit not from the appellants) in respect of which it must have been implied A
i;that there was a right to work the same."’ As their Lordships remarked “ [b]ut the main 
strength of the respondents’ case is that they have a direct grant of the petroleum, 
whereas tlie appellant has merely such residual rights as remain in him subject to the 
grant o f the petroleum”."® Obviously therefore, the facts of this case are not fully 7
analogous to a simation where two adjoining landowners have equal rights to reduce 
petroleum (which lies in a joint reservoir) below their land into possession.
The fact that work was carried out in accordance with usual practice was also seen to be 
in the respondent’s favour. Counsel for tlie appellants had contended that tlie earlier 
case of Barnard-Argue-Roth-Steams Oil <& Gas Co L td  v LarqttharsorC was authorit}^ for die 
proposition that in working reserved petroleum the respondents would be bound to take A
proper care to preserve the appellant’s gas. Their Lordships held that the key point in A
Farquharson (which in fact related to the reservation of ‘springs of oü’) lay in the fact that A77in that particular case the owners of the oü did not recover theit oü in the normal way M
but rather did so by tapping the respondent’s gas m a ‘different container’.®" Later in die 
Farquharson judgement the court in fact affirmed die general rule which was subsequendy 
foUowed in Boyrs
42 ibid at 228. There was no express right to work the minerals. 
48 /W .at 229.
4'4 [1912] AC 864.
the company are clearly entitled to search for and work for oil in these springs o f oil and 
to win and carry it away from them, provided they do so in a reasonable manner and do 
as little injnqr as possible. Wliile the point does not arise in this appeal for decision, 
their Lordships think that the company would not he responsible for any inconvenience 
or loss which might be caused to the respondents... in the conduct of their operations 
in the manner mentioned.^i
In Boj?s it was pointed out that the only possible grounds of challenge might have been 
under the appeUant’s right of support, had the surface been disturbed. As there was no 
evidence of removal of support, this point was not considered further by the court. This 
aspect of tlie decision appears to be in line with US case law, aUuded to above, which 
suggests that even where die gas (or oU) is owned in situ dien it can be lawfuUy 
appropriated by the legitimate works of another. This decision — similar to die USA cases 
— is clearly underpinned by a pohcy consideration that supports die notion that natural 
resources are there to be appropriated and the purpose of die law should no t be to 
impose barriers to such exploitation but rather facilitate legitimate activities in diis 
respect.
Asphalt
The decision of the Privy Council in Trinidad Asphalt v Ambarct^ sits somewhat uneasUy 
with Bojrs and at first blush seems to support a thesis denying the operation of a US- 
fashioned law of capture. In Trinidad Asphalt, when the defendants dug away their land, 
the semi-sohd pitch or asphalt present on die plaintiffs land was exposed to the 
elements and dieii oozed over into the defendant’s border and was appropriated by the 
defendants. AdditionaUy, the defendants’ excavation also had the effect of damaging 
some buddings on the plaintiffs’ land due to subsidence which resulted from die removal 
of die asphalt. The Privy Councü was prepared to hold diat there had been an
50 A/7 at 870.
5 ' ibid at 871.
52 [1899] A.C. 594,
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actionable wrong and awarded damages in respect not only of damage to buildings but 
also tlie value of the pitch itself (which greatly exceeded the value of the buildings) on 
the basis that the pitch, as part of the soil carried witli it a right of support which had 
now been eroded. The fact that damages were awarded hi respect of tlie subsidence to 
tlie buildings caused by the removal of support should hold few surprises as diis is 
clearly in hne wltli the general obligation under English law not to remove support 
discussed in the previous chapter/® What is perhaps somewhat more unexpected is that 
damages for appropriation of tlie pitch was also awarded.
An action brought on the grounds of support would not generally hivolve an award of 
damages in respect of the value of the thing providing support which had been removed 
(of course, this is rarely an issue m support cases where the complaint relates to 
subsidence and structural damage). Nor did the Privj^ Council indicate tliat the actions 
of the plaintiffs amounted to theft (although it was indicated that tlie asphalt was part of 
the sod and hence by implication part of the estate in wliich it lay). In the rather opaque 
judgement, damages in respect of tlie pitch appear to have been awarded simply on an 
rather unsubstantiated equitable basis. The order of the full court in appeal that damages 
be payable only in respect to damages to propertqr on tlie plaintiffs land was in the 
opinion of Lord MacNaghten of the Prhry Council, “ [a] conclusion so lame and 
impotent [that it is] hardly in accordance with tlie principles of equity or common 
sense”®" The damages the Priv)^ Council deemed suitable were in accordance witli the 
original judgement of the Chief Justice and as such, payable in relation to the “injury 
[caused] by the loss of the [pitch].”®®
52 See support section ni chapter 3.
54 Trinidad Asphalt, supra n. 52 at 601.
5^ ibid at 502.
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What seems to set Trinidad Asphalt apart from the gas cases of Boyrs and U Po Naing is 
that the latter cases are concerned with a situation where one part}  ^ is legitimately 
exercising a right to work the minerals in accordance witli proprietary or contractual 
rights. Trinidad Asphalt on the other hand involved behaviour by the defendants which 
can be considered illegitimate and hence in terms of balancing tlie rights of the two parties 
the court sought to find a way to uphold the plaintiff s arguments and support legitimate 
uses over illegitimate ones. Whether the actions of the defendants in appropriating the 
pitch were prima fade unlawful as such is a moot point. The fact that the land had 
subsided as a consequence of support being removed gave further credence to the 
plaintiffs case and provided a ground of action which allowed the court a device by 
which to award damages in respect of the value of the pitch. Such subsidence was of 
course not present in the natural gas cases alluded to above.
Painning Silt
In Jordenson v Sutton, Southcoates and Dtypool Gas C o f  which involved the withdrawal of sût 
from beneatli anotlier’s land, the case was determined by reference to the fact that sût 
(unlilte water) should be viewed as part of the soil and tiierefore subject to a right of 
support. When die actions of die defendants seived to remove die sût from the 
plaintiffs land and hence caused subsidence, an actionable wrong had taken place and a 
claim for damages was upheld. The issue of property in the sût was not direcdy relevant 
to the analysis. Unlike Trinidad Asphalt tiiere was no conscious effort to ‘capture’ the silt; 
diis was merely a by-product of the work undertaken on the defendant’s land. The sût 
was in itself of no value and hence no damages were sought in relation the substance 
itself.
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Brine
The first case dealing with the removal of brine (salt dissolved in water) from beneath 
the land of another is Sait Union L td  v Bmnner, Motid and Cofi When it was alleged that 
the removal of brine from beneatli adjacent land caused subsidence, the court was able 
to side-step tlie question of whether this gave rise to an actionable wrong as on the facts 
the court was satisfied that it had not been proven that the defendant’s pumping 
activities had caused the subsidence. The (pbitef) words of Alverstone CJ, suggest, 
however, that where legitimate pumping activities had the effect that brine was 
appropriated from beneath adjacent land tliere would be no actionable wrong. As 
merely amounting to water with salt dissolved therein, brine did not carry with it a right 
of support.®®
A different result ensued in the subsequent case of Loins L td  v British Soda Cofi In this 
case, serious damage had been caused to buddings on a factory site belonging to Lotus 
Ltd, a shoe manufacturer, due to subsidence of theit land caused by ‘wdd brine’ pumping 
by tlie defendants, on nearby land. Wild brine pumping is the extraction by pumping of 
saturated brine resulting from the dissolution of rock salt by water. As the defendants 
extracted the bi'itie, more water flowed beneath L’s land which had die effect of 
dissolving more salt. The resultant brine was pumped away to be replaced by yet more 
water which had the effect that land and buildings had subsided. The defendants 
argued with regard to die pumping of brine diat no case should He as “diere is no 
distinction between brine and water when considering what may be pumped from 
beneath one’s soH. Brine is merely water containing some degree of salt, and indeed aU
55 [1899] 2 Ch 617.
52 [1906] 2 KB 822.
58 T he inconsistency inherent in not affording a right o f support to underground water is discussed in 
chapter 3.
5'2 [1969] 1 Ch 123.
86
water contains some salt.” They pointed, inter alia to dicta in Salt Union L td  v Brunner, 
Mond eV Co as authority for this proposition."" The plaintiffs however, pointed to tlie 
fact that “no question arises in the present case of a right to support from water, or even 
from brine, as opposed to a right of support from solid rock salt\ (emphasis added)."' 
The fact that such a mineral was part of the soil, it was argued, gave rise to a right of 
support. The court agreed witli this viewpoint and following jordenson v Sutton Southcoates 
and Dtypool Gas Co^  ^ found that the defendants were liable in damages. Additionally, L 
Ltd was entitled to claim an injunction to proliibit further such pumping by tlie 
defendants. The illogical differentials drawn between citcumstances in wliich a party 
draws away underground water and where a party draws away a substance such as sût — 
which is itself suspended in water - that causes an erosion of support has already been 
noted.
Comment
To make some general comments about the law of capture, it is trite to remark that no 
real measure of doctrinal consistency results from tlie relevant case law. The main 
principles that appear to exist are that where a substance is captured from anotlier’s land, 
damages or an injunction may be brought primarily when a right of support has been 
infringed. For this to occur it would seem that the substance removed must be part of 
the soil — eg asphalt, sût or rock salt and that the removal of the same must cause actual 
subsidence (which ruled out a claim on such a basis in Boyrs). If no right of support is 
infringed then in so far as the activities which are carried out on the defendant’s land 
represent a legitimate working of the land carried out in the usual way then it would 
appear that no action will he -  this is fuUy in hne with US cases relating to oû and gas
5" ibid at 127.
51 /W a t  125/126.
52 [1899] 2 Ch 217 CA.
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exploration. Altliough it causes conceptual problems with the idea of propertjq the 
extent of property rights vesting in the tiling in situ do not appear to be germane to 
whether or not an action wih lie (at least under English common law). Property rights 
are largely ignored and in the absence of any other ground of action such as support or a 
nuisance/negligence remedy, the right to exploit property legitimately out-flanks the 
property rights of the aggrieved party.
In Trinidad Asphalt damages were awarded in respect of tlie value of the appropriated 
substance itself. As has been noted, however, the judgement is somewhat opaque and 
no real legal rationale is presented to justify the award of damages in respect of the pitch 
wliich was appropriated by the defendants. It is arguable that the unsatisfactory nature 
of tlie judgement in Trinidad Asphalt is symptomatic of the deficiencies inherent in 
Enghsh common law notions of ownersliip, which shall be discussed below.
Limitations on English common law notions of ownership
While notions of ownership vary across legal jurisdictions, tlie concept has a number of 
general features tiiat are commonly taken as read. According to Mattei,
[ojwnersliip must be protected by die most effective set of legal remedies that are 
available in the legal system given tlie citcumstances. Typically, the owner will be 
protected against (I) dispossession (by a remedy tliat allows him to recover the 
commodity), (2) behaviors that interfere with tiie exercise of the property right both 
temporarily (nuisances) or permanently (destruction) (in this case the legal system will 
use the most effective protection that is available given the circumstances — typically 
injunctions and other specific remedies — rather than damages), and (3) claims both 
exphcit or imphcit of incompatible rights over the object of ownership.52
As ahuded to above, where a migratory tiihig is owned in situ by a landowner or leasee, a 
law^  of capture would appear anathema to tiiese general legal protections attendant to
52 U. Mattel, Basic Principles ofPivpeiij Law  (2000) at p 7'7.
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ownersWp. To some extent it may be possible to rationalise this conundrum under the 
fact that the English common law arguably does not fully countenance tire idea of 
ownership — at least in respect of moveables.
Smith, for example, goes as far to say that
[ownership] rarely troubles practising lawyers, whose concern is usually as to what 
property is subject to ownership or else what proprietary rights are recognised. The 
nature of ownership may be seen as more of a jurisprudential question than a legal one. 
[The reason for this lack of interest in the issue of ownership is that] [ojwnership in 
English law is remarkable for the absence of remedies based upon proof of 
ownership... [common law] remedies are usually based upon possession and rights to 
possession. It is generally sufficient simply to prove a better right than the other party 
and not necessarily to prove absolute ownership. This has the consequence that issues 
relating to ownership are less likely to come before the courts.
This legal proposition is very much symptomatic of tlie historical inductive development 
of tire common law system, in wlrich it is the existence of recognised legal remedies 
tireurs elves which bestow rights, rather than the deductive civilian notion that the 
existence of a general right confers certain remedies. Under English common law, no 
special remedies have developed to enforce proprietary rights. Interests in tangible 
property are by contrast protected under the banner of 'trespassory protection’ for 
interference with possession‘s^ wliich encompasses a number of tortious remedies 
including trespass and nuisance (in respect of land) and trespass and conversion (for 
personalty).^’'’
' R. Smith, Property I miv 2'^ '^ ed (1998) at p 7.
This emphasis upon  remedies based upon possession rather tlian ownersliip is a very pragmatic 
phenom enon. Penner has noted diat “ [n]o one can do anything to interfere witli a person’s ownersliip 
o f  an item, since that is a norm ative relationsliip. A person can only do things which mterfere witli a 
person’s possession. Interference is factual, and alters a person’s factual relationsliip to an item  of 
property. The only tiling tliat can alter a person’s ownersliip o f liis property are rules o f  law or the exercise 
o f  legal pow ers” -  J. Penner, The Idea of Pivpety in Taw  (1997) at p 144. I t is im portant to emphasis, 
however, that possession is n o t merely a factual m anifestation o f ownersliip, it is a distinct legal right in 
itself — see ITalsbniy's Laws ofTngland, (1960) 3"’ ed Vol 29 at paras 720 -724.
See generally A. Tettenborn, Clerk z r  Undseil on Torts (18th ed (2000), Ch.14; R. F. Pleuston and R. A. 
Bucldey, S almond zT Hens/on on the Taw of Torts (21st ed) (1996); W. V . H. Rogers, Winfield eh Jolowics  ^on Tort 
(16th ed) (2002); S. W ortliington, Personal Property Taw : text and materials (2002) d ip t  7.
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It is tempting to argue tlierefore that given tliat oil and gas in the ground has never been 
possessed by the landowner then as long as the actions of tlie taker are in themselves 
legitimate and in the absence of any other remedies such as support (and there would 
clearly be no trespass in such a scenario) then in keeping with the emphasis on 
possessory remedies then no valid claim can be made by tlie aggrieved party. This, 
however, is to oversimplify matters. Where oü and gas is owned in situ or subject to a 
qualified right to reduce into possession, even where, as usual, tliere is no other available 
action based on support or trespass, the tort of conversion (a possessory remedy) would 
arguably allow the return of the oh and gas (or an equivalent value). Even though the oh 
and gas is not in tlie possession of tlie landowner when it is taken, the original 
landowner undoubtedly has a right to take the same into possession which importantly may be 
the basis for an action under this remedy.
Despite the theoretical possibhit}^ of such a possessory remedy it is Hlrely that obstacles 
to the bringing of a clahn may result from the fact that English common law does not 
recognise ownership as an absolute tide. In practice it is not for the aggrieved landowner 
to prove an absolute title, rather that in relative terms his title is better tlian the takers.'’^ ’' 
Tliis is precisely perhaps where the problems for the aggrieved landowner arise m that 
die judge-made law of capture simply holds that the taker’s tide is die better one in 
relative terms. The case-law is unanimous that there is simply a choice to be taken 
between die competing rights of die parties. The law of capture affirms that the 
ascendancy of exploitation of natural resources accords the capturer widi the better right 
than the correlative right (of potential future exploitation) by die other part}% Tliis 
would even be the case where there is ownership in situ of underground minerals. In die
9 0
absence of a case founded on support, or trespass tire legitimate taker in possession gains 
a title which is deemed by the courts to be better tlian the landowner who has seen the 
resource taken from beneath his feet.
Injunction
The question of whether an injunction could be applied for prior to exploitation of tlie 
shared resource talting place may be a different matter, however. The remedy of 
injunction may be sought by any party to prevent the commission of alleged torts which 
are anticipated. Given tliat the award of damages is the primary remedy in England and 
Wales, an injunction, as a discretionary remedy is generally granted where the injury or 
loss would be such that it could not properly be quantified.'’^
To succeed with such a remedy, an aggrieved proprietor must first estabhsh that he has a 
proprietary interest which will be irreparably damaged if the action of the defendant is 
not h a l t e d . W l i i l e  a landowner may well have a proprietary interest in oil and gas 
beneath his land, it seems clear, however, that a law of capture sanctions tlie legitimate 
activities of the otlier party so that his proposed act cannot be seen as an unlawful 
invasion of those propertj^ rights and hence an alleged tort.
It needs to be noted, however, that injunction is an equitable remedy which can be 
granted at the discretion of the court. Tliis remedy is normally granted when tlie court is 
of the opinion that it would be “just and convenient” to do so.™ Even though in 
practice the courts have generally been reluctant to grant an injunction where aU the
See H akh/ny’s Taws o f England 4''' ed. V ol 45 (1985).
This rule can be traced back to A n n o y  v Delamire (1722) 1 Stra. 505; 93 E..R. 664.
Brazier, Street on Torts, IB ’ Ed. (1999) at p 516.
Proctor n Bai/ey (1S89) 2Ch..'D'h9T, Pride of Derby T td  i> British Ceianese T td  {\9Sy) 1 Ch. 149 at 181. 
North Tondon Ry v Great Nrthn R)' (1883) 11 Q B D  30; Duport Steels T id  v Sirs (1980) IW LR  142.
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elements of toit necessary to found an action are not present/^ courts have on occasion
granted injunction to protect title to property, even where no tort has been established.™
In Springhead Spinning Co. v die defendants were officers of a trade union who gave
notice to worlmien, by means of placards and advertisements, tiiat tiiey were not to hire
themselves to the plaintiffs pending a dispute between the union and the plaintiffs. The
plaintiffs subsequently sought an mjunction to restrain the actions of the defendants as
such actions were intimidating and hence prevented the worlcmen from hiring
diemselves to the plaintiffs which thereby rendered them from unable to continue hi
their business and the value of their propertj^ was seriously injured and materially
dimhiished as a result. The court held that the acts of the defendants amounted to a
crime and the court would mterfere by mjunction to restrain such acts, inasmuch as diey
also tended to lead to die destruction or deterioration of property. Although it was
recognised tiiat the chancery court has no jurisdiction to prevent the commission of
crimes. Sir R. Malins VC, held that “[t]he jurisdiction of the [Chancery] court is to
protect property, and it wiU interfere by injunction to stay any proceedings, whedier
connected with crime or not, which go to the hnmediate, or tend to die ultimate
destruction of property, or to make it less valuable or comfortable for use of
occupation” .™ Clearly the facts of this case are different from the 'capture’ scenario
central to this analysis but die general principle remains that injunction may be granted 
.even in circumstances where no tort is proven. It is surely at least arguable that
reasoning such as this might be applied to the hydrocarbon scenario before a proposed 
capture takes place.
Burm tl V George [1993] IF C R  1012, CA.
Tondon v Ryder (No. 2) [1953] Ch 423; Springhead Spinning Co v Vdky (1868) LR 6 Eq 551. 
7^  fW .
’'■* at pp 558 -  559.
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It does at least seem plausible that a claim brought before the court for an interlocutory 
injunction which would provisionally halt a part)'- from extraction until the final 
application is heard, would not fall on deaf ears. In respect of such interim applications, 
the court must merely be satisfied tliat die 'balance of convenience’ between plaintiff and 
defendant favours such a grant.™ As Nwosu points out, amidst a lack of clarity as to the 
efficacy of a law of capture, “the grant of an interim (sic) injunction wtU be 'just and 
convenient’ in the circumstances because while it preserves the plaintiffs proprietary 
rights, it win not on the other hand permanendy extinguish the defendant’s interests.”™ 
From a practical point of view it is Hlceiy that the granting of an interlocutory injunction 
would provide a window within wliicli the adjoining proprietors may be able to forge an 
agreement in respect of joint development of the resource.
Remedies under Scots law
For Scodand, as alluded to above, die authorities are clear that the landowner alone 
holds dominium and hence in respect of sanctioning die propriety of die appropriation 
of another’s propert}'- upon or beneadi land widiout the owner’s consent, there would be 
no balancing of rights as such. As noted in chapter 3, it is hard to see how Scots law 
would sanction the appropriation of a thing owned by another party without that party’s 
consent.’  ^ To establish how any remedy under Scots law would operate in practice, it is
As Brazier notes a prima facie case does no t need to be stated, provided there is a ‘serious question’ to be 
answered - Brazier, supra n. 68 at p 517. I f  this is the case, die balance will thus lie in favour o f a grant o f 
injunction if  die award o f damages would be inadequate or inappropriate and die plaintiff has given an 
undertaldng to pay damages in respect o f  the defendant’s losses from die injunction if  the plaintiff loses liis 
case. See American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon [1975] AC 396.
N w osu, supra n. 31 at p 55.
The non-apphcation of ocmpatio w here a migratory tiling is held to be owned in situ is also discussed in 
chapter 3.
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perhaps useful to draw analogies with the law relating to wrongful appropriation of 
minerals in general/*^
While minerals in siUi are heritable as a severable estate in land, once they are removed 
from the strata in wlrich they lie, they are by definition rendered moveable. Remedies 
for unlawful removal would tlierefore relate to the minerals as moveable property^ In 
respect of minerals In general, Gordon has noted that.
[wjrongful removal may involve criminal liability for theft or otherwise, but, this apart, 
the minerals themselves may be recovered in the same way as any other moveable 
propert)^ which has got into the wrong hands, and an action for damages may be 
brought in respect of the wrongful removal. It will normally, in fact, be more practical 
to claim damages, and all authorities seem to relate to actions of damages.'^^
Damages for minerals in general are granted in respect of the value of that removed.*^ '* 
This undeniably wiU cause a problem in respect of capture of fugacious minerals from a 
shared resource as even talcing into account today’s technical expertise in such matters it 
may be difficult to quantify the oil that has been taken from beneath an adjacent tract of 
land. Nwosu has noted in relation to offshore oü exploration:
despite the undisputed advancement in geology and geophysics, it is still impossible to 
ascertain the quantity if oil in a particular licence area with relative precision. This is 
moreso, where tlie reservoir straddles two adjacent blocks. This is why there is always 
provision for redetermination of tract participation in unit operating agreements.*'
Tliis analysis is o f  course som ewhat hypothetical in tliat throughout the U K  petroleum  reserves are 
vested in the Crown by legislation, although an action could tlieoretically proceed on the basis o f 
appropriation o f som e other migratory tiling o f value.
W. G ordon, Scottish TandLmw 2"^ ed (1999) at para 6-78.
«« Gordon V  Stuttie (1837) 15 S. 549.
K. N wosu, ‘Is the Law of Capture appHcable in Petroleum  Operations in the N o rth  Sea?’ (1997) 1 C A .R  
1, 117 at p 125. There are furdierm ore various different processes that can be employed to estimate oü m 
place including stock tank oü originally in place (STO O IP), recoverable oü, or moveable oil in place 
(MOOIP).
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It is further worth noting the English decision of Indian Oil Cofp. i J d .  v Greenstone Shipping 
Sw i(^ In this case, it was held that if the property of two persons becomes comixed and 
intractable difficulties in deterrnining tlie respective shares of the parties resulted from 
the wrongful act of one party, that party wiU forfeit liis interests in favour of the other 
who obtains title to the whole. It is submitted that such an outcome would be 
inequitable in relating to oil and gas drilling unless some fraudulent or grossly negligent 
action could be attributed to the defender. If the petroleum had been abstracted in 
ignorance or on the basis that it was a mere incident of tlieir exploit one’s own resources 
then it would seem more appropriate to strilce some sort of equitable arrangement based 
upon an estimation of the resource misappropriated from beneath the other’s land. 
Although admittedly this solution does not circumvent the practical difficulties with 
estimate the extent of oil resources below adjacent tracts of land.
The established rule in relation to wrongful excavation of minerals generally is that tlie 
minerals taken are valued in situ and that the full value, without an allowance taken for 
die costs of excavation, would be payable if the talting has been done in the absence of 
the right to do so.^ If the talting had been done in good faitii and with no Imowledge of 
tlie other party’s tide then it would be lilœly that die costs of worlting would be deducted 
from any damages payable.™ What die position in respect of hydrocarbons in this regard 
would be is unclear. It may be suggested, however, that given die lack of clarity 
surrounding property rights in oü and gas in strata and the extent to which a law of 
capture operates, if the court were to find in favour of an aggrieved parlqq then it would
«2 (1988) QB 345,
Gordon v Suttie supra n. 80.
Davdison’s Trs v Caledonian (1895) 23 R. 45.
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seem likely that any award granted would deduct the cost of working the oil and gas 
from any damages payable.®^
The issue of whether a law of capture would operate in Scotland and circumvent any 
remedy sought has already been discussed in tliis thesis ia chapter 3 in relation to water. 
If, die thing in question is res nullms, by operation of the doctrine of ocmpatio, it would 
lawfully vest in the first party able to reduce it into possession. Recalling die discussion 
in chapter 3, it was submitted diat it is very hard to see how die law could sanction the 
appropriation of tiling which is owned in situ from one landowner to another widiout die 
first landowner’s consent or some compensation payable. Scots law follows Roman law 
in stipulating diat ownersliip is an absolute r i g h t . I n  general, “ [p]roof of a right of 
ownership prevails over other claims not derived from die owner’s right”.R estitu tio n a l 
remedies arising from ownership should allow for the return of the propert)^ taken by 
anodier. As Gordon has noted, however, die situation is not so clear cut:
ill Scots Law, the distinction between the remedies of owner and possessor is blurred. 
As Stak puts it : 'we make not use of tlie naiue or nature of Vindication... We have 
shown before \LJb I, Tit Restitution [I, 7] that there is a real obligation upon possessors, 
not having tide sufficient to defend their possession, to restore or re-deliver, not only to 
the proprietor, but to the lawful possessor, which is also consonant to that common 
principle of the Roman law suum ctiique [to each his own]’** Wliile in Scots law, the 
owner is, in principle, entitied to recover the property from any other holder, his claim is 
not based as firmly on his ownership as it is in Roman law. His claim is rather that tlie 
present possessor is not entitied to withhold the property from him because of the 
circumstances in which he acquired it. His action is therefore a petitory action for 
delivery based on the fact that tlie possessor has no title to withhold the propert)  ^ in 
question, rather than a claim for dehvery based on his ownership, although there may 
also be a declaratory conclusion that the pursuer is the owner of tlie property claimed”.*''
** A claim for interdict would also be possible.
See Ersltiiie, II,i,l.
*2 D. Carey Miller, CoiporealMoveables in Scots Law  (1991) at p 6.
Stair IV , 3.45.
W. G ordon, ‘Corporeal Moveable Property’ in K. Reid (ed), T/je Law of Property in Scotland (19961 at para 
531.
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It would remain to be seen in practice, whether a landowner with a right to a migrator)^ 
thing in situ could found upon his ownership in situ as a basis to claim the return of tlie 
resource concerned (or equivalent monetary value) in a 'capture’ situation. Unlilœ the 
situation with minerals generally, where tliere would have been in evidence some 
illegitimate act to remove the same, capture of a migratory thing may entail a legitimate 
act upon the abstractor’s own land. Would such circumstances, in Gordon’s words “in 
the circumstances in which he acquired it” render the new possessor with “no title to 
withhold the property in question”? If a court were to take tlie view that to grant an 
aggrieved proprietor a remedy in such circumstances may stand in tlie way of legitimate 
exploitation and lead to transactional costs and inefficiencies concerning estimatiiig the 
extent and value of the resource then it may be that, despite the initial ownership in 
place, the court would find the circumstances in which the taker acquired it would not 
give rise to a presumption that a remedy should be available.
Rights of exploitation under the UK Offshore Petroleum Licensing Regime
From a practical perspective one tlie most important UK issues relevant to tliis analysis 
is the law relating to property rights and a rule of capture in respect of hydrocarbons 
drilled for under the terms of the UK offshore licensing regime. The offshore context is 
by far the most important in commercial terms in the sense that given tlie lack of 
petroleum reserves onshore, the vast majority of hydrocarbon exploration takes place 
offshore. Some space is devoted here to an analysis of the application of current legal 
thinldng as regards property rights in migratory things and a law of capture in relation to 
the offshore context. The discussion reveals some practical difficulties and deleterious 
consequences of the imposition of traditional (US-based) viewpoints and moreover, flags 
up a number of relevant pokey factors to be considered when developing an appropriate 
property^ allocation regime for migratory things in general.
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To begin with it is woi'tli noting that debates over the applicabilitj^ o f the law of capture 
are relevant from a practical standpoint in this context. Of course this is true because, 
despite the fact that offshore hcences in the UK are awarded in relation to strictly 
defined blocks of UK seaward areas, Vagrant’ petroleum resources, being no respecter 
of artificial boundaries, do not always fit neatly within a single licence area. Indeed, a 
reservoir of hydrocarbons may extend beneath a surface area which has been divided 
into two or more blocks held by different l i c e n s e e s . I n  such instances, one of the 
major questions to be addressed relates to whether each licensee should develop 
separately that part of tlie reservoh underneatli his own Licence block, or whether tlie 
consortia engaged in the exploitation of the joint-reseivoit should forge a pact 
('unitisation agreement) to take necessary steps to develop the reservoh as a single unit. 
As shaU be noted, the UK regulatory reghiie may compel the johit development of fields 
wliich straddle more than one block. The rationale beliind compulsory unitisation — 
primarily to engender more efficient exploitation of natural resources - is discussed in 
more detaü in chapter 5.
Unitisation powers of the Secretary of State
In relation to UK offshore petroleum operations, by vhtue of Model Clause (MG) 23 of 
tlie Petroleum (Production) (Seaward Areas) Amendment Regulations 200T’ tlie 
Secretar}^ of State is empowered to requhe such unitisation where he is “satisfied that a 
field lies withm a hcensed area and an area comprised by another licence and considers 
that it is in the national interest in order to secure die maximum ultimate recovery of
In  the M inster for Energ)'’s report to Parliam ent in 1992, o f  47 offshore production fields in the U K  
sector o f the continental shelf at the end o f 1991, some 19 o f  these fell witliin areas underlying two or 
m ore licensees. - M. Taylor and S. Tyne, Taylor and Winsor on joint Operation Agreements, 2nd ed. (1992) at
p .110.
SI No. 1435.
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petroleum and to avoid unnecessary competitive drilling that the field should be 
unidsed.”™ In such circumstances, if the licensees to tlie neighbouring blocks cannot 
agree on a unitisation scheme which meets with the approval of the Secretary of State, 
the ininister may impose his own scheme on the parties. Such a scheme, by virtue of 
MC 28 must be “just and equitable” to the parties.
In practice, however, there is no known case where a scheme has been imposed by the 
Secretary of State and it may be speculated that parties are keen to shy away from state 
mtervention and invariably reach their own agreement. Reaching their own agreement 
also serves to avoid die delays and attendant costs tiiat may result from the imposition of 
a scheme by the Secretary of State.'"’^
Unitisation agreements in the UK
UnHlce the situation as regards onshore drilling in the USA, it is commonplace for the 
unitisation agreements in relation to a joint reservok to be crafted at the earhest possible 
stage of exploration in tlie UK offshore petroleum regime. The huge expense of the 
complex offshore technoiog}'-, limited seasons for exploration and the capricious nature 
of labour and market supply build a convincing argument for the early implementation 
of a unitisation agreement.™ In any case, the overriding factor compelling tlie earhest 
possible unitisation flows from the Secretary of State’s MC 28 power to compel 
unitisation in the absence of an agreement by the parties.
"2 Taylor and Tyne, supra n. 90 at p 110.
Additionally any scheme im posed by the SS may be done in such a way to be favourable to the SS rather 
than the parties (eg in respect o f  timing).
''■* Pitsas, The Joint Operating Agreement in the UK - the rationale behind the main provisions, CPMLP Pgd thesis 
(1991) at p 56'.
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Unitisation agreements, which in relation to the joint reservoir, override the provisions 
of each licensee’s Joint Operating Agreement (}OA)™ are typically complex and multi­
faceted and have been discussed in some detail elsewhere When a unitisation scheme 
is imposed by tlie Secretary of State (or where parties agree a scheme to avoid such an 
imposition) the question of a law of capture operatmg becomes somewhat redundant. 
As shall be noted below, however, there may be circumstances under the UK offshore 
regime where unitisation could not be imposed by the SS and hence the applicability of a 
law of capture may become of great import.
Where tmitisation might not be imposed
First, tliere have been distances where the licensees holding the majority of a field’s 
reseiwes have been allowed to develop the joint field in its entirety.''’’ It has been noted 
that in these situations, “[the DTI] will generally expect tlie companies wishing to 
proceed with the development to obtain tlie consent of licensees of the adjoining block 
who are Hkely to require an undertaldng from those developing the field that they wül 
subsequently enter into unitisation discussions if requested to do so.”™ In 1991, a 
spokesman stated tliat the “Department of Energy,'’'’ would act to ensure that no actions 
wliich may result in the capture of hydrocarbons from adjoining acreage can take place 
unless the agreement of tlie Licensees has been obtained.” '^’"
In practice, a waiver would only be granted by an adjoining licensee where it was 
considered that the oil lying in that part of the field beneath theit block was of negligible
T he JO A  is tlie contract that governs the relationsliip between joint-venturers engaged in production 
w ithin a particular licence area. For a discussion see Taylor and Tyne, supra n. 90.
9f) Poi- example, English, \]nitisation Agreements in Upstream OH and Gas, David (ed.) (1996) at p 115; Taylor 
and Tyne, supra n, 90 at p 110.
''2 M odel Clause 17. See Taylor and Tyne, supra ii. 90 at p 111.
Taylor and Tyne, supra n. 90 at p 111.
As it was then known.
Q uoted in Taylor and Tyne, supra, n. 90 at p 111.
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commercial value. The difficulties witli such estimations, however, include the fact that 
if, as normal, a waiver was granted prior to production, little may be known at the time 
about the geology and geo-physics of the field. Indeed, it may at a later time transpite 
tliat a greater quantity of oil than had hitherto been estimated subsists beneath tlie 
waiver’s block. It is commonplace, therefore, for the agreement within which the waiver 
is set out to include a provision enabling the parties to re-evaluate the situation. Clearly, 
if a law of capture was held to operate, it may be prudent for tlie party issuhig to waiver 
to stipulate that any new unitisation agreement agreed upon at this stage operates with 
retroactive effect.’^ ’
A second scenario where the efficacy o f capture may become relevant is set out by 
Taylor and Tyne when they assert that in circumstances where kcence-holders covering 
part of a field which also falls into an adjacent block are able to develop the entire field, 
and the adjacent block licensees are either unwilling or unable to drül their own wells, 
then on a strict interpretation of the regulations, it would appear that the Secretary of 
State has no power to impose a unitisation under MC 28.™^  This argument stems from 
tliat fact tliat strictly spealdng MC 28 can only be invoked to avoid unnecessary 
competitive drilling and to secure ultimate recovery of petroleum -  it cannot be invoked 
merely to achieve equitable distribution o f resources to adjacent licensees. If only one 
licence group is seeldng to develop the field and has die technical capacity to do so then 
there is no competitive drilling, no concerns over the maximum recovery of petroleum 
and dierefore arguably no national interest requirement for unitisation.'*’^
Alternatively, if  as norm al one licensee has sold liis rights in relation to a joint reservoir to an adjacent 
licensee, it would be prudent to include a flexible pricing clause.
'*2 Taylor and Tyne, supra n. 90 at p 110.
101
A further problem might possibly arise when an adjoining hcence area has not been 
awarded to another licensee. If a joint reservoir is discovered in such circumstances, to 
avoid the appropriation of oü from beneatli an adjacent, unlicensed block, it is probable 
that the Secretary of State may withhold development consent untü the next licensing 
round or perhaps make an ad hoc 'out of round’ licence award.'”'' It has been suggested 
that in such a scenario it would not be in die national interest to aUow die Hcence holder 
to develop the whole field by drilling a weU lawfully within his own Hcence area.'”® 
Again, however, on a strict interpretation of the regulations, it is arguable tiiat MC 28 
WÜI not apply and dierefore it may not be possible for the DTI to widihold development 
consent pending a unit agreement.
Further possible cases may arise when after production has commenced, a joint reservoh 
from which oü has been drawn by one group of Hcensees is detected where one was not 
previously beHeved to be in existence. From the date of discovery, unitisation would be 
compeUed under MC 28; prior to this date, however, questions remam as to die legal 
ramifications of drainage by a Hcensee from beneath an adjacent block.
The Import of the Law of Capture
Save where a part)T has imowingly misled die DTI hi order to chcumvent Hcence 
requhements on unitisation and to obtahi DTI approval for a development 
programme,'”” in aU of the above scenarios if it is held that a law of capture exists in diis 
context it is arguable that parties who have had oü extracted from beneath theh Hcence
'"2 I t may be speculated that the SS would seek to impose unitisation in such circumstances, but it is 
arguable tha t such a m ove could be challenged in judicial review by tlie part)? seeldng to develop the whole 
block.
Some doubt regarding the efficacy o f  this has arisen in light o f the 1994 H ydrocarbons Licensing 
D irective; Council Directive 9 4 /2 2 /E C .
N w osu, supra, n. 31 at p 16.
***' As parties are not able to benefit from their own fraud.
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area will have no remedy available to diem to compensate for loss of the oil. In the 
absence of any agreement to the contrary, by operation of the law of capture, any oil 
drawn from beneath die adjacent block would become die property of the licensees who 
captured diat oil.
In respect of whether such a rule exists in die UK, die Department of Trade and 
Industry laying its cards on die table, has been unequivocal ;
...it is only the oil wliich Ues vertically below the licence which a licensee is entitled to 
extract... there is no doubt in the department that a licensee is not en tided to the oil 
which may dow into the licence area from adjoining acreage - licensed or unlicensed - as 
a result of any action on the part of the licensees viz. production. To put it briedy the 
law of capture does not apply in the UK.'”’
issue.
This view is contrary to US and Commonwealdi jurisprudence analysed earlier in diis 
chapter. Against this art of confusion then, the next section examines the legal efficacy 
of the law of capmre within the context of the UK offshore petroleum Hcensing regime. A
3It should be noted that there is at the time of writing no direct judicial authority on this A
Property Rights of die Licensees
As has been discussed earlier in this chapter, despite the DTFs position, according to 
Commonwealth and American authority? it appears that a law of capture in relation to 
hydrocarbons would exist as a matter of common law, at least where a party is exercising 
a legitimate right to work the minerals in the usual manner. While It may be possible
H ughes, Department of Energy Uiew on Unitisation Langham  O il Conferences, L ondon M arch 26 1992.
Taylor, ‘U nitisation’ in European Energy Law : Selected Topics, M acDougall and W alde (eds.) (1994) at p 227, y
has pointed  out that tliis assertion would seem curiously inconsistent with tlie p rodsio iis o f  MC 28 wliich 
com pel unitisation in the face o f  competitive drilhng if in fact tliat self-same process is no t a legitimate 
concept. Ill this w riter’s opinion, however, tliere is no tiling inconsistent in die form ation o f  good industry 
practice regulations wliich seek to compel behaw our wliich avoids conflict with com m on law principles.
103
that hydrocarbons could be viewed as pars soli and hence owned in situ this would seem 
not to be a bar to a rule of (legal) capture operating at least under English common law 
and claims brought under the heading of removal of support would not be appropriate 
on tlie obvious basis that subsidence wül not have occurred. The position may however 
be different under Scots law where the importance of the issue of dominium and tlie 
avaüabüity of remedies arising from ownersliip itself may render a law of capture in 
relation to hydrocarbons more difficult to accept. It would seem therefore that an issue 
of importance is deterrnining what law applies to tlie offshore environment. It might 
also be said at tliis stage that whatever the position as to a law of capture may be witli 
regard to general principles of the common law, the offshore petroleum licensing 
framework and property rights thereunder may in fact brmg about different results.
The application of UK domestic laws to the offshore regüne
Within the context of offshore oü exploration, it is tlierefore necessary to establish when 
English law applies and when the applicable law is Scottish. AdditionaUy, and more 
fundamentally, it needs to be estabhshed that UK laws apply at aU to the offshore 
regime.
The application of provisions of the domestic law to tlie UK continental shelf is a matter 
for international law. Acting with autlioritj? granted by international law, the UK has 
taken steps to extend criminal and civü laws offshore. To this end, under the auspices of
government to make Orders in Councü extending civü and crüninal law offshore. For 
the purposes of this thesis the extent that tlie civü law is extended and the circumstances
Indeed, if  capture doesn’t exist under die comm on law, in the absence o f  unidsation (compelled by MC 
or otherwise) oil could simply n o t be extracted from joint reservoirs.
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ythe Continental Shelf Act 1964, the Petroleum Act 1998, ss 10 and 11 empowers the A
in which the applicable law is Scottish of English are the most salient questions. In this 
sense, Daintitli and Willoughby have noted tliat
[w]ith regard to the appHcation of die civil law offshore the decision was made to split the 
United lÂingdom designated waters into English, Scottish and Northern Irish “areas”,'"* each 
under the appropriate domestic jurisdictions. The present authority for the division of die 
United Kingdom designated waters into English, Scottish and Northern Irish areas is section 
1(1) of the 1998 Act and the Civil Jurisdiction (Offshore Activities) Order 1987.'"'' The method 
adopted by the Civil Jurisdiction (Offshore Activities) Order to obtain these ends is to apply the 
civil law of the relevant domestic jurisdicdon to the appropriate area and also to give the relevant 
court hierarchy jurisdiction over the appropriate area”.
Unformnately die wording of the Jurisdiction Order is pregnant with ambiguity and 
leaves open die question of the exact scope of the application of the civil law. N or is 
the wording solely determinative of die question of wliich court hierarchy (Scots, 
Enghsh or Nortiiern Irish) is to have jurisdiction in a given case. “Sometiiing more, 
therefore, needs to be said on each of these topics” ."'
Does all UK civil law apply offshore?
One problem with the Civil Jurisdiction (Offshore Activities) Order is that it fails to 
stipulate that all domestic civil law appHes to the offshore reghne, nor does it make clear 
what parts of die domestic law apply to the regime. Article 2 states that the domestic 
law of England and Wales, Northern Ireland, or Scotland as appropriate “shall apply for 
the determination of questions arising out of relevant acts?’ (emphasis added) occurring 
within the offshore area. Article 1 defines 'relevant act’ as “an act or omission taking 
place on, under or above the offshore area” wliich arises out of activities concerned with 
the exploration or exploitation of offshore natural resources.
1Ü8 H ie between the English and Scottish areas is drawn along the 50°50’ parallel : Civil Jurisdiction 
(O ffshore Activities) O rder 1987 (S.L 1987 N o. 2197), art. 1.
'"9 S.I. 1987 N o. 2197.
D aintith  and Willoughby, UK OH and Gas Law  1-504. 
ibid.
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"2 D aintith and Willoughby, supra n  110.
As statutes will generally be taken no t to extend beyond the boundaries o f die U K  and its territorial 
waters.
"■* D aintith and Willoughby, supra n 110 at 1-509.
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The extent that UK common law therefore applies is not clear. It has been suggested 
that it must be taken that given the reference to 'acts and omissions’ at least the domestic 
law of delict (for Scots law) and tort (for English law) applies to the offshore area."^ It 
is noteworthy that otlier areas of law (eg statutes relating to employment law) have heen 
expressly extended to the offshore area by Parliament separate from the Civü 
Jurisdiction Order."® On a narrow interpretation of tlie Civü Jurisdiction Order, 
therefore, it is arguable tliat aside from delict and tort and those other areas of law 
expressly extended to the offshore area, then tlie domestic law wül not apply.
Under such a viewpoint, tlie law of property within the UK would not be extended to 
the offshore area. A broader, more holistic interpretation of the law relating 'acts and 
omissions’ may be more appropriate, however. Property law and delict/tort are in Ç
practice intrkisicaüy linked and the question of allocation rights in natural resources is 
obviously coloured by both areas of law. Determining questions relating to acts and 
omissions in the offshore environment may also entaü reference to property law as weU ;
as principles of tort or dehct. On this basis,
[t]he very concept of exploration and exploitation connotes activity, so that tlie apparent 
limitation of section 11(1) can in fact embrace ... issues such as questions of title, so A
long as they are related to exploration or exploitation."''
Capmre and the Licensing reghne
Even if it can be specrdated that at least under English common law, an absolute 
dominium rule is applicable, which would facilitate a law of capture in relation to A
migratory resources such as hydrocarbons, m relation to offshore petroleum
development and production, the analysis is coloured by the legal framework and 
application of the UK licensing regime. Taylor and Tyne have suggested that
even if the law of capture did not apply as a matter of general law, it is possible that each 
licence could be interpreted as conferring upon the holders a right to drU within their 
licensed area and to extract any resulting petroleum. If this interpretation were upheld, 
the terms of the licences would therefore result in a rule of capture as between holders 
of neighbouring Hcences."*
The suggestion here is that tlie general common law position is effectively displaced by 
tlie licensing regime. The regime which is implemented is in fact some kind of prior 
appropriation regime — ie one in which rights are granted and protected by the State in 
respect of beneficial uses."®" It may be further argued (this point is taken up below) tliat 
by implication of the way in which rights are granted under this regime, operation of a 
law of capture apphes. This begs the question as to what exactly the nature of the rights 
granted under the licence to licensees are.
Rights under the licence
The precise nature of the rights bestowed upon licensees has been die subject of some 
academic debate and disagreement. It would seem useful to begin by identifying what 
rights the Crown has in offshore reserves as clearly no greater rights than vest in the 
Crown can be transferred to licensees. Under international law, by vittue of the Geneva 
Convention on the Continental Shelf, 1958,"’ the Crown has 'sovereign rights for the 
purpose of exploring and exploiting natural resources’ witiiiti the UK Continental 
Shelf."® These rights, as the exclusive preserve of the Crown, may not be exercised by
Taylor and Tyne, supra n. 80 at p. 112
Such regimes are com m onplace relative to water exploitation in US states — see chapter 5. 
P. Cameron, Property Rights and Sovereign Rights : The Case of the North Sea (1983) at p 47. 
R eprinted in I. Brownlie, Basic Documents in Internationa!Law 5"' ed (2002) at pp 88-91.
*'* Article 2(1).
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any other entity without the Crown’s consent.'"* The provisions of this treaty are 
enshrined within domestic law by virtue of section 1(1) of the Continental Shelf Act 
1964, wliich provides that 'any rights exercisable by the UK [under the terms of the 
Convention] outside territorial waters with tlie respect to the sea-bed and sub-soü and 
theit natural resources’ shall vest in Her Majesty’.
The key authorities in tliis area, Daintith and Hill, have argued that while these rights faU 
short of vesting full ownership of tlie natural resources In the Crown, they are 
nonetheless proprietary? in nature (or 'real’ in Scotland). In support of these contentions 
they point to authority to tliis effect in Karl ofUonsdale where the court took the
view (albeit obitei) that, as a result of section 1(1), ‘statutory title’ to hydrocarbons 
beneath the continental shelf vested in the Crown.'^'
This view has not been universally shared, however. Other commentators have argued 
that offshore petroleum deposits are no more than ?'es nidlius until reduced into 
possession and that the hcensing regime does no more than set out a regulatory 
framework for their exploitation which die Crown can control.'™ Daintith and HiU 
counter such assertions, however, by arguing conviucingly that “[t]he wording o f section 
1(1) is not consistent with die granting of a regulatory power; die contractual form of the 
Hcences themselves argues agaiast it; and so does the absence of any expHcit provision, 
m the 1964 Act or elsewhere, forbidding unHcensed activities”.'™ The idea that the
Article 2(2).
"0 [1982] 1 W LR  887. at pp. 945-947.
'21 D aintith and Hül, supra n. 19 at p. 33.
'22 Marriage, ‘N orth  Sea Financing in the U nited K ingdom ’ (1977) 5 hit Bus Lamjer 201 at p 209; Bentham, 
‘T he concept o f a continental shelf and the financial problem s o f  exploitation’ in Fifth Commonwealth law 
conference proceedings and papers (1977) at p 439.
*2'' D aintith and Willoughby -  supra n. 110 at p 11.
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Crown obtains proprietary rights to hydrocarbons offshore is bolstered by the fact that 
customary international law and practice would seem to lend support to tliis notion.'™
If one follows this contention it therefore ensues that section 1(1) of the 1964 Act 
affords the Crown “the [proprietary] right botli to reduce [natural resources] into 
possession and to exclude any others from doing so.” '™ Is such a proprietary or real 
right passed to licensees? In the UK, seaward petroleum Licences confer upon the 
licensee the exclusive right to “search and bore for, and get, petroleum in tlie sea-bed 
and under the subsoil under the licence area.”'™ This, it has been argued, is best 
construed as “conferring a licence (to engage in activities in the licensed area which 
would otherwise infringe the Crown’s exclusive privilege of exploration and exploitation) 
wliich is exclusive and is coupled with a grant (of all petroleum wliich tlie licensee may 
get under the hcence).”'™ This assertion is ambiguous, however; does tliis relate to 
petroleum beneath tlie block when drilling is commenced,'™" or all oil that can be 
brought to well-head, some of which may have migrated from an adjacent block? This is 
a central question and is discussed below.
UnHlre other licences, however, which as a general rule faü to confer on the hcence- 
holder any proprietary rights as against third parties,'™ it has been asserted that offshore 
petroleum licences “operate to pass a property right in the nature of a profit a prendre 
The best Scottish equivalent is probably rights bestowed by tlie creation of a seiwimde
'21 see The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969) ICJ Rep 3; For a discussion o f  the continental shelf 
regime see I. Brownhe, Pnnciples of Public International Law  6tli ed (2002) at d ip t. 10.
'2* D aintith  and Flill, supra n. 19 at p 33. 
i2fi M odel Clause 2.
'22 D aintith  and HrU, supra n. 19 at p 34.
127^  Tliis is the D T Fs view as noted  above.
'2H See e.g. Patel v Patel [1983] Crt. App. U nborm d Transcript 930; King v David Allen and Sons, Billposting, Lid. 
[1916] 2 AC 54 at 59 and Clorev Theatrical Properties L td  and Westby é r  Co Ltd. [1936] AU E R  483 at 490. 
A lthough for a contrary view see Erringion v Errington and Woods [1952] 1 KB 290.
'2" D aintith and HUl, supra n. 19 at p 34..
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right to minerals. Without giving a legal basis for tliis contention, Daintith and Hill 
suggest tliat the licence should be construed in such a proprietary fashion in Hew of the 
public policy rationale that “tlie massive resources which tlie licensee may be called upon 
to devote to the Hcence warrant the fullest possible protection of his rights.” '®' 
Regardless of such a public poHcy argument, however, the fact tliat the right to 'get’ tlie 
petroleum is conferred on the Hcensees may m itself be indicative of a sufficient 
proprietary interest enabHng the Hcence to be construed as akin to a profit a prendre or a 
servitude right to minerals in Scotland.
Is a rule of capture created under the licensingframework?
For the purposes of this question, it is important to note at this juncmre tliat Hcensees 
do not therefore have property? in the oil until it reaches tlie weU-head. Clearly as the 
Crown does not have title to the oil in situ (at best a proprietary right to reduce the same 
into possession) then it follows that neitlier can the Hcensees. As noted above, under 
EngHsh common law, whilst not conferring on the holder a right of ownership to the 
subject matter in situ, possession of a right altin to a profit à prendre is sufficient, however, 
to sustain an action in tort on behalf of its owner against third parties. Similar arguments 
would apply in Scotland.'®^
While this seems clear enough, the saHent question to be addressed is whether such 
protection wHl extend to providing a Hcensee witli a legal remedy if oil is capmred by an 
adjacent Hcensee from beneath liis block acting in a legitimate fashion and in accordance
As opposed to the creation o f  a separate tenem ent resei-vation o f  minerals which bestow  ownership o f  
the minerals in situ — see W. G ordon  supra n. 79 at paras 6-28 — 6-67.
D aintith  and HÜ1, supra n. 19 at p 34.
'*2 Bolton V Forest Pest Management Institute, 1986 21 D L R  (4tli) 242 at pp 248-249; Stephens v Snell (1939) ALL 
E R  622; Marson v Clarke (1995) AC 778. A Scottish analog)? is Mull Shellfish v Golden Sea P?vducc 1992 SLT 
703 in wliich the court held that a crown tenant o f  the sea-bed was able to sue in respect o f damages b)? the 
defenders to free-floating mussel larvae wliich might be captured by their attacliing themselves to ropes 
hung  by the pursuers over the sea bed and developing into mussels.
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with the license terms under one of the theoretical circumstances set out above in this 
chapter where unitisation cannot be compelled? Rosalyn Higgins is of the opinion that 
since tlie hcence grants the right ‘to search and bore for, and get, petroleum’ in the sea­
bed and sub-soü, “it must be held to imply all that is beneath the hcence area at the 
moment of exploitation.”'®® This means therefore that if hydrocarbons have migrated 
from an adjoining block by lawful drilling operations, they can be produced. The 
rationale underlying this is elaborated by Higgins as
even where title to petroleum in situ is vested in a licence owner, he has legal entitlement 
to percolating substances only to the extent that he can ‘capmre’ them in production. I 
see no reason why this should not be equally attributable to property rights which are 
profits a prendre
Daintith and Willoughby agree and argue that the terms of tlie hcence would allow a 
hcensee to appropriate oil from beneath tlie block of another hcensee in tlie absence of 
any unitisation. Wltile arguing that unhcensed drilhng or unauthorised activities which 
renders one hcensee’s interest dirninished could be restrained there would be no action 
available in respect of hcensed activities wliich serve to appropriate oil from beneatli the 
adjacent block :
[t]lie reason is diat die hcense, while proprietary in namre, conveys no property in any 
specific parcel or volume of petroleum such as that existing beneath the licensed area at 
the moment of the award. It rather authorises, in a defined area, activities of searching 
and boring for, and getting, whatever petroleum may be present there for die time being, 
and accordingly affords no protection against migration of petroleum provoked by the 
exercise of identical rights by the licensee of an adjoining area. Such protection can only 
be provided by the Secretary? of State in pursuit of his limited powers to require a 
scheme of unitisation in appropriate circumstances”.'®®
R. Higgins, Ten Years of State Involvetnent In the Petroleum Industiy Energ)? Law Seminar Proceedings (1979) 
at R.1.6. An argum ent supported by odiers; see for example, Daintith and Willoughby, UK O il and Gas 
Law, (R.26: April 1997), 5-344.
Higgins, supra n. 103 at R. 1.6.
I l l
Comment
Whatever the position under Scots or Enghsh comiuon law may be, it seems a 
convincing argument that once a hcence is granted, a law of capture is in essence created 
by the hcence terms — m that the specific property right transferred to tlie hcensees is 
one which includes the right to exploit any hydrocarbons wliich are brought to the 
wellhead, which may hiclude hydrocarbons from beneath an adjacent block. As has 
been noted, unitisation may not be compelled in ah cases which leaves open the possible 
occurrence of the deleterious consequences of a law of capmre. Such repercussions, 
from a pohcy perspective, require to be addressed, The analysis proceeds to diis general 
issue in chapter 5.
It can be stated at this juncmre, however, that the example of offshore hydrocarbon 
exploitation ihustrates that although a state-controUed, hcence-based regime may ensure t
that the most beneficial uses are made of scarce resources and hence may be more A1'favourable than private, absolute dominium approaches in this respect, difficulties may A
t;
nonetheless continue to exist in respect of the apphcation of such a regime to migratory ft
things. Depending on how tlie licence granted is crafted then it may be that it 
encompasses the right to abstract the resource from beneath tlie land of another — ie the 
law of capmre continues to exist in this context. As noted above in respect of water and 
hydrocarbon exploitation, tlie impact of a law of capmre may be somewhat inequitable 
in that, for example, it may render obsolete tlie often heavy financial investment in 
exploitation of such resources by abstractors powerless at law to stop the resource being 
drained from beneath their feet. Having said tliat, crafting a licensed right in such a way 
as to merely bestow autliority? upon the abstractor to exploit tlie resource falling upon or 
below his own tract of land may be fraught with difficulties from a practical perspective.
D aintith and Willoughby supra n. 133 at 1-347.
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This issue is given more consideration in the next chapter but it may suffice here to say 
tliat deterrnination of the extent of tlie resource in situ beneath a particular tract of land 
may be a vexed question. Hence such a rule limiting the right to a resource to that 
falling beneath or upon a particular piece of land may make exploitation impossible or at 
least subject to high technological costs if exploitation is to proceed on that basis or 
perhaps significant transactional costs in reaching some form of agreement with tlie 
other party (or parties) affected by any exploitation.
Summary of development of law relating to migratory things
Prior to moving on to a more detailed analysis of some of the pohcy themes 
underpinning different approaches to issues of allocation of property and rights o f use in 
migratory tilings, it may first be prudent to puU togefiier the development of the 
common law across different migratory things under both Scots and Enghsh law. From 
die preceding chapters it has become apparent that no single approach can be taken to 
the aUocadon of rights in migratory filings across both jurisdicdons. What can be said is 
that despite the fact diat at times it seems that private ownersldp in situ is recognised (for 
example, on some authority? in respect of gas and underground percolating water) the law 
de facto leaves the ahocation of ownership of such things until after diey have been 
reduced into possession. This result in effect renders the notion of ownership in situ 
largely meaningless, although the quahfied proprietary rights that are recognised in some 
cases may bestow upon the landowner certain legal protection from the acts of others — 
eg against pollution of underground water supplies, or spoiling tactics in respect of 
hunting for game. In most cases, an absolute domimum approach has been taken which 
has meant that under the developing common law, landowners have had a largely 
unfettered right to exploit the resource concerned. Tliis is so, even where their actions 
draw die migratory? thing from the land of anotlier -  what might be termed ‘physical
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.capture'. In otlier cases — where the migratory thing is owned in situ - such appropriation
■
also entails ‘legal capture’, which entaüs the transfer of ownership from one party to 
another. This passing of ownership without tire consent of the owner, is save in the case 
of a State compulsory acquisition, a somewhat novel concept. The technicalities of 
English law, and in particular its paucity of remedies based upon ownership, may go 
some way to rationale this situation from a doctrinal basis. As noted above, a rule of 
legal capture is more difficult to rationalise under Scots law.
The notable exception to the absolute dominium rule is that in respect of water in 
defined channels, a riparian regime operates under both Scots and English common law 
which places limitations on the absolute dominium approach in the name of protecting 
the correlative rights of other riparian users. Additionally, in certain contexts the 
absolute right to exploit a resource may be curtailed. In Scotland, for example, the 
absolute right to abstract underground water is prohibited in the limited ckcumstances in 
which the motive in so doing is spite. Moreover, in botli jurisdictions where the thing 
removed causes an erosion of support (although not underground water in England and 
possibly Scotland) an action may proceed on that basis. The US case-law relating to 
hydrocarbons has for largely practical reasons affirmed the general absolute dorninium 
approach and operation of a law of capture . Moreover such determinations were rooted 
in a formalist theory and simply applied existing precedent in relation to other similar 
migratory things. Misunderstanding and misconception abound in tliese decisions.
Aside from the exceptions discussed above (and discounting statutory exceptions), tire 
absolute dominium approach reigns supreme in respect of migratory things. As we have 
noted from the discussion in the preceding chapters, the doctrine is largely one rooted in 
the encouragement of industrial development. Landowners would hence be able to
114
exploit natural resources upon tlieir land in a largely unfettered way for economic 
purposes which would in turn m general seiwe tlie interests of society. Moreover, the 
hidden and ambient nature of many of tirese migratory things meant that it would be 
unfair and impractical to hold landowners liable if tlreir legitimate exploitation activities 
impacted adversely upon the rights of others. Additionally, the doctrine is subject to 
irrinitrral transactional costs as disputes arising from abstraction are unlikely to be 
entertained by courts and costly determinations of correlative rights — such as what 
might be an equitable use - are not required. While such benefits may be present, the 
absolute dominium regime has been shown in many contexts to cause intractable 
difficulties. Such concerns have in many areas led to the abandomuent of absolute rights 
of private exploitation in favour of curtailments on use in tire name of pubfic utility.
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PART II: CHAPTER 5 
POT JCY CONSIDERATIONS UNDERPTNNTNG MIGRATORY THINGS  
Introduction
Tills chapter is concerned with the policy rationale that underpins the law relating to 
migratory things and exarnines tlie need for a re-appraisal of the law in the light of new 
policy aims. As already alluded to in the previous chapters, the current law has at times 
been crafted against a vacuum of directly applicable legal precedent. In such cases, 
courts have simply drawn analogies with otlier established rules tliat bore comparison. 
In some instances, such comparisons have been largely specious. At other times the law 
has developed as a result of specific policy goals that were sought to be advanced. AU 
this has taken place in respect of substances that are unique in the sense that they often 
faU outwith die control of proprietors in ways not shared witii other forms of property. 
Sometimes, the nature and extent of die substances concerned occurring on land are 
themselves unknown and ‘occult’ and diis lack of technical laiowledge has been an 
influencing factor in shaping the law. The result is, as noted in previous chapters, a 
patchwork of inconsistent, uncertain and at times iUogical and inefficient rules. Tliis 
chapter begins by revisiting the pohcy choices that underpin die law relating to migratory 
things.
Policy choices inherent in property and rights of use in migratory things
As wUl be discussed later in diis thesis, pohcy markers are often less exphcit in die 
development of law by courts dian when determined by regulators. It can be seen from 
die preceding chapters, however, that pohcy choices have informed the development of 
the law relative to migratory things in different ways. As noted from part I of the diesis, 
migratory diings are hi general (although not always) not subject to fuU ownership rights 
wliUe in situ. The pohcy underpinning diis approach is one wliicli reflects the ambient
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nature of tlie resource and proprietors’ lack of control over such diiiigs until reduced 
into possession. In addition, at times the lack of fuU ownership rights in situ is a 
reflection of the wider social utility of the resource and the fact that it is thus too 
precious to be tlie subject of private rights of ownership. As noted above, however, 
operation of a law of capture (whether merely physical or bodi physical and legal) in 
general renders the notion of ownership in situ largely redundant -  ie remedies wül not he 
for the appropriation of the thing from die land of another by die commission of 
legitimate works upon one’s own land. The development of the law of capture was 
steeped primarily in the ground of necessity. This rule of first possession reflected the 
ambient nature of migratory things and the fact that the extent of dieir presence in situ 
and die impacts of different uses could not always be evaluated, at least without heavy 
transactional costs, prior to any proposed uses. Traditional approaches m diis regard 
therefore reflect a notion of efficiency — ie in the sense that a legal regime ought not to 
stand in the way of valuable industrial exploitation and radier encourages the same by 
being characterised by certainty of rights of use.
n
The law of capture renders the extent that a private landowner is vested by the law with y
rights to exploit the resource concerned as the key question in respect of migratory 
things. The dominant model discussed above in respect of migratory diings is one o f 
absolute dominium (or absolute right to use). Akin to that relative to the law of capture, 
the underlying policy rationale behind the absolute dorninium approach is founded upon 
the encouragement of legitimate beneficial uses in the name of societal advancement and 
also efficiency, in the sense of certaint)^ of right of use and avoidance of transactional ■
costs in respect of costly court disputes diat might be hard to determine equitably.
i.... ',j
Subtle variations in the absolute dorninium rule were unearthed in respect of wild 
animals which reflect different policy ideals. In the context of ‘hot pursuit’ situations, by 
comparing Scottish and English approaches thereto, we can see the two policy markers 
of encouraging beneficial uses and efficiency being pitted against one another. Under 
the Scottish rules, where one is in hot pursuit of a wild animal or where it has been 
mortally wounded, the law would grant the pursuer a property right in the thing at that 
time in the name of recognising the effort and perhaps economic hivestment that had 
been expended in tlie pursuit. By contrast, under Enghsh approaches, reflecting the 
factual uncertainties that might surround the determination of when parties were in ‘hot’ 
pursuit or when an animal was mortally wounded, in an efficiency-promoting measure to 
cut down on any resulting transactional costs, property would not pass until the animal is 
captured or Itihed. As we will learn later in this thesis, there may commonly be a balance 
to be struck between these competing policy aims in respect of migratory things.
The notion of beneficial uses promoted by the absolute dominium regime may also 
encompass recognition of the fact that certain uses which might be beneficial in some 
ways are in fact detrimental to other current or projected uses of value. In respect of 
water in defined channels, we reviewed above the operation of systems of riparian rights 
which sought to recognise the correlative rights of adjacent landowners in water running 
through their land. While perhaps on some occasions quelling beneficial, industrial uses 
of riparians, these limitations upon absolute rights of exploitation can be seen as a 
reflection of tlie protection of tlie legitimate uses of others in societ)^
While riparian rights regimes reflect the correlative rights of other landowners, there may 
be wider constituencies tliat may fall under tlie protectoral banner of ‘beneficial uses’. 
Wliile the development of the common law relative to hydrocarbon exploitation
118
reflected the traditional policies of efficiency and a narrow view of facilitating beneficial 
.uses by adopting an absolute donhnium approach and a law of capture, unitisation 
developments Hlce those discussed above in tlie UK occurred in die name of providing 
equity in respect of the correlative rights of competing industrial users and conservation 
to help preserve a finite resource for tlie benefit of all in society. Hence, in this sense the 
pohcy of facihtating ‘beneficial uses’ has a wider, societal connotation. Equally, it should 
be remembered that efficient rules which encourage legitimate exploitation do reflect the
■1:^
wider notion that such industrial development benefits societ)^ in general.
A further pohcy, which hi broads terms might be labehed one of ‘legahty’ can be 
identified from US hydrocarbon jurisprudence. Although US courts reiterated the 
general rationale behind the absolute dominium use rule and operation of a law of 
capture in terms of clarity of right and facihtating legitimate uses, the approach taken hi 
such matters was also rooted in precedent relative to other migratory tilings. The courts 
here can be seen to be striving to act in accordance with existing legal rights that 
landowners had previously been held to have vested in them hi respect of other, 
comparable ambient resources. Wliile tins formahstic approach to legal reasonhig is not 
quite synonymous with the issue of the state’s acting hi accordance witii existing private 
property rights hi a resource hi respect of tlie imposition of a new state-controUed 
exploitation regime that is ahuded to later in this thesis, nonetlieless, this recognition of 
traditional approaches in migratory tilings reflects a general policy of recognishig existing 
legal rights.
The above policy rationales can perhaps be grouped into three broad headings: legality;; 
efficiency and tlie encouragement and protection of beneficial uses. These pohcy 
markers whl be furtlier developed and explored later in tins thesis hi relation to an
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analysis of tlie current reforms which are currently talcing place in respect o f  water 
exploitation in Scotland. It is fair to say that the dominant absolute right to exploit 
model might be viewed as efficient and moreover encourage beneficial uses in certain 
ways but the approach is myopic in that it may be produce woefully deficient results with 
regard to odier aspects of these policy markers. The discussion now turns to this issue.
 ^O r unfettered right to exploit approach.
 ^ T he USA was chosen because o f  the multifarious approaches manifest in different states and the 
abundance o f  materials available.
 ^T ins term  shall be use to denote tliis approach throughout but see the note below.
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The Absolute Dominium Rule Re-Visited
The chapter now proceeds to an analysis some of the general problems that may
emanate from the dominant ‘absolute dominium’^ approach to migratory things that
,developed under UK common law and parties’ reliance upon self-help remedies in this 
.context. In this sense, the wholly negative experience of the US oil industry in tire late 
19'*’ century may be particularly instructive. In Hght of these general deficiencies, the 
chapter then proceeds to an analysis of some of the more specific problems that may 
emanate from a largely unfettered right for landowners to abstract water. The is 
followed by an examination of some of the alternative approaches to percolating 
groundwater found in other jurisdictions (particularly in the USA^) and the rationale 
behind adoption of these new rules and rejection of the traditional absolute dominium 
approach.
Some general problems with absolute dorniniuin approaches 
A. diminished properly right
The absolute dominium approach'^ is often expressed as an unfettered property right - a 
manifestation of the a coelo usque ad centrum doctrine in relation to land ownership.'* The
absolute, largely unfettered right to abstract underground water under English and 
Scottish common law, or to abstract hydrocarbons under early American jurisprudence 
can clearly not be viewed as a fuU property right in tire traditional sense, however^
Chapter 3 touched upon tire limitations inherent in property rights in things subject to a 
law of capture in that where a substance is at law held to be owned in situ or subject to a 
property right to exploit the same, this in itself would generally offer no protection 
against the legitimate actions of others carried out on thek own lands which has the 
effect of drawing that substance away. This is clearly a phenomenon anathema to 
recognised fundamental characteristics of property rights. It is interesting to note that 
the opposite also applies in respect of this absolute right to appropriate — ie. no remedy 
is generally available to other parties adversely affected by exploitation of this absolute 
right to underground water. This is clearly inconsistent with the general notion that 
property is conceived as both a bundle of rights in a tiling and also responsibilities to 
exploit the thing in such a way as to not unreasonably cause harm to others.^ Even if 
one perceives property as a unitary right, exploitation of such a right is of course 
normally subject to the qualification of reasonableness in respect of rights of otliers.
Again this approach is not reflected in the absolute light to exploit underground water.’
This notion may be taken further in that that things subject to a law of capture (whether 
the law bestows them with the label of ownership in place or not) are arguably wholly |
deficient in relation to commonly recognised central attributes of propert)^ rights. In 
relation to things subject to a law of capture, as Votteler has stated
Discussed ill chapter 4.
 ^ M oreover, despite die com m on use o f the term s ‘absolute dom inium ’ or ‘absolute owiiersliip’ respect o f 
groundwater, as was seen in chapter 3 the better view would seem to be that m anifest in the early case-law 
was an absolute right to abstract groundw ater wliich gave no ground o f  action in tort radier dian 
ownersliip in the w ater itself.
See for example, J Penner The Idea of Property in Paw (1996); |.  Penner ‘The Bundle o f  Rights Picture o f 
Property' 43 DCL/1 L. Rer 711 (1996).
 ^ A ldiough o f course riparian rights to water in defmed channels do countenance the correlative rights o f 
others.
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the fundamental characteristics of property rights are absent. In neoclassical economic 
theory a ‘property right’ refers to a bundle of entitlements defining the owner’ rights, 
privileges and limitations for use of a resource... An efficient property rights system has 
the following characteristics : 1) universality — all resources are privately owned, and all 
entitlements completely specified; 2) exclusivity^  — all benefits and costs accrued as a 
result of owning and using the resources should accrue to tlie owner, and only to the 
owner, either directly or indirectly by sale to others; 3) transferability — all property rights 
should be transferable from one owner to another in a voluntary exchange; 4) 
enforceability -  property  ^ rights should be secure from involuntary seizure or 
encroachment by others.^
Using the example of ground-water in tlie Texas Edwards Acquifer, it may be noted that
none of these [above] characteristics have been present under a law of capture. There 
was no universality because entitlements could not be specified under a system where a 
pumper’s use of water was vulnerable to extraction by a neighbor. Exclusivity did not 
exist. During periods when pumping was not needed, well owners did not have the 
option of leasing or selling tlie water to which they had access. Similarly, transferability 
did not exist. Even if a well owner was paid not to pump water, nothing prevented 
another landowner drilling a new well into the Acquifer to begin pumping. Thus a 
transfer would be rendered meaningless because the purchaser was not protected from 
excessive pumping by other users Finally'' there could be no enforceability of a property 
right for all of the reasons stated above. There was no effective way to prevent one 
pumper from encroaching on another individual’s property right.^
Generally spealdiig where property rights are well defined in respect of the characteristics 
set out above, an owner has a strong incentive to use that resource wisely because a drop 
in the value of that resource is tantamount to a financial loss. This is not tlie case, 
however, witli resources that are subject to a law of capture. The lack of knowledge 
today as to what the state of a shared resource may be tomorrow, encourages inefficient 
behaviour.*" By this it is meant that even though the most efficient way to exploit a 
resource may be to sit tight for tlie time being with a view to exploitation at a later date.
® T, V otteler ‘The little fish that roared : The E ndangered Species Act, state groundw ater law, and private 
property rights collide over Texas Edw ards acquifer’ (1998) 28 E N T L  (EnvironmentalPaw) 845 at p 875.
 ^T. Votteler, supra n. 8 at p 875.
It is w orth noting that the extent to wliich the right to capture water is in fact a property^ right is an 
im portant question when it comes to discussing w hether the im position o f  a state controlled licensing 
regime for abstraction am ounts to an appropriation o f  property- and hence if  im posed without 
com pensation may be contrary to the European C onvention o f H um an Rights (ECHR), protocol one, 
article one. Tliis point (as well as otlier hum an rights concerns) is discussed extensively in chapter
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use of the tesource may be undertaken prior to tliis because of the fear that delaying 
exploitation will let in another user who’s actions may entirely or significantly deplete the 
resource. This idea is indicative of the well-known concept of the ‘tragedy of tlie 
commons’, wliich this thesis turns to next.
G. H ardin, ‘The tragedy o f tire com m ons’ (1968) 162 Science 1243.
Similarly, under a simple allocation rule rational actors have no incentive to invest in  maintaining or 
hnproving the asset in situ as the fruits o f such investm ent wÜl be shared by all w ho may access the 
resource w hether tliey have paid for such investm ent or no t -  see T. Eggertsson, ‘O p en  access versus 
com m on property' in T.L. A nderson & F.S.McChesney (eds.), Property PJghts Cooperation, Conflicts and Law  
(2003) at p 75.
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The tragedy of the commons
In Hardin’s classic article ‘The tragedy of the commons’ he laid out the choices facing a y
rational herdsman contemplating the grazing of additional stock on a single, commonly
. . . .  . . .  . yheld pasture. Considering the range of options available to him, a herdsman may weigh 7),%
up the potential benefits of adding one more animal to his herd. Clearly all the profits 
emanating from tlie grazing of the additional animal will accrue to the herdsman wliile 
the detriment to the pasture wih be shared amongst aU the owners of the pasture. On a 
rational basis therefore die herdsman will add that animal and any number of others to 
his herd in an effort to maximise his profits. Other herdsman are lilcely to respond 
klcewise in an effort to restore parity with the first herdsman. The resulting ‘tragedy’ is 
tlie rapid decimation of the pasture and the consequent loss of profit for all.**''
A self-fulfilling prophecy is in evidence here. When an absolute doniinium rule is in 
place, parties may seek to exploit shared resources before otiier parties make use of the 
same and deplete the resource which may in itself lead to over-exploitation, wastage and 
other inefficiencies relative to the particular substance concerned. Having said that tliere
may be some circumstances where this sort of rule is appropriate. In some of the early 
US cases in relation to ok and gas, amidst a relative legal vacuum, the courts made 
practical decisions that were viewed as efficient at that time.*  ^ Tarlock has suggested (in 
fact in relation to shared water resources, but the underlying principle is the same) that
[a] simple allocation rule is appropriate when the costs of allocating a common resource 
are high, supplies are abundant, and all competing users are making a shnkar use of the 
resource. Capture becomes inefficient [however] when the costs of present 
consumption become high. Ideally, a pumper should base the decision to pump on a 
comparison of the present versus future benefits of extraction. A rule of capture is 
inefficient when it is hkely tliat future uses be more highly valued because it penahzes a 
pumper who defers consumption [and finds the resource no longer avakable to him].^^
Oil boom and httst
Hardin’s model is no mere theoretical construct. The ‘tragedy’ inherent in an unfettered
right of private exploitation in shared resources was ak too apparent m the ok boom in
the late 19'’’ century in tlie USA. As seen in chapter 4, operation of a law of capture left
parties to joint reservoirs who found their ‘black gold’ drained away from beneatli their
feet with the only friend of a self-help remedy of malting haste and doing Ulcewise. In
the USA, tlie deleterious practical ramifications of the operation of this ‘law o f  piracy’
and resultant competitive drkling was stark. Against a backdrop of ‘use it or lose it’, ok
exploration in the US became “a Itind of wkd race where there was no compunction in
drkling on a reservoir straddling the boundary of a lease and produchig from it as much,
as fast, as possible.”*'* Of this competitive drkhng, Hardwicke asserted;
the outstanding evks commonly in mind are... production in excess of requirement, 
unnecessary storage, untimely drkhng of wells, the drkhng of many unnecessary wehs, y
wasteful and disorderly production practices, instabihty of markets and feast and famine y
with respect to reserves, and particularly the unsound and burdensome driU and produce w
as you please metliod to protect property hnes against drainage.
____________________________ V
^  As seen in chapter 4. }
D . Tarlock, Lmw of Water Rights and Resources (2001) at S 4:6.
Bliiin et .al., International Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation Agreements, (1986) at p 210.
Hardwicke, ‘T he Rule o f Capture and its ImpUcations as A pphed to Oil and G as’ (1935) 13 Texas Law  
Review 391.
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The cost of the unnecessary production wells was passed on to the consumer in terms of 
higher prices.*** However, the increased production levels led to a flooding of the market 
wliich in fact caused prices to plummet and hence greatly reduced investors’ profits.*’ 
Excess production produced storage problems and whilst oil was stored in a variep^ of 
makeshift receptacles such as “gullies, creeks and earthern reservoirs until demand 
increased or untü storage could be buüt”*** resulting in evaporation and seepage, excess 
natural gas was simply evaporated into the air. The extent of this wastage cannot be 
overestimated. In the infamous Glen Pool oil field, for example, it was estimated tliat 
some 50,000,000,000 cubic feet of natural gas was wasted by 1912.*'’
There are furthermore otlier serious problems, aside from overproduction, which may
result from competitive drilling for hydrocarbons. As Murray and Cross have contended
individual non-cooperative oil production will not only increase the costs of production, 
but will also dissipate tlie benefits achievable from a reservoir due to certain geological 
characteristics of the ok fields. The most efficient production of ok from a field requires 
a reservoir specific rate of production and careful well location. This is generally caked 
the ‘maxknum efficient rate’ or ‘MER’ of production. The production rate of an ok 
field must be controUed to maintain the pressure necessary to force the ok out. The 
location of weks is also crucial because if weks are drkled into the portion of the 
reservok containing gas or water, these weks permit escape of the very substances that 
produce the pressure necessary to recover the ok. Engineering studies can now 
approximate tlie most efficient rate of production and weU location for a particular 
reservok.^'’
Such technological Imowledge concerning optimum wek spacing and MER of 
production clearly lends itself to cokaboration between competing users. The 
compulsory unitisation provisions relative to UK offshore hydrocarbon exploitation 
discussed ki chapter 4 are clearly underpinned by such concerns.
'U - Clark, The Oil Century 97-99 (1958). 
ibid.
R. Chamberlain, ‘A new  dim ension in tlie ratable taking o f natural gas in O klahom a : enrolled house bfH’ 
1221 Fall (1984) Tulsa Law Journal 
J. Clark, supra n. 16 at p 149.
P. Murray and F. Cross, ‘The case for a texas compulsory unitization statute’ 23 S t M ary’s L J . 1099, pp 
1108, 1109. (internal citations omitted).
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The Coase Theorem
The oil boom and bust scenario illustrates that an absolute dominium approach may 
result in iaefficiencies and ultimately be of no benefit to either the competing parties 
themselves or society as a whole/"" As Mattel notes, however, most legal rules in fact are 
of a default nature/* “They constitute a programme of allocation of resources from 
wliich parties are in principle able to negotiate alternative, more efficient solutions”/" 
What in economic theory has been termed the ‘Coase Theorem’ stipulates that whenever 
parties are left free to negotiate alternative rules -  and the transactional costs of so doing 
are not prohibitive — parties wkL attempt to negotiate more efficient agreements wliich 
‘contract out’ of the general law/^
So, for example, in a theoretical land subsidence case, suppose party A’s benefits from a 
continuous pumping operation were greater than tlie harm hifhcted on B by the 
subsidence emanating from such an operation. If B was empowered at law to prohibit 
A’s actions, A and B could negotiate and come to an agreement whereby A would make 
a payment to B equal to the damage sustained. A still would reahse a net gain by 
continuing operations because die benefits would outweigh the costs incurred in the 
payment to B. If the benefits did not outweigh these costs, then A would simply not 
proceed witli the pumping operations. Suppose, instead, that B had no right at law to 
proliibit the actions of A. Where A's benefits from continuous operation were less than 
the harm infhcted on B, it would be in B's interest to hiduce A to cease operations by
Tills point is borne ou t further in the context o f w ater use later in tills chapter.
T hose that he terms ‘yielding rules’ or ius dispositivum to  be contrasted with rules which cannot be avoided 
-  ‘coercive rules’ or ius cogens -  w hereunder some greater public or third party'- interest m ust be protected. - 
U. Mattel, Bask Princip/es of Property Law  (2000) at p 55. 
ibid at p 54.
See R. Coase, ‘T he Problem  of Social Costs’ 3 J.L. <&Econ 1 (1960); R. Cooter, ‘T he C ost o f  Coase’ 11 /. 
Legal Stud 1 (1982), Assuming that parties are acting rationally. Tliis assum ption is no t always borne out in 
practice and is further discussed in chapter 7 in relation to water markets.
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maldng a payment to A. The payment, equal to the benefits that A could have generated 
through continued operation, would compensate A for the lost benefits. Meanwhile, B 
would be realising a net gain in benefits as die costs to induce A to cease operations 
would be outweighed by the benefits derived from not having to suffer the harm. If B’s 
benefits in avoiding the subsidence did not outweigh the net costs to A in ceasing 
operations then on a rational basis no agreement would be forged.
In tlie Hght of this, should it therefore be a concern whetlier the current law in relation 
to migratory things may result in the inefficient exploitation of tliese scarce resources? 
Win parties not seek out their own more efficient agreements which will circumvent the 
deleterious consequences of the law? The key point is that transactional costs and the 
risk of non-compHance by the other parties to any agreement may dictate otherwise. As 
will be seen, a party may (at least initially) stand to gain more personally by breacliing an 
agreement or faking to agree to such arrangements untk other parties begin to do 
Ultewise. Aside from the above difficulties, it may be problematic to estimate the costs 
or benefits that may accrue to each partj^ from any particular course of action. In 
relation to tlie hypothetical subsidence case above, estabHshing a party’s costs resulting 
from the other party’s proposed activities (which moreover may not be certain to cause 
subsidence at ak) and estabHshing the correlative profits that may emanate from the 
exploitation that might cause the subsidence may not be easy to determine witli any 
certainty. Additionaky, such determinations may themselves entak expensive 
technological processes and hence may add to transaction costs. '^*
In  relation to percolating groundwater, for example, T odd  states “ |k]nowledge about groundwater has 
im proved in recent years, but it remains costly. In  fact, relative to the immediately apparent, som ew hat 
small benefits o f  coordinating well spacing, knowledge and other transaction costs involved in coordinating 
m ay seem very liigh, Transaction costs may be so liigh as to foreclose any bargaining” . D . T odd, 
‘C om m on Resources, Private Rights and Liabilities : A  Case Study on Texas G roundw ater Law’ (1992) 32 
N a t Resources J  233 at p 240.
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Game theoiy
By utilising a game theory model Murray and Cross illustrate tliat, in the context of 
hydrocarbons exploitation, while three parties to a joint reservoir can mutually gain from 
cooperation and contracting out of the general law, one party might be tempted to 
increase liis gain through non-cooperation to any agreement although ultimately such 
non-cooperation may result in all parties (and society in general) dramatically reducing 
theit cost-benefit r a t i o T h e  prisoner’s dilemma inherent in their model can be 
summarised as follows : if we assume that die total recoverable oil from a reservoir is 3 B 
and the total costs are 3 C, then assuming tiiat the oil is readily accessible and hence die 
value of the oil wkl outweigh the costs of production, if die diree parties cooperate to 
produce from the well the same amount of ok, each party’s profit can be set out as 
foUows :
(1 )B -C
(2) B -  C
(3) B -  C
If party one decides that he can maximise his profits by ceasing to cooperate and 
doubling liis efforts, then die fokowkig breakdown of profits is realised :
(1) 1 .5 B - 2 C “
(2) .75 B -  C
(3) .7 5 B -C
If the 2”" party decides to do Ikrewise, the result would be ;
Murray and Cross, supra n. 20 at pp  1105 — 1110.
D oubling the production will n o t double oil recovered. I f  the profit made on the oü is sufficient
how ever, tliis w ould no t deter liim.
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(1) 1.2 B - 2  c
(2) 1.2 B - 2  C
(3) .6 B - C
If the third party decides to cease ‘cooperation’, the result becomes
(1) B - 2 C
(2) B -  2 C
(3) B -  2 C
The original allocation of recovery returns to the original situation where parties were 
cooperating, but the key difference lies in the fact tliat each party’s costs have doubled. 
An additional 3 C has been expended by society in costs.
Furthermore, if the fact alluded to above that competitive drilling may reduce tlie 
amount of oil which can be recovered from tlie reservoir (as drilling operations deviate 
from the maximum efficient recovery) is taken into account then (assuming tliat 
doubling production results in a fifty percent reduction in recoverable petroleum) the 
final result is thus :
(1). .5 B -2 C
(2) .5 B -  2 C
(3) .5 B -  2 C
Unitisation responses
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In relation to oil and gas development in tlie USA, tlie voicing of such concerns paved 
the way for calls for compulsory unitisation of joint reservoirs and against such a 
backdrop remedial action on the part of both industry and government was deemed 
necessary to avoid these undesicable consequences. Over time, such action took place in 
the guise of conservation rules and practices within the US oil industry,^’ and also 
tlirough botli US state and federal legislation governing well-spacing and compelling 
unitisation of joint reservoir operations.^** AU US states, with the notable exception of 
Texas, have now adopted legislative measures compeUing compulsory unitisation of joint 
reservohs.^** Tliis is a typical, neo-classical economic approach to solving the problems 
of over-exploitation of shared resources through either the vesting of the property in tlie 
state or at least curtailing unfettered private rights to exploit such resources and re­
definition of rights to private individuals by government institutions.^" The extent tliat 
such an approach ought to be imposed witliin Scotland in relation to water resources is 
discussed in chapters 6 and 7.
As noted in chapter 4, in relation to offshore hydrocarbon exploitation in the UK, the 
law of capture that is arguably inherent in the licensing regime is similarly circumvented 
by the compulsory unitisation powers of tlie Secretary of State which may be invoked to 
avoid the deleterious consequences of competitive drkling in circumstances where an ok 
field straddles more tlian one block. As the previous analysis in chapter 4 suggested, 
however, on a literal interpretation of tlie model clauses, the Secretary of State may be 
unable to mipose a scheme where only one party is wkling or unable to develop die joint
See M urphy, (ed). Conservation in OH and Gas : A  'Local History, 1948 (1972; repiiut).
For examples o f the legislative regulatory measures, approved by the Suprem e Court, see Ohio Oil Co. v 
Indiana, 177 US 190, 44 L, Ed. 729 (1900). See also the Model A ct on Conservation 1949 promulgated by 
tlie Interstate Oil Com pact Commission.
It is interesting that such a m ove towards unitisation was no t viewed as a federal m atter despite the 
public interest in maximising recovery. Presumably tliis was due to the states’ jurisdiction over land and 
the lack o f  public ownership o f  hydrocarbons.
G.A. T obin  et al, ‘W ater Resources’ in Geography in America Gade and W km ot eds (1989) at p 127.
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field. As thaïe is no competitive drilling in such circumstances, the SS’s powers of 
unitisation could arguably not be invoked. O f course the fact tliat diere is no 
competitive drkling in such a scenario means that many of die deleterious consequences 
of the absolute dominium regime -  such as inefficient exploitation of the resource and 
over-production — would be avoided. Nonetheless, such a scenario is clearly unpalatable 
in that it potentially renders parties who have invested heavky m a project with no 
recourse at law when the natural resource is exploited by an adjacent licensee. The lack 
of guarantee that one’s financial stake wkl be protected at law is stark. For the policy 
reason of encouraging investment and safeguarding the interests of mvestors it is 
arguable tiiat such a loophole should be closed.^"" A simple redrafting of die 
appropriate Model Clause 22 would restore the position to that wliich legislators 
obviously intended.
This chapter now proceeds to the issue of comparative approaches to migratory things 
which are manifest in other jurisdictions. The focus shifts to water law, as die study wkl 
later involve an examination of the current reform of Scottish water law. Tlie material 
in this following section will assist in kiforming die analysis pertinent to diat debate. 
This chapter now reviews different approaches manifest in respect of water resources in 
the USA and begins witii some specific problems diat the absolute doniinium approach 
might hold for water exploitation.
Water exploitation
The absolute dominium rule revisited
In chapter 3 it was noted that the traditional rule that apphes at common law in respect 
of percolating groundwater in die UK is the absolute dominium rule under wliich a
A lkiough it is arguable that as iuvestm ent decisions could be made in the Imowledge o f such a risk then 
there is no need for the law to offer protection against it.
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landowner has an unfettered right to make use of such water as may be present below 
liis land. At the extreme end of the traditional rule is that espoused in the English case 
of Bradford v Pickle f  where a party was able to extract water from beneath anotlier’s land 
even if done for malicious reasons. In chapter 3 it was noted that this view stemmed 
largely from the fact that EngHsh common law does not recognise any ‘abuse o f  rights’ 
doctrine found in many civÜ law systems, nor the aemulatio vicini doctrine (recognised in 
Scotland) which would prohibit purely malicious pumping. Despite continued 
acceptance of this approach in England, the rule was arguably never fully accepted in US 
states and it is widely assumed today that no US court would allow purely malicious 
pumping. As Tarlock has simply stated, “[the rule] is inefficient and unfait” .^ ^
It is interesting to note that there is some US authority suggesting tliat die absolute right 
to use underground percolating water should not extend to sanctioning acts borne purely 
of malice which in fact pre-dates Bradford and indeed Acton v Bhmdelf In the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court case of Greenleaf v Francis''  ^ the defendant drilled a well on 
his own land but also close to liis neighbour’s land which had the effect of draining away 
liis neighbour’s water supply. The court referred to die a coelo usque ad centrum doctrine 
and held that as the owner had dominium in die soil, diis included die underground 
water. The court (which was not troubled by consideration of whether an abuse of 
rights doctrine was apt), viewed, however, that “ [tjhese tights should not be exercised for 
mere malice” ."*^ Not aU US courts took this line, however, and at least some decisions 
affirmed die Bradford view and rejected die iiiaHce qualification.** ’^ In common widi die
[1895] AC 587 HL.
D. Tarlock, supra n. 13 at S 4: 6.
(1843) 12 M & W  324. T he earliest reported English percolating groitndwater abstraction case.
3-* 18. Pick. 117; 35 Mass. 117 (1836).
ibid at 121-123. Wliile such a rule seems equitable, it wül be noted below that a m ere malice exception 
does no t go far in enough in alleviating some o f  the negative repercussions o f  the absolute dom inium  rule. 
Including Chatfidd v IVilson 28 V t 49 (1855); Huber v M e r k e l N.W. 354 (Wis. 1903).
rationale set out in Bradford the reasoning behind this rejection stemmed from the 
principle that “an act legal in itself, violating no right, cannot be made actionable on the 
ground of the motive wliich induced it”/** In short, such courts rejected operation of an 
abuse of rights doctrine under the common law as internally inconsistent. While this 
may be seen as a negative development, this re-assertion of the harshest aspect of the 
absolute doininium doctrine provided a shot in the arm for the development of new, 
more equitable approaches to the allocation of rights in percolating water encompassing 
restrictions on private exploitation which went far beyond the mere prohibition of acts 
taken in malice.^ **
Some US states ultimately rejected the absolute dorninium rule in its entitet)^ and 
adopted alternative approaches designed to circumvent the harsher aspects of the rule: 
including limiting uses to those deemed ‘reasonable’ (Imown as the ‘reasonable use’ or 
simply, ‘American’ rule) or adopting a correlative rights regime for groundwater.
Furthermore otlier states have developed regimes based upon protection of the right of 
prior appropriation of the resource for beneficial uses. Before these various alternative 
approaches are examined it may fkst be worth analysing some of the general reasons 
why the traditional absolute dominium rule may be rejected in relation to underground 
percolating water.^*’
Reasons to reject the absolute ownership rule 
Refusal to treat surface and sub-sjuface water the same
It is well established that percolating groundwater and surface water are in hydrological 
terms inextricably linked — for example, water may diffuse (and hence becoming f;
C hafe Id v Wilson 28 V t 49 (1855) at 55.
M Taggart, Primte Property and Abuse ofPdghts in V'ictorian England (2002) at p. 156.
A num ber o f  states still recognise the traditional English rule in respect o f groundw ater including Texas, 
and Connecticut.
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percolating) from an underground channel or percolating water may flow into or become 
part of a defined stream/" It has been argued tlierefore tliat “ [t]o anyone at ak famkiar 
with elementary hydrology principles it must seem astounding that the law should divide 
water into surface water and ground water and treat each independently”/ ’ The 
approach inherent in the UK (and elsewhere), that compartmentalises water and sets out 
different legal rules for water lykig m different states in essence means tliat one party’s 
abstraction of tlie same water but at different stages in its hydrological cycle may incur 
different legal consequences. Furthermore, despite die fact diat diere is a general legal 
presumption in the UK tiiat ak underground water is in fact percolating (and not movkig 
m a defined underground stream) even in today’s teclinologicaky advanced society, from 
a hydrological point of view it may stkl m some instances be kiipossible to determine 
whetiier or not water at any given point of abstraction is in fact percolating or faking 
within a defined sub-surface channel.
It has also been recognised that given the cause and effect relationship between 
percolating water and water in defined channels, to ensure an efficient and sustainable 
approach to water akocation and use, governance regknes need to approach water 
resources with consistency across the board.'*  ^ There is kttie to be gamed, for example, 
in concentrating on conservation ki respect of water in surface channels and protecting 
correlative rights therein when no efforts are made to taclde excess abstraction of 
ground-waters wliich may tiiemselves feed surface streams and dkninish surface water 
flows. In die context of Scodand, for example, clearly a regkne diat countenances 
riparian rights and hence Iknitations on riparian owners’ rights of use ki relation to water 
in defined channels on the one hand but recognises an unfettered absolute dominium
T he relationsliip between surface w ater and groundwater flows is classically set out in D arcy’s Law -  see 
tlie entry ‘Henri-PliiUibert-Gaspard D arcy’ in Encyclopaedia Britannica, III Micropaeida 377 (1974).
].L. Sax, WMterEaw : Cases and Commentaries (1965) at p 238.
•*“ See generally RA Dowling, Groundwater : our hidden asset (1998).
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approach in relation to ground water on the other, fails to approach water governance in 
such ‘joined-up’ terms/**
Lack of knoivkdge of underground water is no longer present today
As discussed in chapter 3, a key part of tlie rationale beliind the absolute doininium rule 
and a denial of any operation of riparian rights in relation to underground percolating 
water related to tlie lack of scientific Imowledge in such water deposits. In a damning 
critique of the Texas absolute doniinium rule (based on English common law), Shadwick 
asserted that
[w]hÜe lack of scientific Imowledge may justifjc.. the 1904 Texas Supreme Court 
decision in East,'*'^  yesterday’s excuses are an intolerable basis for today’s law... Born in a 
time frame when groundwater hydrology was unlmown, Texas groundwater law is based 
upon scientific ignorance. Against a backdrop of what is Imown today... groundwater 
law stands out as a jurisprudential anomaly... East, was the result of inexpertise.... As 
occult and secret as the hydrology of groundwater may have seemed in 1904, the 
presumption of the unlmown in 1991 is inconsistent with present I m o w l e d g e . ' ^ s
The science of hydrology, underpinned by an interaction of many disciplines including 
geology, chemistry, microbiology, physics and mathematics, has for some time evolved 
so tliat it is more possible to “Imow with a great deal more certainty than was previously 
[the case] the direction and rate of groundwater flows”.'*'* Clearly, groundwater is no 
longer always the ‘hidden’ treasure of old and hence it may be possible, if it is deemed 
appropriate, to apply the rules which govern defined streams to underground percolating 
w a t e r A s  noted below, such approaches are now followed in certain US states. This 
type of regime may, however, entail significant costs. The issue of whether such a move
Any m ove though to protect an individuaFs rights from  abstraction o f ground water may require 
considerable individual and wider societal costs. These ideas are developed in chapter 7.
Houston eh T.C  K - U East, 98 Tex. 146, 81 S.W. 2d 279, 280-281 (1904). This case is the seminal Texas 
decision affirnung the traditional absolute dominium rule.
L. Shannon Shadwick, ‘Obsolescence, Environm ental E ndangerm ent and Possible Federal Intervention 
Com pel Reform ation o f  Texas G roundw ater’ (1991) 32 hT X L R 641 at p. 666.
T. A nderson, Water Crisis : Ending the policy drought (1983) at p 93.
A lso see generally, R.A. Dowling, supra n. 42.
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would be a useful one in the UK is analysed in chapters 6 and 7. Whatever die merits of 
such a move, clearly the ignorance rationale is no longer in itself a viable one.
Water not a renewable resource
It has already been noted that tliat the absolute dominium approach may lead to over­
exploitation of resources between competing proprietors and waste. Wliile such a 
scenario may not be problematic in respect of resources that are abundant and 
renewable, tlie key point about water in general is diat it is not, as once thought, a 
renewable resource in the strict sense. Strantz has noted that :
the commonly understood ‘water cycle’ envisioned surface water evaporating into the 
atmosphere, dien cooling and falling ...into oceans, rivers and lakes... collecting in 
underground acquifers, percolating upwards... and becoming surface water once again, 
ready for... repetition of the cycle. However, this simplistic model presumed that equal 
volumes of water always move through each stage at equal rates, and that materials 
mixed with water were always able to naturally precipitate out somewhere m the cycle, 
leaving pure water cycling through the system. In fact, varying rates of natural flow, 
natural contamination... and the ability for human activities to upset the volume 
balances In each stage, create the potential of.. .contamination and permanent 
damage...Too rapid an extraction or too great a mixing of deleterious material... can 
remove useable water from tire cycle.'***
Environmental problems
Linked to die above is the notion that too heavy abstraction of groundwater may lead to 
a number of environmental problems. For example, species, fauna and flora and 
general ecosystems dependent on springs fed by die groundwater may become 
threatened.'’''* Near coastal areas, where water levels beghi to fall after excess abstraction, 
sea water may begin to hitrude into die acquifer thus contaminating die supply.^" 
Generally, when the water table level is declining, the acquifer is particularly susceptible
"*** N.J. Strantz, ‘Rights to groundw ater in N orth  D akota : trends and opportunities’ (1995) 71 N D L R  
(N orth  D akota) 619 at p 623.
See for example. Anonym ous com m ent, ‘Environm ental significance o f  instream flows’ 17 S i Mary’s LJ  
1297 (1986).
N .A .D ow hng, siipr'a n. 42 at p 34.
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to various Idnds of contamination. Decreasing the amount of water in tlie system will 
exacerbate any pollution problems because their concentration per unit of water will 
increase. In addition, the act of pumping helps disperse pollutants more quicldy 
tlirougliout the acquifer. Of course, if pollutants continue to enter the system, then the 
problem becomes even more acute. Further problems emanating from excess 
withdrawals may include land subsidence (for wliich, as noted in chapter 3, under 
English common law there is no remedy for aggrieved landowners), increasing mining 
costs as water levels decline^’ and ‘drawdown’ (discussed below).
Water level drawdown.
Water level drawdown is a common problem that stems from over-abstraction. The
problem as experienced in Texas is usefully articulated by Todd:
[a]s groundwater is pumped, the water table.. .wkl typicaUy decline. If pumpage greatly 
exceeds recharge (flow into the acquifer) drawdown can be significant. Extensive 
drawdown has been measured in the Houston-Galveston area.^  ^ From 1943 to 1977, 
water levels declined as much as 250 feet in weks completed in the Chicot acquifer, and 
as much as 300 feet in weks drawing from the Evangeline acquifer. Drawdown at this 
scale is a concern for two reasons : first, kft costs increase, and second, if the water table 
drops below the screened depth of the wek, the wek may have to be reworked or even 
abandoned or replaced.
Moreover heavy withdrawals froiu acquifers wliich share what can be termed ‘blended 
zones’ with less pure acquifers may ruin naturaky occurring pressure barriers dius 
speeding up the degradation of the purer acquifer.^*’ As wkl be seen when analysing 
alternative water regimes, such problems may stkl arise to varying degrees when odier 
akocation rules for underground water are in place. Nonetlieless, clearly the absolute 
dominium approach, placing few Hmits on exploitation, tends to create these problems 
more commonly than in otlier systems.
See examples cited in D. Todd, siipm n. 24 at p 235. 
In  Texas.
D. T odd, supra n. 24 at pp 234-235.
N. Strantz, supra n 48 at p 643.
Alternative approaches to groundwater govetnance.
Tlie discussion now proceeds to an analysis of alternative approaches tliat may be 
encountered in relation to groundwater governance wliich seek to alleviate some of these 
commonly encountered repercussions/^ Altliough tliere are variations of each tliere are 
in fact two main approaches to groundwater governance/^ prior appropriation regimes, 
where rights to groundwater are now commonly vested in the State and certain prh'-ate 
uses are authorised and protected on a priority basis; and non-appropriation regimes 
where the right to exploit groundwater is seen as an incident of private ownersliip, which 
encompasses the largely unfettered right set out in traditional absolute dominium rule 
and those systems which place certain hmits upon the right of exploitation, including the 
reasonable use rule and the correlative rights rule.
Protecting prior uses
Some water law regimes have chosen to protect existing uses of groundwater under 
recognition of a beneficial prior or prescriptive right. In fact there is some early English 
precedent in relation to groundwater in which such a view was given judicial support. 
Prior to the seminal, absolute dorninium case of Acton, in Balston v BenstecF Lord 
EUenborough supported the principle of preserving a prior or prescriptive right of use of 
groundwater under English common law. The facts in tliis case were set out by Lord 
EUenborough:
Percolating groundwater has been chosen because o f  the multifarious approaches to rights to abstraction 
that can be found. M ost o f  the approaches (apart from  absolute dominium) are also utilised in respect o f 
surface w ater in defined channels.
G. Sherk, ‘E astern water law’ (1986) 1 N a t’l Resources H rE n v tA l.
"  1 Camp 463(1808.)
5** By contrast prior appropriation was never accepted in Scotland either m  relation to groundwater or 
defined streams. A ccording to Wliittj', “Scots Law developed directly from  the jus commune beginning in 
the seventeenth century at latest and at no tune received the English doctrine o f prior appropriation” -  N. 
\Xdritt}', ‘W ater Law Regimes’ in Reid & Zim merm an (eds) A  Hisio/j of Private Law in Scotland (2000) Vol 1 
at p 451.
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[a]s far back as could be recollected, there had been a gush of water from a hole in the 
plaintiffs close... In 1805, the plaintiff purchased this close, and erected a paper 
manufactory upon it; for which a copious supply of spring water is essentially requisite. 
At the same time the defendant, becoming owner of the adjoining close, opened a stone 
quarry in it. As the excavations proceeded, considerable quantities of water were 
found... A deep drain was afterwards made to carry it off into the river... But, in the 
meantime, the water flowing into the plaintiffs [collector] had been gradually decreasing 
and subsequently to tlie making of the drain did not amount to more than an eighth or 
tenth part of its former quantity. On the idea, therefore, that the defendant had 
unlawfully diverted tlie water coming to the spring, this action was brought.
Causation was duly proven that die defendant’s acdons had caused the water in die 
plaintiffs stream to dry up. The court recognised operation of a sort of proto- 
prescriptive right and upheld the plaintiffs case on the basis that “20 years exclusive 
enjoyment of water in any particular manner affords a conclusive presumption of right in 
die party so enjoying if
If die common law had followed this approach, die first drawer of water would possess 
a prior right based upon prescription wliich others could not diereby erode by virtue of 
their own activities. The rule was not conjured out of diin air by Lord EHenborough; 
rather it echoed the traditional Enghsli common law rule that was applied in relation to 
water in a defined channel prior to the later adoption of die riparian rights regime.^^ 
There is some dispute as to whether this early doctrine was one merely based upon a 
prior use or radier a prescriptive right. Blackstone’s view, for example, was a simple rule 
of priority: “ [i]f a stream be unoccupied, I may erect a mill thereon, and detain the water; 
yet not so as to injure my neighbour’s prior mill, or liis meadow: for he liadi by first 
occupancy acquired a propertj^ in the current”;^ " other authorities such as EUenborough’s 
view above, however, suggested that the right was based on some prescriptive period.
Balstou p Bensted 1 Camp 463 (1808) at 464. 
ibid.
See the cases and references cited at footnote 72. 
W. Blackstone, Cotmnenlanes^o\ II 403.
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Whatever the case in this respect, the rule proved short Hved in England in relation to 
both groundwater and water in a surface stream. Tliis approach has, however, flourished 
elsewhere.
Such prior or ‘appropriative’ rights regimes can be found in certain western US states 
such as Nevada, Kansas, Idaho and New Mexico. The states which have adopted this 
rule tend in a climatic sense to be the driest in the USA.^  ^ This is no coincidence as the 
prior appropriation approach has historically been seen as the most appropriate in arid 
climates. Under such approaches, established, beneficial uses of this scarce resource can 
be recognised and protected under law. As die Nevada Supreme Court on rejecting 
riparian rights in respect of groundwater suggested in Reno S?nelting, Milling and Rédaction 
Works V Stevensotd'^
[the] inapplicability [of the riparian rights rule] ... applied forcibly to the state of 
Nevada. Here the soil is arid, and unfit for cultivation unless irrigated by the waters of 
running streams. The general surface of the state Is table land, traversed by parallel 
mountain ranges. The great plains of the state afford natural advantages for conducting 
water, and lands otherwise waste and valueless become productive by artificial irrigation. 
The condition of the country and the necessities of tlie situation, Impelled setders upon 
the pubKc lands to resort to the diversion and use of the waters. This fact of itself is a 
strildng illustration, and conclusive evidence of the inapplicability of [riparian rights].
The majority of prior appropriadon regimes are now regulated by statutory licensing 
systems whereunder die state is vested with ownership of groundwater and rights to 
abstract the water are granted to private parties on a priority basis and conferred 
protection against competing u s e r s . T h e  key point about the prior rights systems in 
western US states is tiiat a prior right can only be established and hence protected when
For example, N evada is the driest state in the USA w ith annual rainfall on  average a mere 9 inches, with 
som e part o f  the state receiving only 4 or less — Nevada Division o f  W ater Planning, N evada W ater Facts 
at h ttp ://w w w .sta te .nv .u s/cn r/ndw p /w at-fac t/p rec ip .h tm .
('-I 21 P. 317 (N v 1889) at 318.
Any jurisdiction seeldng to establish a state-controlled licensing system for water abstractions may be 
faced witli com pensation concerns over tlie talcing o f  private property rights. This issue is discussed at the 
end o f  tliis chapter and extensively in respect o f  Scotland in chapter 7.
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tlie use is a beneficial one.^  ^ The term ‘beneficial use’ is itself a somewhat vague concept 
and although state legislators have at times attempted to define what amounts to 
beneficial and/or non-beneficial uses, as Taiiock has suggested, definition of the term 
remains a largely judicial role “which historically performed tliree functions... [that] are 
being expanded to incorporate new limitations on the use of water in light of changing 
competing demands. First, the doctrhie emphasized that the basis of the water right is 
the continued use of the water. Second, it suggested that the use of water was limited to 
productive purposes. Third, it empowered the courts to curb the wasteful use of 
water” .
The sum total of these rules may mean that beneficial uses tend to be compatible with 
current uses rather than future exploitation. So for example, abstracting water and 
storing it with a view to future uses may not be seen in this context as “beneficial”. Wiel 
asserted the traditional view that for beneficial use “the intention must be bona fide and 
not for speculation, such as the intention to store water for a monopoly” .^  ^ While such 
an approach may obviously lead to short-termism in water use, future uses have been 
deemed ‘beneficial’ in more modern times. For example, since the late 1960’s, the 
“progressive growth doctrine” developed in New Mexico allows an appropriation to be 
based on projected fumre uses such as the expansion of irrigated acreage.^’®
At first blush, a clear drawback of a prior appropriation regime is that there is no 
equitable apportionment of water guaranteed thereunder which means that if water is
Union M ill <&Mining Co. v Dangberg, 81 F. 73 (C.C.D. Nev. 1897).
D. Tarlock, supra n 13 at S 5.66. It should be noted o f course tlrat here hi Scotland any new regime 
wliich sought to brhig in  the state regulation o f  water uses could be brought about on a different basis -  eg 
on a de novo ‘reasonable’ allocation basis.
(0 Wiel, Water rights in western states 3’'^  ed. (1911) at p 407.
State ex rel. State Engineer v Criderl^ N.M. 312, 431 P .2d 45 (1967); Dept ofEcolog)’ v Tbeodoratns 135 Wash. 
2d 582, 957 P 2d 1241, 1255-57 (Sanders, J dissenting).
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scarce then later appropriators may simply go without. A key point, however, is tliat 
appropriators may lose theit right of appropriation through either prescription or 
forfeiture/abandonment of beneficial uses. In times of water scarcity, therefore, 
competing parties may take aggressive action to eitlier challenge existing uses as non- 
beneficial in namre or attempt to show tliat a right has fallen into disuse. In relation to 
Nevada’s groundwater regime, for example, it is provided that :
[fjailure for five successive years on the part of the holder of any right... to use 
beneficially aU or any part of the underground water for the purpose for which such 
right shall be acquired or claimed, shall work a forfeiture... and abandonment of ... 
rights to the use of such water to the extent of such nonuse. Upon the forfeiture of a 
right to the use of ground water, such water shall revert to the public and shall be 
available for further appropriation, subject to existing rights.
The general prior appropriation rule can be justified in the sense that beneficial uses are 
secured in respect of groundwater wliich is a relatively scarce resource in most Western 
states. Although latecomers may have to do without water in times of scarcity, die 
doctrine acknowledges the financial investment and effort in relation to such activities as 
drilling and irrigation and safeguards investors’ interests in this regard.™ Despite die 
inherent requirement that this scarce resource should be effectively utüised in arid 
clhnes, appropriation regimes have been heavily criticised, however, as both failing to 
recognise the legitimate water needs of secondary users and also being inherentiy 
wasteful on die basis that such a ‘use it or lose it’ approach is out of kilter with die need 
to conserve water resources and discourage wastage.^^
A ct o f  Mar. 15, 1947, ch. 43 ,1947 Nev. Stat. 52. 
N . Strantz, supra n. 48 at p 629.
S. Harrison, ‘The Historical D evelopm ent o f N evada W ater Law’ (2001) 5 University of Denver Water Law 
Review 148 at p 182. For a recent example o f the loss o f  prior appropriation water rights see W. Turner 
‘W ater rights can’t be saved : use them  or lose tliem’ at
http: /  / w w w .w aterbank.com /N ew sIetters/nw s45.htm l 9th July 2004.
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Corrélative rights
It has already been noted tliat one of the reasons why riparian rights recognised in 
relation to flowing waters in a known and defined channel have no role to play in 
relation to underground percolating water concerned the practical difficulties of 
monitoring water flows beneath tlie land and hence attributing correlative rights to 
landowners. Nonetheless some judicial support for upholding some sort of correlative 
rights regime in respect of percolating groundwater was in fact manifest in some early 
English case-law. Take for example, the dissenting views of Sn John Taylor Coleridge in 
Chasemore who supported both correlative rights and a prescriptive appropriative right in 
under ground water :
why water in natural course of transit under ground should, as such, be more of a 
subject of individual property than water flowing above ground, is not explained; but 
passing that by, it seems to have been overlooked, the water draining from under liis 
neighbour’s soil into, as well as collected in, the neighbour’s well, must on the same 
principle be the neighbour’s property; indeed, independently of this, it is well established 
that water collected in a well is so much taken from the common stock and reduced into 
possession, and become die subject of property. Now it is certainly a novel principle 
that by an operation on my own land, I may both excusably abstract, and lawfully 
convert to my own use, the underground property of my n e i g h b o u r . ’^^
If one were to apply a riparian rights regime similar to that wliich exists in relation to
streams above ground (and those below in a Imown and defined channel) to
underground percolating water, overlying landowners would have the tight to
underground water subject to tlie ordinary and reasonable use of the water by the
competing users, tlie right to take and use water at least for domestic purposes and die 
right to draw water for extraordinary purposes provided that such use is reasonable and
Chasemore v Richards (1859) 7 H L  Cas. 349. A num ber o f  early English cases relating to mik use 
supported  a prior or prescriptive right in relation to mill use on w ater running in a defined stream -  sec for 
example, Ltitirei’s Case (1600) 4 Coke 86a, 76 ER, KB; Rjissel and Handjords Case (1583) 1 Leo 273, 74 E R  
248 ICB; Richards v H it! (1695) 5 M od 206, 87 ER  611, KB; Anonymous (1638) Cro Car 449, 79 E R  1031, 
KB; Tenant v Goldnnn (1705) 2 Raym Ld 1089, 1094, 92 ER  222, 225, KB; Palmer v Keeblethwaiie (1686) 1 
Show  KB, 64, 64, 89 ER  451, 451. W liedier or n o t these early cases in fact established a doctrine o f p rior 
right, rather than a prescriptive right is discussed in CM. Rose, Property and Persuasion : Essays on the Histoiy, 
Theo7j and RJeetoric o f Ownership (1994) at p 168.
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the water is not substantially altered in volume or character/^’' Despite being a more 
equitable rule, where water is scarce, such an approach may be difficult to adhere to in 
practice.
Some of the terminology used in modern parlance is somewhat confusing and the 
approach outlined above is in some respects similar to both the ‘American’ or 
‘reasonable use’ rule adopted in most Eastern US states and the ‘correlative rights’ rule 
that has been adopted in California which in some senses mirrors reasonable use but 
differs in certain key ways. Here both rules are discussed:
Reasonable use rule
The reasonable use rule in essence provides a modification to tlie absolute dominium 
approach in that the right to exploit underground percolating water remains an incident 
of landownership but such exploitation is limited to tliat which is deemed reasonable. 
The doctrine was developed liistoricaUy as a riposte to the perceived inequities and 
harshness of the absolute doiniriium rule. Since the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
explained in 1854 that
the rights of each owner being similar, and their enjoyment dependent upon tlie action 
of other landowners, their rights must be correlative and subject to the maxim sic utera., 
so that each landowner is restricted to the reasonable exercise of his own rights and a 
reasonable use of his own property in view of the similar rights of others
a number of US States have rejected the absolute doiitinium rule and replaced it with a 
reasonable use equivalent.
Subject to prescriptive rights wliich, for example, could sanction an industrial use wliich exliausts the 
w ater supply.
Basset v Saisbutj Manufactunng Co 43 N .H . 569 (1862). States such as Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, 
Maryland, N ew  York, N orth  Carohna and Tennessee have all embraced a reasonable use rule.
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Judicial recognition, of the concept of recognition of correlative rights was fuelled by the 
practical effects of industrial exploitation. To tliis end, tlie expansion of the reasonable 
use rule (often simply termed tlie ‘American’ rule owing to its popularity) in the late 19* 
century across Eastern States, was to large extent a response to the emerging technology 
of high capacity pumping. Such new, mass abstraction techniques were utilised when 
wells were sunk in rural areas to feed tlie growing needs of cities. The resulting drying 
up of rural land was perceived by the courts to amount to unfair competition for 
f a r m e r s . T h e  leading New York case of Forbell v City of New Yorfz^ set out the 
following justification for advancement of the rule :
the courts of New York have held that the drainage of land ... by a city pumping works, 
which exhausts from ... the natural supply of underground or subterranean water, and 
thus prevents the raising of crops... renders the city liable to the landowner for the 
damages he sustains, and entitles him to an injunction against the continuation of the 
wrong... The strong trend in later decisions is towards a qualification of the earlier 
doctrine that the landowner could exercise unlimited and irresponsible control over 
subterranean waters on his own land, witliout regard to the Injuries which might thereby 
result to tlie lands of other proprietors in the neighbourhood. Local conditions, the 
purpose for which the landowner excavates or drills holes or wells on his land, the use 
or non-use intended to be made of water, and other hire circumstances have come to be 
regarded as more or less influential in this class of cases, and have justly led to an 
extension of the maxim ‘[s]ic utere tuo ut alienum non laedaes’ to the rights of 
landowners over subterranean waters, and to some abridgement of their supposed 
power to injure their neighbors while benefiting themselves.
Reasonable uses
It would be misleading to suggest that reasonable use rules are effect driven. Hence if 
loss is caused to a neighbouring landowner as a result of an abstraction, tliat hi itself 
would not be grounds for an action. Rather the rule is process driven and the focus is 
on whether or not the abstraction complained was a reasonable one to have been made 
in the chcumstances. What amounts to a reasonable use, is clearly therefore a key 
question, Determination of this point may be no easy task and hence in such reghnes.
D. Tarlock, supra n. 13 at S.4,8. (2002).
5^ 47 App. Div. 371,164 N.Y. 522, 58 N .E . 644 (1900).
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one might expect transactional costs in the guise of court disputes to be high. In 
reviewing tlie operation of the American rule across US States, Behrens and Dore have 
noted tliat “there is no bright hue test for what constitutes a reasonable use. The court 
must evaluate whetlier a use is reasonable on a case by case basis in Hght of all pertinent 
factors including the parties involved, their relative positions, the comparative value of 
their uses of the groundwater, and chmatic conditions”.™ Reasonableness may further 
take into account such factors as well location and volume of water abstracted.^^
Having said this, certain assumptions about what sort of uses might fulfil tlie 
reasonableness requirement can be made. It was established at an early stage that the use 
must be for a beneficial purpose on the overlying land/® secondly, use on non-overlying 
land is per se unreasonable. It has therefore been suggested that the reasonable use rule is 
the most constricting on landowners as die fact that water can only abstracted for 
beneficial uses upon overlying land and not for any other use, is clearly an enterprise 
limiting measure.™ On the other side of the coin, however, it appears that generally 
under a reasonable use rule, if a use can be established for a beneficial purpose on 
overlying land then the landowner may abstract all the water even to point of leaving his 
neighbour with none. So, in this sense, no regard is paid to other landowners’ correlative 
rights.®'’ Moreover, while it is clear tliat any malicious abstraction wiU per se be 
unreasonable, conservationists have challenged the reasonable use rule in tliat it is at least
E. Behrens and M. D ore, ‘Rights o f  landowners to percolating groundwater in Texas’ 32 South Texas Law 
Review 185 (1991) at p 190,
T. H enderson,} . T rauberm an & T. Gallagher, Gromidivater Strategies For State Action 2  (1984) at p 31.
78 Evans V City of Seattle 182 W ash. 450, 47 P.2d 984 (1935).
7^  E.F. M urphy, ‘The Recurring State Judicial Task o f Choosing Rules for G roundw ater : Flow Occult 
Still?’ 1987 N E R  120 at p 134.
8” In so far as one use is preferred to another. A list o f  cases in respect o f  different states is listed in 
Tarlock, supra n 13, including : Ky, United Fuels Gas Co. v Sawyers 259 S.W.2.d 466 (Ky. 1953); Tennisee, 
Nashville C  eF St. L . Ry. U  Richert, 19 Tenn. App, 89 S.W. 2d 889 (1935); N.C., Bayer v Nello L. Teer Co. 256 
N.C. 509, 124 S.E.2d. 552 (1962).
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open to question as to whether practices that are wasteful are proliibited on that basis 
alone without the wastage causing any damage to competing users.®’
California Correlative Rights
The correlative rights rule was brought to the fore in the landmark California case of 
V WalkinshanF where the doctrine espoused was based upon reasonable use, but 
also drew on the application of riparian rights and the idea of the proportionate sharing 
of withdrawals among landowners overlying a common basin — this right arising as an 
incident of ownership of the land overlying the acquifer. Basically spealdng, under the 
correlative rights regime, all overlying landowners are entitled to abstract unlimited 
amounts of water on theit land for beneficial purposes except that where there is a 
scarcitjr of supply each landowner is limited to a “fair and just proportion” of the total 
ground water supply.®  ^ In the absence of any other loiowledge, the general rule seems 
to be that the owner of the largest tract of land is simply entitled to the largest share of 
water regardless of whedier this is the most efficient or fair solution.®'^
The rule is more complex than others. In addition to die correlative rights of overlying 
landowners, in times of surplus, groundwater may be subject to furdier claims of others 
based upon die right of prior appropriation. Generally, if after meeting the reasonable
8^  M oses, ‘Basic G roundw ater Problem s’ (1969)14 Rocky M t Min. L . Fdfi. Inst 501 at p509, suggested that 
‘w aste is inherent in the term s reasonable use. W aste is unreasonable” . Courts have n o t always shared dûs 
view. See for example, see fo r example, Prohosky v Prudential Ins. Co. 767 F.2d 387 (7*'' Cir. 1985).
82 74, P 766, 772 (Gal 1902).
8-^  ibid. The doctrine was summarised concisely by Justice Shaw in the subsequent case o f  Bmr v. Maclay 
Rancho Water Co a l5 4  Cal. 428, 434-35, 98 P. 260 (1908) as follows (at 263) : “Two owners o f separate 
tracts o f land, situated over com m on strata o f  percolating water, may each upon lûs own land, take by 
m eans o f wells and pum ps from  the com m on strata, such quantity o f  water as may be reasonably necessary 
for beneficial use upon lûs land, or his reasonable proportion  o f such water, if  diere is no t enough for all, 
bu t that one cannot, to the injury o f  the other, take such waters from  die strata and conduct die same to 
distant lands n o t situated over the same w ater-beahng strata” .
8-^  T he California approach is very similar to diat set out hi “The restatem ent (second) o f  torts” (1977) 
w lûch states the rule at § 858 tlûs way : “Liabüity for Use o f G round W ater (1) A proprietor o f land or lûs 
grantee who withdraws ground water from the land and uses it for a beneficial purpose is not subject to 
habiht)’' for interference w ith the use o f water by another, unless ... (b) the wididrawal o f ground water 
exceeds the proprietor's reasonable share o f  the annual supply or total store o f  ground water ....”
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and beneficial needs of the ovedying owners, there is surplus water, then it can be used 
reasonably and for beneficial uses on non-overlying lands.®® In contrast to the rights of 
overlying landowners, the most recent non-overlying appropriators must give up theh 
uses first in times of shortage — there is no pro rata sharing in this context.®*^  As between 7
(non-overlying) appropriators, priority in time applies; the initial appropriator is entitled 
to all reasonably and beneficially used surplus water, to the exclusion of subsequent y
appropriators. Where an appropriator’s use follows drat of an overlying owner it is Jlimited to waters surplus to the overlying landowner's use.® If an appropriator's use 
precedes that of an overlying landowner, however, he must give way to the overlying 
landowner, although his privilege is limited to a quantity necessary for his use.®® These
rules that prefer use by overlying owners, operate in essence to preserve the finite 
resource. This is so because external appropriations, or extractions for export, acmally 
withdraw water from the basin, whereas uses by overlying owners at least partially yl
replenish the basin. It may be speculated, however, that by granting an unwavering q;
priority to overlying users, courts may have failed to consider the relative social utility of T
,7
specific extraction programs and the environmental damage or benefit that they may
Screate. t
:Moreover, correlative rights regimes have been criticised because under these approaches
the state is not in fact able to limit overall levels of abstraction. Furthermore, in practice y
85 See City of Pasadena v CHy of Alhratnbra 33 Cal. 2d 908,925,207 P.2d 17, 28 (1949); Alphaugh Inig. Dist v ■%
County of Kern. 113 Cal. App. 2d 286, 292, 248 P2d 117,120 (1952).
8'» See CaUfonna Civil Code S 1414 (West 1954); City o f Pasadena supra n. 85; City of San Bernardino v City of
Pdvcrside 186 Cal 7, 26-28 (1921).
87 See, e.g. Corona Foothill v Ulibtidge 8 Cal 2d 522, 66 P .2d 443 (1937),
88 See supra n. 82,
8'7 County of Inyo v City of Fos Angeles (Invo II) 61 Cal App. 3d 91,100, 132 Cal R ptr 167,173 (1976).
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the regime may entail high transactional costs. Disputes between competing abstractors 
as to who should get what water and when can generally only be settled by litigation.'™
These concerns have been elaborated by ICletzing :
[a] cogent argument has been made that the Katz case unintentionally established 
principles that were prone to produce overdrafted groundwater basins... The essence of 
the [correlative rights] doctrine was the sharing of available supplies fairly among 
overlying users. Its weakness was tlaat the only method for limiting withdrawals was by 
court action. The court could have hardly anticipated that, because of the time and 
expense, law suits would prove to be impractical for the individual user; only eight 
basins would be adjudicated in the succeeding eighty-five years. Many of the remaining 
basins would continue in overdraft. But even if the court had been prescient, it had no 
authority to establish a simplified administrative procedure for allocating rights or a State 
regulated permit system for extractions. The most it might have done was to proclaim 
the need for legislation and thus focus public attention on the problem.'-'^
The doctrine of mutualprescription and eqtdtable solutions
The above problems may to some extent have been exacerbated (albeit inadvertently) by 
die California Supreme Court’s adoption of a doctrine Icnown as “mumal prescription”. 
In die case of City of Pasadena v City ofÆ bam braf concerning a dispute over groundwater 
rights in a basin at a time of increasing water scarcity concerns, die court held diat as the 
basin had been in overdraft for a 5 year period,'’® all the parties (both overlying 
landowners and appropriators) had gained prescriptive rights as against one another and 
as such their rights to extract water from the basin should be “limited by a proportionate 
reduction in the amount wliich each party had taken throughout the statutory period.”'™ 
The court’s view was that the public interest was better protected in this way because a
7" K. N orris, ‘T he Stagnation o f  Texas G round  W ater law : a political v environm ental stalem ate’ (1990) 22 
STM LJ 49?> at p 513.
7' P. IGetzing, ‘Im ported groundwater banking: the kern water b a n k -a  case study’ (1988) 19 P A C LJ  1225 
at p 1234.
92 207 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1949).
9^  O verdraft commences whenever extractions increase, or the wididrawal maximum decreases, or both, to 
the point w here the surplus ends.
9"* City of Pasadena supra n. 92 at 33.
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proportional reduction in each abstractor’s share of water would be less severe than a 
ruling which eliminated the water rights of some users entirely/®
The result of this decision, however, has been to encourage abstractors to take as much 
water as possible when water scarcity in respect of tlie acquifer could become a 
possibiHtjq and in the run up to any possible court adjudication which, on the basis of 
mutual prescription, would reduce each appropriator’s respective abstraction rights 
proportionate to their levels of pumping over the prescriptive period. In the case of 
City of Cos Mngeks v City of San Fernando f  involving a dispute over water rights to a 
depleting acquifer, the court was able to sidestep the mumal prescriptive approach set 
out in Pasadena by holding that section 1007 of the California Civü Code'’®' prohibited the 
establishment of a prescriptive right against pubhc bodies. As Taguchi has noted “[t]his 
holding was significant because nearly aU basins have some public users who would now 
have an edge over private parties who claimed prescriptive rights in a groundwater basin 
adjudication”.'’® The essence of a public body is one which is acting on behalf of societjr 
(or at a section tliereof) and some sort of presumption that such a body’s rights should 
trump those of private investors may hold some moral resonance. This approach, 
however, may not be seen as an industry —friendly one. This general issue of societal 
versus industry interests is picked up in chapter 7.
In addition to the public body exception, the court also amended the pro-rata pumphig, 
mumal prescription approach set out in Pasadena to one which, in Taguchi’s words, 
“some beheved would compel courts to look at equitable factors... including physical
95 /W .
98 14 Cal.3d 199, 537 P.2d 1250, 123 C alR ptr. 1, C al, May 12, 1975.
97 'California Civil Code S 1007 (West 2002).
98 T.L. Taguclû, 'W hose space it is anyway? Protecting the public interest in allocating storage space in 
California’s groundw ater basins’ 32 Sw. U.L. Rev. 117 (2003) at p 129.
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and climatic conditions, consumptive use in different areas, and the extent of established 
uses before apportioning water in future basin adjudication cases” .™ This approach, 
although shrouded witli uncertainty, would may pay more regard to notions of public 
utihty by taking into account the promotion of the most beneficial uses of the 
groundwater and lessen the extent that competing abstractors might seek to increase 
their pumping prior to any possible court adjudication of water rights.
The current situation, however, is perhaps not synonymous with the City of Cos A.ngeks 
decision. In the most recent basin adjudicative case of City of Barstom v Mojave Water 
A g e n y f^  wltile upholding die general approach set out in City of Cos Angeles, die Supreme 
Court viewed that “[w]e have never endorsed a pure equitable apportionment that 
completely disregards overlying owners’ existing legal rights. Thus, to the extent ... [that] 
\City of Cos Mngeles\ could be understood to allow a court to completely disregard 
California landowners’ water priorities, we disapprove it”.™’ In City of Barstow, an 
equitable, physical solution that had been crafted by the original trial court after die 
parties to the action had collected appropriate hydrological data, was dierefore held not 
to be binding on any overlying landowners who had refused to sign up to it. As Tarlock 
has noted
[t]he court’s reluctance to impose the trial court’s physical solution on the holdout 
farmers appears to be based upon the conclusion that it was inequitable to deprive 
farmers of their prior water rights because the payment of replacement waters would be 
a hardship to diem and the fact that the trial court had not made detailed findings on the 
beneficial or non-beneficial use of the h o l d o u t s .
99 ibid.
5 P 3d 853 (Cal. 2000).
*9^  ibid at 868,
102 p) Tarlock, supra n. 13 at S 4.17.
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VOverview
The above section has provided a review of the various alternative approaches to 
ground-water allocation. Indeed most of the rules are also applied (perhaps with 
modifications) in respect of water in defined surface channels. Each rule has certain 
positive and negative attributes and moreover their appropriateness to any particular area 
may be dictated to a large extent by hydrological attributes and climate. For ease of 
reference, the next table summaries the pros and cons o f the three alternative 
approaches inherent in the US states, plus the absolute dominium model :
Table 1: alternative approaches to groundwater governance in the US
Approach Pros Cons
Prior appropriation - Rights may be vested in 
the state to recognise value 
of water resources
- Beneficial uses protected
- Licensed rights may be 
determinable and exclusive 
and hence open to trading 
to ensure the most efficient 
use of the resource
- Value placed on water 
may encourage efficient use
- Rights vested in state may 
entah. compensation issues
Problems deterrninhig 
beneficial uses
- Focus on current uses 
may lead to ‘short-termism’
- Where water is scarce, 
secondary users may go 
without
- ‘Use or lose it’ principle 
may lead to waste
Reasonable use - Reasonable use approach 
pays due regard to rights of 
others.
- No State halting’ of 
private property right
- Problem of determining 
what is a reasonable use
- Prohibitive in that uses 
generally limited to 
overlying land
- In times of scarcity a 
reasonable use may pay no 
regard to correlative rights 
of others
Correlative rights - Rule inherently concerned 
with fairness in respect of 
correlative rights of otliers
- In times of surplus aUows 
parties otlier than overlying 
landowners to share in 
resources
- No State ‘taking’ of
- State unable to restrict the 
total amount of water- 
extracted
- Fligh transactional costs; 
liigh incident of inter-part)^ 
disputes
Mumal prescription 
doctrine leads to overuse
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t
private property right and waste
Absolute dominium model - Low transactional costs - State unable to restrict
Pro development total amount of water
(liistoricaUy) extracted
- May lead to inequity,
unfairness
Law of capmre
encourages inefficiency and
over-use
It would appear from the above analysis that there is no one-size-fits aU ‘optimum’ 
model. From the review of the various different regimes above, aU of the possible 
advantages that might result from their imposition — some of wlrich are prevalent in 
more than one system — which an optimum water governance regime might strive for are 
now identified:
- A recognition of the importance of water rights for all in society
- A need, however, to countenance existing private property rights in water
- A need to take into account the correlative rights of other overlying landowners
- Allowing others (beyond overlying landowners) the right to make use of the 
resource
- Certaint}^ of extent of right and hence low transactional costs
- Disallowing unreasonable activities in respect of water
- Encouraging water use to aid industrial development
- Encouraging and protecting beneficial uses
-Limiting water uses in times of shortages / environmental problems
-Setting out exclusive and determinable rights which may encourage trading to
produce die most efficient use of the resource.™®
9^3 Trading is discussed extensively in chapter 7.
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Clearly not all positive features are present in any one system. The choice of regime that
individual states have made in respect of water governance represents a prioritising of
certain positive features at the expense of certain other features and this balancing act 
.may be influenced by a number of different factors including, liistorical legal influences, 
political expediencies, climate, prevalent current or historical water uses, locahsed 
environmental concerns and technological awareness of water resources. In Western 
states in the USA, for example, the presence of arid climates and relatively low water 
deposits led to the need to establish appropriative regimes in which tlie scarcity of the 
resource demanded a state-controlled system at the expense of private rights, which 
could limit the total amount of water abstracted to avoid drought and recognise and 
protect the most socially beneficial uses. By contrast, in many Eastern states, where 
water is generally plentiful and drought concerns have not historically been prevalent, 
except in specific localised areas - states have typically embraced an absolute dorninium 
regime or in rejecting the inherent unfairness of such an extreme Blackstonian approach, 
correlative rights regimes wliich although tend not to limit the total amount of water 
abstracted, encourage water use in the name of industrial development wlihst recognising 
the correlative rights of others in societjr.
!
A key aspect which cannot be ignored pertains to the legal ramifications of tlie
imposition of any new water abstractions regime. The US state of Texas, wliich has 
,continued to adopt an absolute dominium approach in respect of groundwater, has in 
the face of continual environmental and drought concerns, been reluctant to move to a 
state-controlled prior appropriation system which might fit in with current 
chmatic/ hydrological conditions Although such a system would perhaps best address 
these drought problems it would hlcely be pohticaUy unacceptable to landowners and (in
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the absence of compensation) potentially contrary to the 5* Amendment of the US 
Constitution which stipulates that “no person shall b e .. .deprived of ... property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation”.™'* Texas already operates a permit system in respect of use of water 
in defined channels and as McCleskey has noted
[t]he Texas Water Commission could adiiiinister a permit system for ground 
water.. .[hjowever, Texas or US courts may hold divesting all Texas landowners of tlieir 
water rights to be a taldng. Would the State’s assuming ownership of aU ground water 
be considered an exercise of eminent domain? If so, the State would have to 
compensate for the reasonable value of the water beneath their land.’^ ^
Summary
From the above it can be seen that policy ramifications have played a part in the reform 
of the law relative to migratory things in different jurisdictions. In respect of water, new 
policy considerations have arisen often in light of emerging Imowledge of the extent of 
the resource in situ and as a fuller appreciation of the impacts of different uses has 
become more apparent. Competing policy aims may not be compatible in their entirety 
and some poHcy markers may be required to be sacrificed in lieu of others. This is an 
issue discussed later in this tliesis.
This thesis has already discussed in some depth the current common law situation in 
Scotland. As the discussion in Part III over tlie next two chapters illustrates, Scotland is 
set to undergo some radical reforms in water governance over the next decade or so. 
Whether or not these reforms may produce an optimum system for Scotland is anodier 
matter. Clearly an optimum regime in Scotland should hope to achieve at least some of
194 It is unnecessaiy for the purposes o f tliis thesis to analyse the nature o f the ‘taldngs regime’ in tlie US. 
F or an in-depth discussion o f  the US takings regime and the Supreme C ourt’s different articulations o f  the 
concept o f property;- in this regard see U.S. Underkuffler-Freud, ‘Takings and the N ature o f Property^’ 9 
(1996; C 4 N /L /U R  161.
9^5 R.A, McCleskey, ‘Maybe Oil and W ater Should M k  -  at least in Texas W ater Law’ 1 (1994) T X W W R  
207 at pp 223-224.
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those societal benefits that have been articulated above and that the balance be struck 
and trade-offs made in tlie correct way for the needs of the nation. Moreover this 
should be done in such a way that is not inconsistent with existing private property rights 
which may currently be present in water. In tliis respect altliough there is no 
constitutionally grounded right against an uncompensated state taldng in Scotland, the 
impact of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) may produce a similar 
debate to that prevalent in Texas regarding any state variation of existing rights to water.
In short, the next two chapters will thus focus on the proposed reforms in Scottish water 
governance. Chapter 6 examines the nuts and bolts and a number of ‘micro issues’ 
which arise from implementation of the new scheme. Chapter 7 takes a more analytical 
approach, and by drawing on material in this and preceding chapters and other relevant 
Hterature, discusses the impact of die proposed reforms and whether or not the new 
regime is an appropriate one for water governance in Scodand.
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ownership and hence should rather be vested in the state for the benefit of aU. Water’s
' M oreover water uses are constantly slrifting and needs may fluctuate with climatic change.
2 G. Sherk, P. W outers and S. Rochford, W ater wars in the near future? Reconciling com peting claims for 
die w orld’s dimiitishing freshwater resources -  the challenge o f  the new m illennium ’ CEPM NP On-line 
journal, vol 3, art 2, p i.
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PART III: CHAPTER 6
SCOTTTSH WATER I^ W  REFORM : NUTS AND BOLTS 
Introduction
It is utterly trite to remark that water is a life-sustaining resource essential to the well­
being of manldnd. This has been recognised since classic formulations of the law held 
that water in its natural state was too precious to be subject to the vagaries of private
uses in society are, of course wide and varied and include both municipal and industrial 
demand in respect of food security (irrigation), economic development, environmental 
and natural resource protection, inining and navigation. ’
On a global level, tlie fact can be pointed to that some 97% of the earth’s surface is 
covered in water. The general view commonly taken as regards water supphes may 
hence be that such resources are abundant and the issue of scarcityr is not one that 
should trouble society unduly. It should be understood, however, that some 94% of the 
world’s water is non-accessible in that it is contained in the world’s oceans. Moreover, 
much of the remainder is tied up in ice-caps or glaciers. “It has therefore been estimated
Ithat only 0.36% of the world’s water contained in rivers, lakes and swamps is sufficiently dIaccessible to be considered as a renewable fresh water resource”.^
In fact increasing world water scarcity is a topic that has received much attention over 
recent years. World Bank statistics have identified approximately twenty countries tliat 
have been declared “chronically water scarce”. Furtliermore, witli projected climate
changes and increasing abstraction needs, it is estimated that by 2050, some 66 countries 
encompassing some two thirds of tlie world population will face between moderate to 
severe water shortages.®
In a statement made in July 2000 to the Scottish Grand Committee on behalf of the 
Department of International Development, George FouUces MP remarked that “ [m]any 
countries desperately need clearer legal frameworks for efficient and equitable allocation 
and effective use of water, and to ensure sustainable management of the water resource 
for fumre generations”/  Wliile referring to the need for the imposition of such regimes 
in other (particularly developing) nations, FouUces should perhaps have been looldng 
closer to home. His observations may be sahent in respect of the UK where the current 
legal regimes in places arguably do not in fact reflect such ideals. Scotland, in particular, 
is currently undergoing root-and-branch reforms in an effort to align herself with such 
an enlightened approach, with a radical shake up of the regulation of water rights to be 
implemented over the next decade or so.
Unhlce the case in England and Wales, where for some time the common law has been 
altered by the imposition of a comprehensive licensing framework,® the current simation 
in Scotland remains one largely governed by the common law rules of absolute
3 W orld W ater Council, "From  vision to action : organising the policy tliink tank" (1999), p 7.
4 G. Foulkes, The Scottish Contribution to International Development Statement to the Scottish G rand Committee, 
10 July 2000 available at h t tp ; / / w w w .drm dee.ac.uk/law /w a te r/foulkes__speech.htm.
3 In  E ngland and Wales, subject to certain exceptions, no  party may abstract w ater from  any source except 
in pursuance o f  a relevant hcense granted by tlie w ater a u th o r ^  (the E nvironm ent Agency) (Water Act 
1963 s 23; W ater Resources A ct 1991, s24(l)) and in relation to groundwater, a party may not begin or 
cause any other party; to begin to construct a well, or borehole or work by which the water may be 
abstracted from  the strata (1963 Act, s 23(2)(b)). T he general restriction does n o t apply where the quantity; 
o f w ater does not exceed 5 cubic m eters (1991 A ct s 24(1)), nor does tlie abstraction o f a quantity; not 
exceeding 20 cubic meters fall witliin the terms o f  the restriction in so far as this has the consent o f  the 
E nvironm ent Agency. N or wiU abstraction o f underground water for domestic purposes fall witliin the 
terms o f  the restriction (in so far as the quantity; abstracted does not exceed 20 cubic meters in any 24 
hours -  1991 A ct s 24). Changes to tlie regime will be forthcoming when the W ater Act 2003 becomes 
operational.
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dominium as regards groundwater and riparian rights in relation to water in defined 
channels/ Scotland is a nation generally perceived to be blessed with (or perhaps 
blighted by) a surfeit of water. Indeed, concerns over flooding and arguments over the 
rights of proprietors to eject water onto adjacent lands have historically been far more 
common than disputes relating to water shortages.® Official statistics of water resources 
bear out this experience. The Scottish Environment Protection Agency has noted that ;
[i]f Scotland's available water resources are measured against a UK or European basis, 
Scotland is not short of water. Exploitable water resources are equivalent to 16,000 nP 
per person per year in comparison with 2,090 for the UK, 3,490 m  ^ for France and 
2,156 m.3 for Germany. As a consequence of the perception tliat water supplies are 
plentiful, powers to control abstractions of waters and to regulate use of rivers in 
Scotland are fragmentary and Hmlted.^
Aside from a smattering of case-specific, statutory exceptions,'® the traditional common 
law position has been historically perceived as generally sufficient for regulating water use 
in Scotland.™ These common law rules are set to be overlain with a comprehensive 
statutory framework, however, in the aftermatli of potentially radical reforms brought 
forth by tlie Scottish Executive’s landmark piece of legislation, the Water Environment 
and Water Service (Scotland) Act 2003 (WEWS). Tliis, inter alia, for the first time 
provides for the development of a comprehensive statutory licensing regime for water 
use in Scotland.”
8 D iscussed in chapter 3.
7 N . Wliittj;, ‘W ater Law Regimes’ in Reid and Zim m erm an (eds) A  Histofy of Private Law in Scotland (2000) 
at p 468. As was discussed in chapter 3 tiiere is a general paucity; o f  cases dealing witli disputes over tights 
to w ater in Scotland.
8 Scottish E nvironm ental Protection Agency, State of the Environment, Water Onality Report : Part 1 (1996) 
available at htip:.-f/m vw.sepa.ofg.uk./publications/starc of/1696ivarcrqLiality/report/text /\vatcrtcxi.htm .
9 There are a few notable exceptions including ; water for public supply is abstracted under The W ater A ct 
1908, s 17; water for hy;dro-electricity; is abstracted under the Electricity Act 1989, sched. 5; limited 
controls powers exist under tlie N atural H eritage (Scotland) A ct 1991 to control abstraction for irrigation 
and in cases o f drought.
A t least by implication. Case-law dealing w ith water rights has been few and far betw een in Scotland and 
there is relatively little academic discussion o f  such issues.
W ater provision being a devolved rather tiian ‘reserved’ issue under tlie Scotland A ct 1998.
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Problems engendeted by the cutfent regime
The main driver for reform has clearly been the requirement to bring Scottish water
12governance in line with provisions set out in the European Water Framework Directive. 
The current largely laisseq^  faire water governance regime in Scodand is on any cursory 
analysis clearly not compatible with die provisions of the Directive. It would be 
misleading to suggest, however, diat concerns about compatibility with European 
attempts at harmonisation are the only drivers for change. Recalling the positive feamres 
of water regimes discussed in chapter 5, collated from die various approaches found in 
different US state jurisdictions, it can be noted diat currendy some of those are prevalent 
in Scodand but not others. So, for example, the absolute dominium regime for 
percolating groundwater has encouraged water use to aid industrial development and die 
certainty inherent in the law has aided low transactional costs. The current law in tliis 
regard has not, however, protected in any way die correlative needs of others in society;, 
nor has it redected a need to view groundwater as a public resource, too precious for 
unfettered and perhaps wasteful, private exploitation.
D irective 2 0 0 0 /60/E C .
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Pelhaps in the past — and the shortage of case-law regarding disputes over abstractions is
.testament to this fact — such concerns were not in practice pressing ones given the 
prevalence of water resources in Scodand. If it is indeed a case of ‘water, water, 
everywhere’ dien as a fundamental assertion it can be stated that there seems htde need 
for the law to interfere much in the realm of apportioning water rights (at least in terms 
of abstraction) beyond sanctioning a simple absolute dorninium approach.
. . 1
I
Despite the perception of Scotland as a perennially wet realm, localised incidents of  ^ ’
water shortages and other identified environmental problems stemming from over­
abstraction have, however, in recent times resulted in calls from commentators for 
abstractions to be controlled.’® In keeping with tlie perception of percolating 
groundwater as an abundant resource, the incumbent absolute dorninium approach has 
allowed largely unlimited abstractions by landowners and, in particular, certain industrial 
sectors. Tins unfettered right of abstraction, while not always problematic, has begun to 
cause well-documented problems in certain geographical areas of Scotland. SEP A, for 
example has reported a number of concerns, including: increasing abstraction o f water 
from groundwater aquifers in Dumfries had lowered the water table both threatening a 
valuable drinking water resource and resulting in the drying out of connecting rivers; f
there are approximately 1000 hydro-energy ‘off-takes’ in Scotland which transfer water 
out of catchments to generating stations, many of which in fact remove all the water
I
during low river flows; the combination of recent dry summers and increased irrigation 
has led to pressure on small east coast water burns; over abstraction of water for
3^ Including SEP A — see for example, SEP A : ‘State o f the Environm ent, W ater Quahty R eport’ ; Part 1 
(1996) available at
liftp:/ / wwvv.sep.i.onyuk/ pubhcartons/ stare o f / 1 ‘>96waivrqiiality / report / lexi,/ vmrertexi.iiim 
'4 Some o f  tliese Imock o n  effects have been discussed previously m  chapter 5.
'3 SEP A, supra n. 13.
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drinking from lochs or reservoirs may have significant impacts upon river ecology
"Ïdownstream. Examples include rapid changes from high to lows flows in the River 
Leven downstream of the Loch Lomond barrage which leads to the stranding of 
migratory salmon fish and their spawning beds;™ The increasing phenomenon of bottled 
water (some 500 miUion litres are sold in the UK every year) which is almost always 
sourced from groundwater may also put further pressure on groundwater supplies.’®
Although tlie current system in respect of water in defined channels is subject to '
restrictions on use engendered by riparian rights, the regime in Scotland has arguably, on
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occasion, failed to adequately protect correlative rights in practice and moreover, fads to yrestrict total amounts of water abstracted. In respect of surface waters (and 
underground waters) ia defined channels, as noted in chapter three, riparian rights allow 
landowners to draw water freely for private use and primary purposes.™ While such 
largely minor abstractions are of limited concern, rights to undertake secondary (such as 
commercial) abstractions may also be acquired by prescription.’® When tliese rights are 
acquired, downstream riparians would not be able to object, regardless of their impact.
As Hendry has noted “many such abstractors exist (particularly breweries, distilleries, fish 
farmers and agricultural users) and problems (in particular, localised over-abstraction) are 
recognised but not at present addressed”.’®
So it is against tliis backdrop of a regime which has increasingly been recognised as 
flawed that the current reforms are to take place. It is perhaps with some itony tliat tlie 
reforms are not the direct result of such concerns but rather stem from an agenda driven 
from within Europe. While change is needed, whetlier such a European agenda and its 
policy manifestations will result in an optimum regime for Scotland’s waters is another 
matter. This chapter now proceeds to an analysis of the main provisions of die reforms.
In the next chapter, the proposed regime is judged according to a set of criteria which it 
is submitted are in accordance with an optimum water regime for Scotland.
;
'8 discussed in chapter 3. ..
'7 A lthough the period of prescription is unclear W M  G ordon , Scottish Land Law, 2nd ed (1999) at para 7.32 
suggests such a right would be acquired in line witii die 20 year negative prescription period. -
S. Hendry, ‘Enabling the framework - the W ater E nvironm ent and W ater Services’ (Scotland) Act 2003 y
(2003) 14 Water Law  16 at p 20. )
..I
The European Ftamework Water Directive and the Water Environment and 
Water Service (Scotland^ Act 2003.
As noted, WEWS is primarily a response to the need for the Scottish water regime to be 
compliant with the aims of the European Water Directive. Compatibility with the 
European measures is to be achieved by way of Ministerial orders made under powers 
conferred by WEWS. Prior to exaiiiining the WEWS provisions, it may be wordiwhile 
first casting an eye over the main tiiemes of the directive.
The Water Framework Directive
EC Directive 2000/60/EC was adopted in 2000 and entered into force on 22 December 
2000. The Directive is an attempt to establish a harmonised framework throughout 
member states and is the consequence of a realisation that the pre-directive European 
water measures were too fragmented and while comruonly targeted specific problems 
relative to water, ignored an overall strategic approach to water resources across 
Europe.™
The basic purpose of the directive is set out in Article 1 :
The purpose of this Directive is to establish a framework for the protection of inland 
surface waters, transitional waters, coastal waters and groundwater which;
1. prevents further deterioration and protects and enhances the status of aquatic 
ecosystems and, with regard to their water needs, terrestrial ecosystems and wedands 
directly depending on die aquatic ecosystems;
2. promotes sustainable water use based on a long-term protection of available water 
sources;
3. aims at enhanced protection and improvement of the aquatic environment, inter aha, 
through specific measures for the progressive reduction of discharges, emissions and 
losses of priority substances and the cessation or phasing-out of discharges, emissions 
and losses of the priority; hazardous substances;
4. ensures die progressive reduction of pollution of groundwater and prevents its farther 
pollution, and
See A. Farm er, ‘T he EC W ater Fram ework D irective : An In troduction’ (2001) 12 Water Law  1.
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5. contributes to mitigating the effects o f floods and droughts.
At the heart o f the directive’s rationale is the concept of sustainability and to tliis end 
ensure that water resources in member states remain imbued with (or are altered to 
attain) certain characteristics deemed in accordance with such an aim. Under Article 4 of 
the Directive, therefore, member states are required to achieve what has been labelled in 
ecological terms 'good groundwater status’ and ‘good surface water stams’ by 2015. 
Waters will be classified by States in to one of five classes : ‘high’; ‘good’; ‘fair’; ‘poor’ and 
‘bad’. Such a stams wül be determined by the worst of three separate assessments of 
biological, chemical and hydro-morphological stams.^° For the first time, tlie stams of 
surface water wiU be assessed in terms of ecological quahty as well as chemical qualit} ,^ 
and the quality and quantity of both groundwater and surface water will be considered 
together.^^ Clearly, therefore, tlie overarching aim of tlie directive and hence abstraction 
regimes tiiat are manifest thereunder is to ensure the sustainability of the resource for the 
good of aU in society. It hence can be flagged up at this stage that while such an aim has 
at its heart the notion that water is too precious to be left to the whim of private 
ownership, it may only be delivered at the cost of maldng inroads into current private 
property rights held in water. Similarly, the directive’s aim may also, at times, be at odds 
witli the goal of industrial development which may reap economic benefits for societ)c
There will be only limited exceptions to the requirement to meet good stams in 
accordance with the timetable set out in the directive,^" for example, bodies o f water 
which have been “heavily modified” by human activity (e.g. those tliat have been
A nnex V o f  die A ct sets out vaiious param eters which will determine how  the ecological status o f a 
given water body can be identified.
T he D irective wiU also, inter alia, introduce a new, integrated approach to the control o f pollution at 
source through tlie setting o f emission hmit values and o f  environmental quaht}' standards for water.
22 ie by 2015.
164
artificially constructed or restricted). Further exceptions (whereunder members states 
may be given additional time to meet ‘good status’ detailed in article 4) may be possible 
on a variety of other grounds include technical problems, namral conditions and cost 
implications. Such exceptions may be important in that they may allow water regulation 
in Scotland room to manoeuvre and the consideration (at least in part) of a number of 
different water regulation regimes whereunder priorities other than preservation of the 
resource may be in the ascendancy.
The requirement in general throughout member states, however, is some sort of Hcensing 
regime for abstractions aldn to that found in prior appropriative regimes common in 
western US states. To this end, in order to lay the groundwork for acliieving tlie aims of 
the directive. Article 11 requires member states to establish:
controls over the abstraction of fresh surface water and groundwater and impoundment 
of fresh surface water, including a register or registers of water abstractions and a 
requirement of prior authorisation for abstractions and impoundments... Member States 
can exempt from these controls, abstractions or impoundments which have no 
significant impact on water stams.
WEWS
The current abstraction regimes in Scotland in relation to botli groundwater and surface 
water clearly do not live up to tlie requirements set out in article 11 of the directive. For 
one, given the largely unlicensed nature of water governance in Scotland, information on 
the extent of water resources in situ and abstractions thereof is patchy. Additionally, as 
alluded to above, there may be localised instances of over-abstraction heralding 
deleterious envhonmental and other consequences which presently are not controlled at 
all and hence, under the terms of the directive will requite to be licensed. Provisions 
compatible with the terms of the ditective are thus to be put in place under powers set
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out in WEWS. The sahent measure of the Act in this respect is section 20 which allows 
Ministers to put into place a regulatory framework to control, inter alia, abstractions of 
groundwater and from surface streams and impoundments of surface water.
The detail of the hcensing provisions requires to be fleshed out tlirough mimsterial 
orders. Draft orders have now been forthcoming^'^ and further information can be found 
in the discussion papers which preceded the Act^  ^ and information pubhshed by SEP A -  
the body to whom the role of enforcing the new regulatory hcensing reghne has been 
entrusted.
^asis for the regime
The abstraction hcensing regime is part of a wide-ranging strategy based upon what has
been termed a ‘river basin management planning process’. This process is a requirement
of the European water Dhective^^ and will provide for the regulation of water-related
activities which hold envhonmental consequences within a ‘river basin district’ m
accordance with the aims of the planning process. River basin management planning
“whl... [thus] provide a reference point for ah forms of planning that affect the water
.environment”.^  ^ Importantly, 'joined up’ thinking in terms of the water environment and
the impact thereon of a myriad of different water uses is central to the planning process :
2-^ A n enabling provision.
2“' Scottish Executive Environm ent, G roup Controlled A.ctmties Régulations : A  Consultation Consultation 
Paper, April 2004 (Paper 2004/8). See also Scottish Executive Environm ent G roup, Controlled ^environment 
Activities Regulations: Revised Proposals for General Binding Rjiles March 2005 (Paper 2005/4) and Scottish 
Executive E im ro n m en t G roup, (Controlled Activities) (Scotland) Regulations 2004 : Draft Regulations : Analysis of 
Responses to the Scottish Executive IP '' M arch 2005 at
b tip://wxvw.ScotlaiKj.gov.uk/]ibrary5/en.vironm en,t/rw eair-0Lasp.
2^  cited below.
Article 13.
27 Scottish Executii^e Environm ent G roup, The Future of Scotland's Waters - Proposals for Eegislation Feb 2002 
(Paper 2002/4), para 1.2. U nder s 3(1) o f the A ct tlie 'water environment' extends to "all surface water- 
ground water and 'wetlands'". S 3(5) defines wetlands as "an area o f  ground the ecological, chemical and 
hydrological characteristics o f  wliich are attributable to frequent inundation or saturation by water and 
wliich is directly dependent , w itli regard to its water need on a body o f  groundw ater or a body o f surface 
w ater” .
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“[a] key feature of the system will be a spatial analysis of all human impacts on the water 
environment that recognises the interconnections between aU, tlie elements in the water 
cycle — rivers, lochs, esmaries, coastal waters and water under the ground”/^ So, in tliis 
way, unlike the present common law regime, decisions over water usage rights wiU 
attempt to take into account the interrelationship between groundwater and surface 
streams and tlie impact of various water activities over both water resources and other 
water activities. In accordance witli tlie goals of the Water Framework Directive, the 
overall aim of the new regime is to “help drive forward ... sustainabihty... [and] integrate 
environmental priorities with social and economic imphcations... [and achieve] tlie best 
possible balance between the protection of the water environment and those who 
depend upon it for their prosperitjr and quality of hfe” .^  ^ Such a balancing act is a 
perennially difficult task and budding up a sufficient laiowledge base of Hlcely 
environmental impacts set against probable economic fall-outs for any proposed water
use is nicely to cause stark difficulties. While the state of water resources in situ may not 
.be the ‘occult’ it was at the time of early court decisions, die occult now perhaps lies in 
die lack of laiowledge which exists in relation to the impacts — both environmental and 
economic — of water use.^°
It seems clear therefore that the current benefit of low transactional costs which the
incumbent common law regime in Scodand exhibits, would be largely lost under the
reforms. Tentative economic analyses which shall form the basis of the River Basin
Management Processes required to meet the ecological requirements of the Directive
have already been undertaken and tiiese are discussed later in the chapter. An important
point to note here is that abstractions are not to be considered in isolation -  as it may
have been in the past - under die new regime. Radier, abstractions are to be considered
____________________________
2* The Future of Scotland's IFaters, supra n. 27, para 1.2.
2'; z W .
These issues are taken up in chapter 7.
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1as one composite part of a wide-reaching river basin planning process which will take 
into account the repercussions of a whole range of water uses and the relationships 
between such uses.
The River Basin
Û"
The basic building block of the new regime will be the river basin — the tract of land 
.from which surface water eventually flows into the sea (and all connecting 
g ro u n d w aters).G iv en  the large number of significant river basins arising namraUy 
throughout Scotland, it was proposed to set out river basin plans (RBP’s) on a district
the establishment of one RBD has not been conclusively determined yet in the Act itself 
although tlie intention was clearly stated after the consultation exercise.^^
For a general discussion and critique o f  the river basin concept see L. Teclaff ‘T he River Basin Concept 
and Climate Change’ (1991) 8 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 355.
■’2 The Future of Scotland's Water, supra n. 27 para 1.4.
''•7 s 4 o f the A ct merely stipulates that Ministers will establish one or m ore RBD's. Tliis lack o f  certainty 
w ithin the A ct is a com m on feature o f tliis som ewhat bare enabhng prmtision.
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.basis comprising groups of river basins and their associated groundwaters. This would
facilitate the establishment of a large scale, consistent, strategic plan for each RBD. 
Wliile the establishment of three RBD’s was thus initially mooted, after a mixed response 
from consultées (many of whom viewed that at such a large scale there was little added
Iif
value to be had in three rather than one basin district) the Executive’s preferred option is 
now the establishment of one RBD.^^ In what may seem a somewhat illogical omission,
I
Given tliat water resources are no respecter of artificial man-made boundaries, special 
recognition is made in the Act of the fact that separate bi-lateral arrangements wiU 
require to be made in respect of tlie cross-border basins at the Tweed, Tyne and Solway. 
This should not cause intractable difficulties as the water regime in England and Wales is
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.5=;:-
undergoing similar reforms in an effort to meet tlie aims of the Directive and will require 
to put m place similar RBD management plans which should intertwine with the Scottish 
approach reasonably well.
It should in fact be noted that in establisliing RBD’s, Scotland is at a disadvantage 
compared to England and Wales '^  ^as unhlce its southern counterpart there has previously 
been no statutory framework in place to facilitate such a strategic approach. In terms of 
the regime change in respect of water, Scotland therefore is facing more radical changes 
than England and hence the new system may entail additional regulatory costs which will 
require to be borne by society and, in particular, water users.
Public participation is a central feature of sustainable development^^ and hence the RBD 
plan shall be the product of a consultation between the regulator and interested parties. 
In accordance witli article 14 of the Directive, certain procedures for consultation must 
be followed including : a timetable and work programme for tlie development of tlie 
RBD must be made public 3 years prior to its operation; an interim overview of salient 
water issues is to be made public 2 years prior to the operation of the RBD; draft copies 
of tlie plan are to be made public at least a year prior to implementation and tliere should 
be at least a 6 month window for the public to comment on the plan. As there is to be 
only one RBD for the whole of Scotland, recognising the need to involve participation at 
a local level and engender the ‘ownership’ of local stakeholders of the consultation 
processes for establishing RBD plans, the original legislative proposals gave SERA the 
power to establish sub-RBD plans. To ensure that such meaningful local participation 
can take place, however, sub river basin district plans - which wiU feed into the RBD plan
The Environm ent A ct 1995, s 4(2) gave the (English) E m aronm ent Agency powers to establish strategic 
water resource planning management.
Principle 10 o f  tlie Rio Declaration, U N  Conference on E nvironm ent and D evelopm ent, Rio 1992.
A lthough there is no requirem ent to involve the general public directly. This potential weakness is 
discussed in chapter 7.
1
• Water use licences
• General binding rules (GBR’s)
• Simple registration
• Management agreements'*^
7^ This point is picked up in chapter 7.
The Future o f Scotland's Waters, supra n. 27 at para 3.9.
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- are now mandatory under s 15 of WEWS. Clearly engendering local ‘ownership’ and 
participation will be central in getting parties on board with the reforms. This is 
particularly so, when, as noted below, many of these parties will require to bear 
significant costs in the aftermath of a new, more restrictive regime in relation to 
abstraction and impoundments. As the proposed regime wül upset the existing balance 
of private water rights in water, such local ‘ownership’ may be necessary to assuage those 
whose rights are adversely impacted upon thereby.
The proposed licensing regime
Under the Scottish Executive’s plans, all water-related activities which may impose an 
environmental risk (including abstraction of groundwater and surface water and 
impoundments of surface water) may be subject to one of a number of different levels of 
regulatory requirement. Gauging when and to what extent environmental risks wül 
follow an abstraction or impoundment may be no easy task and expensive to determine. 
With that point firmly in mind, the different regulatory requirements include:
Ticences
Decisions as to the nature of regulation required will be taken by the regulator at a local 
level by taldng into account impacts on tire local environment by the proposed activityf*'
For activities within the River Basin District (including abstractions and impoundments) 
that pose die greatest enviromnental risk, the liighest form of regulation, water use 
licences wül be required. The licences wül be ‘activit}  ^ and site specific’ in the sense that 
conditions attached thereto wül be taüored to local conditions.'*^ It is clearly thus an 
important feature of the proposed regüne that decisions in respect of licences are taken 
at a local level and that tlie licensor can take into account the environmental 
consequences of the abstraction as against its potential economic and social benefits.'**
The problem with taldng such decisions as these is to ensure that judgements to either 
grant or refuse a licence are informed. It may well be that in today’s technological society 
it is possible to be aware to a far greater degree than previously about water resources i
(particularly groundwater) and the link between groundwater and surface water flows is y4
far better understood (although such determination may be costly). What remains,
■’j
however, is the gap in knowledge as to the impact that refusal to grant licences for T
abstraction may hold for society — particularly where the attainment of ‘good water 
status’ in accordance with the Directive may be to the detriment of other (particularly 
economic) advantages which society may benefit from. (
‘.4
I":
1■’‘2 ibid at para 3.10. /
The Future of Scotland's Waters, supra n. 27 at para 3,11 A lthough standard licence term s are also Hkely to f
be formulated.
A lthough discretion to side-step sustainabtUty may be Umited as tire key aim o f  the W ater Directive, 
however, is one which in general places sustamabihtj^ o f  the resource ahead o f o ther policy goals in term s 
o f  w ater governance.
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Small abstractions
Despite initial proposals mooted to allow abstractions below 20 cubic metres per day to 
remain unlicensed,'*^ the Executive seemed keen not to adopt this rule and the regulator 
was to be given discretion to determine when Hcences would be required at a local level/^ 
Tills meant that many small abstractions — wliich may currently be considered to  be of 
negligible risk would be caught up within the regime at one level or another, bringing 
with it regulatory costs that, under the Scottish Executive proposals, would be borne by 
the abstractor. The intention in this respect appears to have again changed of late, 
however. Despite concerns regarding the arbitrary namre of attributing certain 
regulatory requirements to certain levels of abstraction on a blanket basis, abstractions 
below 10 cubic meters per day are now set to be subject to GBR’s.
Under WEWS, any abstraction, whatever the size, wiU in general only fall within the 
ambit of the regime where it involves “the doing of anything whereby any water is 
removed bj mechanical means” (my emphasis).'*'* This would mean that manual forms of 
abstraction (eg by bucket) or abstraction caused by eitlier people or livestock drinking 
straight from rivers and wells would not be covered the regime. Although it is unlilcely 
that such abstractions would be significant, tliere may be potential difficulties in localised 
areas where if a drought exists, such manual abstraction on any level could not be 
prohibited or controlled. It may at first blush appear that non-mechanical methods of 
abstractions such as mill lade activity which may perhaps hold significant repercussions
•^ 2 Set o a t ill die Scottisli Executive Consultation Paper, Rivers, Lochs, Coasts : The Future of Scotland' 'Waters 
(2001). Tliis Hinit is currently utilised in England and Wales.
T he set hm it was criticised on various grounds by respondents to the Executive's consultation paper 
including that it was an arbitrary figure; tliat it was too low; and by contrast that it was too liigh -  see A. 
Farm er & C, M onldiouse, Analysis of Responses to Rdvers, Lochs, Coasts : The Future of Scotland's Waters’ : Final 
report to the Scottish Executive Institute for European Policy (January 2002) chapter 7.
Scottish Executive E nvironm ent G roup, Controlled Environment Activities Regulations: Revised Proposals for 
General Binding Rades supra n. 24 at p 5.
S 20(6).
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for water levels might tlierefore fall through the net. It is important to note, however, 
that such works would fall into the category of impoundments of surface waters which 
are also subject to the new regime. Impoundments are defined in s 20 of WEWS as “(a) 
any dam, wen or other works in the body of water by which water may be impounded; 
(b) any works diverting tire flow of water in the body of water in connection with the 
construction or alteration of any dam, weir or other works falling witlrin paragraph (a)”. 
Moreover the Executive has proposed that extraction by gravity fall within the remit of 
the regime.
It should be noted that the current English licensing regime also exempts certain 
activities from control including small ‘one o ff quantities'*^ and abstractions for 
navigation and harbour authorities.'*** While the majority of these exemptions are non- 
con tentions, one potentially problematic exempt activity that as been identified is triclde 
irrigation — a method of land drainage.'*  ^ It has been argued that this process was 
exempt from the regulations in order to ensure that obstacles were removed from tlie use 
of what was perceived as an effective and efficient method of land drainage.'*** Use of 
this unregulated process, however, has risen exponentially in recent years bringing with it 
well-documented environmental problems. The most recent English figures suggest a 
growth of trickle irrigation abstraction from 1,330 ha. In 1987 to 4,120 ha in 1995.'** For 
Scotland, irrigators may find their current activities restricted in particularly sensitive 
geographical areas.
Controlled Activities Regulations, supra n.27 at para 1.5.
-«51991 A ct s 27.
■*« 1991 A ct s 26.
■'7 s 29(5).
R. Cunningham, ‘R eform  o f water resource control in E ngland and Wales’ (2002) 13 Water Lan> 35 at p 
38.
Ministry' o f  Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Survey of irrigation of outdoor crops in 1995 (k^ork : 
G overnm ental Statistical Seiwice, 1996).
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5” Available at h ttp ://w w w .sepa.org.uk/w fd/regulation.htm  
that may be augmented by specific local licence conditions. 
=2 Controlled Activities Regulations, supra n. 24 at para 3.15.
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licence conditions
SEP A wiU be given powers to impose a wide range of conditions to licences. It is 
anticipated that full licences will be required where it is necessary to control site specific 
impacts of any proposed water use. SEP A have indicated that in their view, fuU licences 
would be required only in a minority of c a s e s . I n  relation to abstraction and 
impoundments, a list of non-exhaustive licence conditions^* has already been identified 
by the Scottish Executive and include :
• Requirements to follow best practice and utilise best technology
• Reporting requirements
• Conservation measures to facilitate long-term exploitation of the resource
• Code of practice compliance
• Restricting licences to certain identified users
• Restricting the duration of a licence where that is deemed necessary to protect 
the environment.^^
These final two conditions may in practice prove the most controversial in that die
absence of absolute, identifiable property rights in water resources may discourage what
may be heavy levels of investment from industry. Moreover, such restrictions may
discourage the trading of Hcences, which has been identified as one way of ensuring the 
.most efficient use of scarce resources such as water. The issue of trading in general is 
discussed under ‘efficiency’ in chapter 7. The standard Hcence conditions should apply 
to all Hcences Hi relation to each controUed activity. It is argued tiiat this consistency 
across the board should assist the protection of the water environment whilst at tlie same
i
time provide some semblance of the certainty in respect of water licences that industry 
requires to make informed, economicaRy-viable, business decisions.”
General Binding Rrdes
Following on from this, a step down tlie regulatory ladder from water use licences can be 
found in the guise of ‘General Binding Rules (GBR’s)’. GBR’s are sets of publicised 
mandatory rules that would apply to particular controlled activities “where tlie 
environmental impacts are predictable and mitigation measures can be defined in a 
common form”.”  Anyone carrying out this sort of activity would be bound to act in 
accordance with tlie GBR. Clearly, much work wül require to be done in ascertaining tlie 
‘predictable’ environmental impacts that may emanate from particular uses when 
currently so little is Imown about the possible repercussions of many current water- 
related activities. Despite the fact that GBR’s were initiaüy seen as the 2"“* most onerous 
form of regulation behind licences, tliis may no longer be the case as the latest proposals 
from the Executive indicate a desire to dispense with the need for registration of such 
activities; rather parties engaged in such works must simply comply with the provisions 
of the GBR’s.” “ Tliis may be seen as surprising, particularly in the context of the 
current lack of information regarding current water use activities and the need to remain 
aware of these in case of changing environmental or social needs. This move may be 
seen as a response to concerns voiced from industry about tlie onerous nature of 
complying with the regime.
ibid at para 3.17.
5-* ibid at para 3.20.
Scottish Executive EnvironiTient G roup, Controlled Environment Activities Regulations: Revised Proposals for  
General Binding Rules supra ii. 24. A list o f activities relevant to GBR’s and proposed prescriptive rules in 
this regard can be found in tliis report,
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Simple registration
At the bottom of the original regulatory ladder is simple registration. In respect of 
activities that are deemed to entail low environmental risk, mere notification of any 
proposed action would be required prior to it taldng place and a licence or compliance 
with GBR’s would not be required. Registration wiU allow the regulator to keep up to 
date statistics on aU water activities thus building up a fuU picmre of current and possible 
future environmental impacts.”  At the time of writing tliere appears some confusion 
surrounding the relationship between simple registration and GBR’s. Given that as 
GBR’s look set to entail no registration, simple registration may now be seen as the more 
onerous of the two regulatory measures.
The Tayment regime
Under article 9 of the Water Directive, member states are required to “take account of 
tlie principle” of recovery of the costs of water sendees. In Scotland, there will hence be 
charges at aU levels of regulation wliich whl require to be borne by the abstractors. To 
give an example of a regime currently in practice, for England and Wales, a fixed 
application processing fee is charged for tlie regulator’s work (in this case the 
Environment Agency). In addition, most licence holders pay an annual charge based on 
the amount of water licensed for extraction, the source of tlie water, the time of the year 
the water is used and the purpose for which tlie water is used. The acmal charges vaiy 
considerably, but typically range from £1 to ^18 per mega litre abstracted per annum.
“ ibid at para 3.20-21.
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The charge is currently for the licensed volume rather than the acmal extracted volume, 
so there is currently no incentive in England to take less water than is allowed by the 
hcence — an issue wliich may not be conducive to the conservation of supplies. It may 
be prudent tlierefore to ensure that charges in Scodand are based upon acmal water 
withdrawn rather than the maximum that could be appropriated under die licence terms.
While the detail of the Scottish regime has not yet been fleshed out, there is clearly a
need to investigate the extent that charging might not merely cover the administration
costs of the regulator but also places a value on water itself and hence encourage the
most efficient use. Indeed die directive requires that such an approach be in place by
2010.”’ While such a move may bring about conservation of the resource, it could
further be perceived as an assault on current private propert}'  ^ rights in water and might 
.possibly act as a barrier to exploitation of water resources for die economic weU-being of
society. Moreover, whedier in Scodand a regulatory regime for water requires to focus 
to such an extent on sustainability issues is debatable. These issues are discussed in 
chapter 7.
5'' Article 9. A ltliough such an approach can be ignored if it does not com prom ise the general aims o f the 
directive.
Management agreements
One of the problems that was identified in chapter 5 concerned die fact diat a prior 
appropriation reghne may result in secondary users going without in times of a drought. 
Leaving aside the issue of time-limited licences for the thne being, in an effort to combat 
such problems where there is an anticipated shortage of available resources, WEWS 
makes provision for the adoption of management agreements whereunder all potential
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users would forge some sort of contract on how to divide the scarce resource in the most 
efficient and equitable manner. As the Executive in theh proposals state
[w]e believe that management agreements will also be a useful addition to the control 
regimes. These would be appropriate where a number of users in a distinct geographical 
area could co-ordinate their activities to better protect the water environment and their 
own interests. For example, a management agreement could provide a number of 
abstractors from the same water body with an opportunity to collaborate with each other 
and the regulator to design and employ a locally appropriate means of protecting the 
water resource. Management agreements would depend upon the consent of all parties. 
The agreement would form part of the water use hcence for each party to theagreement. ^ 7
7^ The Future for Scotland's Waters, supra ii. 27 at para 3.18.
;,v
This sort of approach is not unlilce tlie current position as regards unitisation agreements
which are forged between parties drhhng for oil under UK offshore production hcences.
As the discussion relating to hydrocarbons in chapter 4 detailed, more efficient means of
exploiting hydrocarbons offshore are mandated by the Secretary of State (SS) to
circumvent the deleterious consequences of competitive drhling. While the SS has
compulsory powers in this regard, they are in practice never invoked and ratlier parties
have sought to forge their own agreements to avoid tlie imposition of a such a scheme 
.by die state. Parties tiius have a vested interest in forging an equitable and efficient 
agreement. It may be speculated that although in the water hcensing context, the consent 
of ah parties is required to enforce such management agreements, parties are similarly 
unlikely to be recalcitrant in so doing to ensure that overly restrictive hcence conditions 
are not imposed by the regulator. It seems plausible diat hi such cases parties might 
estabhsh, inter se, some sort of correlative rights system akin to that found in certahi 
eastern US States whereunder the respective share of audiorised volume of abstraction 
may be tied to die size of land owned.
'"3":
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at least in certain cases, transfers the balancing act of competing rights for water in 
defined channels from the courts to the regulator and moreover extends such an
A lthough as discussed iu chapter three there are mixed viewpoints on this.
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9
Environmental v Economic Mnalysis
The seismic shift in water governance approach that WEWS presages is primarily one 
that enables water resources to be allocated in respect of the uses of value to society but 
in a way that protects the water-related enviconment Conservation and sustainability 
must wallc hand in hand with the need to countenance the requirements of industry.
Clearly advancements in hydrology, for example, in charting the extent of current river 
flows and groundwater resources, tlie growing understanding of tlie relationship between 
groundwater and surface resources and increasing knowledge of the deleterious #
consequences of over-abstraction facilitate such a two handed approach. CiTills new basis is of course a far cry from the (still current) common law in relation to 
groundwater which was underpinned by a both an implicit view that water was part of 
the land” and hence subject to the control of the landowner, and further that the 
unfettered right to drain water upon one’s own land was necessary in that to hold 
otherwise would hinder industry and proper exploitation of the resource. Conservation 
has been markedly absent from early common law cases relating to groundwater and the 
issue of public utiht)  ^ was generally seen as best furthered by encouraging industrial 
development. In respect of water in defined streams, at least under tlie common law, 
there emerged a realisation that the resource was too precious to be the subject of the 7
ownership of riparians and that such namral resources were res commîmes and subject to a
Icontrolled right to exploit which countenanced at least the needs to other riparians. This T
'■?system, however, is not one which countenances the needs of others in society and does 7
.Htde to avert wasteful or environmentally unfriendly practices. The post-WEWS regime
I■s 
;
Although as noted in chapter three tlie issue o f  ownersliip at com m on law is n o t particularly clear. This 
issue is discussed furdier in chapter 7 in relation to HRA compatibility^
7'" Scottish Environm ental protection Agency, Water Framework Directive : Technical Annexes 2 and 5 
Consultation Summa>y of Responses March 2003 at para 3.4.1.
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approach to groundwaters. Furthermore, into this balancing act have been thrust issues |
of public utility.
4
The current position as regards ownersliip of waters will not change in tlie post-WEWS 
era^ ** but many potential users will require to apply for a relevant licence or comply with 
other regulatory requitements in the wider interest to abstract or impound the resource 
and where such a permission is granted, users wül require to pay for this privüege.
In terms of ascertaining impacts of different water uses, it has been argued that the 
laudable aim of treating surface water and groundwater as component parts in a single
iwater system which is deemed central to the approach to River Basin Management 
Planning that wül be taken by SEPA, may in practice be no more than a fanciful notion. 4
For example, in the recent SEPA consultation exercise, Scottish Water commented that
the desire to resolve the scientific difficulties of treating groundwater, wetlands and T
surface water as component parts of a single water system wül require extensive and j
costly research [and] may not be achievable. This goal would require extensive large- 
scale monitoring, increase [in] the complexity of models and therefore may not be ; :
justified by the level of improved understanding.''^
Tliis point may resonate generally across any licensing regime which seeks to establish
priorities for those uses which are deemed as beneficial. The central point of an
appropriative, right-based regime is that regulators requite to make choices which are 7
■4
informed. Decisions in this regard taken by SEPA may at times fall short of being any |
where near fully informed and tlius for example, in any water shortage context, the abÜit}?
'j
of the system to estabhsh any sort of hierarchy of competing uses in beneficial terms may rf
be placed in question.
Cost benefit analysis of compliance with the directive
As noted, a key difficulty with the imposition of a licence-based appropriative regime is 
that although it may reap environmental benefits for society, it imposes costs upon water 
users which may make inroads into previously held, private property rights in the 
resource. In order to inform tlie legislative process leading up to the enactment of 
WEWS, the Scottish Executive commissioned a cost-benefit analysis of implementation 
of the provisions of the European Water Ditective in Scotland.*** The imposition of 
controls over abstraction of both groundwater and surface waters is of course but one 
part of compliance with the directive. The discussion here reviews only some of the 
projected costs and benefits which may emanate from a shift from the largely unfettered 
common law position relating to abstractions.
The general aim of the report is to produce a set of assumptions relative to both the 
current or ‘present day’ environmental situation relative to the water environment in 
Scotland and also projected environmental improvements that might emanate from 
implementing the Directive from 2001 to 2040. The research also attempts to measure 
tlie costs of imposition of a compliance reghne (including abstraction controls) on 
specific business sectors and society in general.^^
A major plank of the smdy is the ‘stams-gap assessment’ ; an analysis of the cost-benefit 
differences between the ‘business as usual case’ - a hypothetical case scenario outlinhig 
the envhonmental simation if the Dhective were not to be hnplemented - and tlie 
situation after the Dhective’s aims have been fully implemented. Tliis whl then provide 
the basis for a cost-benefit analysis of tlie effects of implementing the directive.
K. Andrews, The Future for Scotland's Waters : Analysis of Costs and Beneftts : Costs and Benefits of Implementation 
of the E C  Water Framework Directive (20001601EC) In Scotland Final Report to the Scottish Executive June 
2002 . 
ihid at para 1.3.
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It should be noted of course that the analysis is speculative. First, deterriiiiiing what the 
current environmental state of ah waters in Scotland is at present and therefore how 
water activities would have to be controhed to ensure ‘good status’ of such waters under 
the terms of the water directive is no easy task. For example, even the authors of tlie 
report conceded that there were difficulties in establishing the present environmental 
situation and ‘business as usual case’ as regards groundwater (‘where very httle 
information is Imown in Scotland’)”  and hydro-morphological impacts of abstraction 
(‘where limited data is available’).”  As discussed in chapter three, rights in relation to 
groundwater long remained out of reach of the clutches of tlie law and any well-defined 
legal rules at least in part because of its ‘occult’ and hidden stams. Clearly in Scotland, 
groundwater resources to some extent have remained a liidden treasure. This hidden 
stams itself also stems from the fact that the law relating to groundwater use was largely 
unregulated. Groundwater Imowledge manifestly requires to be improved in Scotland if 
an effective and informed regime is to be put in place.
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A number of current water uses are identified in the research wliich may currently hold 
negative repercussions for the water envitonment and hence will require to be controlled. 
Potentially problematic industry sectors flagged up include agriculmral krigation, 
distillers, pulp and paper mills, hydro-power plants and water services. At the moment, it 
is speculated that the lack of adequate controls over the abstraction activities in these 
industry areas would be likely to further deteriorate water stams in the future — in relation 
to both water quantity and quahty. Hence, controls are hlcely to be enforced in tliese 
industrial sectors to limit or reduce theit abstraction activities in accordance with tlie 
aims of the directive. Such controls will necessarily impose costs on these industry 
sectors to reform their own activities in accordance with a more hmited right to abstract
‘'5 ibid at para 3.1.
■
:
(or impound) water/^ The report then proceeds to die crux of the issue: an estimation of 
these costs as opposed to the benefits diat might be gleaned from compliance with the 
Ditective’s aims.
So, for example, irrigators would require to reduce abstractions on certain identified areas 
of land where die catchment is particularly sensitive to irrigation. The report estimates 
the cost of tliis to Scottish farmers at around an average of j()9,000 each per year, at a 
total cost for the industry of some c.^1.6 million per annum. Similarly, pulp and paper 
mill operators may face an outiay of £5 million for increased storage costs emanating 
from reduced abstraction; hydroelectrical providers may face an annual cumulative bdl of 
around £15 million and die water industry some £95 million. An as yet unlmown cost 
win need to be borne by distillers.”
Clearly dien diere may be significant costs for industry as a result of die sliift from the 
current common law water regime to a restrictive licensing system. For many o f those 
active in these industry sectors, in particular farming, which has struggled in economic 
terms in recent times, such a prognosis will make uncomfortable reading. Such costs, it 
might be argued, may be legitimately borne by industry in pursuance of a sustainable, 
envitonmentally sound water envhonment. The problem for policy makers, and indeed 
for regulators in any appropriative regime, will lie in clearly identifying these benefits and 
placing some quantifiable value on diem. Arguably, however, some of these potential 
benefits to society are quantifiable, at least on a speculative basis. Wilde the report 
concedes that clearly identifyiug potential benefits to such water bodies as groundwater 
and wedands may remain out of reach for die time being,”  the authors at least offer
*‘5 Additionally adntinistiative costs will result from  applying for a licence.
K. A ndrews, supiv n. 61 at table 4.22 for a breakdow n o f  all the projected costs. 
*’7 at least for die time being.
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some tentative, partial, monetary benefits in respect of inter alia rivers and coasts.”  The 
measurement criteria appear somewhat subjective and perhaps difficult to quantify. 
Nonetheless improvements to Scottish rivers (for residents) brought about by the 
imposition of water-use controls in accordance with the aims of the directive are 
evaluated by reference to increasing quality in river ecology, bank-side vegetation and 
aesthetics and have been provisionally measured as bringing benefits that can be 
quantified as being between £120 and £262 mlQion per annum, while benefits to anglers 
through sounder ecological envhonments are estimated in the somewhat wide range of 
between £10 million and £58 million. The above analysis raises questions as to how 
costs of complying with tlie regime should be borne across societjq given that those who 
benefit most from the imposition of controls may not be those who will suffer detriment 
as a result of compliance.
Time limited licences
As noted in chapter 5, a prior appropriation regime (whether one based on a licensing 
system or not) may be problematic in that although it ensures that scarce resources are
K. Andrews, supra ii. 61 at para 5.3.
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As alluded to above, derogations from meeting the aims of the Water Directive may be
.7allowed in certain circumstances, particularly where technical or cost problems make 
timely compliance unfeasible. Clearly tlie existence of such derogations may afford 
certain industry sectors an oppormnit)^ to seek the delay of any abstraction restrictions 
that may prove costly to their businesses. The flexibility inherent in the directive in tliis 
regard raises some interesting issues about furtliering economic interests at tlie expense 
of environmental objectives wlihe keeping within the spirit of the European measures.
__
allocated for beneficial uses, in times of shortages secondary users may simply go 
without. It may therefore be prudent to ensure that licences are not granted in perpetuity 
and may be revoked or at least varied by the state in times of drought, if seen to be 
causing other environmental damage of some sort or where perhaps more beneficial uses 
of the water are proposed.”  It has been reported by tlie Scottish Executive that in 
general, abstraction licences granted to industry wül not be time limited, although it has 
been suggested that there may be some exceptions to this.™
The licence of Right Tegacy in England Wales
Whhe from an industry perspective there may be a sound reasoning behind the granting 
of licences for indefinite periods of time, policy makers in Scotland might learn from tlie 
negative legacy that has been left beliind as a result of tlie largely unfettered early licences 
— termed ‘Licences of Right’ (LORs) - tliat were traditionally granted south of the 
border. Despite the well-established hcensing regime^* for abstractions and 
hnpoundments of water in England, this has not, to date, curbed escalating drought 
problems which have been experienced south of the border. The Environment Agency 
is cognisant of such difficulties:
[i]n some areas of die UK, current abstraction practices are causing concern for the 
environment. For example, much of southern England has little surplus surface water 
available during the summer. If abstraction increases beyond current levels, there could
'’7 In  such a circumstance, SEPA may find it prudent to suggest to w ould-be abstractors that they forge 
some sort o f  management agreem ent- the possibihtyi o f which is included in the regulations {Controlled 
Activities Regulations, supra n. 24 at para 1.11).
7" Controlled Activities Regulations, supra n. 24 at para 1.10.
7' wliich stems back to tlie 1945 W ater Act.
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be a harmful effect on river flows and wetlands. In some cases existing licences are 
already causing environmental damage or would cause damage if they were used fully’^
72 T he Environm ent Agency, Environment Facts and Figures : available at http  : / /www. environm ent- 
agency.gov.ulc/yourenv/eff/w ater/213872/609264/?version= l& lang= _e 
75 R. Cunningham , supra n. 48 at p 36.
7-' T he Wildlife & Countryside Link, High and D y  (1996).
7^  English N ature, Water Abstraction and Sites of Special Scientific Interest in England (2000).
7'' R. Cunningham, supra n. 48 at p 36.
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These concerns are not new and since the early 1990’s there has been increasing concern 4)
voiced that a number of important wetland sites have been affected by low flows or 7adecreasing water levels as a result of the abstraction of water from surface and 
groundwater resources. In 1995, for example, England and Wales “suffered what was 
for many the worst drought in living memory”.™ This prompted a report highlighting 
widespread drought concerns published by a group of voluntary conservation 
organisations.^'* Then in 1999 the Environment Agency and English Namre jointly 
published a report which considered some 358 wetland sites and discussed a number of 
envhonmental and otirer problems caused by over-abstraction.™
■8The main difficulty identified as dogging the current English system stems from those |
abstractions that took place prior to the 1963 Water Act and hence were autlrorised as 
‘Licences of Right’ (LoR). These licences were hiitiaUy granted under the 1945 Water 
Act and could be renewed under the 1963 Act within a five year period of its 
implementation and based on the previous three years’ usage. Such LoR’s were issued 
without any restrictions. According to Cunningham :
[t]he grandfathering of existing abstractions as LoR hiapUcitiy assumed practices, that had 
gone unchallenged under the common law were not impacting other legitimate users and L
were therefore acceptable... Wlahe this approach may seem pragmatic, it clearly place[d] 
an incentive [for] abstractors to inflate their clahns on entiy so as to allow for growth, 
uncertainty, monopolising a valuable resource and thus restricting entry into a market. 76 *4
' 7 .
The problems in England and Wales in this respect were compounded by the fact that 
initially licences granted in pursuance of the 1945 Act would have been fairly easy to 
obtain. Under the 1945 Act the issues of water quantity and quality were low priorities; 
that Act was more concerned witli issues such as the wastage of water, excavating for
77 A. Murillo, J. Bough & H. Cook, ‘G roundw ater A bstraction and Legislative C ontrol’ (1999) 10 Water 
Law  130 at p 135.
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metals and water for faming purposes. Perhaps echoing traditional common law q:
approaches to water use (and for that matter exploitation of other migratory things), as 7
Murillo et al have noted “licences [under the 1945 Act] were almost certainly granted 
using different criteria ie. producing as much steel, coal, gravel, food, etc., as possible to 
aid post-war recovery. Water quahty and, to an extent, quantity were far lower 
priorities”.*''*
7;While the pecuharities of the Enghsh LoR regime are not present in Scotland, they yy
provide an example of the problems that can be caused by the granting of hcences in
perpetuity and should sharpen the resolve of regulators to ensure that the Scottish regime i  :
5is one imbued by flexibhity to ensure comphance with environmental expectations set 
out in the European Water Directive. In a time when it has been identified tliat tlie 
extent of water resources in situ and the fuU environmental and economic consequences 
of multifarious water uses remain unclear, it may be that current industrial abstractors
would seek to carry on their existing pre-WEWS levels of abstraction and point to the A
■J
limited (or at least httle known) environmental impacts of their activities. In hght of this q
inherent uncertainty and the pohtical pressures that such industries may seek to exert on 
pohcy makers in this regard, it would seem best to ensure that abstraction rights which y
may transpire to be undesirable or excessive can be varied or revoked by tlie regulator at ( ■
a later date. Moreover, if a hcence were to be granted for a fixed period of time, subject 
to renewal, it may fohow tliat wary abstractors would seek to ensure tliat tlieir abstraction
7® R. Cuniiiiigliam, supra, n. 48 at p 40.
7‘5 Controlled Activities Regulations, supra n. 24 
E N D S  report 351, Scotlandgets ahead on new water environ/nent controls (April 2004).
activities do not damage the environment and thus further provides an incentive for
4
abstractors to collaborate with regulators to explore new ways of exploiting the resource Æ
in the most efficient way.***
Overview
This chapter has mapped out the proposed new licensing regime for abstractions and
‘iimpoundments of water resources in Scotland. The proposals are to be phased in from 4)
April 2005 but full compliance with the aims of the water ditective is not required until #
2012.™ There is a general perception that Scotland is ‘ahead of the game’ in this regard, 
in particular, when compared to England and Wales.“  At least, in so far as abstractions 
and impoundments of water are concerned, however, Scotland’s starting position lies 
someway behind its English counterpart’s and the above analysis has identified a number 
of potential hurdles to be surmounted. Beyond these teething problems, the next 7
chapter analysis the post-WEWS regime in Scotland and evaluates the extent that it is an 4
optimum model for water governance in Scotland. 4
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and compliance with regard to the regime/
I
CHAPTER 7
'1SCOTTISH WATER LAW : ANALYSIS OF REGIME CHANGE
Introduction
I:
:
While the preceding chapter focused on the nuts and bolts of the new regime in Scotland 
and the rationale behind its imposition, tlris chapter evaluates tlie post-WEWS regime for 
water governance in Scotland against a set of relevant criteria. The criteria that the 
regime can be judged against have been identified from policy discussions inherent in 
case-law in the UK relating to migratory things, approaches to water governance in other 
jurisdictions (particularly the USA), examples of international law and practice and from 
relevant academic literature. Although the following criteria whl doubtless not be 
exhaustive, it is submitted that they are relevant pohcy markers of an optimum water 
governance system by which the new regime for water allocation in Scotland may be 
judged. Each issue is exarnined in turn and the extent that the post-WEWS regime in 
Scotland might meet such aims is discussed. It should be noted that the criteria 
identified are germane at three levels : the overarcliing question of the type of regime
which should be selected to control water use; the detailed substantive rules wlrich sit
. . .therein; and also the procedural rules wliich seek to ensure administration, monitoring
*
' As W outers notes “in essence tliete are four key points that m ust be addressed [by a w ater governance s;
regim e].. .:(i) legal entitlem ent (what is the scope o f the resource and who is entitled to use it?); (ii) 
fram ew ork for allocation (where all needs cannot be met, who is entitled to w hat quantitj' o r quality o f  the 
resource?); (iü) institutional mechanism s including governance issues (who is responsible for overseeing the 
im plem entation or overseeing the im plem entation o f the laws?), and (iv) compliance verification, dispute 
avoidance and resolution (liow are rights and obligations enforced?) — P, W outers, Water Laiif : Achieving 
Eqnitabk and Sustainable Use of W^ater Kesources (Guest Editor's Note) Papers Presented at the Dundee W ater 
Law and Policy Seminar (July 2000) available at
h ttp ://w w w .dundee.ac .uk /law /iw lri/D ocum ents/R esearch /IW L R l% 20T eam /W outers/iw ra .pdf
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It should also be borne in mind that it may be difficult to ascertain an objective ‘one size 
fits aU’ regime that may be relevant for all water governance systems across the globe/ 
Tins is because an additional factor which feeds into tire identified criteria is that of 
climatic or ecological appropriateness. This factor may dictate what appropriate balance 
requires to be struck between competing aims and is discussed at tlie end of the chapter. 
With this firmly in mind, it is submitted that an optimum reghne should have the 
following characteristics :
• Efficiency^
• Encouragement and protection of beneficial uses in society
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• Legality
Î
:
While the above criteria may appear sparse, it is submitted that aU other markers o f an 
optimum regime whl feed into one or more of those listed above. So for example, as whl 
be discussed below, an appropriate regime would clearly be one that could ensure f
comphance thereto and resolve disputes. The abhity or otherwise of a reghne to meet 
these objectives would play an important role in ensuring both efficiency and also /
engenderhig the protection of beneficial uses. In a Ihce faslhon, tlie need for a reghne to 
exhibit clarity may be a factor that might hnpact upon its general efficiency.
 ^ Caponeia, for example, rejects the no tion  o f a universally applicable regime because such a m odel w ould f
"depends n o t only on its liistorical, cultural, religious, geo-physical and legal factors, bu t also on  the 
political wiU to undertake... needed administrative or institutional reform ” . -  D .A. Caponera, Principks of 
W'^aterlMiv and Administration (1993) at p 175.
 ^Wliich may be manifest in various ways as explained helow.
ii'
s
It may be useful here to recall the positive features of the various alternative water 
regimes set out in chapter 5. It can again be seen that these features may all fall within 
the criteria above. In terms of protecting beneficial uses, the positive features drawn 
from the regimes analysed in chapter 5 encompassed: a general recognition of the 
importance of water rights for all in society, including recognising the rights of aU 
overlying landowners and die needs of tliose not overlying the resource; encouraging 
water use to aid industrial development; limiting uses in times of 
shortages/ environmental problems; and prohibiting unreasonable and wasteful activities. 
In terms of efficiency, the positive features from alternative regimes revealed 
encompassed : clarity of rights; low transactional costs and exclusive, determinable rights 
to facilitate trading and more efficient uses in society. In terms of legality, the positive 
features from alternative regimes revealed the countenancing of existing private property 
rights in water.
Chapter 5 observe that the range of potential positive characteristics of a water 
governance regime are not fully compatible in the sense that they cannot aU be sought to 
a maximum extent in every case, aU of the time. For example, there may be an 
undeniable tension between the quest for efficiency and the need to ensure protection of 
beneficial exploitation and prohibition of environmentally damaging uses. Thus, part of 
the analysis is to examine whetiier the balance in tiiis regard has been struck in the right 
way for Scotland. O f course in so doing, it should be borne in rnind tiiat compliance 
witii tlie European Water Framework Directive must be seen as tlie overarching aim of 
both WEWS and the empowering legislation which follows in its footsteps. In tiiis 
regard, Scottish policy-makers’ hands may be tied to some extent.
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This chapter begins with an extensive analysis of tlie requitement that any regime 
imposed itself be lawful, in terms of legal duties owed by policy-makers to water users. 
This analysis differs from tliat relating to other policy markers in that it is essentially a 
technical ‘black letter law’ question rather tlian a critical policy debate. It is of no less 
importance, however, in that any legal deficiencies tliat can be identified may undermine 
the regime and tlie commitment of stakeholders to it, and provide opportunities for 
recalcitrant parties to exploit loopholes in the provisions thus running contrary to the 
goals of efficiency and protection of beneficial uses.
Lawful nature of the regime
In chapter 5, it was suggested that the imposition of any new regime would need to be 
politically acceptable and in particular, not be inconsistent with the lawful assertion of 
private property rights which may currently exist in water. One particular example 
noted was the debate wliich has existed for some time in respect of the possible 
imposition of a state-controlled licensing regime upon the largely, absolute dominium 
approach to groundwater use incumbent in Texas and the issue of compatibiht}'- with the 
‘taldngs’ clause set out in the Amendment to the US Constimtion. Although there is 
no US-style ‘taldngs’ clause, as such, that policy-makers in Scotland would need to 
comply with in the estabhshment of a new water governance regime, human rights 
concerns under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) may provide an 
equivalent challenge for pohcy makers. This discussion is particularly relevant in tliat, 
as noted in chapter 5, industry sectors wifii a hitherto, largely unfettered right to abstract 
water resources as an incident of landownership may in die future find tiiemselves 
subject to significant restrictions on future abstractions. Moreover, they will be bound to 
pay for the privilege of attaining a resource fiiat was previously deemed part of land in 
which it was found.
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It might be contended that any ethical argument doubting the proprietary of the 
imposition of a new regime with its attendant ‘taking’ of the private right to draw water 
from land is superseded by the needs of society to ensure the sustainability of what may 
increasingly become a scarce resource. Wliile such sentiments may be true, a more 
pertinent discussion focuses upon the fact that the Scottish Parliament — in line widi 
section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) — as a public body, must act in 
accordance with die provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR).'* It therefore follows that WEWS and the regime tiiat is articulated tiierefrom 
by ministerial regulations must clearly be compatible with the terms of the ECHR. 
Similarly, as a public regulator, SEP A will also be under an obligation to act in 
accordance with convention rights. Here the reforms anticipated under WEWS are 
analysed in the context of compatibility with the ECHR, particularly in light of the 
obligations placed upon public bodies under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). This is 
a somewhat complex question and a number of issues require detailed analysis. There is 
currently, very Httie writing on this specific issue and accordingly a significant amount of 
space is given to discussing this matter.^
General informing ECHR concepts 
Margin of appreciation
Prior to discussing the issue of compatibility^ in detail, a brief outline of some general 
inforrning concepts may be useful. As a general point it should be noted that states are
By way o f s 31(1) o f tlie Scotland A ct 1998, the m em ber o f  tlie Scottish Executive responsible for 
p rom oting a Bill m ust state that its terms are n o t incom patible witli the convention. Unlike, its U K  
counterpart, tlie Scottish Parliam ent — as a creature o f  statute and public body witliin the definition o f the 
H RA  - is forbidden to enact legislation contrary to convention rights.
= In  fact at the time o f  writing there appears to be no academic treatm ent o f the issue o f  the post-W EW S 
regime and E C H R  compatibilityc T he autlior presented a conference paper on tliis topic at tlie Scottish
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afforded a ‘margin of appreciation’ in their approach to human rights with the result that 
many of the rights enshrined in die Convention are not absolute and states may interfere 
widi them where tiiey can demonstrate an identifiable and legitimate public interest/
States do not, however, enjoy unlimited discretion in this regard. In J-iandyside v UK, for 
example, die Strasbourg court remarked tiiat “the domestic margin of appreciation... 
goes hand in hand with a European supervision” .^
The doctrme of margin of appreciation is an international concept wliich reflects tlie fact 
tiiat the European court is faced with resolving matters that may vary considerably across 
different contracting states, many of which have distinct respective social, cultural and 
pohtical characteristics. It had previously been questioned therefore whether such an 
international concept should have a place in deliberations based on the HRA in the UK 
domestic courts.*  ^ It had been suspected that something along similar lines would hltely 
be applied, however, as just in tlie same way that tlie Strasbourg court has countenanced 
the fact that there are instances in which states are better placed to make policy decisions 
for the benefit of their respective societies, the domestic judiciary would be hliely to 
accept that these decisions are best left in tlie hands of elected politicians. In practice it 
had been suspected therefore that the domestic courts would employ a similar practice in 
respect of state discretion, albeit with a different label. As Smyth has observed, “whether 
it be termed a margin of appreciation or not, the notion that pubEc authorities have a 
residual area of permissible discretion is a basic feamre of our common law and that 
residual area of legitimate movement wIE continue to be accepted by judges for the
.,7 :
Law Faculties Conference (Scotland’s Hotel, Pitlochry, 311 M arch 2004), M oreover tlie autlior has written 
a substantial article dealing w ith these issues to be published in tlie E dinburgh Law Review, Jan  06.
See Palnier, ‘Flum an Rights : Im plications for L abour Law’ (2000) CL] 172.
 ^ (1976) 1 EFIRR 74 at para. 48.
" See for exam ple,]. W aldham and H. Mountfield, H/maii Rights A c t 1998 (1999) at p. 18.
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foreseeable future” /  This has been borne out in both Scottish and English authority |
■s':where courts have referred to an equivalent concept oft termed “judicial deference” /
under the HRA which pubHc authorities may act within in respect of certain rights. The 
domestic judiciary seem equally as keen as the Strasbourg court not to usurp die 
discretion of the state to take appropriate decisions in a range of areas.
Proportionality
The second principle is that of ‘proportionality^ which means that even where states 
identify a legitimate public interest for interference with a person’s human rights tiiere 
must be “a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and 
the aim sought to be realised”." Hence, excessive means cannot be used to realise a 
legitimate aim. A measure taken by tlie state “should not exceed the objectives 
legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; when there is a choice between several
caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued”. I t  should be noted that 
tilese two concepts are not always differentiated as neatly as received wisdom would
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appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous and the disadvantages f
:.ïf4
suggest — in fact the two overlap at times. These concepts shall be returned to when £
discussing the right to possessions below.
The right to possessions 
Introdiution
Article one, protocol one provides that ;
)M. Smytli, Business and the Human Rights A c t 1998 2000 at p 117.
See A  V Scottish Ministers 2001 SC 1; Stott v Brom  2001 SCCR 62; Mardc v Thames Water Utilities L td  [2004]
2 A.C. HL.
1' James v UK  (1986) 8 E H R R  123 at para 50.
Case C-331188 Fedesa [1990] E C R  1-40233 at para 13. Tliis is iti fact a E uropean Court o f  Justice case 
but a similar concept o f  proportionality'- lias also been applied in respect o f  EC  law.
.... L ’As
AEvery natural or legal person is entitled to tlie peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. 
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to 
the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. 
The preceding provisions shah not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance 
with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or 
penalties.
As a preliminary point it should be noted that the right to possessions set out in protocol 
one is arguably a somewhat weak provision. There are a number of underlymig factors
1,:
which have contributed to this. First, the decision to include such a right at all within the
■4.
Convention was itself a controversial one. The provision was not included in the original 
Convention because it was felt that this would have endangered agreement on the overall 
terms of the treaty.^ "^  Even when the possessions provision was added in 1952 it was not 
without difficulty.’  ^ Specifically the governments of Sweden and the UK were
,.;r
concerned that the addition of a property right would interfere with programmes of 
. . .nationahsation that tlreyr were pursuing at the thne. The UK and Swedish authorities 
made it clear that they did not wish to become hidebound by an agreement which would 
prevent them from forcibly acquiting property as part of a bona fide socio-economic 
programme of nationahsation. Hence, they sought to ensure that theit right to acquire 
property under compulsion would not be prohibited by the convention.’^  There were 
other general objections too; on a fundamental level it was argued that the right to 
property'- was an economic right ratlier than a civh right and that a convention concerned
with the protection of human hberties was an inappropriate vehicle within which to 
formulate and protect such rights. Reflecting this concern, Harris has stated that
Protocol N o 1 entered into force on 18 May 1954, ratified by the U K  on 3'''* N ovem ber 1952.
A t the time o f  die drafting o f the convention, an article was proposed based upon the w ording of Article 
17 o f  the Universal D eclaration o f H um an Rights 1948 wliich reads “ 1. Everyone has tlie right to own 
propert)'- alone as well in association witli others. 2. N o one shall be arbitrarily deprived o f  liis properpr”.
Tills was rejected by contracting states.
D . Rook, Property Law and Human Rights (2001) at p 1.
D ignam  and Allen, Companies and the Human Rights A c t 199S (2000) at para 12.2.
A
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.[t]he peaceful enjoyment of his possessions no doubt contributes to the weU-being of an 
owner, but it may be the means of damaging the weU-being of his feUows. Since 
‘possessions’ covers anything from immense riches to tlie clothes someone stands up in, 
how could it be supposed that the weU-being of aU humans makes ‘enjoyment’ of aU 
possessions a universal right?'^
Ill a similar vem few could argue with the weh-worn remarks of Holmes J. in tliis regard:
“government could hardly go on if some values incident to property could not be
ditninished witliout paying for every such change in tlie general law”.’® As a
consequence of such concerns, bodi the wording of the provision and tlie way in wliich
it has been interpreted by the European Court on Human Rights in Strasbourg (ECtHR)
is generahy restrictive.
■
_UK interpretation v Strashot/rg inteipretation
One pohit that may inform the analysis regarding human right compatibihty is tliat it has
been argued that the UK domestic courts may interpret article one, protocol one in such 
a way as to bestow more opportunities for those parties seeking to assert those rights J
than those in the court in Strasbourg.
Although there seems little evidence thus far in this respect, it has been argued that the 
discretion of the state to interfere with property? rights may be hiterpreted in a more 
restrictive manner by tlie UK courts because of the value the domestic judiciary has 
traditionally placed upon the assertion and defence of property rights.’^  In this regard 
the words of Blackstone are relevant: “sacred and inviolable rights of private property” 
should not be set aside for the public good witliout “a full indemnification and 
equivalent for the iajuiy diereby sustained”.^ ” While such an argument may have held
J.W. Harris, I s  Property' a H um an Right’ in J. McLean (ed). Property and the Constitution (1999) at p 79.
Pennsylvania Coal v Mahon 260 U.S 393 (1922).
D ignam  and Allen, supra n 16 at para 12.6.
Blackstone, Commentaries T o \ 1, p. 135.
197
4
some merit historically - and certainly an absolute Blackstonian view of property rights is
manifest in much early English authority^’ - it may be that in modern society such an
argument may not hold much water. Absolutist notions of private property have been
eroded heavily of late by the requitement to take into account the needs and expectations
of others in society; witness the growth in the UK over recent years of pervasive social
legislation in tlie UK relating, for example, to planning and anti-pollution and otlier
environmental measures, which has made significant in-roads into private property
rights.^^ Moreover, in relation to Scots law it might be argued that property law has
never really been absolutist in the Blackstonian sense and the rationale behind the
imposition of state regulation in the water field to pay due regard to the rights of others
in society is a well-established principle which is aheady manifest in traditional limitations
of property use, such as those found in the laws of nuisance or support.^^“
'
A possible further justification for departing from Strasbourg jurisprudence in respect of
property rights is that the Convention is characterised by an ‘evolutionary’ character -  its
provisions are not set in stone as such and the treaty is desigied to move with shifting
social and political standards and expectations.^® Although not directly germane to the 
. . .property context, a ‘living instrument’ approach can be seen m other areas such as the
.approach of the Strasbourg court to the issue of sexual orientation. In the early 1980’s
$
Perhaps m ost strildngly illustrated in Bradford v Pickles [1895] AC 587 H L bu t also present in m ore recent 
English cases such as R  Denton [1981] 1 W LFR 1446 (no offence under the Criminal D am age A ct 1971 to 
damage or destroy one's own premises by fire); Phipps v Pears [1965] 1 QB 76 (every m an entitled to pull Iris 
own house dow n or cut dow n iris own trees even where It leaves liim with no shelter).
For an interesting discussion o f tlris issue see Gray and Gray, Elements of Land Lmw 3"' ed (2001) at pp 
1133 - 1137,
22a Furtherm ore, it can be argued that “in an era o f increasing environmental awareness it has become 
much m ore feasible to contend tlrat land ownerslrip is a form  o f social stewardsliip, tlrat right and 
responsibiht}' are inseparably fused .. .” - K. Gray, ‘Land Law and H um an Rights’ in L. T ee (ed) Land Law  
Issues, Debates, Policy (2003) at p 239. See also M cKenzie Skene, Rowan-Robinson, Paisley and Cusure, 
‘Stewardsliip: from  rhetoric to realit]'’, (1999) 3 Edin L R  151.
22 See for example. Tyre v UK (1978) 2 EFIRR 1 at para. 31.
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case of Dudgeon v United Kingdom f  the Strasbourg court held that the critninalisation of :
certain homosexual acts between consenting adults amounted to a breach of article 8 
(respect for private and family life). The judges took the view that previously accepted
approaches should be departed from on the basis that
It is arguable tliat treating the convention in this way as an evolving dynamic document
interfere with individual possessions in the UK and many other contracting states. The 
reason for tlie traditional restrictive approach of the ECHR to tlie property provisions 
was that at the time the ECHR and the protocol was crafted, the goal of nationalisation 
was seen as an overriding concern and sufficient in itself to justify talcing a citizen’s 
property? for at times less than market value. In tlie post-war climate in which the
2' (1981) 4 E H R R  149.
25 ibid.
2^’ D ignam  and Allen, supra n 16 at para 12.6.
[ajlthougli members of the public who regard homosexual acts as immoral may be 
shocked, offended or disturbed by the commission by others of private homosexual acts, 
this cannot on its own warrant the application of penal sanctions when consenting adults 
alone are involved.25
which reflects the shifting values of the member states would restrict the state’s ability to
I
:ECHR was drawn up, it could be argued tiiat the overriding philosophy behind the treaty?
.was centred on promoting community-based policies and doctrines in preference to the
economic ‘rights’ of individuals. Such an underlying ethos may no longer be the case and
in fact such an approach is out of step with the policies of most of the countries of the
Council of Europe where the political emphasis is very much upon capitalism and the 
. . . .importance of individual possessions. Most states are in fact or have been in recent 
years, engaged in privatisation policies.^’’
’■r"'A
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Interpretation of the provisions
At first glance, the protocol is perhaps a little confusing^^ in that it refers to the concept 
of ‘possessions’ in the first paragraph and then ‘property’ in the second/^® It has been 
suggested that ‘possessions’ is the primary term in the article and has been used in this 
manner as it is a generic concept whereas “‘property’ is a complex concept even in a 
single system. It is far too complex to form the basis of a rule apphcable to over 40 
systems”.^ ®
Whatever the rationale behind the terminology and despite the article’s inherent 
wealmesses that shall be discussed below, it seems that on a fundamental level tliis 
provision is to be interpreted liberally and the term ‘possessions’ may be wider in scope 
dian common state understandings of ‘property’. In Gasus Dosier and Fordertechnik GmbH  
V The Netherlands for example, (a case in which the right was held to apply to the sellers’ 
interest in property sold under a retention of title clause which was delivered but no t paid 
for and seized by the tax authorities in respect of the purchasers’ debts) tlie Court held 
that possessions in this context are “certainly not hmited to ownership of physical goods: 
certain other rights and hiterests constituting assets can also be regarded as ‘property 
rights’, and thus as ‘possessions’ for the purposes of this provision.” "^*
The article has thus been held not only to encompass land and corporeal moveables but 
also all acquited rights which have an economic value, eg shares,®" patents,®' fishing
22 or arguably poorly drafted.
22=? altliough interestingly the French and Italian versions refer to ‘property’ in the first paragraph.
2* A. Brow n, Human Rights (2000) at p 80. Tliis viewpoint can perhaps be challenged on the basis tha t the 
use o f  term  property or possessions used in tlie protocol 1, article 1 refers to the objects o f  ow nership and 
no t to the right o f property?.
25 (1995) 20 E H R R  403.
5" Bramelid andMalmstrom v Sweden Appl 8588/79 and A ppl 8589/79, (1982) 29 D R  64.
5' British American Tobacco Company v The Netherlands (1955) 21 EH R R  409.
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lights®  ^ and compulsory insurance schemes.®® Judgement debts and contracmal 
entitlements®® are also included within tins Hberal interpretation of ‘possessions’.
The key point to note in this regard is tliat the article is no respecter of national 
definitions of property. As Coppel has noted
[t]he starting point for establishing unlawful interference with a protected property right 
is the question of whether tlie entitlement or expectation at issues constitutes a property 
right under national law. If it does, that will usually be the end of the matter. However, 
‘possessions’ has an autonomous Convention meaning which may include items which 
do not have die requisite status under national law.^ ^
Thus ill Van Mark v The Netherlands^ even though the concept of goodwill was not 
recognised as a property? right under Dutch law, the court held tliat in so far as Art 1/1 
was concerned it feU witliin its scope as a private right to possessions.
Do mater rights in Scotlandfall within the ambit of possessions'^
To answer this question it is necessary to revisit the current state of the common law as 
regards property rights in Scottish water resources. Recalling the analysis in chapter 
three as regards this question, it seems clear that water in a defined channel is not 
considered to be the subject of individual ownership and rather is owned by the state in 
trust for individuals. Under Scots law, however, riparians are bestowed with a qualified 
right to use the water as an incident of landownership.®®
52 Bamr v Sweden (1989) 60 D R  128.
55 Gctygusu^vAustria (1997) 23 EH R R  364.
5-* Stran Greek Refineries and Straits Andreadis v Greece (1994) 19 E H R R  293. 
55 Mellacber V Austria (1997) 23 E H R R  364.
5^ ' ibid.
52 A /101 , (1986) 8 E H H R  483,491.
5^  See chapter 3.
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The question as regards percolating groundwater is less clear. The two conflicting 
viewpoints -both of which have been lent some autiiority under Scots law - that were 
alluded to In chapter three, are that either groundwater is owned in situ as part of the land 
in which it is found or that such water is res nuUius until reduced into possession but |
subject to an absolute usfructury right to abstract. With respect to those commentators 44
who take the contrary view, the analysis presented above®’ showed that the latter Aj
standpoint that groundwater in itself was res millius but subject to an unfettered right to 
extract is perhaps the better view and altogether more consistent with recognised 
principles of landownership. Furthermore the fact that there is no express
55 in chapter 3.
5" U nder the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act 1946 and Petroleum  (Production) A ct 1934 respectively. 
•» A /31 , (1979-80) 2 EH R R  330, 335.
■A'
nationalisation of water resources under WEWS — akin for example, to the case with coal T
4and hydrocarbons'*" - may lend support to the viewpoint that at least the Scottish
Executive considers that such water resources are already res commttnes. f
Does a right to take waterfall within the ambit of possessions? . 3
V;
■'A:
At first blush, a problem may appear to he in the fact that Strasbourg case-law has y
suggested that article one, protocol one only serves to protect property which has already ■:;}
been acquired but not future rights or expectations to property. In Marckx v ç
. 4,Belgium, where a challenge was made inter aha under the possessions article that Belgian
• V I
succession laws restricted the succession rights of illegitimate children, the action failed v-?
on the ground that the article did not extend to guarantee rights to acquire property?, but 
merely to safeguard existing property rights. It should nonetlieless be borne in mind 
that although it seems that under Scottish common law there is no right of ownership in 
tlie water itself but a mere right to take possession of tlie same, it has long been held that 
a riparian right to abstract water is an incident of landownership, wliich can be enforced
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against the public as a real right in Scotland'*^ and there seems no reason to doubt that an 
unfettered right to abstract percolating water (which arises as an incident of 
landownership) should also be considered a property right in the context of the ECHR. 
This may be particularly so, given that this unfettered right is more extensive tlian a 
riparian right subject to the need to countenance the correlative rights of others.
Again if one makes comparisons with similar cases, it seems logical that if the Strasbourg 
court is willing to uphold a fishing right or an entitlement under contract as falling within 
die ambit of possessions, then in lilce fashion it would follow that a usfructaiy right to 
take water would be treated in the same way.
How are rights protected?
Having estabhshed that the current common law rights to abstract water should fall 
within the ambit of ‘possessions’, the next question to be asked is whether the imposition 
of a Ucensing regime by the Scottish Executive would fall foul of the provisions of article 
one, protocol one. To assist in answering this question it should first be noted tiiat the 
article has three important rules of interpretation.'*® The three rules were first enunciated 
by the court in the seminal case of Sporrong t&Honroth v Sweden:
The first rule, which is of a general nature, enounces the principle of peaceful possession 
of property; it is set out in the first sentence of the first paragraph. The second rule 
covers deprivation of possessions and subjects it to certain conditions; it appears in the 
second sentence of the same paragraph. The tliird rule recognises that States are 
entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of properly? in accordance with the 
general interest, by enforcing such laws as they deem necessary for the purpose; it is 
contained in the second paragraph... [the court] must determine, before considering 
whether the first rule was complied with, whether the last two are applicable.
42 ]q_ Wliitty, 'W ater Law Regimes' in K. Reid and Zim m erm an (eds) A  Hisfoty of Privaic Law in Scotland 
(2000) at p 451.
■’5 A. Brown, supra n. 28 at p 80.
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It is therefore apparent tliat the notion of peaceful enjoyment of possessions constitutes 
a separate ground of complaint in itself. Although its scope is not clear, it is a residual 
ground in die sense that it may be wider in scope (or at least refers to different 
infringements of property rights) than the deprivation of property and control o f use of 
property provisions and may be the basis of a claim where the state infringement 
concerned does not amount to a deprivation or control. It seems useful tlierefore to 
refer to any possible mfringement of the deprivation and control provisions by the 
imposition of a licensing regime prior to examining tliis separate residual ground.'*'*''
Deprivation of Property
Coppel has noted that the deprivation of property provision will only apply “where 
property has been confiscated de jure so that the owner is deprived of his legal title.”*®
AFollowing this argument, where mere de facto property rights have been lost, the provision
win not apply. Despite this viewpoint there is some authority to suggest that rendering y
property rights practically worthless without removing legal title may be encompassed 
witliin the article. In Papa??tichalopoulos v Greece^ '^ legislation transferred the use of land j;from the apphcants to the Navy Fund which rendered the applicant’s legal title A
unmarketable and practically wortliless. Despite the fact that title de jtire was not lost, the 
court held that the deprivation of properly? provision applied.
In the context of the imposition of a water abstraction licensing regime, such a move f
would not appear Hkely to fall within the deprivation of property provision. There is no -j
deprivation of title as such — as in fact as we have estabhshed there is no title to the water
(1983) 5 E H R R  35; (1984) 7 EH R R  256,
A lthough the three rules are no t distinct in the sense o f being unconnected and the second and tliird 
rules are broadly hiterpreted hi tlie light o f the general prhiciple expounded in tlie first -  see for example, 
James n UK supra n. 11 at para 37.
J. Coppel, Human Rights A c t 1998 : e/iforeing the Human Rights Convention in the domestic courts (1999) at p 377.
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currently vested in the landowner and the existing right to abstract is not removed by the 
state*  ^ — rather the licensing regime merely modifies the existing right to exploit the 
resource. Moreover, aldiough the right to die water itself may be the ‘possession’ widiin 
die scope of article one, protocol one, even in such a case where that right is in effect 
deprived by a licensing regime, Strasbourg jurisprudence would suggest that this 
regulatory intervention would amount to a control on land-use rather dian a deprivation 
of die right to the water.*^" In essence therefore, the imposition of the licensing regime 
would Hlrely amount to a control of use of property rather dian deprivation per se.
Control of the Use of Property
It has been argued that in practice there may be Httie difference between deprivation and 
control provisions, although proving deprivation is beneficial for the appHcant in diat 
this raises a presumption of a right to compensation.*® Despite the potential overlap 
between the provisions, clearly the control provision is wider in scope than the 
deprivation clause. This arm of article one, governs simations in which a person’s right 
of property is controUed by die state in some way. The most obvious examples thrown 
up by Strasbourg case law include restrictions on land use due to planning controls or 
environmental regulations.*” Otiier examples of control include the imposition of 
positive obHgations on the land owner,®" and inheritance tax law restrictions.®' One 
particular control over use of land which may be of particular relevance to this smdy is 
die loss of certain exclusive rights over land. In Baner v SwedetH a landowner’s exclusive 
right to fish on his privately owned waters was lost after legislation was passed to this
(1996) 21 E H R R  434.
•‘2 and no nationalisation o f water resources in the Act.
'*2'? See for example, Baner v Sweden (App. N o. 11763/85).
55 See D. A nderson, ‘Com pensation for Interference w idi Property?’ [1999] E H R L R  543 at p 553.
55 See for example Pine Valley Developments L td  v Ireland (1991) 14 E H R R  319; Sporrong dx Eonrotb v Sweden, 
A /52 , (1983) 5 EH R R  35.
5" Dener V Sweden (1989) 59 D R  127
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effect. This was held to amount to a control on the use of liis property, rather than a 
deprivation of his right to fish as such. In a similar vein, in tlie case of Chassagnou v 
Francef landowners were compelled to transfer their exclusive right to hunt to members 
of a municipal hunting association. Again this was held to be a control over the use of 
tlieir land. The Strasbourg court held that “ [t]he compulsory transfer of the hunting 
rights over their land to [ the hunters’ association] prevents tliem from malting use of 
their right to hunt, which is directly Hnked to the right of property”.®*
Public interest
Exactly what is meant by the term ‘public interest’ is not made clear in article 1, protocol 
1. It appears, however, that this term relates to the state’s justification to deprive citizens 
of their property and, as such, deprivations of property? must be made in pursuance of a 
legitimate aim.®" The concept of ‘legitimate aim’ is expressly recognised in tlie 
Convention and article 8(2) provides a number of such aims including national security.
5' M arckx v Belgium supra n. 41.
52 (App. N o. 11763/85).
55 [1999] E H R R  615.
55 ihid at para 74.
55 A lthough it appears that pubhc international law will only be o f relevance w here the property o f  n o n ­
nationals has been expropriated -  James v UK a /98 , (1986) 8 E H R R  123 at 148-151. It is w orth reviewing
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Before analysing the potential for breach of these provisions in respect of the proposed 
water abstraction regime it should be noted that both the deprivation and control of 
property provisions are subject to their own express Limitations. The discussion below 
will reveal that these are not particularly onerous and the Strasbourg court has 
additionally applied its own ‘fair balance’ test to the provisions. The express limitations 
relating to deprivation of property are tliat such deprivation must be in the public 
interest, and lawful according to domestic and pubhc international law.®®
;
A
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public safety, the economic well-being of the country and tlie protection of morals.®” It 
seems evident that tliis test could easily be fulfilled in respect of a water licensing regime. 
The need to provide sustainability for die future use of the resource would clearly fall 
widiin the scope of article 8(2). Given judicial reluctance to interfere with legitimate state 
aims in this regard,®”" it would seem unHlcely that courts would embark on any 
determination of whether this aim of sustainability would be met by the terms of die 
post-WEWS regime.
Fair-balance and Compensation 
Aldiough article one, protocol one is silent on the issue of compensation for deprivation 
of property,®® it has been noted that in practice “where a person has been deprived of his 
possessions, within the second Hmb of Article 1/1, the strhdng of a fair balance between
:
individual rights and the interests o f die community wiU require the payment of
compensation in all but exceptional circumstances.”®” The existence or not of 
compensation whl be relevant in deterniining whether an appropriate provision meets die 
court’s Tair-balance’ test."” The extent of compensation offered may of course also be 
relevant. The level o f compensation need not necessarily, however, be commensurate 
with the market value of property appropriated. In Uthgow v UK,"'for example, the court
held diat compensation should be ‘reasonably related’ to the value of the property
die se i l  die (albeit unHltely) event that a Scotdsh court were to hold that the iu p o s itio n  o f  the post-W EW S 
regime am ounted to a deprivation i i  respect o f particular users.
5^’ See the viewpoint o f the Com m ission in Gillow v UK  (1989) 11 E H R R  335.
52 For examples o f cases w here states have successfully pled a public iite rest, see James v UK supra n 55
(elim iiatioii o f social iijustice  in die housing sector); Uthgow v UK  (1986) 8 E H R R  329 (nationalisation o f
industries); Hentrich v France (1994) 18 E H R R  440 (prevention o f tax evasion).
52'» In  cases such as those i i  footnote 57 above,
55 A num ber o f contracting states (includiig die U K) were not in favour o f  die inclusion o f an express 
right to compensation.
55 Coppel, supra n. 45 at p 374. W liat amounts to exceptional circumstances is unclear. It has been 
suggested diat there may be no right to com pensation for state deprivation in a time o f  war — see D.J. 
Harris, M. O 'Boy le and C. W arbiick, Uaw of the European Convention on Human Rights (1995), at p 532.
In tliis context ‘fair balance’ relates to the general principle o f proportionality.
^'Uupra n. 51
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appropriated but that tliis need not amount to full compensation where there were 
legitimate public interest reasons for reimbursement at a lesser value."^
In accordance with the general interest
The requirement set out in article one, protocol one is that states need be acting m 
accordance with the general interest in controlling the property of citizens as opposed to 
acting in tlie ‘pubhc interest’ in respect of deprivation of property. It seems unclear as to 
whether there is in fact any difference between the two requirements."® Rook has 
suggested, however, that
[a]ny deb a te  o v e r the  poss ib le  d iffe rin g  sco p e  o f  th e se  p h rases  is p ro b a b ly  fu tile  as it is 
ex trem ely  uiiHkeiy th a t th e  S tra sb o u rg  In s titu tio n s  w hl d isp u te  a leg itim ate  a im  p u t 
fo rw ard  by  a sta te . A s w itli the  seco n d  ru le  [deprivation  o f  p ro p e rty ], th e  decid ing  fac to r 
u n d e r  th e  [con tro l o f  p ro p e r ty  p rov is ion ] is hkely to  b e  th e  p rin c ip le  o f  p roportionaH ty  
[fair balance].
Proportionality (fair balance)
In common witli the second rule, there must be proportionahty between tlie aim pursued 
and the means employed. Again the issue of compensation is important in this context. 
Given, however, that control of use amounts to a less serious infringement of property? 
rights then the right to compensation is not so well protected as is the case under the 
deprivation rule. In fact the court in Pinnacle Meat Processors v UK"® took the view that a 
control of use “does not, as a rule, contain any right to compensation”. This strict 
viewpoint has been consistently fohowed by tlie Strasbourg court and perhaps offers tlie
2^ For example, measures taken in pursuance o f econom ic reform  or social injustice — see James v UK supra 
n. 11 at para. 54.
'■5 In James v UK, supra n 11 it was suggested tliat the two concepts were in fact different and in particular 
that the state would be granted m ore latitude to control the use o f property rather than deprive its subjects 
o f  property?. Tliis point was no t decided in the case, how ever and die court rem ained silent on w hether a 
distinction existed.
'”’5 D. Rook, supra n. 15 at pp 79-80. In a similar vein it may be that die U K  dom estic courts would be 
unhlcely? to dispute a legitimate aim pu t forward as justification by the state and again proportionahty? whl be 
the im portant issue to be determined.
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starkest illustration of the limited nature of the property right enshrined in the 
Convention."" It is an issue lilrely to be central to discussions pertaining to die 
imposition of a licensing regime for water in Scodand.
Aldiough diere is no direct authority relating to diis point from domestic courts in
Scodand, a recent EngHsh decision may be instructive. In Trailer and Marina (LevenJ T,td
V The Secretary of State for the Tinvironment, Food and Rural A f fa m f  the issue before the
court can be summarised as follows : T sought a declaration diat amendments to die
Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 introduced by die Countryside and Rights of Way
Act 2000 s 75(1) and Sch. 9 were incompatible widi the property? rights enshrined in the
Human Rights Act 1998. T owned a stretch of canal which was embanked at either
end thereby preventing boats from crossing through. The relatively undismrbed nature
of the canal encouraged a rich wedand habitat to develop and the Nature Conservancy
Council (“NCC”) designated the canal as an area of special scientific interest (“SSSI”)
under the 1981 Act so that specified operations were prohibited except widi the
consent of die NCC. In 1997, T  and the NCC had entered into a management
agreement in which T agreed not to develop fishing and boating activities on the canal
in remrn for an annual compensation payment of /jl 9,000 to reflect potential loss o f 7
.income. However, the new provisions of the 2000 Act and the accompanying
■
rninisterial guidance prevented the NCC from continuing to pay compensation in 
respect of losses based on activities wliich had not been undertaken. T submitted diat 
the restriction preventing the canal's commercial use had reduced the canal's value 
ahnost to nil and a stamtory scheme tiiat required that to happen, witiiout 
compensation, was disproportionate.
<^5 App. No. 33298/96
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In tliis case, Mr Justice Ouseley carried out an extensive review of relevant Strasbourg 
authorities in holding diat the imposition of the regime without compensation to the 
claimant was not disproportionate. He was at pains to affirm the wide discretion diat 
national governments have enjoyed in respect of interference witii private property 
rights which are deemed to be in the national interest"® and die fact diat as a general 
rule —following Baner p Swede - it has been well estabhshed that a control of the use of 
property (as die circumstances in this case clearly amounted to) did not generahy 
require compensation to be paid to affected proprietors to be proportionate.”" In 
particular he remarked that
I  reg a rd  Baner as sh o w in g  w h a t th e  gen era l b u t n o t  necessarily  u n iv e rsa l p o s i tio n  is in 
re la tio n  to  a c o n tro l o f  use. C o m p e n sa tio n  fo r  it is n o t in h e re n t in  th e  C o n v en tio n , 
c o n tro l o f  use  leg isla tion  does n o t ‘as a ru le ’ co n ta in  p ro v is io n  fo r  c o m p e n s a tio n .. .  it 
is c lear th a t [the lack  o f  co m p en sa tio n ] w ill b e  sign ifican t o n  rare  o ccas io n s  r a th e r  than  
as a m a tte r  o f  ro u th ie .”'
Ouseley’s approach to the issue of compensation was taken despite counsel for the 
claimant’s rehance on Chassagnou v France’  ^ in which the court considered a control on 
use to be disproportionate when die state ordered that landowners transfer hunting 
rights over their property to hunting associations in the absence of compensation. 
Landowners so affected were made members automaticaUy of die hunting association 
so that they could now hunt over other land also subject to the new provisions. The 
main ground of complaint was not grounded hi die claimants’ loss of an exclusive right 
to hunt upon their own land but rather diat there was now no way to protect anhnals
See for example, Baner v Sweden supra n. 52; Jacobsson P Sweden [1989] 12 EH R R  56; Fredtn v Sweden [1991] 
13 EHRR; Tre Trakoter Aktiebolag v Sweden [1989] 13 EH R R  309.
«2 [2004] E W H C  153 
’^5 see paras 56-67.
5^ supra n. 52.
2" see paras 68-85
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upon tlieir land from the actions of members of the hunting association who now held 
a right to hunt them. The claimants were not interested in hunting at all and tiierefore 
their own new rights to hunt on the lands of others was seen as no compensation. 
The Strasbourg court concluded that :
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n o tw ith s ta n d iu g  th e  leg itim ate  aim s o f  th e  [F rench  leg is la tio n ]... tlie  C o u r t co n sid e rs  
th a t th e  re su lt o f  th e  co m p u lso ry  tra n sfe r  system  w h ich  it  lays d o w n  has b e e n  to  p lace 
the  ap p lican ts  in  a s itua tion  w h ich  u p se ts  th e  fair ba lance  to  b e  s tru ck  b e tw e e n  
p ro te c tio n  o f  the  r ig h t to  p ro p e r ty  a n d  th e  req u irem en ts  o f  th e  g en era l in te re s t. 
C o m p e llin g  sm all lan d o w n e rs  to  tra n s fe r  h u n tin g  righ ts o v e r th e ir  lan d  so th a t  o th e rs  
can m ak e  u se  o f  th e m  in  a w ay  w h ich  is to tally  in co m p a tib le  w ith  th e ir  beliefs im p o se s  
a d isp ro p o rtio n a te  b u rd e n  w h ich  is n o t  ju stified  u n d e r  th e  seco n d  p a rag rap h  o f  A rtic le  
1 o f  P ro to c o l N o . 1. T h e re  has  b een  a v io la tio n  o f  th a t p ro v isio n .
"AIt was pointed out by the court in Trailer and Marina that Chassagnou was not a case 
which should be taken as one establishing any sort of general principle that a control of 
use without compensation should be seen as proportionate. In the court’s view,
Chassagnou was more concerned with the fact that landowners morally opposed to 
hunting had, under the French legislation, no means of voicing their objection to the 
hunting of association members upon tlieir land when others (not so opposed) had tlie 
compensation of a right to hunt on the land of others. The case was
n o t  o n e  in  w h ich  th e  ro o t  o f  d isp ro p o rtio n  Is to  b e  fo u n d  In th e  ab se n c e  o f  
co m p e n sa tio n  to  th e  ow ners b u t  it  w as a c o n tr ib u to ry  fac to r in  th e  h g h t o f  
c o m p e n sa tio n  available fo r th o se  w h o  in  so m e  w ay w o u ld  b e n e fit f ro m  th e  new  
h u n tin g  righ ts. T h e  essence  o f  th e  case w as n o t th e  ab sen ce  o f  co m p en sa tio n .
This view does seem a correct reading of this somewhat unusual case. It is clear from 
the court’s judgement in Chassagnou that the imposition of the hunters’ activities against 
the moral bchefs of the landowners concerned faded to strdce an appropriate balance
2‘ at para 80.
22 supra 11. 53.
25 at para 85.
25 Trailer and Marina supra n. 67 at para 79. Justice Ouseley's approach has since been affirm ed on  appeal. 
T he Court o f  Appeal was at pains to affirm the legitimate right o f tlie state to im pose controls on  use in 
the national in terest but suggested tliat w here a control amounted to a disguised appropriation then that
between the general interest and the rights of those landowners affected and thus 
compensation was payable on that ground. It is not perhaps a case which represents a 
useful foundation for any general notion that compensation be payable for a control of 
use by the state.
Peaceful PLnjoyment of Possessions
This is the residual ground which may serve to catch tliose interferences in property 
which do not fall within the second and tliird Umbs of article one, protocol one. It seems 
clear that the imposition of the post-WEWS regime m Scotland wih amount to a control 
and hence no discussion in this sense is required in respect of this first limb. As noted 
below, however, it may come in to play in respect of state’s positive obhgations.
Concluding remarks about possible HRA breach an imposition of the regime 
From the discussion above it seems Hlrely that tire imposition of a stamtory hcensing 
regime wih not amount to a deprivation of property that would bring with it an 
assumption that compensation be payable. There is no express nationalisation as such 
and neither would there be tliere be any actionable de facto deprivation which might 
arguably give rise to an expectation for compensation to be paid, in the sense that title to 
land affected by the hcensing regime would be unlilœly to be rendered wortlrless 
thereby.”® By contrast it seems evident tlrat the imposition of a hcensing regime would 
amount to a control upon the use of property, even, as noted above, where tire effect of 
that reghne would be to prolribit abstraction altogetlrer. In this respect, the ‘general
might entail com pensation -  Trailer and Marina (Leven) L td  v Secretary of State for Food, The Environment and 
Rural Affairs [2004] EW CA  Civ 1580,
25 M oreovei, at least the Strasbourg court has shown a tendency to classify m easures a control ratlier than 
deprivation when any ambiguip? exists and arguably even in cases where the infringem ent complained o f 
appears quite clearly to am ount de facto to a deprivation ratlier than control - see for example Tre Tracktoer v 
Sweden (1989) A 159; Fredin v Sweden supra n. 66 (both relating to goodwill); Flancjyside v UK  (1976) A 24, 
para, 63 (tliis case involved the destruction o f property that had  been lawfully adjudged dHcit and contrary 
to the pubhc interest).
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interest’ test required of a state would easily be achieved in that the regime is to be 
imposed on a basis clearly for tire benefit of society (present and future) as a whole. The 
Strasbourg court has rarely challenged such a state rationale, and in this instance the 
domestic Scottish courts are unhlcely to do so either, particularly where WEWS and its 
attendant framework have been hnplemented in pursuance of a European Dhective. As 
discussed hi relation to control of property cases, the Strasbourg court has been reluctant 
to requite the payment of compensation to the parties affected thereby. As noted, the 
issue of compensation seems to he heavhy on whether the mfringement of a property 
right amounts to either a deprivation or radier control. Given that in practice there may 
be httie differential between the two, this scliism has been attacked on the basis that such 
a rigid rule may be unfah and illogical at thnes.”" The Enghsh decision in Trailer and
Marinf^ may indicate no lilcely reason why Scottish courts would take a different view, 
and it may simply be that compensation would not be requited to fulfil the Tait-balance’ 
test of tlie court.
As one com m entator has rem arked "tlie distinction between deprivation and control, in the context o f  
die duty to compensate, is an untidy and unsatisfactory one” : D . A nderson, supra n. 48 at p 553.
22 supra n. 7 4.
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Having said that, and bearing in mind that Scottish courts are not bound by Strasbourg
jurisprudence (or Enghsh decisions for that matter), it might be argued tliat the costs
hivolved for those whose activities are hnpacted upon adversely in the post-WEWS
.regime should lend itself to tlie presumption of some payment of compensation. While 
it is anticipated that (at least initiahy) tliere whl be no requited payment for water- 
abstracted itself beyond a fee to cover the adirhnistrative costs of the regulator)? regime, 
as discussed in this chapter 6, comphance with the ahns of tlie directive and the resulting 
restrictions on abstractions whl seriously impact many industry sectors in monetary?
terms. It remains to be seen, however, whether such a fact in itself may persuade a 
Scottish court that compensation should be payable.
I
A factor that may add fuel to this viewpoint may be that in the Scottish Executive’s 
prehrninaiy cost-benefit analysis, tliose estimated post-WEWS benefits which were 
quantifiable would seem to at least initially be enjoyed by parties other than those who 
might shoulder the immediate costs. This unequal distribution of costs and benefits 
between different groups in society may call for a redistribution of moneys by the state in 
tlie form of compensation paid, indhectly funded by taxpayers.^*^
It should further be recalled that a principal aim of the Water Framework Directive is 
that water resources be recognised as a good with an intrinsic value of its own and thus 
states should be encouraged to make use of economic instruments to encourage the most 
efficient use of die resource. In short, states should develop reghnes wherem abstractors 
would pay a fee for die water itself, which would be determined by market conditions. If 
abstractors in Scodand were required to pay a handsome fee for a resource which was 
previously free as part of their estate (and which presumably formed a composite part of 
the land’s value at the time of purchase) then again this furdier supports a requirement 
that compensation be payable.
I
A contrary argument which can be posited, however, is that the imposition of the 
hcensing regime, far from being a limitation on existing property rights, should be seen 
as a strengthenhig of property rights — particularly in die case of groundwaters. As die 
discussion in chapter 5 touched upon, shared resources subject to an absolute right to 
abstract are characterised by an absence of certain fundamental propert)f-based
214 A
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clearly remedies these difficulties T  As noted in chapter 5, hcence-based prior right 
regimes in US states, in general, bestow upon users exclusive rights to abstract set 
volumes of water, which may be transferred to others for more profitable exploitation 
and enforced against secondary users.
characteristics such as exclusivity, transferability and enforceabilit)c Such features are 
largely absent in respect of both groundwater and also water flowing in defined channels. 
A licensed right to take water, while it may be limited and may entail costs, nonedieless
The question of revocation of a licence
Abstraction licenses wiU not normally be thne-Hniited in Scodand although it was
suggested by the Scottish Executive that licences - which presumably would be granted
for indeterminate periods - could be revoked or varied in particular circumstances where,
for example, environmental damage might result from continuing to abstract at current
. .levels.**°" This issue in itself may raise human rights concerns diat bear examination. In 
respect of this question, debates surrounding recent English legislation, the Water Act 
2003, which allows for existing water use licences to be revoked or varied, may be 
instructive here. Wliüe tliis legislative measure was being mooted, a debate emerged 
concerning whether such revocation powers would be compatible with the HRA,^  ^ AU
new hcences issued under the Water Act 2003®^  wiU be time-limited’^  ^ but in relation to 
Ucences which pre-date the reforms — and which were granted on an indefinite basis - if
C hapter 6 provides a breakdow n o f  preliininary cost estimates for abstractors.
79 y  Y otteler, ‘The little fish that roared : T he Endangered Species Act, state groundw ater law, and private 
property rights collide over Texas Edwards aquifer’ (1998) 28 E N T L  (EnvironmmtalLmw)  845 at p 875. 
These were discussed further in chapter 5.
Controlled Activities Regulations, supra n. 45 at para 1.10.
See for example, R. Cunningham , ‘Reform  o f water resource control in England and W ales’ (2002) 13(1) 
Water Law 35; W, H owarth, ‘A bstraction Licences, Propert}'^ Rights and C om pensation’ (2002) 13 Water 
haw  95.
T he buUc o f  which will come into force ki 2006.
U nder s 25.
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abstractors refuse to give up licences voluntarily the regulator would be empowered to 
revoke or vary a licence witdiout any compensation from July 2012 J''
These provisions have been regarded as “the most politicised and most cmcial to the 
success of [the] future [English water] system” .®^ Despite die concerns voiced regarding 
the legality of tliese provisions in terms of human rights obligations, the government has 
continually expressed the view that there is nothing in them which is incompatible with 
its obligations under the ECHR.®'’ Given a lack of UK case-law in this area, Strasbourg 
jurisprudence may again be instructive here. In Fredin v Sweden (No following a shift 
in emphasis in Swedish nature conservation law, the apphcanf s licence to extract gravel 
from his land was revoked. Despite the fact that the licence was revoked ratlier than 
varied in any way, the Court followed the general pattern of Strasbourg decisions in tliis 
area and viewed that this action amounted to control on tlie use of property rather than a 
deprivation as such.®® Rook has noted tliat “ [such decisions] indicate that the revocation 
of a licence wiU be treated as a control of use rather than a deprivation, the control being 
directed, not to the actual licence itself, but rather to tlie appHcant’s underlying business
does not generally require compensation and on such a basis, revocation of an 
abstraction hcence in England (and Scotland for that matter) would hlcely not therefore 
require compensation. From the analysis of the court in Fredin, this is especially so if
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interests”. Again perhaps this somewhat skewed reasoning is resonant of the wealcness 
of the property provisions in the Convention. On tlie fair-balance test, a control of use
i
U nder s 27. Tliis pow er is confined to cases where tlie Secretary o f State is satisfied that it is necessary 
in order to protect any waters, channels or underground strata, or any flora and fauna dependent on them , 
from  serious damage.
R. Cunningham, supra n. 81 at p 40.
Draft Water Biii : Government reply to the N in th Report of Session 2000-01 from the Environment, Transport and 
Regional Affairs Committee (HM SO, 2001),- Water Bill Consultation on Draft Eegislation : Government RMSponse 
(HM SO, 2002).
supra 11. 66.
Similar holdings o f  control o f use for revocation o f  licences were found in Tre Traktorer Aktiebolag v 
Sweden (1989) 13 EH R R  309; Pine Valley Developments E td v Ireland (1991) EG G R Series A  N o. 22.
1
tliere are clear environmental objectives that could be pointed to by the state in justifying 
the revocation.®’^'" To this end, in Fredin tlie court was keen to affirm the legitimate 
objective of die state to take appropriate action in the name of environmental protection. 
Such environmental objectives could clearly also be pointed to in any revocation or 
variation of water abstraction or impoundment hcences here in Scodand. Moreover, in 
supporting its decision that revocation could be made widiout compensation, the Fredin 
court pointed to the fact that die hcensee had no legitimate expectation diat the right 
would not be revoked.
Whereas this second aspect of the court’s reasoning has been flagged up by 
commentators on Enghsli water abstraction reforms who have argued that diose 
abstractors granted a “Licence of Right” under die Water Act 1936 could be said to have 
held a legitimate expectation not to have the hcensed revoked,’’’ die issuing of abstraction 
hcences under the new regime in Scodand — even if not expressly time-hmited - could be 
done in such a way as to flag up the possibhity that diey could be revoked in die future. 
On Strasbourg authority, this would lend weight to the abhity of the SEP A to vary or 
revoke the hcence at a later date without compensation being payable.
As a final point here, it might be noted that although there is no UK case-law on this 
issue. Commonwealth authority on the interpretation of various state Bhls of Rights may 
provide some insight into how the revocation of hcences might be taclded by the 
domestic judiciary. In Fa Compagnie Sumere del Bel Otnbre Ftee v The Government of
D. R ook supra n.. 15 at p 77.
89a supra n. 66 at para 55.
Fredin supra n. 66 at para 54.
91 W. H ow arth, supra n. 81 at p 96. A lthough even if  tliis point were to be conceded, it is subm itted that as 
noted, hi any case the Strasbourg jurisprudence makes it clear tliat com pensation would be a requirem ent 
in control o f use cases on  veiv rare occasions.
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MauritiuN - a case in which Mauritius legislation required landowners to renew their 
leases with tenant farmers — the Privy Council held that such restrictions did not amount 
to an acquisition of property under the Mauritius BiU. of Rights but rather that they 
amounted to a restriction similar to a control on use under article one, protocol one of 
the ECHR which hence required no compensation/'’®
Allen has argued that such an approach suggests that UK courts would treat regulation as 
a deprivation requiring compensation only on rare occasions.”'’ It is true that there are 
further Privy Council cases in a similar vein dealing with properp^ rights and breaches of 
■Bills of Rights that support this contention.”® The context within which these decisions 
were taken, however, should not be forgotten. Roberts notes that
[o]ne cannot help but feel that, in dealing with cases involving deprivation of properp^ 
the Privy Council has been wary in upholding traditional common law notions of 
Property rights, lest they be accused of imposing British standards upon countries which 
may have chosen, through democratic means, to adopt more corporatist principles of 
property ownership.
Against this political backdrop then, perhaps tlie Privy Council’s approach to 
interferences with property in these contexts may inform litde in respect of die 
imposition of die post-WEWS regime.
Positive obligations of pubhc audiorities under HRA
Anodier issue which is of relevance hi respect of potential human rights concern relates 
to the requirements placed upon states, and hence pubhc authorities under die HRA, to
'■^2 [1995] 3 LRC 494. 
ibid.'àX. 506 pgr Lord Woolf.
T. Allen, ‘The H um an Rights A ct (UK) and Property Law’ in J. McLean (ed). Property and the Constitution 
O xford, H art Publislhng, (1999) at p 152.
such as ]uana v A tt. Gen of Guyana [1971] A.C. 972; Malaysia v. Selangor Pilots Association [1978] A.C. 337; 
Government o f Mauritius v. Union Flacq Stegar Estates Co. E td  [1992] 1 W.L.R. 903.
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ensure that the regulatory regimes that they operate positively guarantee certain rights to 
citizens affected by the regime.”®'" The nature of these positive obligations have been 
usefully summarised by Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick as follows;
(a) the obligation of the authorities to take steps to make sure that the enjoyment is 
effective;
(b) the obligation of the authorities to take steps to make sure that the enjoyment of the 
right is not interfered with by otlier private persons; and
(c) the obligation of the audiorities to take steps to make sure that private persons take 
steps to ensure the effective enjoyment by other individuals of the right.^ '^^
Bearing the above in mind, the potential problem for any new licensing regime in
.Scodand is that even though die imposition of the licensing regime itself may be 
,compatible with Convention rights, it might be argued that regulators may permit
. . .abstractors to carry out activities that breach die human rights of others which would be
................................................................contrary to public bodies’ positive obligations in this regard. Perhaps the most obvious
example of this would be where a hcensed abstraction has the effect diat it causes
subsidence and perhaps damage to buildings on adjoining land. As noted in chapter 3,
while the current common law position in this regard is unclear in Scodand, in England
die position seems relatively well setded that a removal of support would not be
actionable under support or neghgence and arguably Scots law may be determined in die
same way. The current state of die common law, however, would not necessarily stand
in die way of any action brought, if the activities complained of amounted to a breach of
certain human rights.
N . Roberts, ‘T he Law Lords and H um an Rights; tlie experience o f the Privy Council in interpreting Bills 
o f  R ights’ (2000) 2 E H K L R 147 at p 176.
%!\ is because certain convention rights are w orded in such a way as to im pose such positive
obhgations. T he w ording o f article 8 and article 1, protocol 1 is discussed in tliis sense below.
96b Harris, Boyle and W arbrick supra n. 59 at p 284.
Indeed under the 'horizontal effect' o f  the convention it may be that under the current com m on law an 
action could be brought by one partyr against another on the grounds diat the existing com m on law  relative 
to support o f  underground percolating water (if it does no t offer a remedy) ought to be tem pered by
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The causing of subsidence in these circumstances may arguably be in breach of article 1, 
protocol one and also article 8 of the convention Article one, protocol one has already 
been discussed in detail. Article 8 in general provides for the right to private and family 
hfe and prescribes that
1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.
2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’
How does article 8 apply?
Aldiough article 8 is generally perceived as protecting citizens’ rights agamst state inroads 
into privacy, it has also been applied in other ways on bodi a Strasbourg and domestic 
level. In particular, die article has been interpreted as bestowing a right of occupation to 
a home. The right has, for example, been manifest as protecting occupants of homes 
from the imposition of new occupancy agreements,”^  toxic emissions,”® severe dust 
contamination,”” excessive noise’”” and subsidence.’”’
In relation to a hypothetical subsidence case, at first glance, article 8 would only seem to 
be of relevance where the buildings so-affected could be described as being ‘homes’. 
Strasbourg jurisprudence has taken a somewhat liberal stance, however, in interpreting 
what is meant by a ‘home’ in diis context. The term ‘home’ does not simply relate to die
convention lights. For a discussion o f  the horizontal effect see I. Leigh & L. Lustgarten, ‘Maldng Rights 
Real: The Courts, Remedies and the H um an Rights A ct’ (1999) C L/ 509.
97 Gillow V UK  (1989) 11 E H R R  335.
Uopeii Ostra v Spain (1994) 20 E H R R  211.
99 KJjamt and 180 others v UK 26 E H R R  CD 212. A lthough the case failed on the facts.
'90 PomII and Rayner v UK  (1990) 12 E H R R  355,
Mardc V Thames Water Utilities Utd [2004] 2 A.C. TIL. This is discussed in m ore detail below.
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iabodes of owner-occupiers but has been interpreted to include caravans,’”^  the domiciles 
of tenants’”® and even those unlawfully occupying premises.’”'’ More importantly, 
however, the definition of home has in some circumstances, however, been extended to 
include business premises. In Nietmkt:i v Germany, the case concerned the state’s search 
of a lawyer’s office. In response by a claim by the state that article 8 only applied to 
homes rather than business premises it was noted that:
As regards the word ‘home’, appearing in the English text of the Article 8, the European 
Court observes that in certain Contracting States... it has been accepted as extending to 
business premises. Such an interpretation is, moreover, fully consonant with the French 
text, since the word ‘domicile’ has a broader connotation than the word ‘home’ and may 
extend, for example, to a professional person’s office.’”®
On the above analysis therefore, article 8 may be of significance in relation to a
subsidence stenmiing from a Hcensed abstraction which causes damage to domestic
premises and perhaps business premises. The key aspect of article 8 in this regard is diat
it does not merely guard against protection against direct state infringement of diese
rights but, as noted above, also bestows a positive obhgation on states m this regard.
This is because, as Dignam and AUen have noted, “ [t]he notion of ‘respect’ in Article 8 
. . . . .impHes that the national authorities are ,.. not only under a duty to refrain from acts that 
. . .might constitute a violation of Article 8 but also have a positive obhgation to secure such 
respect” .’”® In addition to article 8 concerns, article one, protocol one may again be 
relevant in a subsistence case. While die second and tliird Hmbs of die article refer 
merely to negative obhgations — ie protection from state appropriation or control - the 
first hmb of die provision sets out a positive right to the peaceful enjoyment of
'"2 Buckley v UK  (1996) 23 EH R R  101; M a ky  v UK  (1996) 22 E H R R  CD 123. 
d  V UK  (App. N O . 11716/85).
Hunter v Canay WharJ\1001'\ 2 All E R  426, per Lord Cooke at pp 458-459 (dissenting).
105 (1992) 16 ERR 97 at para 30.
'99 A. D ignam  and D . Allen, Company Uair and the Human Rights A c t 1998 supra n. 16 at para 4:2. This 
positive obligation placed upon states may be relevant generally across a num ber o f  convention rights — see "§
I
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possessions and therefore obligations may again be placed upon states to ensure that the 
regulatory regimes they operate upheld this right.’””
The key point about the state need to uphold these positive rights is that tliis 
requirement may be breached even if the action complained about involves two private 
parties. Rook has noted that
[t]he European Court has aclaiowledged that Article 8 imposes obligations on the states 
which involve : ‘the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for family and 
private Hfe even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves {X and Y v 
Netherlands (1985) 8 EHRR 235 at para. 23)...’ Thus the state is held accountable for its 
failure to remedy private abuses and violations by taking positive steps to legislate or y
carry out other preventative a c t i o n . '"s
It seems that positive obHgations (in relation to those convention articles that are 
characterised by positive rights) wiH be bestowed upon states in respect of the actions of 
private parties particularly where there is some sort of Hnk diat can be estabHshed 
between the offending acts and the regulatory regime of the state. So for example in 
Lope^l Ostra v SpahN^ the pubHc audiority concerned was not itself responsible for the 
offending poUuting emission from a factory that was deemed contrary to article 8. The Y
factory, however, had been built on state-owned land with the assistance of a pubHc 
subsidy. This Hnk, therefore, between the offending act and the state’s regulatory regime
Awas sufficient to estabHsh in the circumstances a breach of the state’s positive obhgations
77
in respect of article 8. It may be that such a regulatory Hnk is not required at ah, b
7'however. As the European Commission in lj)pes(  ^ Ostra noted, notwithstanding the &
extent of direct or indirect responsibHity attributable to the state or its pubhc audiorities
KW
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for example A  v UK  (1999) 27 E H R R  611 concerning tlie interplay between the law relating to the .
reasonable chastisem ent o f  children and article 3. f
'97 See for example, OneiyildFv Turkey (48939199) (Unreported, June 18, 2002) (ECHR)
'9" D, Rook, supra n. 15 at p 50.
supra n. 98. 1
■
'99^  ibid at para 55.
in general, article 8 “obHge[s] the State to protect the rights of tlie individual even against 
the actions of third parties” .’””'"
In any case, following this reasoning, if SEP A were to grant a hcence to an abstractor to 
draw a certain volume of water and tliis had the effect of causing subsidence to 
neighbouring land and buildings thereon, then, under section 6 of the PIRA, this could 
incur a breach of SEPA’s positive obhgations under article 8 (if it were a home or 
perhaps office premises) and article 1, protocol one. O f course as discussed above, 
neither article 8 nor article one, protocol one is an absolute right and a state whl only be 
in breach if it fails to fulfil the fait balance tests apphcable to such rights. Although there 
appears no Scottish domestic authority on such matters, Enghsli case-law is instructive 
here botli in respect of the extent that positive obhgations are required of pubhc bodies 
under the HRA and also how the fait balance tests should operate in with regard to 
positive obhgations.
I
In Marcic v Thames Water Utilities Ttct'^^ the sahent facts were as foUows: Mr. Marcic hved 
in a family home in Middlesex. At times of heavy rain, flood water invaded liis front 
garden, reaching tlie exterior briclcwork of his house but not entering the house itself. 
From 1992 there were one or two flooding incidents a year, however, this rose to four m 
1999 and four or five in 2000. As a result of the flooding tlie house suffered from damp 
and musty smehs and the waU and ceding cracked suggested subsidence. The garden was 
liighly contaminated. Although the problem did not cause any clinical illness or iujury to 
Mr. Marcic or his family it was clear that tlie value of Mr. Marcic's property had been 
seriously and adversely affected.
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At first instance, in the Technology and Construction Court (‘TCC’), the defendant water 
utihty company was found to have a non-feasance immunity m respect of common law 
nuisance.’” Nor could a relevant duty be extracted from the Water Industry A ct 1991. 
Following the Strasbourg decisions of Fopet^ Ostra v SpahU^ and Guerra v Italy however, 
the TCC found that the effects of the flooding were covered by article 8 of the ECHR 
and also article one, protocol one. The inactivity of the pubhc authority in providing an 
effective remedy could not be justified and was, therefore, unlawful under ss.6 and 8 of 
tlie HRA.
Certain aspects of the TCC’s decision were overturned by the Court of Appeal.’” In 
particular, it was found that there was no immunit)^ for a common law action to be 
brought for nuisance in the circumstances and hence damages should be awarded for this 
common law breach rather than any breach of human rights. Significantly, (albeit that 
the issue was not paid much attention by the court) the court also dismissed the pubhc 
autliority’s chahenge to the claimants’ case under human rights law (based on tlie 
existence of a statutory complaint scheme), stating that the court had not been persuaded 
that the Judge was wrong to hold that Thames had mftiaged the claimant’s Convention 
rights. In the court’s view, notwithstanding the legitimate state aim in setting priorities hi 
respect of pubhc sewage works and the existence of a statutory complaints scheme, these
factors, by themselves, may not afford the Thames authority a fuU defence in the absence 
of compensation. As Phhhps L.J. noted
[i]t seems to us at least arguable that to strike a fair balance between the individual and 
the general community, those who pay to make use of a sewerage system should be
"9 EW CA Iv 64; [2002] 2 W.L.R. 932 (CA).
Mardc V Thames Water Utilities E td  (Preliminary Issues) [2001] 3 All E R  698 (QBD(T&CC)).
"2 supra n. 98.
Guerra and Others v. Italy (1998) 26 E.H.R.R. 357 ECH R . 
supra 11. 110.
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charged sufficient to cover the cost of paying compensation to the minority who suffer 
damage as a consequence of the operation of the system,
Marcic was subsequently appealed to the House of Lords” ® where it was held, inter alia, 
that the existence of a statutory complaints scheme, in effect, balanced the interests of 
tliose customers whose properties were subject to flooding with the remainder of its 
customers whose properties were drained by the sewers, by imposing a general 
drainage obligation on Thames and entrusting enforcement to an independent
as regulator, who oversaw operation of the scheme.”® The Lords were keen not to be 
seen to be usurping the role of policymakers in balancing individual interests such as
.:,5
jregulator.”®'" In the Lords’ view Mr. Marcic could have pursued his complaint with the «i
independent regulator under the statutory scheme but had chosen not to do so.
Moreover, Parliament had acted well within its bounds as a poHcy maker and the 
statutory scheme was compliant with the 1998 Act. In short, according to the Lords, y
the fairness of Thames Water's scheme of priorities was not for the courts to assess
because Parhament had properly assigned that responsibility to the Director General, y=;i
Marcic’s against the general interest. The court noted that a determination such as one ; ;|
regarding the provision of a fait system of priorities for sewage was one better taken by &
regulators tlian in the courtroom.”®" Rather than picldng through the details of the 
scheme, in reacliing its judgement, the Lords merely considered tliat the statutory 
scheme as a whole was in accordance witli the Convention and sufficient to comply 
with the state’s obligations under article 8. Parhament enjoyed a wide discretion in
respect of article 8, and even though in the circumstances, there had been clear .7
adrninistrative difficulties in adniinistering the statutory scheme in this instance, the "y
I
at para 113. y
Mardc v Thames Water Utilities Utd [2004] 2 A.C. HL. y
It is w orth  malting the poin t here that the regulator is also under a dut]^ to act in accordance with the 
E C H R  and thus an action could be brought on the grounds o f breach o f  statutory duty.
"9 Mardc supra n. 115 at 38, 70-71.
7;■y.
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legislative framework provided remedies for flooding victims, was subject to judicial 
review and hence struck a reasonable balance between die relevant competing 
interests.”” As noted by the court,””" this approach can be seen as consistent witli that 
taken by the Strasbourg court in Hatton v The United KingdomN
The key question in respect of the present analysis would be that if subsidence were to 
occur as a result of a hcensed abstraction (and there was deemed to be no remedy at 
common law) it would need to be determhied in what circumstances SEP A might be 
held to be acting contrary to the fak balance test or specific exceptions set out hi article 
8. In so far as article 8 is concerned, it may be recahed that the 2"® para of the article 
aUows state interference when this is in accordance witli national security, pubhc safelyy 
or the economic weh-being of the country, or for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of liealtli or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others. In relation to a subsidence case, the caveats which would be relevant would 
relate to whether tlie subsidence could be justified for the economic weh-being of tlie 
country, or to protect tlie correlative rights and freedoms of others. From the analysis 
above, in respect the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions, sknilar questions might 
be asked to determine whether the state fulfhled the ‘fair balance’ test.
"9a supra n. 115 at 38.
"7 ibid at 41-43, 47.
"7a ibid at 41.
(2003) 37 E.H.R.R. 28. Tliis view has been criticised, however, on the basis that such an approach fails 
to take into account procedural farhngs wliich may themselves faU short o f convention rights -  see for 
example, H. W überg ‘Pubhc Resource Allocation, N uisance and the Hum an Rights A ct 1998’ (2004) 120 
L O R  574.
In overcoming these tests, clearly where the onus of proof hes is important. Trotman 
has suggested that the burden of proof of lack of justification m respect of a state or 
pubhc body’s failure to take positive steps to protect convention rights should He with
S
Y
226
"9 T. Trotm an, ‘Local authority; liabilit}^ and defective buildings : the hnphcations o f  Marcic Tham es W ater 
Utilities L td .’ [2003] 19 (1) Const.. L /  17 at p 20.
'20 supra n. I l l  at para 71.
227
y
the claimant as the situation is clearly different from one in which the state is directly
acting to contravene certain human rights.” ” This approach was not, however, taken in
Marcic where tlie TCC at first instance held diat die burden of proof in relation to this
margin of appreciation fell on the state to prove that there was good reason as to why no
action was taken to proliibit conduct which might abrogate human rights.’^ ” As noted
above, on appeal to the Lords, the existence of die statutory scheme was deemed
adequate in terms of the state fulfilling its convention obhgations. Notwithstanding diis,
there is nothing in the Lords’ judgement to suggest that the burden of proof in respect of 
.the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the state would fah upon the apphcant in respect 
of positive obhgations.
J
f!
Leaving aside the issue of proving die justification for a failure to act, and assuming for 
die time being that there is no right of support of underground water at common law in 
Scodand, at least in so far as a breach of article 8 is concerned, the economic interests 
argument is a significant one in this context. SEP A might remedy the fact that presentiy 7
there might be no remedy available in respect of an abstraction diat causes subsidence in 
a number of ways but each would hold economic consequences. For example, it could
A
become a hcence condition that abstractors would pay for any subsidence caused by theh 
.abstraction, or alternatively, SEP A could take on habhity for abstractions itself and 
spread the costs (or estimated costs) of potential habhitj^ amongst abstractors. Clearly 
either move may involve consequences of an economic nature and moreover such 
initiatives may have htde bearing on un-regulated abstraction activities. If SEP A were to 
agree to pay compensation to affected parties, passhig the potential costs of tliis to ah 
hcensees would, of course, add to die regulatory costs of the reghne. The imposition of
such costs might tun contrary to a general state need to encourage investment into the 
exploitation of water resources. Writing in to the licence conditions that hcensees would 
incur habhity for any subsidence again would perhaps be unpalatable to would-be 
investors.’^ ’ The other alternative would be for SEPA to simply to prohibit abstractions 
where it was hlrely to cause subsidence. This option might be problematic in tliat it 
might be difficult to determine when such subsidence might occur and moreover could 
be seen as being incompatible with the existing rights of those proprietors who are 
seeking to abstract water. In this respect it should be recahed that one of the areas of 
state discretion articulated in article 8 relates to situations where enforcing the rights set 
out in the provision would be incompatible with the human rights o f others. Similar 
arguments may be encountered in respect of article one, protocol one which again is not 
an absolute right. It is subject to a fair balance test which, as ahuded to above, includes 
determinations related to both proportionahty and the state margin of appreciation.’^ ^
To what extent some of the arguments outlined above are manifest in the case-law 
setting out the general nature of the current common law position may be an important 
factor in establishing the state’s case for infringement of the rights set out ki article 8 
and/or article one, protocol one. If the common law currently excludes a clakn for 
subsidence in such cases then tiiere may in fact be sound pohcy reasons for so doing. As 
noted in chapter 3, however, this Itind of reasoning is largely absent from (Enghsli) 
common law cases which have dealt with tins issue. Ratlier, decisions in this area have 
largely stemmed from the basic Blackstonian premise that die right to abstract
'21 I t is conceded, however, that tliis issue may be o f  little significance in tliat there Is only one reported 
case o f rem oval o f  support o f  underground water in Scotland — Bald v Alloa Colliey 1854 16 D  870.
It needs to be borne in mind that an increase in abstractions in the post-W EW S environm ent (and perhaps 
a change in climatic conditions) may lead to m ore o f  such cases arising in tlie future.
'22 111 relation to tliis right to possessions set out in tlie first rule, tlie court m ust determ ine w hether a ‘fair 
balance’ has been ‘struck betw een the demands o f  die general interest o f  the comiminit)? and the
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undei-ground water is an absolute one. It was noted that there has been httle discussion 
of any pohcy rationale underpinning the law, based, for example, on economic 
considerations or a pro-development agenda. If indeed it is held that there is no right to 
support of underground water under Scots common law, then given the largely 
unsatisfactory reasoning inherent in the case-law’^ ® and inconsistency with tlie law of 
support in other contexts’^ '’ then the state of the common law hi this regard would not 
be much of an aid to SEPA’s case. The abihty of parties to take out insurance against the 
effects of subsidence as a ‘self-help’ remedy in this context may lend some weight to the 
current state of the law (if it provides no remedy). Nonetheless, if the court was not 
convinced that the lack of appropriate remedial action by SEPA sufficiently took into 
account the balance of interests required in article 8 then it may be that, at the very least, 
tlie imposition of some sort of statutory scheme to handle complaints in respect of any 
subsidence which might result from abstractions should be contemplated by die 
Executive.
;
Moreover, despite die Lord’s view in Marcic that there was no human rights based
■'Î
.remedy available. Lord Nichols did express die point obiter that in die instance of external 
sewage flooding, “if it is not practicable for reasons of expense to carry out remedial 
works for the time being, those who enjoy the benefit of effective drainage should bear 
die cost of paying some compensation to those whose properties are situated lower 
down in the catchment area and who, in consequence, have to endure intolerable sewer 
flooding...”’ ®^ Given that in a subsidence case, one party (die abstractor) clearly may
requirem ents o f tlie protection o f  the individual’s fundam ental rights -  Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden supra 
n. 44 at para 69.
'2  ^ As have noted the one case in tliis area may, depending on its interpretation, suggest otherwise - Bald v 
Alloa Collieiy supra n. 121.
'2' See chapter 3 for tliis discussion.
'23 Marcic supra n. 115 at paras 44-45.
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profit while the other party, as a result of the subsidence, loses. Lord Nichol’s view may 
lend support for the notion of tlie need to pay compensation in such circumstances.
Positive obligations and the removal of water
- s
For completeness it can be noted that while die removal of water by Hcensed abstraction
causing subsidence may be a somewhat rare occurrence in Scodand another far more 
common set of circumstances could arguably also raise hmnan rights concerns. A case 
might also proceed on the basis of a breach of SEPA’s positive obhgations under the 
first limb of article one, protocol one, where a Hcensed abstraction has taken water away 
from beneath the land of another. The ground of complaint would simply be diat 
property has been taken away by another under the auspices of SEPA’s Hcensing regime. 
As ahuded to above, even diough it is probable diat landowners do not own water on or 
beneath dieir land itself, the usfructary right to take water — whether it be in defined 
channel or percolating through die ground — is in itself a property right and should 
therefore faH widiin die ambit of possessions. So in theory a landowner might argue that 
diis ‘possession’ has been removed by an abstractor under the auspices of a state-run 
Hcensing reghne which is contrary to the SEPA’s positive obhgations hi diis regard.
"li"'
In diis sense, it might weh be a relatively straightforward task for the state to overcome 
the ‘fah-balance’ test in aHowing Hcensees to abstract water from beneath die lands of 
another by referrhig to the migratory nature of water resources and pointing to die 
hnpracticaHty of any otiier solution. In most cases water could simply not be abstracted 
at aH if a remedy were to be made available to another party whose water has been taken 
from beneadi his feet or from a river or stream runnhig dirough his land. Such
I
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reasoning is manifest, for example, in much of tlie US case-law relating to the ‘capture’ of 
hydrocarbons.
Additionally, it may be that at least in relation to groundwater the case would faU at a
'29 D iscussed in chapter 4.
'27 Coppel, supra n 45 at 376; Baner v Sweden supra ii. 52. 
'2® D iscussed in chapter 3,
'29 D iscussed hi chapter 3.
prior hurdle, however, without the need for any state justification of fait-balance. Tliis is 
because under the first hmb of protocol one, article one, “interferences with property 
wliich arise out of private law rights and obhgations are considered to define the scope of 
the property right, ratlier than to interfere witli it.”’^ ” For groundwater therefore, tlie 
property right concerned —of landowners to abstract water — is expressly hmited by the 
actions of others who may draw the whole or part of that water away prior to tlie 
landowner taldng it into possession.’ ®^ Tliis action therefore defines tlie right and does 
not represent an interference witli it. In relation to water in defined channels, the 
situation is different in the sense that riparians have a right to a continuing flow of tlie 
w a t e r . I f  the actions of an abstractor or impounder serve to seriously deplete the water 
downstream then this goes beyond the definition of the right under private law and may 
then lead to a question of whether SEPA has fulfhled its fair balance test.
Efficiency
Efficiency can be sought in a number of ways, including the formation of a water market 
. .to fachitate trades between market actors and the use of economic carrots and sticks to 
encourage most efficient use. EquaUy a regime whl seek to avoid inefficiency in other 
ways, such as ensuring low transaction costs, fachitating dispute avoidance, providing 
effective dispute resolution programmes and eliminating unnecessary regulation. In this
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context efficiency is fundamentally concerned with reducing costs for industry 
participants and facilitating the most economically efficient (profitable uses) in society. 
As noted below, it is also argued that the estabhshment of efficiencies in this sense may 
contribute to a reduction in waste, conservation and allocation of water to the most 
beneficial uses. The extent that such other ‘efficiencies’ can be acliieved, however, is a 
moot point and is debated below.
Water Markets
The creation of a water ‘market’ would in theory create incentives for conservation of 
water resources by offering water rights’ holders the chance to seU their excess rights to 
others. This hes in stark contrast to Hardin’s nightmare scenario in respect of the 
problems tliat might be engendered from a ‘common pool’ approach to shared resources 
resulting in overuse and ultimately decimation of the resource.
As noted in chapter 5, one of the perceived advantages of a hcence-based regime is that it 
may fachitate the trading of hcences hi such a fashion. From a basic economic 
standpoint, it is argued hi simple terms, that if the profits to one party outweigh the cost 
of purchasing property^ rights from another (at a price higher than tlie potential benefits 
to the first part)J tlien discounting transactional costs, it may be economicahy efficient 
for the trading of a property right to take place.’®”
128a A lthough any such debate would be coloured by the fact that prescriptive rights in w ater in defined 
streams may be established.
See the discussion at chapter 5.
232
In addition to licences, rights to abstract/im pound  under G eneral Binding Rules will also be capable o f 
being traded — see Scottish Executive E nvironm ent G roup, Controlled Activities Regulations (April 2004 : 
Paper 2004/8) at para 1.18 (although quite how  tliis might be acltievable in so far as activities under G BR ’s 
may not require to be registered is unclear).
'^2 A lthough as a personal right, it would no t survive a change in ownership.
See W. G ordon, Scottish Land Law  (1999) at para 7-83.
A lthough if  a hcence is for a limited period o f  time or may be revoked w ithout compensation tlien 
trading becomes less attractive. Tliis point is discussed below.
The post-WEWS regime in Scotland wih fachitate such trading.’®’ An initial question 
that can be asked relates to whetlier current rights to take water at common law in 
Scotland could already be traded m such a way. If one takes the example of groundwater 
in Scotland, it might be argued that a landowner is quite entitled to seU a personal light to 
others to come onto his land and draw water away’®^ and tlius exploit tlie water resource 
in a more efficient manner than he could liimself. Moreover a servitude right to take 
water may be capable of being created which, behig a real right, would survive a change 
of ownership. The right of aquaehaustus is a recognised servitude under Scots law and 
covers the taldng of water from some source such as a weU or a stream.’®®
i
The key point about licence trading, however, is tliat a right granted under hcence is botli 
.quantifiable and exclusive hi a manner that absolute rights to abstract groundwater or 
riparian rights to take surface water under die common law may not be.’®'' An 
abstraction licence confers upon the owner a right to abstract a defined volume of water 
which hnportantly is protected against the actions of others — thus a monetary value can 
more easily be attached to the value of the hcence. As ahuded to in chapter 3, the same 
cannot be said for rights to water under the common law which although (hi respect of 
groundwater) are often labehed as ‘absolute’, may in practice be worthless if rendered 
obsolete by tlie actions of others that serve to draw the water away (leaving the aggrieved 
user with no remedy at law). Having said this, it is possible that some situations may 
arise where given a lack of prevahing knowledge concerning quantities of underlying
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groundwater, a licence may be granted in respect of a volume of water of which pumping 
is not sustainable, but as the regime develops and Imowledge-bases expand such 
problems should be alleviated.” ®
As well as promoting tlie most efficient use of the resource it has also been argued that 
trading may also help fachitate overall conservation of the resource. For example, as 
Gregory has noted in respect of water trading in the USA /
[a] developed water market reduces water scarcity;- by increasing the value some place 
upon water. In other words, some water users may not be placing an appropriate value 
on the water that they use because they either receive it for free, pay a subsidized rate for 
it, or currently use more tlian they need. If those wasteful users could sell quantities of 
excess water, then they would realize that wasted water is equivalent to wasted money. 
Then, they have the economic incentive to seek and employ less wasteful uses for their
excess to otlier market participants. 137
Tills situation also raises the possibility o f  conflict between different licensees. M oreover the costs of 
generating this knowledge - passed on to all users - may counterbalance any efficiency gains.
"9 A. Gregorj% ‘G roundw ater and its future: com peting interests and burgeoning m arkets’ 11 Stan. Envtl. 
L.J. 229 at p 249.
'-'7 See for example Morriss, Yandle & A nderson, ‘Principles for W ater’ (2002) 15. TuI. Envtl E .J  335 at p 
336.
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water. In some instances, water users might decide that the value they would reap from 
selling all of their water may surpass the value of their intended use for the water. In 
such cases, the water had been inefficiently allocated prior to the water market; now it 
could be devoted to a use that society economically valued more.'^"
A pro-market stance like that taken by Gregory, may posit that limitations on the ability 
to trade water rights in tlie name of protecting the environment and other regulatory 
tools wih increase trading costs, prohibit otherwise efficient trades and thus hinder the 
efficiency of water ahocation. An extreme pro-market stance holds that regulation is not
necessary at ah and that operation of the market whl itself lead to efficiencies and Y
ultimately conservation of the resource as users wih conserve water use and seU the :1
The interaction between law and economics is an uneasy one. There is perhaps an 
inherent resistance from lawyers, with their emphasis on delivering justice or fairness that 
economic efficiency could have any role to play in such an analysis. However, in a world 
of scarce resources, the need to avoid waste and ensure their most efficient exploitation 
assumes some sort of moral value. Indeed, if one takes this argument furtlier it may be 
morally repugnant to pursue pohcy goals that create inefficiencies.” ”"
It has been argued, however, that fachitating efficiency as between different market
actors should not necessarhy be seen as an overarching ahn in respect of substance kite 
water which can be considered a ‘pubhc good’” ® and thus cannot be left unfettered to tlie
a whole.””
I
Leaving aside that argument for the moment, whhe pro-market contentions might be 
based upon a ‘perfect market’ theory, it shah be hlustrated below that in practice such an 
argument is flawed iu respect of water.
------------------------------------------
137a g  Pettet, Company Lam  (2001) fit p 71. ;
In  strict term s a 'pubHc good' is one tliat is bo th  public and indivisible in that it cannot be shared 
am ongst the pubhc in the sense that some may have access to it while others are denied such access and it 
is rather shared freely (although no t necessarily equally) between the group -  see T.L A nderson & P.
Snyder, Water Markets : Priming the Inmsibie Pump (1997) at pp 113-114. W lihe water resources are not ■;
strictly pubhc goods in tliis sense, nonetheless given the resource’s im portance to hum an and otlier hfe, 
and its migratory characteristics, it can be considered as such - J. DeUapena, ‘T he Im portance o f Getting 
N am es Right : The Myth o f  Markets for W ater’ (2000) 25 W M M E L P R 317  at p 329; J.L. Fortuna, ‘Water 
Rights, Pubhc Resources and Private Commodities ; Examining the Current and Future Law Governing 
the Allocation o f Georgia W ater’ (2004) 38 Ga Water L  Ren 1009 at pp 1015-1016.
' 9^ See for example, C. Landry, ‘Buy tliat fish a drink : T he U nited States’ approach to environmental 
protection in an era o f water m arketing’ [2001] 12 Water Law  240.
I
vagaries of the market. This argument stems from the fact ahuded to in the beginning of
this section that the notion of efficiency may hold different connotations. There is an
imphcit assumption here that what might be efficient in fiscal terms for a hmited number
of market actors may not necessarily promote the uses that are the least wasteful in
. . .environmental terms and/or most beneficial in economic and otlier senses for society as
235
Potential obstacles to water trading
While water trading may be a theoretical boon, at least in some senses, in practice it may 
be no easy task to realise these benefits. Despite moves towards the embracement of 
markets for water in jurisdictions such as Chile,” ” the USA” ’ and England it has been 
noted that actual markets in free-flowing water are in fact extremely rare and tend, in 
practice, to function between similar users in close proximity to one another.’'’^  A 
review of experience in England suggests both that the nature of a water as an ambient 
and pubhc resource dictates that transactional costs may be prohibitive hi aUowhig any 
water market to function effectively. Moreover, market actors may currently be 
hamstrung by regulatory requirements that dampen enthusiasm for trading.
See for example, C. Bauer, ‘SUpperj^ Properg? Rights : M ultiple W ater Uses and die N eoliberal M odel in 
Cliile 1981-1995’ (1998) 38 N R ]  109.
Reference can be m ade to the discussion o f  trading in western US states in N .K. Johnson  & C.T. 
DuM ars, ‘A Survey o f  the Evolution o f  W estern W ater Law  in response to Changing Econom ic and  Pubhc 
In terest D em ands’ (1989) 29 N R ]  347.
"2 J.W. D ellapenna, supra n. 138 at p 324.
D E T R  Economic Investment in Relation to Water Abstraction: A  Consultation Paper (April 2000) available at 
htip:,'' / www.cuv iio nmeut.detr.eov.uk, CPUsnh / vcf iwaIer/ miles.htm last visited, 10th M arch 2003.
The English experience
......
While trading to date in England and Wales has been relatively rare, pohcy makers south 
of tlie border have for some time been keen to see trading extended as they agree with 
the well-worn view that it wih encourage the more efficient and thus sus tamable use of 
the resource:
...in  p rinc ip le , a b s trac tio n  hcence  trad in g  sh o u ld  b e  p ro m o te d  as an  effec tive  m e a n s  o f  
ach iev ing  th e  o p tim a l d is tr ib u tio n  o f  w a te r  re so u rces w ith in  an d  b e tw een  d if fe re n t 
sec to rs  o f  use  an d  th u s co n tr ib u tin g  to  su s ta inab le  d ev e lo p m en t.
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Under the current legislation operational in England and Wales” '* the trading of hcences 
is curtailed somewhat by the fact that generaUy spealdng a hcence holder must be the 
occupier of the land upon which the water is to be drawn from.” ® The Water Act 2003 
wih amend tliis position to stipulate that a mere right of access to the land (which could 
be negotiated with the landowner) would be sufficient for a hcence to be granted.”*’ On 
a prima facia basis therefore, if trading is to be encouraged in Scotland then a shnhar 
method ought to be adopted. In fact the approach that has been suggested to be 
adopted by the Scottish Executive is that hcences shah be ‘activity specific’ and that in so 
far as any trade would take place, mere notification of a change in ‘responsible person’ 
would be required if ah pre-existing hcence conditions could stih be met.””
Trading soutli of the border may agam currently be stifled by the fact tliat at present 
hcences are only granted in respect of abstractions where tlie land upon which the water 
is to be used is specified.”® This may mean that would-be purchasers of hcences would 
require to seek variation of a hcence prior to purchase, which may entah additional
transactional costs and thus make the trade less attractive. Under the reforms set out in 
the Water Act 2003 tliis problem may be aheviated to some extent as the hcence whl 
merely require to state the general purpose for which the water is to be used and thus
A'
s 35, Watej; Resources A ct 1991 (WRA). A t tlie time o f writing the W ater A ct 2003 is no t yet in force.
T he E nvironm ent Agency has listed a num ber o f ways that trades can presently take place under the 
English system: 1, outright disposal o f tlie land on which abstraction takes place; 2, renting or leasing the 
land; 3, rehnquisliing tlie licence wliile continuing in possession o f the land, then granting occupational 
access to the land to another w ho may tlien apply for the licence; 4, by varying the licence to cover a small 
quantity then granting rights o f  access to the land to another; 5, selling the whole or part o f the abstracted 
w ater to otlier users; 6, first entering in to  an agreement to relinquish a licence for paym ent and then 
applying for a new licence on otlier land in the vicinity o f  the original licence — see D EFR A , Tuning WMter 
Taking -  Government Decisions Following IVater Consultation of the Economic Instruments in Relation to W^ater 
Abstraction (June 2001), Appendix 2.
' “'9 Tliis in itself may bring with it significant transactional costs. For example, witness the experience in 
o ther contexts with ‘ransom  strips’ — w hereunder a previous ow ner may have retained ownership o f  a small 
strip o f  the land concerned in order to either profit from  or control its future developm ent -  see P. Finch, 
‘Ransom  Strips and Public Rights o f  Way’ (1999) 14 RUFLR 1.
"7 Controlled Activities Regulations supra n. 131.
"8 s 46(4) WRA.
lends itself more flexibility to prospective trades.”” As the time of writing the Scottish 
situation is unclear in this respect. As has been noted, it is anticipated that a trade may 
be made in Scotland with nainimal regulatory interference in so far as the licence 
conditions can be met. It is unclear whether a change in use of the water would affect 
licence conditions in individual cases.
Whhe not trying to pour cold water on pohcy makers’ aspirations in this regard, the 
Environment Agency,”” has reacted cautiously to the government’s proposals to further 
encourage the trading of water hcences in England and Wales. A number of additional 
potential obstacles (beyond those taclded in the Water Act 2003) were identified which 
may also be of import in Scotland including: the geographical and bounded nature of 
water resources would mean that trades would normahy be confined to defined 
catchment units or units linked by some sort of transfer mechanism.” ' Such problems 
may be compounded by the fact tliat the transport of water is generaUy expensive and 
this factor may make an otherwise efficient trade prohibitive.”®
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As noted above, what might be an efficient trade on a local basis as between two market 
actors may not be efficient from a wider or national perspective, at least in the sense of 
protecting more beneficial and sustainable uses in society. To this end it may further be 
suggested that the acceptance of water hcence transfers by regulators would have to take 
into account tlie fact that certain water uses generate wastewater which can cause 
environmental problems. Moreover, as noted in chapter 5, correlative rights reghnes —
U9 Wliich am ended s 46(4)WR/V. Tliis approach is no t w ithout its drawbacks, however. In particular, 
there is a need to countenance tliat the environm ental im pacts o f abstraction may be site specific.
•S'* The current regulator for water abstractions in England and Wales.
The E nvironm ent Agency response to Tuning Water Taking supra n. 145 at para 4.1.
I
regime^ '^  ^ can be identified here. While the ability to trade without high levels of 
interaction with the regulator will be key to any successful developing market in water 
licences designed to encourage the most economically efficient use of the resource (at 
least in terms of optimum uses witliin market actors), interaction with the regulator in 
some shape or another may be required to ensure the absence of negative environmental 
consequences and/or promote more efficient uses for societj? in general.
ibid. It was noted above that w ater m arkets where tliey do arise tend to be manifest across small 
localities rather than on a national scale.
‘53 ibid.
‘5-I identified in chapter 5.
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nice that incumbent in California — favour overlying uses as such activities may at least 
partially replenish the acquifer from which the water is drawn, unlike the case where the 
water is to be used on non-overlying land. So in the context of the Scottish system, if a 
trade is to take place where the water is to be used for a different purpose, then the 
regulator may need to ensure that tliese potential problems are evaluated prior to 
authorising tlie trade. Furthermore, the possible redistribution of abstraction points 
from groundwater or surface streams — even if the water use is to be the same - would 
require examination as the environmental impacts of abstraction may in fact be site 
specific.
Even if a trade is ultimately accepted by the regulator, undeniably the greater die 
regulatory involvement in die trade, die higher the transactional costs will be for die 
parties concerned. This fact may prejudice the ability to make an economically efficient 
trade. An inherent tension between two different aims of such a water governance
■
T.
I
4;
.ï!:A
Markets in optimum conditions don’t always work
Leaving aside such specific difficulties with water markets as transactional costs and also 
the need to countenance more holistic views of efficiency to recognise the public nature 
of water, there are other flaws that can be identified witli a purely market-based system 
of property allocation in general. First, in relation to identifying tlie respective efficiency 
of competing uses, it may be difficult to predict what the perceived costs and benefits of 
these different activities are. The value of water exploitation to competing users may in 
many cases be speculative and predicated on no more tlian assumptions, expectations 
and perhaps in some cases, hopes. Moreover, experience may suggest tliat it is not 
always the most efficient uses tliat wül prevail in the market place, and rather it may be 
tire case that die party witii die most resources is simply able to wield its monetary clout 
over others in the market place even where its use is not strictiy speaking die most 
efficient. A case in point in this regard is that relating to Los Angeles water abstraction 
in which since the 1940’s vast amounts of water have been abstracted by the Department 
of Water and Power from the Mono Lake causing over-abstraction and draw-down and T
severe environmental consequences.
conditions, markets do fail and that it appears diat market actors at times simply 
'satisfice’ rather than maxitnise dieir economic i n t e r es t s . DeUapenna  draws on a stark 
illustration to this effect:
‘55 F o r a discussion see C. A rnold, 'W orldng out an environmental etliic : anniversarjr lessons from M ono 
Lake’ (2004) 4 Wjo. L. Rev. 1.
R.H. Coase, T h e  Problem  o f  Social Cost’ 3 J.L.. E C O N 1 (1960).
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Finally the pro-trading argument is based upon the somewhat dubious assumption that #
market actors always behave in a rationally economic sense and seek to 'maximise’ Iefficiency continually. Coase recognised that even in seemingly optimum market
:
;  1,
[wjhen we find that even in such a classic setting as among Bedouin horse dealers, 
markets simply fad to reach the most economically efficient outcome we must begin to 
question when markets can be expected to achieve the most socially desirable outcome, 
even if we define 'most socially desirable’ in the narrowest economic t e r m s .
Trading and time limitedl revocable licences
As noted in chapter 6, it has been suggested that Hcences would generally not be time- 
limited in Scotland but may be in some circumstances where it is predicted that 
environmental or drought problems may arise in the future by continued abstractions at 
licensed levels. It was also noted that hcences might be varied or revoked in some 
circumstances. While a right to vary, revoke or time-hmit may be a useful one for 
regulators to hold up their sleeves, it is interesting that, for England and Wales, it has 
been argued that a major factor that wdl dampen enthusiasm for the trading of hcences 
hes in the fact that under the Water Act 2003, ah new abstraction hcences wdl be time 
hmited.^^^ Carty has argued that
it is unUkely that a potential new entrant into the market wiU want to purchase a hcence 
that is going to be revoked despite the presumption of renewal where environmental 
sustainabdit}  ^ Is not in question, there is continued justification of need, and water is 
being used in an efficient manner’. Such uncertainties may deter a trade which may 
involve substantial investment.‘^ 9
In general, property rights are more easdy traded if they are certain and determinable. If 
trading is to be encouraged to ensure efficient uses — at least m a strict fasliion - then 
placing future possible constraints on the propert)^ right to be traded wdl discourage 
transfers. It is this author’s view tliat the pro-market argument fads to hold water so to 
speak hi any case for the reasons outlined above. As noted above, markets are perhaps 
not the best vehicle for ensurhig efficient uses both in the wider pubhc sense hi respect
‘57 DeUapenna, supra n. 138 at p 372. 
NormaUy 12 years.
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of water and moreover, transactional costs may prove prohibitive to many trades in any 
case. Therefore, liiniting regulation, taking liberal views on allowing trades and granting 
licences in perpetuity (and tlius mcreasing the potential environmental dangers that might 
arise therefrom) in the name of ensuring efficiency in a narrow sense may not be a 
laudable aim for the reform of Scottish water laws. In general, based on the analysis 
presented in the preceding section, it is the view of this autlior that the Scottish 
Executive should be wary of placing too much emphasis upon creating optimum market 
conditions.
Other efficiency tools
Aside from the operation of a water market there are other tools that can be used to 
.encourage efficiency. While traditional common law doctrines have dictated otherwise,
.given scarcity concerns, water should no longer be perceived as a Tree’ good and 
economic incentives through, for example, fees or taxes might be introduced to 
encourage the more efficient use of the r e s o u r c e . A s  noted already in this thesis, this 
land of efficiency drive has been markedly lacldng in the incumbent common law 
regimes regarding water in Scotiand. The post-WEWS regime, however, is based upon 
die general principle that the ‘user pays’’^’' and thus abstractors subject to the regulatory 
regime will requite to bear at least the costs of operation of tiiat regime. As noted in die 
previous chapter, costs may be even higher in the future in that a key objective of the 
Water Framework Directive is to place a value on water itself and make use of economic 
instruments to curtail over-use and waste. Therefore in geographical areas where water is 
scarce or in respect of uses that are more profitable to abstractors, such a policy, in 
simple terms, would dictate tiiat it would cost more to abstract water dian in odier areas
'59 p. Carthy, ‘W ater trading in England and Wales - can we buy that fish a drmk’ (2001) 12 Water Law  338 
at p 347.
J.W. DeUapenna, supra n. 138 at p 336.
i
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where water is more abundant or in respect of less profitable uses. The Scottish 
Executive has not yet set out a plan in this respect, perhaps largely because of the 
political sensitivities involved.
Dispute avoidance and low transactional costs
Aside from promoting water markets to engender efficient use and providing cost 
incentives, regime efficiency may be promoted simply by the presence of well-defined, 
clear propert}?- rights in water, The more certaintj^ inherent in a legal right and the less 
ambiguity inherent therein, arguably the more efficient die system of property allocation 
is. This is because if the right to the resource is ambiguous, disagreements over prioritj^ 
of use can lead to costiy litigation between disputants. Tliis is a factor which has blighted 
reasonable use and correlative rights regimes in USA.^ ’^^  Therefore property rights 
should give rise to as litde ambiguity as possible so diat they in effect become self- 
enforcing. Mattel has noted that
[c] on fusion and doubt in the rules of property create incentives to litigate, because each 
conflicting individual hopes that he or she will end up being favoured by die judicial 
decision. Clear-cut property rights, to the contrary, reduce litigation because parties wiU 
already know who wdl lose and who will win so that they will avoid spending money on 
a litigation the outcome of which is akead]r clear ex anteT^
It should also be noted that such a scenario should also encourage investment and thus 
additionally may help encourage optimum water uses for society. This issue wiU be 
discussed under ‘beneficial uses’ below.
see Coniroiled Jiclipities Regulations, supra n. 131 at para 1.26.
‘'’'2 See chapter 5.
1^ 3 EUickson, Order Without Law  (1991). Having said that diere in an inherent tension between
providing certaintj^ so that people can organise their affairs M tlt som e confidence about the legal 
consequences o f  their actions and retaining enough flexibility to provide fairness in particular 
circum stances for deserving parties -  L. Tee, ‘In troduction’ in-Land Law Issues, Debates, Polic)’ (2002) at p 2, 
''''' U. Mattei, Basic Piincipks of Property Law  (2000) at p 65.
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As noted, for Scotland, the determination of water allocation rights by SEP A may give 
rise to fewer disputes arising therefrom than if, for example, a US-fashioned reasonable 
use or correlative rights common law approach had been taken. So wliile the regime’s 
transactional costs may be higher at die outset^^^ than a wholly unfettered absolute 
dominium approacld^’'’ it is preferable in diis sense over other US common law 
approaches and also perhaps the current common law riparian rights system in Scodand 
where determinations over reasonable uses and questions regarding what amounts to 
primary and industrial uses have exercised the courts’ minds from time to time.^^  ^ It has 
been noted above that licences and other consents granted to abstract/itupound may be 
subject to variation or revocation after review by SEP A and may give rise to post-licence 
challenges being brought to SEP A by parties affected by a licensee’s activities. So the 
spectre of possible transaction costs under the Scottish regime in dûs sense is a real
one.’*’*^
Furthermore, disputes might still arise under WEWS in respect of disagreements 
between competing abstractors seeldng to exploit a water body where given ecological, 
biological and hydro-morphological conditions, abstractions are Hl{:ely to be limited — at 
least in die sense that parties may have to stagger their abs t rac t ions .Given that 
litigation is seen as an inefficient mechanism for the resolution of competing users’ 
interests, central to the regime should be the encouragement of consensual forms of 
dispute resolution between disputants. Although lip- service is paid in diis regard by the
‘‘’5 ill terms o f  administrative fees.
As discussed in chapter 5, the absolute dom inium  approach benefits from  been subject to zero 
transactional costs.
"’7 There are a few cases in tliis respect discussed in W. G ordon, supra n. 133 at paras 7.29 — 7.40.
168 Furtherm ore, as evidence from  US licensed-based regimes discussed in chapter 5 suggests, their ‘use it 
or lose it’ characteristic encourages over-use o f the resource as abstractors are reluctant to hold back on 
exploitation o f  the resource and perhaps lose their licence after a challenge from  other would-be 
abstractors. F o r England and Wales, the W ater A ct 2003 will reduce the period o f inactivit}^ which would 
trigger possible revocation o f the licence from  seven years to four years. It will be interesting to see what 
position the Scottish Executive takes in tliis regard when the licensing regime is up and running.
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Scottish Executive in their encouragement of management agreements^whereby if 
water is scarce, parties are encouraged to enter into a contractual arrangement inter se to 
divide the resource, it may be that some more explicit encouragement of negotiation or 
perhaps mediation might be bénéficiait^
Additionally, the post-WEWS regime in Scotland is also largely silent on the issue of 
disputes that might arise in respect of the determinations of conflict between those 
carrying out licensed and non-hcensed activities. So, for example, a Licence may be 
granted by SEP A to part)^ A, whose abstraction activities curtail tlie unregulated, non­
mechanical activities of the neighbouring party B and, moreover which are contrary to 
that parties’ riparian rights to a continuing flow of stream of the same quality and 
quantity. Given that the regime itself does not attempt to remove existing private 
property rights that currently exist in water resources in Scotland, it is plausible that 
licensed activities might run contrary to the vested rights of other proprietors. How the 
regime might deal with issues such as these is at the moment unclear and the current 
scope for uncertainty undermines the reforms. The post-WEWS regime also leaves 
uncertain the issue of whether or not an abstraction, either licensed or regulated in some 
other fashion, which draws water away from beneath the land of another resulting in 
subsidence and damage to buildings will result in a remedy for tlie aggrieved party. As 
noted in chapter 3 and discussed above in relation to human rights concerns, the law is 
inherently uncertain in tliis regard. Such uncertainty again adds to potential transactional 
costs involved for market participants in terms of possible litigation.
Controlled A-Ctmtiss Regulations, supra n  131 at paras 1.17 & 1.20. 
ibid at para 1.11.
*71 Altliough tliis is n o t to suggest tliat such negotiation or mediation should be compulsory. Such a m ove 
would, in effect, deny parties the right to assert tlieir legal rights. Nonetheless a culture o f  voluntan' ex ante 
dispute resolution could be fostered. The presence o f  a tliird part]' neutral or ‘m ediator’ has been seen as a 
useful catalyst to the resolution disputes in a range o f  conflict areas -  see for example, R. Mays and B. 
d i s k .  Alternative Dispute Resolution in Scotland (Scottish Office CRU ; 1999).
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13.
Encouragement and facilitation of beneficial uses
As scarcity becomes more of a pressing issue in respect of water resources, so ensuring 
that beneficial uses are recognised and protected by a legal regime becomes an important 
featureE^ As noted in chapter 5 it was such a policy consideration that drove a marked 
shift by policymakers from riparian rights to appropriative regimes in western US states T
characterised by arid climes. The current common law system in Scodand generally 
leaves determination of water uses in the hands of private individuals, except in so far 
that in relation to water in flowing stream, secondary (industrial) uses must leave the 
water undiiriinished in both quantity and quahty.'^^ While the post-WEWS regime does
3not alter the issue of ownership re, it will seek to ensure that uses that are detrimental à
at least as set out in the terms of the European water directive'^'' are curtailed.
I
The post-WEWS regime is one in which the determination of beneficial uses, in the form 
of permitting activities, is to be vested in SEP A as the regulating body responsible for the 
adrninistration of the r e g i m e . A l t h o u g h  it will be shown that there are particular 4
problems associated with administrative decision-making, it has been argued that the A
administrative determination of what is a reasonable or beneficial use in respect o f water
a’!has certain advantages over determination of the same by a court as would occur, for is
example, under the US reasonable use doctrine. Notwithstanding that the criteria for 
estabhshing what a reasonable/beneficial use entails may be similar in respect o f both
*72 T he perennially 'wet' nature o f  Scotland may render such concerns as encouraging and pro tecting  
beneficial uses in society; as o f  less im portance than in m ore arid nations. Tlris issue is discussed in m ore 
detail at the end o f  this chapter. ?
*73 Save that an unrestricted right to take water for such uses may develop by prescription - see chapter 3.
*7* under article 4.
*73 Given the general surplus o f water resources in  Scotland, the focus o f  the regime is rather one wliich
seeks to prohibit unsustainable activities in respect o f  particular water bodies rather than the advancem ent /
o f  the m ost beneficial uses as such. Given slrifts over time in either increased water scarciy  a n d /o r  /
increased dem and for water, the regime’s emphasis could be sliifted to one m ore explicitly ensuring 
beneficial uses.
J
judicial and administrative determinations, the process is very different. While judicial 
determinations will take place in relation to disputes between parties which have already 
occurred, admiihstrative decisions are taken ex lege at the time of allocation o f the right. 
Leaving aside, for the moment, tlie issue of whether tliis lends itself to more informed 
decisions about beneficial uses, it should also be noted that the regulated system has tlie 
advantage over court-adjudicated, reasonable use reghnes in that the decision is taken 
prior to the (often heavy) financial investment attendant to water exploitation rather than 
leaving such activities shrouded in uncertainty and subject to possible litigation brought 
by competing users after investment has begun. Thus a regulatory based regime may 
provide tlie certainty which may encourage would-be abstractors to carry out potentially 
beneficial uses.’™
In terms of overall strategic approach, tlie proposed hcensing regime for Scotiand seems, 
at least if one takes a positivist view, to be on a sound footing. The River Basin 
Management approach, noted in chapter 6, which will underpin the regulatory regime in 
Scotiand, seeks to take an integrated approach gauging a range of water uses and water 
bodies and deterinining the relationsliips which subsist between them. This integrated 
approach is one which is neigh universally recognised at international level as an intrinsic 
feature of an optimum water allocation reghne.’™ This approach allows co-ordinated 
decisions to be taken wliich should provide integrated solutions to water pohcy 
questions.™'’
J.W. DeUapenna, supra n. 138 at pp 367-368.
'77 For a US example see the Regulated Riparian Model Water Code Q.W. DeUapenna ed., 1997) at 6R-2-01 to 
6R-2-08
*73 Such issues were discussed above under ‘efficiency’.
*79 See for example, L. Teclaff, ‘E volution o f the River Basin C oncept in National and Internationa] W ater 
Law’ (1996) 36 Nat. Resources J. 359.
***** For examples o f such international approaches see International Law Association, R eport o f die Fort}'- 
Seventh Conference 242 (1956) (Held in D obrovnik); R eport of the Fift)^-Second C onference Held at 
Helsinld, 1966, at 484, International Law Association (1966), reprinted in IT A , Helsinld Rules on  the uses 
o f  the waters o f  international rivers (1967.)
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In general it might be said that courts are not best placed to take technical decisions 
surrounding optimum water uses.™’ Following on from this, a feature of a regulatory 
regime aldn to the one instigated under WEWS, is diat a more strategic and hoHstic 
approach to determining reasonable/beneficial uses can be taken than would be the case 
with court determination of such issues. As has been noted
[ujnder traditional common law... [approaches], a .. .determination of whetlier a 
particular use is reasonable has always been essentially relational, focusing on the relative 
social utihty of the particular competing uses before the court. Wliile generalized 
[public] interests... could always theoretically be included in... the judicially weighing of 
one use against another, such inclusion rarely occurred except perhaps in the form of 
unarticulated intuitions. The administrative agency is, on the otirer hand, composed of 
experts who devote their professional life... to studying such questions. This 
knowledge,.. wül shape the weighing process in a manner which is at once more abstract 
and more responsive to the total reality surrounding the use of water drawn from a 
particular source.
Another factor that supports administrative decision-malting is that unlilte its judicial 
counterpart, an administrative agency is not hidebound by tlie strkmres of judicial 
precedent, which may limit the abihty of the judge to deviate from old, outmoded pohcy 
considerations.”’^ '^  Despite the merit in this view, the benefits of regulatory decision 
malting may at times be weakened in certain ways. For example, malting the correct 
pohcy choices for regulators is no easy task and tlie preceding chapter discussed some of 
the technical problems and associated costs involved in ensurhig that the most informed 
pohcy decisions are taken by SEP A in respect of water resources in Scotland. In this 
respect it needs to be remembered that given the hitherto lack of a national catchment-
*3* A n issue perhaps inirrored in commercial law, w here courts are no t keen to intervene in business 
matters.
*32 J. DeUapenna, supra n. 138 at p 368. M oreover, unHke regulatory regimes, in respect o f the developm ent 
o f  pohcy, a com m on law system often sliifts in a fragm ented and piecemeal fashion as it is reliant on 
parties bringing cases to tlie courts (and largely on parties' pleadings) for new principles to be developed.. 
A useful discussion o f  tliis phenom enon in tlie USA can be found in Morriss, Yandle and Anderson, supra 
n. 137 at pp 355-356.
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based system of water governance in Scotland™^ and associated attempts to taclde 
different water uses and their impacts ititer se in an integrated fashion, Scotiand’s starting 
point m this respect is perhaps behind many other Member States in hnplementing die 
terms of the European Water Directive.™'’ As noted in chapter 6, diis may be particularly 
true hi respect of groundwater where die quantity lying beneath land, cannot at the 
moment, be gauged with any real certahity hi Scodand. With such matters hi mind, one 
factor diat may be histrumental in assisting die determination of the best possible 
decisions for water allocation in Scotiand is die active participation of stakeholders. 
Before examhiing this issue, first die issue of how such ‘ownership’ of stakeholders may 
lead to more effective regulation and comphance is discussed.
Active Participation of Stakeholders
As whl be noted below, die issue of engendering the ownership of local stakeholders has 
been seen as essential to ensuring theh acceptance of die regime, which would thus aid 
comphance and hence promote beneficial uses. O f course in respect of comphance, 
SEP A will be empowered to, for example, force hcence conditions agahist non- 
comphant parties and take remedial action where necessary.™^ The enforcement o f rules 
can be costiy, however, and regulatory regimes tiiat are able to create incentives for 
comphance rather than merely ask hidividuals to behave against their fundamental 
(financial) hi teres ts are more hkely to be successful in an efficient sense.™'’ A way to
i82n A ltliough administrative agencies' decisions w ould need to be taken witliin the powers conferred upon 
tliem by statute.
*33 altliough some voluntary catchm ent planning schemes and a 'shadow River Basin M anagem ent Plan' 
have been pu t in place -see  S. Hendry, ‘Enabling T he Fram ework -  The W ater E nvironm ent A nd Water- 
Services (Scotland) A ct 2003’ [2003] 14 Water Law  16.
*3‘* As has been noted, England and Wales, for example, has for some time operated a licence based 
approach to water usage.
*33 Controlled Activities Regulations supra n. 131 at para 1.21.
*86 Meiners et al, ‘Burning Rivers, Com m on Law, and Institutional Choice for W ater Q ualip '’ hi The 
Common Law and the Environment R.E. M einers & A.P. Morriss eds (2000) at pp 69-83.
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foster an incentive for parties to conform is to ensure that the reghne is engendered by 
their ‘ownership’ of it.
The issue of participation in this respect is a fundamental one recognised at International 
level. In fact the European Water Directive itself calls for the active mvolvement of the 
pubhc in the implementation of regulatory reghnes pursuant to its pohcy aims.™  ^ Tliis 
need for active involvement and the engenderment of local ownersliip is also found in 
many international water frameworks. The Bonn recommendations, for example, 
prescribe tliat “water governance arrangements should monitor the performance of 
pubhc institutions... and invite civÜ society to play an active role in these processes”.
It was noted hi tlie previous chapter tliat the reghne brought in under WEWS is to be 
underpinned by extensive consultation processes and indeed die proposals for the 
hcensing arrangements to be brought in post-WEWS were subject to a fahiy lengdiy and 
rigorous consultation process. As far as on-going macro-level pohcy decisions relative to 
die reghne are concerned, die Scottish Executive is empowered to formulate new 
regulations rather than SEP A although die Minister whl be required to consult witii 
SEP A and other hiterested parties as he tiiinks appropriate.™’’ In this vein, the draft 
regulations promulgated by die Scottish Executive hi April 2004 are to be subject to 
consultation prior to enactment.™’’ As Ahen has suggested, however, “the need for 
‘active involvement’ of die pubhc in the hnplementation of die [European Water 
Directive] hiiphes somethhig more than shnple consultation and information
*37 article 14.
188 Water - Key to Sustainable Development : Recommendations for Action, International Conference on Freshwater, 
Bonn, D ec 2001, at action no. 12. Reference can also be m ade to Symposium Urgent Action Needed for 
Water Security : Stockholm Statement 2002, principle 1 available at
w w w .siw i.org/A ners/Steph/dow nloads2002_Stockholm _Statem en.pdf which states that "an ongoing 
dialogue between pohcy and decision makers and the users is o f  utm ost im portance".
***9 WEWS s 21(1).
provision” .”” In this sense a Water Forum has been set up comprised of interested 
parties, stakeholders and experts to help engender such active mvolvement and the River 
Basin District shall provide for a River Basm District Advisory Group to feed into the 
RBD management process.™^ It remains to be seen whether such initiatives whl address 
adequately the need for continued and active pubhc participation m Scotland.
This need for pubhc participation is not simply hnportant in engendering the ‘ownership’ 
of stakeholders in the new regime to ensure tlieh comphance and commitment thereto. 
As noted above, the active participation of stakeholders is also important in ensuring that 
pohcy decisions can be taken in the most informed way possible. To this end, a feature 
of most international models of water governance is an approach to water allocation 
underpinned by pohcles coordinated on the “lowest, most appropriate, administrative 
tier.”™^ In Scotland, decision malting regarding water uses whl be taken on a centrahsed 
level. There is to be only one river basin district as such, although it shah be based upon 
tlie environmental objectives of hidividual river basins. Furdiermore, hcences wih be 
issued pursuant to local conditions and needs.™'’ Whhe the shigle RBD may provide for 
consistency in approach across Scotland as a whole, this ‘one-size-fits-ah’ strategy may in 
practice be too far removed from local conditions for an optimum approach to water 
ahocation to be achieved, as recognised under international law. As the Scottish 
Executive has recognised “it is much easier to engage the interests of members of the 
pubhc and community groups in locahsed radier dian strategic issues”™^ and tiierefore 
decision malting organisations should be as local as possible witiiout compromising die
*91* T he Consultation period ended in 9*''July 2004.
*9* A. Allan, ‘A com parison between the water law reforms in South Africa an Scotland : Can a generic 
national water law m odel be developed from  these examples?’ (2003) 43 Natural Resources journal 419 at p 
484.
192 W EW S s 17(1).
*93 See for example the Bonn Recommendations supra n. 188; Stockholm Recommendations supra n. 188.
*9* Controlled Actimties Regulations, supra n. 131 at para 3,15.
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overarching strategic aims of the regime. International approaches to water governance 
recognise the fine balancing act that must be struck between the two aims of estabhshing 
a unified approach and taldng account of local conditions.™’’ The sub-river basin 
management programmes which whl be compulsory under WEWS may go some way to 
providing a bridge between local stakeholders and the centrahsed aUocation body. 
Whether Scotland can find the right balance in tliis regard remains to be seen.
Moreover, as noted by Hayek, for a system of property aUocation to operate effectively it 
must be predicated on aU sahent hiformation pertaining to the reghne. Thus decisions 
taken by a regulator such as SEP A in tlie quest for the holy grah o f ‘beneficiaF uses (or at 
least, for the time being, non-detrimental uses) must be based upon the widest range of 
relevant views possible. This is a problem generaUy hi that typicaUy such information is 
higlily dispersed.™^ This is particularly true of a regime as complex as one which seeks to 
engender equitable and efficient aUocation of water resources across a wide range of 
users. In tliis sense, Morriss, Yandle and Anderson suggest that
[j]ust determining tlie technical characteristics of water, biology, climatic conditions, and 
riparian use for one major body of water is a high-cost task.. .technical Imowledge is 
constantly changing, and major breakthroughs often occur in tlie heat of the task... 
coming up with an optimum solution becomes even more daunting when the planner 
has to identify and include tlie social dimensions of the problem.*9**
De-centraUsed decision malting is thus required to asshnUate tlie disperse strands of 
Imowledge that exist within a communit}^ which can be brought to bear on the problem. 
To this end, the participation of local stakeholders is an essential feature of such an 
optimum regime which would hope to taclde a pohcy area as complex as water resource
■9*' Scottish Executive Environm ent G roup, The Future of Scotland's Waters - Proposals for Legislation Feb  2002 
(Paper 2002/4) at para 1.25.
See, for example, principle 1 o f  the Stockholm Statement supra n. 188.
imanagement. As noted, Scotland’s attempts to foster such active participation may for 
the time being be Umited at best. It may be that further action must be taken by the •&
Scottish Executive and SEP A to ensure that such ineaningful local participation takes 
place.
Dispute resolution and the protection of beneficial uses 
Despite tlie lack of detail forthcomhig thus far in tliis regard, it is hlcely that under the ' 7
post-WEWS regime in Scotland, as is the case with allocation of rights, disputes arising 
Eom regulated abstractions will also (at least initially) be handled admimstratively
Ithrough SEPA. What this therefore entails, is effectively a transfer of function from the 
courts to administrative fora both in respect of the initial allocation of rights and also the 
determination of disputes.
I
It may seem sensible, in terms of efficiency, for administrative fora to resolve disputes
■Îarising from the regimes they operate. Problems in ensuring that dispute determination cj
is not tarnished by the political activities of certain stakeholders may arise, however. In 
particular a speciahsed adrninistrative body hke SEPA may be more susceptible to the 4
influence of groups of stakeholders than general courts because its specialised nature 
provides an efficiency incentive for lobbying efforts.””* Thus poUtical pressure exerted by 
particular stakeholders may be brought to bear over SEPA’s dispute resolution processes.
Such dispute resolution processes may, tiierefore, in practice favour the more powerful
istakeholders over other less influential groups. This notion stands in contrast to 4
dispute resolution in general courts where cases arismg hi specific legal areas (eg water
*97 F.A. Hayek, T h e  Use of Knowledge In Society’ 35 A m . Ec'oii. Rev. 519 (1945).
*93 A. Morriss, B. Yandle, T.L. supra n. 137 at p 339.
*99 FI. Bruff, ‘Specialized Courts In  Administrative Law’ (1991) 43 Admin. L . Rev. 329.
rights disputes) would represent a small fraction of the judge’s overall docket. It 
dierefore follows that stakeholders would be far less lilrely to invest resources in lobbying 
activities.™ It should be noted that industry sectors who whl feel the brunt of the post- 
WEWS regulations such the distiheries, farrning and energy sectors, have been thus far 
particularly vocal in promoting tlieir mterests in the consultations pre-WEWS.'^®  ^ They 
are likely to be simharly so vocal in respect of disputes relative to water allocation and 
use as the regime develops. The ability of SEPA to stand firm in the face of the lobbying 
of tirese interest groups may be paramount in ensuring that beneficial uses remain at the 
heart of the water regime for Scotland.™ It is worth noting tliat this undue influence by 
powerful stakeholders may in fact go beyond dispute resolution processes. There may be 
a danger that influential interest groups may in fact be able to exert ‘regulatory capture’ 
over various aspects of the post-WEWS reghne which may have the effect of 
ditnmishing the drive to embrace the most sustainable practices in favour of furthering 
their own interests.'^'’^
Summary
How therefore does the post-WEWS regime in Scotland measure up? In terms of 
legality, the issue of compliance with the ECHR seems hlcely not to be much of a hve 
issue except around the fringes of the regime, for example, in relation to SEPA’s positive 
obhgations and issues of withdrawal of support. Additionally, SEPA may have to tread 
carefully around the Issue of revocation or variation of hcences. In terms of imposition
7"" Morriss, Yandle &c A nderson, supra n. 137 at p 360.
201 W itness, for example, the protestations o f tlie Scottish Wliisky Industiy  n o ted  at 
http ://w w w .sepa.org .u lt/w eeldybrieting/2001/M ay/04052001.htm .
792 A n ancillary point that m ight be m ade here is tliat given that regulation powers will rem ain wtitli the 
Scottish Executive rather than SEPA, tlie possibilit)? o f  political expediencies taldng precedence over m ore 
environmentally sound policy may act to underm ine confidence in tlie regime - See A. Allen supra n, 191.
293 A  com parable example may be the regulatory capture o f  the US patents system by the legal profession - 
see for example, B. Kaliin, T h e  paradox o f private legislation : business, econom ic and pohtical effects o f 
patents on inform ation processes’ Is Software Patentability Necessary Conference (2002, E uropean  
Parliament) available at h ttp ://w vw .greens-cfa .o rg /pdf/docum ents/S oftw areP aten ting /T ex tK ah in .pdf.
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of the regime itself, as the analysis presented earlier in tliis chapter indicates, any 
challenge under the terms of the ECHR is at best a slim prospect.
The issues of efficiency and protecting beneficial uses can be dealt with together because 
diey are so inextricably linked. While free market economists might argue that these two 
aims are not incompatible and that market based approaches to water governance can 
give rise to both efficiencies and the most beneficial uses, it has been suggested in tliis 
chapter that as a pubhc good water cannot be left to the vagaries of the market and that 
regulatory measures are required to ensure that beneficial uses are protected. This 
position is one which has been enshrined in die domestic law (at least in so far as 
ownership is concerned) for centuries. It can be recaUed from chapter 3 that, reflecting 
its hfe-sustaining attributes, running waters in general have been treated as res cofnmmies at 
common law in Scotiand. Moreover, even if it is accepted that markets wih function at 
ah in the context of water, what may be economicahy efficient hi terms of die monetary 
value of an abstraction to would-be users on a local level, may not correlate with the 
most efficient use in a wider economic sense. Nor shah such local efficiencies 
necessarhy ensure equitable and sustainable uses on the wider national level. The 
Scottish Executive’s approach is correct therefore in keeping die spectre of regulation up 
its sleeve in respect, for example, of revolting or varyhig licences and limiting transfers of 
hcences in the name of protecting beneficial uses.
As has been identified in this chapter, efficiency may be bhghted by die regulatory costs 
in setting up and operating the new system, which hi general shah be borne by industry. 
The potential regulatory costs involved and the Scottish Executive’s estimations of hlcely 
monetary burdens with regard to different industiy sector’s comphance with the reghne 
have aheady been noted. Such costs are hkely to be significant. Given the hlcely unpact
of die reforms, die question that needs to be asked is do die benefits wliich might be 
reaped by the regime outweigh die costs? A factor that shall weigh heavÜy in any 
determination of such a cost-benefit analysis, wül be die extent that under the new 
regime, it is possible to identify beneficial uses of water and in particular, identify 
abstractions and impoundments that hold deleterious consequences for the environment. 
This is a key question for aU regulatory regimes and as noted in chapter 5 not one diat it 
always easüy resolved. The RBD management approach inherent m the new reghne is 
one underpinned by international law and practice and may help engender die integrated 
solutions to water governance problems diat are required. If the reghne in Scodand is to 
grapple effectively with these issues, it was noted tiiat die active participation of 
stakeholders may need to be furdier encouraged to assist in the cross-poUination of ideas 
between state and others in society and die directing of aU available Imowledge hi arriving 
at water allocation decisions.^”'’
On the other side of die coin, it has been noted that issues of clarity and certahity of 
rights to water brought about by the post-WEWS regime may bring theh own 
efficiencies. This is because clarity of property rights in effect renders them self- 
enforcing and hence may engender dispute avoidance and a saving of parties’ and the 
state’s costs in this regard.
Chmatic factors and gaps in the reghne
It was suggested at the beginnhig of this chapter that chmatic and ecological factors 
might influence a state’s choice of water regime. In dhs sense, aldiough hcensed-based 
regimes (broadly of the sort diat WEWS would institute) have been deemed more 
appropriate hi arid chmates where defiihtive state-made choices require to be taken with
A lthough the problem  o f  regulatory 'capture' in tills regard o f dispute resolution processes and o ther
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regard to competing uses of what is undeniably a scarce resource. While most Eastern 
US states^ '^^  have rejected the traditional absolute dotninium approach, diey have not, in 
the main, turned to hcence-based regimes. Rather such states have plumped for 
reasonable use or correlative rights regimes. Scotland is not an arid nation and it might 
be posited that, despite locahsed drought problems in a smattering of geograpliical areas, 
the general abundance of water might lead one to the conclusion that a comprehensive 
hcensing regime (with its attendant costs), predicated on state-made choices regarding 
water aUocation, is shnply not needed. In short, tiierefore, it could be argued tliat the 
post-WEWS regime is a hammer craclting a nut. Tliis, of course, is a symptom of the 
pan-European approach of the Directive in prescribing a harmonised approach to the 
ensuring of certain tnirhmum ecological and biological features of water resources across 
member states. The Directive presumes that the same general measures governhig 
abstractions and impoundments may be considered equaUy as appropriate in rain-soaked 
Scotland as, for example, in the arid chmes of southern Italy.
Scotland is more analogous to Eastern US states In the sense that although water 
resources are generaUy plentiful, it is argued that absolute rights to abstract should be 
curtaUed to prevent waste, inequity and locahsed envkonmental and drought problems. 
A move to a correlative rights or reasonable use reghne is clearly a less drastic step — hi 
terms of state regulation - than a hcensed-based system and one, hi which, at least the up­
front regulatory costs entaUed would be far lower for society and in particular, affected 
industry sectors. Conimon-law based reasonable use and correlative rights reghnes cany 
theh own problems, however. RecaUing the analysis in chapter 5, correlative rights 
regimes may entaU transactional costs of theh own in the sense that they may be bhghted 
by inter-abstractor disputes wlhch can proceed to protracted, expensive court
aspects o f  the post-MTEWS legiine was noted.
adjudication, or alternatively are characterised by acquiescence, where because o f the 
costs of htigation, die legal rights of less empowered parties are largely ignored dius de 
facto unenforceable. Reasonable use doctrines do not protect secondary users in times 
of scarcity and may be limiting in that interpretations of what is ‘reasonable’ have 
normally been confined to uses upon overlying land.^'”’ Furthermore, the lack of certainty 
inherent in such rights may proliibit what may be cosdy (but nonetheless value-laden) 
investment in water exploitation and limit the trading of water rights.
In any case, the terms of die Water Framework Directive in essence call for the 
estabhshment of a licence-based regime to control abstractions and impoundments 
where this is necessary in order to achieve ‘good’ status and thus policymakers in 
Scodand are yoked to such an approach. Despite concerns about the imposition of a 
hcence-based system, the key issue about the post-WEWS regime in Scodand m diis 
regard is that fuU hcences wih only be required in a rninority of cases, where after a risk 
assessment, conditions are hnposed upon abstractors to avoid environmental harm. The 
Scottish Executive has noted diat for the majority of abstractions and impoundments, 
full hcences whl not be required and thus nhiiimum regulatory controls and associated 
costs whl face the buhc of abstractors.™ The current common law provisions whl 
continue to apply in die majority of cases. Whhe this may be seen as appropriate in not 
over-regulating, it may be seen as an opportunity missed, hi that traditional common law 
approaches, particularly in relation to groundwater may not be the most appropriate in 
any circumstances.
295 w ith the notable exception o f  Texas 
29:' A ltliough with a de novo regime, different interpretations o f 'reasonable uses' could be determined.
297 Controlled Activities Regulations, supra si. 131 at paras 1.7 - 1.11.
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The post-WEWS regime is clearly at an embryonic stage of its development and how 
SEPA and the Scottish Executive whl tackle the concerns identified in this chapter will 
begin to be seen as tlie Hcensing system enters its adolescence. The fact aUuded to 
above, that the hcence regime whl only be apphcable in certain cases does leave open tlie 
largely unanswered question, first noted in chapter 6, of die hiteraction between hcensed 
and unhcensed activities and in particular what legal remedies might result when a 
hcensed abstraction, hnpinges upon the common rights of un-regulated users. Such 
uncertainties inevitably give rise to efficiency concerns. Moreover, other aspects o f water 
governance are not clarified by the reghne. As noted above, the issue of subsidence in 
respect of die abstraction of groundwater is not taclded by the reghne and tiiese 
ambiguities again may be counter-productive in ensuring that die hcensing framework 
can achieve its goals. In diis sense tiierefore, this pohcy gap represents an opportunity 
missed.™
293 A nd as discussed above, the hum an rights issues engendered by tliis issue may lead to challenges against 
the regulator.
PART IV: CHAPTER 8 : CONCLUSION
above or beneath the lands of otliers by activities carried out on one’s own land. The law 
and underlying pohcy m one area can tiierefore usefully inform that in aiiotlier.
4
This tliesis has attempted to draw together in one place a discussion of the law relative to
various different sorts of migratory things which may be present upon or beneath land.
In the same way in which the various common cords that underpin judicial and
.regulatory approaches relative to different migratory things have been brought together 
in this work, this final chapter seeks to draw together the strands of the analysis 
presented herem.
4
To tliis end, tliis work has sought to compare and contrast the variant legal approaches 
and tlie pohcy arguments which underpm them, in relation to different Idiids of
migratory things in a new, ‘joined-up’ way. Tliis is not to say that on occasion the law
from one area has not already permeated the other and aided its development, prhuarily
through judicial pronouncements (as noted, perhaps not always m a justifiable way).
.GeneraUy however, the law in each area has developed somewhat in a compartmentahsed 
sense and issues of property and rights of use in migratory things have not generaUy 
developed in an integrated, unifying way. It is not suggested that there should be one, 
aU-embracmg theory relative to migratory things in general - their respective nature and 
characteristics clearly vary widely. As noted in part 1 of this thesis, however, different 
migratory things share a nrunber of characteristics, includhig: a monetary value to private 
landowners; varying degrees of wider social utihty; physical difficultj? in exerting control
over die resource untU reduced into possession; and the abihty to be appropriated from
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While the opening chapters for the first time set out a substantial comparative analysis 
relating to different migratory things across Scotland and England, this part of the thesis 
also revealed important insights into the general problems that a legal system may 
encounter in respect of aUocatmg propert;^ rights to migratory things. The legal 
arguments inherent in the case law expose bodi the fragiht}'^  of trite, general legal 
concepts and brocards and also the overlap and inconsistencies between different legal 
prmciples and grounds of action. To some extent, given theh ambient nature, migratory 
things can truly be said to be a square peg in a round hole and, in this sense, present 
challenges to existing tenets of land-law.
Moreover, it was argued that the issue of private ownership in such tilings is largely a red 
herring.’ For example, operation of a law of capture (which may imply botli physical 
capture of tlie resource and legal capture of ownership) serves to largely render the 
question as to whetlier migratory things are owned in situ superfluous. Where legal 
capture has taken place, this provides a real challenge to general, recognised 
characteristics of ownersliip — particularly tlie idea that an owner is protected against 
appropriation of his property by otliers without his consent. A law of (legal) capture 
chcumvents this notion by holding that where legitimate activities of one serve to draw 
the thing away from the land of another (which, by vhtue of the maxim, a coelo ad cetitrutn, 
may be owned in situ) tlien this physical capture is followed by legal capture and thus die 
title of the original owner is lost. To some extent such a view can be rationahsed, at least 
under Enghsh law, by die fact that the concept of ownersliip is a somewhat weak one. 
There are remarkably few remedies based upon ownership under English common law, 
indeed m the main, remedies stem from possession. Since migratory tlimgs (even those 
that are owned in situ) have never been possessed, tiieii it may be difficult for an
Except perhaps in relation to hum an rights concerns.
26]
and instead actions tend to be sought on other grounds such as support or tort.
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aggrieved proprietor to raise an action based upon such remedies. Moreover, given that 
ownersliip is not an absolute notion under Enghsh law but rather a relative concept, at 
tlie end of the analysis, the relevant question maybe simply be concerned with who has 
the better title. If the legitimate exploitation of one’s own land has resulted hi tlie 
capture of the property from another, then from a practical perspective and in pursuance
of legitimate pohcy ahiis, a court may favour the capturer. In fact hi relation to most 
Enghsh and Commonwealdi jurisprudence in this regard, property rights barely feature
Whereby an approach supporting legal capture may be doctrhiaUy sustahiable under 
Enghsh law, it is hard to see how it might fit in with the authorities on the Scots law of 
properpq which recognise ownersliip as an absolute concept and provide remedies based 
upon ownership. As noted hi this thesis, while the doctrine of occupatio bestows 
ownership of ownerless items upon die first party to reduce them into possession, this 
concept would not sanction, by appropriation, ownership of items which in fact aheady
!■belong to another at the thiie of then capture. Scots law approaches to these questions 
have rarely been tested in practice. The bulk of (rare) Scottish cases have related to the 
capture of water, which in general, has been held as res mdlius. This doctrinal conundrum 
has not therefore required to be overcome.
In general, questions relative to rights to exploit and restrictions placed upon such rights 
have historically been more important dian ownership as such. A number of different 
policy markers underpin the disparate legal approaches that courts have taken in respect 
of such questions from time to time. The pohcy indicators underpinning these different 
approaches have aheady been noted in this diesis and include; encouraging economic 
investment and industrial development; providhig low transactional costs; providing for
certainty of rights to exploit; recognising the correlative rights of otliers; conserving the 
resource; limiting environmental damage; and adhering to existing precedent. These can 
be distilled into three broad pohcy factors, namely; legahty; efficiency and the 
encouragement and protection of beneficial uses.
As noted in chapter 5 (Part II) of this diesis, the pohcy markers underphining early 
court’s determinadons of the law relative to propert}^ and rights of use in respect of 
migratory things were dominated by the desire to encourage die legitimate exploitation of 
these valuable resources and the avoidance of transactional costs which might act as a 
barrier to such activities. The potential value to private users and an emerghig industrial 
society in general of the exploitation of migratory things was not lost on early judicial 
decision makers; nor was die ‘occult’ nature of such migratory thhigs as groundwater, 
nor die transactional costs involved in deteriiiining hlcely impacts of different uses upon 
activities of others. It is of htde surprise therefore that courts m die main plumped for 
simple property rules of first possession and untrammelled rights of use. Only where the 
resource could be more easily identified and impacts predicted (eg water in defined 
channels) was a reghne imposed that countenanced the correlative rights of others. More 
importandy, largely absent from early court determinations regarding property and rights 
of use was any reahsation of die wider social hnpacts of different uses of migratory 
things — at least beyond die tacit recognition that industrial and legitimate exploitation of 
resources would benefit society as a whole.
In relation to migratory things in the UK, therefore, it can be recalled that, as part of a 
basic pro-development agenda, ‘legitimate’ uses have generally overcome die correlative 
rights of odiers hi society. Such pro-use approaches are somewhat myopic, however. In 
view of inefficiencies and inequit}  ^ stemming from traditional absolute dominium
26:
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approaches, new rules designed to address tlrese concerns began to develop in relation to 
die issue of rights to exploit migratory tilings, such as prior appropriation, reasonable use
I
■3
Chapter 5 analysed US approaches to exploitation o f  groundw ater in this regard.
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and correlative rights doctrines/ The debate over private law rights in migratory things 
has exercised the minds of courts historically. Particularly in respect of things subject to 
wider societal concerns regarding exploitation (such as water), the debate regarding 
allocation of rights is now mirrored in the public law sphere and where tiie courts once 
arbitrated this question, of late they have been increasingly supplanted by policy makers 
and regulators.
The policy goals of a regime allocating rights in migratory things as identified above are
■-not entirely compatible. Clearly a key question concerns how a legal system determines
the correct approach. In particular, how a legal regime balances out tire underlying policy 
,rationale of different property and allocation choices is an important task. From the 
.analysis presented in this work, the factors which may influence what particular policy is 
chosen include; the value of the thing (either in a private, monetary sense or wider social 
utility sense); the physical ability to exert control over the substance until reduced into 
possession; the extent that its presence (and extent of its presence) is Imowable in sitti\ 
similarly tiie degree to which knowledge exists as to the impact — either in terms of
efficiency or some other social utihty repercussion — that particular uses might have; and 
how abundant or scarce the resource is. Given the multiplicity of factors that might 
require to be weighed up in respect of any policy determination, it is not surprising that 
courts, at various times in history, with varying levels of technological knowledge, and in 1
respect of different migratory tilings, have taken disparate views. In many contexts, 
regulatory regimes are now faced with tiie challenges of balancing up such competing 
needs. As argued in the context of Scottish water law reform, specialised regulatory
agencies may be better equipped to grasp the mantle of tliese problematic issues. 
Increasing technological Imowledge and greater awareness of tlie impacts of different 
sorts of exploitation may assist in making better decisions about the allocation o f rights
 ^ In  the U K  propeip ’ and rights to exploit hydrocarbons have been nahonalised, although as noted, 
concerns may still exist in respect o f  gaps m die regime. Issues relative to wild arhmals are primarily 
covered now  by statutory gaming legislation.
265
in migratory things.
.It is hoped that the arguments presented in this thesis may be of use to those involved in
the formulation of policy in respect of what are currently 'Eve' issues within categories of
migratory things. In tliis sense, the relevant area of policy in Scotland relates to the
allocation and use of water.  ^ Reforms set out in WEWS and its pursuant regulations will 
. .radically shake up existing approaches to water governance and in particular, the right to 
.abstract and impound water. In formulating relevant policy, policymakers should pay
regard not only to the comparative approaches to water allocation questions incumbent
in other jurisdictions (also analysed in tliis thesis) but also the policy arguments which
have underpinned determinations (by both courts and legislators) of the law in relation to
different migratory tilings from time to time. For example, the rationale behind the
unitisation measures taken in respect of the need to conserve od and gas in botli die US
and tlie UK offshore regime, is similar to that underpinning needs to conserve water.
.The US hydrocarbon experience is another illustration of a shift of aEocation o f private 
rights in migrator)^ things and determination of disputes thereto, away from the courts to 
regulators. This move occurred largely with a view to more effectively avoiding waste, 
inefficiency and decimation of scarce resources and providing for a faker distribution 
between competing users.
J
.y■;In the analysis presented in earher chapters, tlie various policy rationales underpinning 
different choices in respect of allocating rights in migratory tilings were identified and
A nd die many problem s discussed in chapter 6 regarding effective operation o f regulatory regimes.
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distilled into three considerations, namely efficiency, protecting beneficial uses and 
legality. At one level or another, courts have always been intrinsically concerned witli 
striking an appropriate balance between the first two of these and current attempts by 
policy makers in respect of water use in Scotland is no different. This issue is clouded by 
different perceptions of what efficiency denotes and in particular the schism that subsists 
between economic efficiency in respect of private users and wider notions of efficiency 
for society as a whole, which might encompass a reduction in waste, conservation and 
allocation of the resource to the most beneficial uses in society. One of the key debates 
elaborated in chapter 6, pertained to the question of the extent that the free market could 
generate such efficiencies -  both in a narrow or wider sense — or whether by contrast 
regulatory intervention was needed, particularly in respect of protecting wider, societal 
interests. On tlie balance of arguments presented in tliis thesis, this writer’s stated view 
is that, notwithstanding the administrative costs brought about by regulatory regimes, 
water, as a key public good, cannot be left to the vagaries of the market. In any case, it 
was argued tliat markets may function badly in this context, due to a number of stated 
practical difficulties.
4 i
The third criteria, legality, is one reflected in other jurisdictions. The state talcing or
infringement of existing private rights in migratory tilings in pursuit of the above policy 
.aims raises interesting questions about the interaction between public law regulation and 
the private rights of landowners and otlier water users. As noted from US water 
governance experience, the imposition of a new regime must be legal in terms of a state’s 
constitutional requirements and tliis debate was reflected on hi the sense of similar
human rights concerns over the establishment of the post-WEWS regulatory framework 
in Scotland. Tliis is a somewhat complex question and, given a lack of direct authority/ in 
tliis regard and the embryonic nature of the development of human rights law in 
Scotland under tlie Human Rights Act 1998, the relevant analysis presented in this thesis 
is somewhat speculative. The human rights concerns identified in chapter 6 may give 
rise in the future to disputes as tlie WEWS regime develops and it wiU be interesting to 
see if the views set out here in tliis regard provide a viable platform for determination of 
such matters.
With regard to water use and allocation in Scotland, as the new licence-based regime is 
developed and becomes operational and perhaps trends in water use alter and/or climatic 
changes take place, studies will doubtless be undertaken on the appropriateness of the 
scheme in meeting the aims of the water directive and/or whether tlie directive’s aims 
themselves requite to be re-cast. In this sense, an important issue noted in this study is 
the potential inappropriateness of a generic model of water governance applicable to 
different nations imbued with varying climatic/water scarcity conditions. This issue is 
one that can be applied to all migratory things in wliich variations in societal needs and 
quantities and natural distribution of the resource may require regimes to take diverse 
approaches to balance up competing policy choices in different ways.
Additionally, any generic model should clearly be flexible enough so that it can be 
tailored to particular needs. With regard to the post-WEWS regime, the Scottish 
Executive would not wish it to be too heavily encumbered by costs and a d m in istrative, 
burdens, which might stifle necessary water exploitation. Equally any relaxed regime
26 7
imposed^ must be one tliat is flexible so that it can be adapted quicldy to meet changing 
requirements, perhaps calling for more stringent controls on private exploitation, witliout 
facing insurmountable political or legal hurdles/
The policy debate over water rights and allocation reform in Scotland mirrors tliat which 
has taken place in other jurisdictions. This debate also reflects that which has exercised 
judicial minds in the UK over the past few centuries in respect of questions such as the 
aEocation of private rights to resource users, the protection of correlative private rights 
of others and limitations upon exploitation in tlie name of wider societal needs in various 
different contexts from wEd animals to oE and gas exploitation. The contentious issues 
arising in this debate are Ekely to be raised again in tlie future both in the courtroom and
by poEcy-makers. As this study Eidicates and the Scottish water reform case study 
exempEfies, the poEcy questions are many, the solutions varied and final determination a 
difficult, complex process.
 ^ As the W EW S reforms may be in the sense that it is anticipated full licences wiU only be required in a 
iTUnoritjr o f  cases.
The example o f Ume-linEted licences was discussed earher in tire thesis. A scheme w hich bestows 
indefinite, Hcensing rights upon  parties may face bo th  political pressure and legal challenges if  it were to 
attem pt to curtail these rights a t a later date.
'
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